General/Background 4

Trump’s Plan for a Substantial Increase in Military Spending 5

Answers to Common Defensive Arguments 8

Answers to: The US Outspends the World’s Military 9

Counterterrorism Bad Answers 14

Scenario/Disadvantage Answers 19

Allied Alienation/Backlash Answers/ 20

Africa Presence Bad Answers 23

Agamben/Bare Life Answers 29

Alliances Bad/Bases Bad Answers 31

Allied Economic Development Good/Allied Development Stops Civil Wars 35

Arms Race Answers 36

Burdensharing Good Answers 38

Cooperation With Other Countries Better/Multilateralism Better Answers 41

Colonialism/Imperialism Answers 44

Counterbalancing Answers 57

Deficits Answers 60

Deterrence Wrong Answers 62

Diplomacy Better/Military Spending Trades-Off with Diplomacy Answers 64

Drones Bad Answers 85

End Strength Increase Bad/Light Footprint Good Answers 89

Foreign Military Aid Bad Answers 90

Free Riding Answers 91

Gender Violence Answers 98

A2: Intervention Bad/Genocide 99

Hegemony Bad Answers 107

Human Rights Framework Answers 116

Imperialism/Military Intervention Answers 124

“Intervention” Bad Answers 126

Job Reductions Answers 128

Middle East Presence Bad Answers 130

Military Industrial Complex Bad Answers 139

Military Isn’t Evil 145

Military Intervention Worsens Conflicts Answers 148

Military Prostitution Answers 156

Military Sexual Assault Answers 160

Missile Defense Bad Answers 163

Nuclear Modernization/Expansion Bad Answers 175

Public Infrastructure Trade-Off Answers 192

Pan Kritik Answers 193

Social Spending Trade-Off Answers 196

Russia Encirclement Bad/Arms Race with Russia Bad Answers 204

Sanctions Good Answers 213

South China Sea Build-up/Arms Race Bad Answers 215

“Wait and See” Better 220

Waste/Military Waste/Inefficiency Answers 222

Withdrawal Doesn’t Produce Peace/Reduces Conflict 225

Answers to Common Defensive Arguments 226

Answers to: Defense Spending Doesn’t Need to Be Higher than the Cold War 227

Answers to: Democratic Peace 228

Answers to: Peacekeeping Solves 229

Answers to: Nuclear Deterrence Means No War 230

Answers to: Globalization Stops War 231

Answers to: We Already Spend a Lot 234

Answers to: We Spend 10X What China Does 235

Extensions 240

Russia Threat 241

General Deterrence/Hegemony 242

Answers to: Our Military is Big Enough 249

Maintenance Costs Pro 250

Offshore Balancing Answers 253

soft power – wrong 262

xt wrong 263

# General/Background

### Trump’s Plan for a Substantial Increase in Military Spending

Jeff **Daniels, November 17,** 2016, Trump’s defense spending could spur private sector job creation, http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/17/trump-defense-spending-could-spur-private-sector-job-creation.html

Here are five major things we know now and how it could potentially impact different defense-related companies:

**More ships:** Trump's Navy plan calls for 350 surface ships and submarines, up from 276 today and above the Pentagon's current target of 308 ships over the next 10 years.

"Clearly shipbuilding is one sector that will benefit," said Cowen's Schweizer, a former acquisition professional with the Navy's Littoral Combat Ship program.

The analyst said the companies with the biggest potential exposure to Trump's planned ship build-up are major defense contractor [General Dynamics](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/GD" \t "_blank), shipbuilder [Huntington Ingalls](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/HII" \t "_blank) and [BWX Technologies](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/BWXT" \t "_blank), a maker of nuclear reactors for aircraft carriers and submarines.

An acceleration of Navy shipbuilding also could result in tens of thousands of new private-sector jobs created in shipyards on both coasts. It's unclear how many of the new submarines would be created, but the Navy's current submarine fleet stands at just over 50 and had been projected to fall to 41 boats in 2029, according to the Congressional Research Service.

As for carriers, the Navy has 10 in service and the $13 billion USS Gerald Ford will soon joining the others. "We believe the U.S. should have 13 carriers to meet our security obligations," said Tom Spoehr, a retired Army lieutenant general and director of the Heritage Foundation's Center for National Defense.

**More aircraft:** Trump's Air Force would consist of at least 1,200 fighters, up from the present 1,113. Trump pointed out the average age of the current Air Force fleet is around 27 years and includes B-52 bombers, which were introduced in the 1950s.

All indications are the B-21 long-range strike bomber that went to [Northrop Grumman](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/NOC" \t "_blank) is safe. The Air Force lifted its stop-work order on the $80 billion stealth bomber in February after the government denied a protest from [Boeing](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/BA" \t "_blank).

[Lockheed Martin's](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/LMT" \t "_blank) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a fifth-generation fighter program costing nearly $400 billion, is the most advanced aircraft in the U.S. military. Yet Trump hasn't always been a big fan of the program. Last year, he criticized the F-35 as "not very good."

Lockheed has been having meetings with Trump's transition team to discuss the F-35 and head off any attempts to downsize the program. Other partners on the F-35 program are Northrop and [BAE Systems](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/BA.-GB" \t "_blank).

"If you pull the plug on that (F-35 program) it's going to be 15 years before we have something else to put in its place," said David Ochmanek, senior defense research analyst at the RAND think tank and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense in two presidential administrations. "That would be a seismic thing to disrupt."

**More troops:** Trump's Army would consist of around 540,000 active-duty troops, a figure he indicated the Army's chief of staff has sought. "We now have only 31 brigade combat teams, or 490,000 troops, and only one-third of combat teams are considered combat-ready," Trump said in September.

The Marine Corps also would be expanded under the Trump plan, going from 23 battalions today to 36, or around 10,000 more Marines. That's a figure the billionaire said the Heritage Foundation indicated was the minimum number needed to comfortably "deal with major contingencies."

"The funding increases would pay for soldiers and not equipment, and would therefore be of minor benefit to hardware manufacturers," said Credit Suisse analyst Robert Spingarn.

Still, the analyst believes there's some upside for larger munitions firms such as General Dynamics and [Orbital ATK](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/OA%27WI" \t "_blank), as well as for missile companies such as Lockheed, [Raytheon](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/RTN" \t "_blank) and Boeing.

Trump also pledged in his Philadelphia address that he would "seek to develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system" and modernize the Navy's cruisers with ballistic missile defense capability. He charged that under the previous two Democratic presidents the nation's "ballistic missile defense capability has been degraded."

**Cyberwarfare:** There's also a pressing need to "invest heavily in offensive cyber capabilities to disrupt our enemies, including terrorists," according to Trump.

The president-elect wants to make new investments in the cyber area that will both modernize the military's capabilities as well as lead to new job creation in the private sector. This could help IT and cyber-related government service companies such as [Booz Allen Hamilton](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/BAH" \t "_blank), [ManTech](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/MANT" \t "_blank) and [Science Applications International](http://data.cnbc.com/quotes/SAIC" \t "_blank).

Trump also indicated that one of his first directives after taking office will be to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some other departments to conduct reviews of cyberdefense capabilities for the purpose of identifying all vulnerabilities.

**Burden sharing:** Another defense issue Trump has addressed several times is the desire to have allies share more of the financial burden for security rather than American taxpayers. The U.S. has various treaties such as NATO and arrangements with Asian countries that provide for help against possible aggression.

Yet some believe the current arrangement of helping with weapons sales may actually reward the U.S. with economies of scale. Raytheon is considered one of the most exposed major defense contractors in terms of international military business.

"These same agreements allow for sales of major weapons systems which lowers the average cost to the U.S. military," said Howard Rubel, a defense industry analyst at Jefferies. "Based on current rhetoric, the new administration does not understand this subtle benefit, nor the benefit of interoperable weapons from radios to warplanes."

## Answers to Common Defensive Arguments

### Answers to: The US Outspends the World’s Military

#### Yes, but we need to increase the size of the navy to solve the specific impacts we read. They don’t have any evidence that a general lead can solve these specific impacts and we have evidence the navy can

#### US lead is collapsing.

**Zalmay Khalilzad, 2017 a former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense, was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 2017,** National Interest, January-February, America Needs a Bipartisan Foreign Policy. Donald Trump Can Make it Happen. http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/america-needs-bipartisan-foreign-policy-donald-trump-can-18820

A discussion of a new foreign policy must take into account the relative U.S. power position. **While the United States remains the world’s strongest power, with unmatched capabilities in the military, economic, technological and intellectual domains, *its advantage over others has eroded****.* The U.S. share of global GDP declined to 20 percent, as fast-growing economies claimed greater shares and U.S. growth lagged. U.S. national debt reached levels, as a percentage of GDP, not seen since immediately after World War II, when debt had funded the war effort. Annual deficits continued to run at $600 billion, and the growth of spending on entitlement programs is escalating. Meanwhile, **budget deals had gutted military spending: force-structure cuts were scheduled to reduce the army to its smallest size since the interwar years. Currently, readiness is at its lowest in decades, and modernization programs are constrained, even as the threat from abroad increases.**

#### Relative strength doesn’t matter. The US can’t execute a defeat terrorism or deter the Russians now

Dr. Dan **Gould, December 21**, 2016, *Dr. Dan Goure is a Vice President of the Lexington Institute. He served in the Pentagon during the George H.W. Administration and has taught at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities and the National War College, Trump Defense Priorities Right on the Money, http://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/the-buzz/trump-defense-priorities-right-the-money-18813*

Close behind **defeating ISIL must be the priority of rebuilding a military that has been savaged by years of budget cuts, an excessively high operational tempo** and policies emanating from the White House that limited their operational and tactical flexibility. T**he outgoing Secretary of Defense has repeatedly stated that this country is in serious danger of losing its military technical edge over adversaries big and small as a result of inadequate modernization budgets. The U.S. Air Force and Navy are smaller than at any time since before the start of World War II. The U.S. military today is incapable of executing the Defense Strategy. The** Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified before Congress that his service currently is capable of addressing only a single regional contingency, not the required two. **The Chief of Staff of the Army reported that only 13 of his brigade combat teams are fully ready for war.**The Army has so little money for modernization that it can only afford to upgrade the lethality of its Stryker Brigades at a rate of one every three years. The truth is that **this country and its major allies are not ready to go eyeball-to-eyeball with Russia.** After the Cold War, Europe declared itself to be a zone of peace. Everyone disarmed as fast as they could. **The United States, which once had some 300,000 military personnel deployed in Europe**, including two full Army Corps, **now has to rely on a couple of forward deployed brigades and a single rotational armored brigade**. Most NATO countries do not spend the required two percent of GDP on defense; Germany is one of the worst at barely one percent. NATO has decided to put four battalions into Eastern Europe, about 3,000 men. **There they will face 100,000 or more Russian troops who can operate under a high-tech air defense umbrella with superior artillery, missiles and electronic warfare systems. *The U.S. military must be rebuilt if it is going to be able to deter or, if necessary, fight Russia.*** Is there anyone, even a diehard Democrat, that won’t get behind the idea of building a comprehensive cyber strategy for the U.S. government?  Unfortunately, that is only a partial answer to the problem. Even if such a strategy can be created, what should be done about state and local government networks and, most important, the great bulk of critical infrastructure which resides in private hands? More important, the government needs policies and authorities that will allow it to respond effectively and rapidly to cyber attacks. It is not enough for the U.S. President to tell Vladimir Putin to “cut it out.” Cyber defense will never be good enough to prevent persistent, state-based entities from trying to get into critical public and private networks. Cyber deterrence must rest on the demonstrated capability to cause a would-be hacker more pain than the gain is worth. By the way, how much pain does Russia deserve for outing John Podesta or Donna Brazile?

#### Strengthening US military capabilities critical effective diplomacy that will stop Russian aggression and accidental conflict escalation

**Allison & Simes, 2017,** January-February, National Interest, A Blueprint for Trump to fix relations with Russia, Januaryhttp://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/blueprint-donald-trump-fix-relations-russia-18776?page=**show** Graham T. Allison is director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans. He is the author of the forthcoming book**[Destined for War: America, China and Thucydides’s Trap](http://amzn.to/2hFd8fc" \t "_blank)**.Dimitri K. Simes, publisher and CEO of the**National Interest**, is president of the Center for the National Interest.

**A genuinely different approach toward the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts should incorporate *credible strength and creative diplomac*y to produce outcomes favorable to the U**nited **S**tates. To demonstrate its strength, America should use military deployments and private warnings (so as to avoid publicly cornering Putin) to communicate to Moscow that unilateral solutions will not work in either Syria or Ukraine. **The key is to show that the United States and its allies will be able to provide enough support to the rebels in Syria and to the government in Kiev to make sure that both conflicts are unsolvable on Moscow’s terms without prohibitive costs to Russia**. This also means showing that whoever the United States chooses to support will gain strength over time, which encourages serious negotiations sooner rather than later. Sixth, **you should strengthen U.S. military capabilities in ways that simultaneously dissuade Russia from aggression (both overt and covert) against NATO allies in Europe and respect Russia’s legitimate interest in ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet Union. It is almost impossible for the United States to have too big a stick**. But **by far the most likely paths to military conflict with Russia begin not with a premeditated Russian attack, but with an unintended event, for example, an incident between nationals and ethnic Russians in one of the Baltics that creates a crisis in which Putin concludes he must intervene.** NATO is the greatest alliance in history and played an essential role in America’s Cold War victory. But today, it stands in need of substantial reform. Europe is presently itself in crisis. The failure of the EU economies to grow since the Great Recession, Brexit, uncertainties about who may be Nexit, an unending stream of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, and an inability to control its own borders—all these raise fundamental questions about the viability of the European project. Given these challenges, the United States should not allow itself to become a lightning rod—or scapegoat. Thus we urge you to reiterate America’s commitment to NATO, including Article Five security guarantees, at the outset. But Washington should also propose that NATO members undertake a zero-based reassessment of the alliance. In his inaugural address, JFK urged Americans not to ask what their government could do for them but to “ask what you can do for your country.” European leaders should ask less what America can do for them and more what they can do for European security. ***Your effort will be aided by an overall increase in U.S. military capabilities***, **much as President Ronald Reagan’s *diplomatic outreach* to the Soviet Union benefited from a perception in Moscow that the United States was changing the balance of power in its favor after a period of decline**. **This is especially important at a time when Russia’s defense production is poised to grow by 10 percent this year, *despite economic pressure***. Combining investment in U.S. capabilities with calculated use of your reputation for unpredictability could be particularly useful, much as Nixon cultivated the image of a “madman” to enhance his leverage in Southeast Asia. An early demonstration of your resolve might also be necessary—when suitable circumstances arise—to change Russian perceptions of the costs of ignoring U.S. preferences. At the same time, we urge you to follow through on your campaign pledge to persuade Europe to contribute more to the alliance. Since European NATO members are the principal beneficiaries of the security guarantee, and they collectively exceed the United States in population and rival it in gross domestic product, they should pay a significantly larger share of the costs. We should put an end to the illusion that, as the Financial Times [put it](https://www.ft.com/content/6dd583cc-acd2-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122" \t "_blank), “the U.S. commitment to defend even the newest and smallest NATO members must remain unconditional.” Like all alliances, NATO is valuable to the extent that it advances and defends other American national interests—it is an instrument, not the icon that some in Europe (and particularly Central Europe) would understandably like it to be. Accordingly, the United States should reiterate its commitment to defend the Baltic states from naked aggression, in concert with other allies, but insist that the Baltic governments themselves attempt to normalize relations with Moscow and meet the highest international standards in ensuring the rights of ethnic Russians. The goal must be to prevent incidents that could provide a temptation—or excuse—for Russian intervention. There should be no illusions that America accepts responsibility for allies who provoke conflict and then request assistance and reassurance to deal with the consequences.

### Counterterrorism Bad Answers

#### No link – we aren’t defending an increase in counterterrorism – we are defending an increase in military deployments to the Asia Pacific

#### Non-unique – we have a large military budget now -- $615 billion. This is used in counterterrorism, causing all of the impacts that they identify. They don’t have any impact to the specific increment of the spending increase on counterterrorism but we are showing the value of the specific increase in Asian security deployments

#### Turn – we need more funding to improve our counterterrorism so it is not focused on the problems they identify

Jordan & Kosal, Winter 2017, Jenna Jordan is Assistant Professor, Margaret E. Kosal is Associate Professor, and Lawrence Rubin is Associate Professor, all in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, Winter 2017, Washington Quarterly, The Strategic Illogic of Counterterrorism Policy, <https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Winter2017_Jordan-Kosal-Rubin.pdf>

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the illogic of current U.S. counterterrorism policies and the environment that makes kinetic action the default strategy; to be more successful**, the Trump administration should take steps toward recalibrating U.S. policy**. This paper has argued that three main factors have made kinetic activity the default option. First, there is no clear, substantive definition of what constitutes a counterterrorism success or failure. Second, public opinion and institutional politics demand policies that require immediate, visible results, subsequently discouraging policies that require long-term investment. Third is the lack of a viable deterrence policy. These factors have made kinetic action a strategy instead of a tactic and have hindered meaningful discussion about the prioritization of U.S. national security threats and an understanding of the threat that IS poses in comparison to other national security threats, severely limiting the United States’ ability to employ further-reaching, longer-term policies. The problem with an overreliance on kinetic activity is that it has the potential to undermine the larger counterterror effort and often does not result in degrading terrorist organizations, even if it aligns both with public opinion and current institutional capacities. **The United States needs an alternative to counterterrorism policies that rely primarily and overwhelmingly on kinetic responses**— too much of the conversation in the United States is framed in terms of “boots on-the-ground.” To cite retired General Stanley McChrystal, at the time ISAF Commander, “new resources are not the crux … Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent troops; our objective must be the population.” 30 Yet, the military option is often the “go-to” in developing a response to an extremely complicated problem that requires a multifaceted strategy. When faced with uncertainty about how to fight IS or al-Qaeda, the United States knows how to conduct direct kinetic operations successfully, which are observable and signal to the public that the government is indeed fighting against terrorism. **In contrast, long-term policies *require resources* that are not easy to acquire or do not have immediate return on their investment and are therefore disincentivized.** In situations in which there is little agreement on who should pay for the nonkinetic policies, the default focal point for interagency cooperation is kinetic. We must change these patterns. **A successful counterterrorism strategy requires clear, substantive goals and appropriate measures through which to evaluate those objectives,** rather than metrics that satisfy largely domestic, popular perceptions. These objectives can be assessed in a number of different ways, though neither policymakers nor scholars have agreed upon the best ones. Terrorist groups can collapse, experience a decline in activity, have a shortened lifespan, control less territory, or acquire fewer recruits. If success is defined, for example, as eradicating enemy combatants or any individual suspected of being a terrorist, it is understandable how the kinetic option can seem inevitable. This lack of understanding over how to degrade and defeat terrorist organizations is a problem for governments trying to develop strategies to counter terrorist groups and for scholars trying to assess and understand the causes and solutions. More metrics alone is not the answer. **It is critical to utilize measures that are specific to each case.** There are robust and whole-of-government programs that attempt to deal with other aspects of combating terrorism, but they are often dismissed, underfunded, or critiqued for not producing immediate results. These might include locally tailored counter-radicalization programs and de-radicalization programs, development assistance, public diplomacy, and civil society assistance. What is striking is that many government officials acknowledge this conundrum and see no easy way out. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the American public will accept and support these types of policies. But **a focus on governance and capacity-building efforts will help**. These programs, many of them already established, may not produce the immediate results that the public demands in the aftermath of an attack on allies or the homeland or after a prolonged conflict, like Afghanistan. If they are tied to regional stabilization and prevent our regional state and non-state adversaries from undermining our national security interests, there is a fighting chance. Furthermore, it is imperative the U.S. leadership is clear about two things: terrorism cannot be defeated overnight, and it may never be eradicated completely. This is a challenging thing to say during an election year, but the hope is that the new administration will take this to heart. In addition, there needs to be clear, substantive measures of successes and failures at the mission level and also at the level of each agency involved. **Better** coordination and **funding for non-kinetic activities is a priority** so that the kinetic option is not always the focal point for institutional cooperation. The policy implications for the Trump administration are clear: If something is not done to change this pattern, the United States may continue to apply suboptimal strategies that could result in the weakening of U.S. power and greater loss of American lives. Kinetic options are not the only, or even the primary, answer to countering terrorism.

#### Their argument is absurd. The logic of their argument is that we should let the military collapse, letting terrorism spread. US measures have been effective, we just need to do more and do it better

Robin Wright et all, US Institute of Peace, December 2016, The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Beyond, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf

The United States alone has spent trillions of dollars -- in military campaigns, intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, and diplomacy – to counter jihadism. Progress has been made; fewer than a hundred people were killed inside the United States between 2001 and 2016 -- in stark contrast to the death toll on 9/11. Yet the threat endures.

#### They can’t solve for what already happened. Even if US policies have caused a backlash and terrorist resentment, they have no evidence that withdrawing will solve the problem. ISIS would just see a power vacuum and take over. The same with Al Qaeda.

#### Defense cuts mean more terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan – their general claims don’t apply there

**John Donnelly, November 23**, 2016, Roll Call, Pentagon warns stopgap spending bill could hurt terrorism fight, http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/pentagon-warns-stopgap-spending-bill-hurt-terrorism-fight

The Pentagon comptroller has warned Congress that **continuing to rely on stopgap spending bills will undermine U.S. forces in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan**, according to a memo exclusively obtained by CQ Roll Call. After lawmakers return from their Thanksgiving break, they are expected to send President Barack Obama a continuing resolution that would fund government operations at current levels through the end of March. The current CR expires Dec. 9. But **if the new** stopgap spending ***bill does not include additional funds for U.S. military campaigns overseas*** — as well as more flexibility in how to spend defense dollars — **then American counter-terrorism operations could suffer**, according to the memo written by Defense Department Comptroller Mike McCord. “A CR locks DoD, which is tasked with acting in real time to defend our interests in a rapidly changing global security environment, into last year’s budget with last year’s priorities,” McCord says in the memo. “**The most problematic shortfalls are in the operation and maintenance, train and equip, and munitions procurement accounts that fund counter-terrorism operations and assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.”** A new CR would require that U.S. government agencies operate for nearly half of fiscal 2017 at the same spending level as in fiscal 2016, except for programs that Congress might explicitly exempt from that rule. Domestic departments would also be hamstrung in executing their budgets. But defense officials and hawks in Congress say the Pentagon's needs are more pressing because the military has troops in battle. McCord’s memo appears to have provided much of the material for a Senate floor speech last week by Arizona Republican [John McCain](http://data.rollcall.com/members/26?rel=memberLink" \o "Click to view member info in a new window" \t "_blank), the Armed Services chairman. [[***McCain Says 'Idiots' Supporting a CR Would Benefit Putin***](http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/mccain-says-idiots-supporting-continuing-resolution-benefit-putin)] “A continuing resolution would place our troops at greater risk by forcing them to operate under an outdated budget that does not recognize the full extent of the threats they face,” McCain said then. For Pentagon leaders, a CR would mean making do with $2.2 billion less than they had planned to receive in fiscal 2017. That sounds manageable, but McCord says this interpretation is “misleading and outdated.” **The actual result could be as much as $22 billion in “account level shortfalls because of misallocations**,” he says in the memo. Under a CR, unless exceptions called “anomalies” are written into the law, no new programs can be launched. What's more, existing ones can neither boost nor trim their activity or production levels. The Pentagon has identified 78 new starts and 89 production increases in the first half of the year alone, McCord said. For example, the Navy’s program to develop and build a new class of nuclear missile submarines cannot begin planned procurement of some parts. But **McCord says the more urgent problems are in the war zones.** Certainly, money can be shifted to the war budget from the so-called base budget in cases where some of a program’s money is in the overseas budget and some in the core budget, he says. For instance, a plan to quadruple to $3.4 billion a program to bolster militaries in Europe against a perceived threat from Russia could be “stopped in its tracks,” according to McCord. But he acknowledged that the blow might be softened by redirecting some funds. However, other programs only exist in the war budget. **These include initiatives to train and equip Afghan and Iraqi forces. Such programs cannot borrow money from the base budget to meet their goals.** [[***On Defense, Obama Punts to His Successor***](http://www.rollcall.com/news/on_defense_obama_punts_to_his_successor-245857-1.html)] In particular, he said, **the Pentagon wants $289 million to support Kurdish Peshmerga forces**, and that would not be automatically provided under a CR without being explicitly included. The cash crunch in this program comes as Kurdish forces “are playing a key role” in the ongoing campaign to retake the Iraqi city of Mosul from the Islamic State, McCord said. Many of the war funds the Pentagon says it needs are contained in a new $5.8 billion overseas contingency operations budget request, which officials say is largely needed to support higher-than-expected troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq. The CR would last until March. But the new war money is needed by January, officials have said. It remains to be seen whether lawmakers will include the new overseas funding package as part of the next CR. If they do, some of the war-front shortfalls will be solved. A new presidential administration has never come into office under a CR for the Pentagon, McCord said. Choosing to adopt a full-year CR would be “nearly unimaginable, especially with troops in harm’s way,” he said. Among the more perverse potential consequences of a possible full-year CR identified by McCord: The Pentagon would owe the Boeing Co. $331 million in penalties for not having purchased a contractually mandatory 15 KC-46 aerial refueling jets, up from the dozen built in fiscal 2016. This would be “a waste of funds for which the taxpayer would get nothing in return,” he wrote.

#### That’s where most of the terrorism is

Daniel **Depetris, December 7**, 2016, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-ineffective-war-on-terror/

72 percent of deaths from acts of terrorism happened in five countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iraq, and Syria.

# Scenario/Disadvantage Answers

### Allied Alienation/Backlash Answers/

#### They don’t have any evidence that our Asian allies oppose more defense spending

**Too divided to pose a challenge**

**Lieber, 08** - is professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown University (Robert, “Falling Upwards: Declinism, The Box Set,” World Affairs, Summer, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Lieber.html)

Consider the frequently cited alternatives. With its twenty-seven member states, 500 million people, and the sum of its aggregate economies, the European Union is always mentioned by those who predict an imminent counterbalancing to the United States. But Europe faces steep obstacles in achieving anything resembling a common foreign and security policy. Its cumbersome institutions, public demands for enormous rates of domestic expenditure, hamstrung attempts at political integration, as well as its Hamlet-like uncertainties about the use of force and military spending, give Europe a global impact far less than its size and wealth would otherwise dictate. An additional reason why it punches far below its weight is that, rather than fielding a true pan-European military, its member states continue to maintain separate (and barely funded) defense establishments. Another is that, with limited exceptions, European countries can deploy only modest forces in the field and, lacking critical mass, render themselves far less effective than even their aggregate numbers might suggest.   
For these reasons and more, when national leaders attempt to galvanize opposition to American policies, they seldom prove successful. As a conspicuous case in point, during the months prior to the Iraq War, French, German, and Belgian leaders launched a campaign to gin up opposition to the Bush strategy. Though they gained Russian backing in the UN, they largely failed to do so at home within the EU, where some two-thirds of member governments (including, most significantly, those of “New” Europe) ended up endorsing the American-led war. With the passage of time as well as the coming to power of Atlanticist leaders in Germany (Merkel), France (Sarkozy), and Italy (Berlusconi), there appears to be, if anything, even less inclination to stand in America’s way.

**No chance of balancing—tons of factors cripple their power**

**Singh 2008** – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

Aside from its elusiveness currently, however, this multipolar vision also has grievous normative problems. Prior balances of great powers have rarely been either stable or benign (think of the years preceding WWI and during the 1920s and 1930s leading to WWII). Even were some new concert of major powers to be thrashed out, however, it is doubtful that such a set of rival powers would resolve the humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, genocides, failed states and Islamist movements that together threaten the contemporary international system. At least as pointedly, the main potential rival powers to the US are themselves inhibited by all manner of problems ranging from energy needs and environmental decay to the threat of pandemics, acute socio-economic inequalities and demographic stresses. In each, the internal tensions and strains of social, economic and political change may be as likely to retard as to advance the various emerging powers' routes to great or superpower status. The EU, for example, faces acute demographic problems that deeply complicate the still unresolved institutional and political dilemmas shaping its development. Generous welfare spending, inflexible labour markets, a rapidly aging workforce, a diminishing tax base, a declining fertility ratio and the problems of a growing but alienated Muslim population pose powerful hindrances to sustaining positive growth rates. However large its economy, the EU likewise remains a relatively minor global actor: In the near future, the European Union (**EU) will be a structurally-crippled geopolitical actor**. It has expanded too fast and speaks in 23 tongues. Too much of the leaders' time is spent on discussing how Europe should make its decisions. The patchwork accords reached under the German presidency in June 2007 have not solved the fundamental problem. **It would only be a mild exaggeration to say that the perpetual European discussions on seating arrangement are akin to re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic**. The geopolitical environment around Europe has worsened while the EU has focused inwards: it faces a more troubled environment in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even vis-a -vis Russia. This is a pretty dismal record. (Mahbubani, 2007, 203-204)

**Europe lacks the will to follow through**

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 92-93, WEA)

Could Europe and the United States nonetheless one day come to an irreversible parting of the ways and even become great power antagonists? Momentous events often arrive by surprise, so the question deserves attention. In essence, a fundamental rupture would require the combination of two elements. One of these is capability, the capacity of Europe to act as a great power opponent of the United States. The other is will – that is, whether Europeans or Americans desire this to happen and seek to bring it about. Despite the rhetoric of conflict, neither of these elements now exists nor seems likely, but under what conditions could they ultimately occur? In terms of capability, the E.U. would need to achieve an unprecedented breakthrough in which member countries did not just talk about relinquishing fundamental political sovereignty, but actually did so. But the existing ability of each of the twenty-five members to exercise a veto necessarily limits E.U. foreign policy. In contrast, a true European federation, a United States of Europe, would possess the institutional prerequisites for acting as a single great power in defense and foreign policy. Even then, the E.U. countries would also need to make the politically difficult decision to allocate scarce resources in order to build a powerful military and to choose competition rather than partnership with the United States. French leaders have tended to favor such a course of action, but theirs is not the prevailing view. Could these changes ever take place? Theoretically, the answer is yes, though the likelihood remains remote. Some scholars of international relations and history argue that reaction to America’s extraordinary predominance will lead to such an outcome, but for the combination of reasons cited above, there is little reason to anticipate such a transformation. Motivation and will also are key. Were the Europeans to find themselves facing some unprecedented threat to their survival in circumstances where the United States was no longer able or willing to provide security, then the political impetus for Europe to provide its own security could emerge. On the other hand, the alternative of E.U. political fragmentation or breakdown cannot be ruled out, either. By itself, a growing European-American divergence in values and beliefs of the kind to which Robert Kagan and others have pointed is unlikely to sustain this kind of change. Instead, a steadily worsening climate of political dispute that finally reached a breaking point on both sides of the Atlantic would have to occur, and with it a collapse in either the will or ability of the United States to sustain its own world role, for example, in reaction to a military quagmire or some devastating series of

### Africa Presence Bad Answers

#### The Horn is full of landmines now—this is an enormous humanitarian disaster

Moore 11—over five years’ experience on the Landmine Survivors Network providing assistance and support to landmine victims, journalist, humanitarian worker [Michael, “Landmines and the Famine in East Africa,” *Landmines in Africa*, 8-5-2011, <https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2011/08/05/landmines-and-the-famine-in-east-africa/>, accessed 9-9-2015]

Much of the Horn of Africa is polluted by landmines and explosive remants of war. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland all have extensive minefields and ERW contamination from wars dating back to the Italian invasion in the 1930s. The recent war (1998) between Eritrea and Ethiopia placed more mines and ordnance along the countries’ borders and the near-permanent state of civil war in Somalia has meant that two decades’ worth of explosive material litters the areas around Mogadishu and 10% of the communities in Bakol (or Bakool) have landmines and ERW. Surveys in Somalia have been limited, but according to the Landmine Monitor, in 2009 Somalia had 126 landmine and ERW casualties on top of the 116 in 2008. Ethiopia saw 21 casualties over the same years, Eritrea 102, Somaliland 81 and zero for Djibouti. The Horn of Africa represented 40% of all landmine casualties in Africa in 2009 and the Monitor believes the numbers are under-reported, suggesting many more incidents went undocumented.

As a result, I expected to find significant reporting on the plight of landmine victims as a vulnerable population within the famine-affected region. Instead, I’ve seen no mention of landmine accidents or reports from mine action organizations (specifically the HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group and Handicap International) about how their work has been constrained by the famine. The civil war in Libya has dominated headlines about landmines in Africa along with the deaths of four United Nations peacekeepers in Abyei in Sudan. The one report I could find described how landmines had closed a road to Dolo, one of the towns in Somalia’s declared famine zone.

The below graphic, compiled by the BBC from information from UNOCHA, UNHCR, USAID and the Famine Early Warning System Network, shows the famine-affected areas including the mine-affected regions of Bakool and Mogadishu:

[chart omitted]

The Guardian and the Christian Science Monitor both wrote about the difficulties in providing famine relief to Somalia. Both papers blamed Al-Shabaab, the Al Qaeda-linked Islamist rebel movement, and the lack of funding for the World Food Programme in general and for famine relief in Somalia in particular. The Christian Science Monitor also points out that violence is on-going in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia and that the country as a whole lacks a government; the Transitional Federal Government, the UN-recognized authority in Somalia, only controls the small amount of land protected by Ugandan and Burundian peace-keeping forces. The Guardian lays some of the blame on the United States’s anti-terrorism laws which are designed to prevent assistance from reaching groups like Al-Shabaab. These laws create a reporting and due diligence burden that aid agencies and organizations have difficulty understanding.

I could take this lack of information as a positive sign: no news is good news; if there are no reports of injuries from landmines amongst the tens of thousands of refugees fleeing the famine, then maybe there aren’t any such injuries or only just a few. Alternatively, as the Landmine Monitor has suggested, reports of landmine casualties may be under-reported and simply lost in the thousands of refugees and displaced persons arriving in camps every day. According to Handicap International, of the 400,000 refugees in Dabaab camp just across the Somali border in Kenya, at least 20,000 have some form of disability, but the registration and identification of services needed for those persons is woefully inadequate. Of the estimated 8,000 refugees with disabilities who arrived in the camp in July 2011, only 500 have been registered and only two (2!?) wheelchairs were issued. Therefore I think it is likely that a great many landmine victims may be living in Dabaab and other camps without their situation being known and without access to rehabilitation services. In an area where access to the necessities of life – water, food, vaccines – is limited, access to rehabilitation services may be impossible, compounding the vulnerability of landmine victims.

In addition to the landmine victims in the camps, many landmine victims may not have been able to make the trip or suffered from injuries along the way. From a study in Uganda, 61% of deaths due to landmine injury were immediate and the majority of the other deaths occurred during transit to the hospital. Refugees arriving at Dabaab camp traveled as far as 249 miles across landmine and ERW-affected regions; if someone stepped on a landmine, it is unlikely that they would have been able to finish the trip and their death would be unrecorded.

There is another side to the impact of landmines in the East African famine: what happens when refugees and displaced persons return home? In Angola after the civil wars there, returnee families would settle on land that was heavily mined, sometimes with the knowledge of the presence of mines, sometimes not. In Bosnia, I was told that the months with the highest numbers of landmine victims were not during the war years, but afterwards when people returned to their homes, not knowing that their land had been mined. These injuries took place before mine-risk education programs could be implemented and before any minefield surveys were conducted. Thus, the risk from landmine contamination for people affected by the famine in East Africa could last long after the famine concludes. When refugees and displaced persons leave the camps and return to their homes, they will have to pass once more through mine-affected areas and may find their homes are now mine-affected when before they were not.

#### Troops at Lemonnier are key to demining—withdrawal collapses ability to conduct operations

Riely & Jones 15—K. Jack Riley Vice President of RAND National Security Research Division, PhD in public policy analysis from Pardee RAND Graduate school // Seth G. Jones PhD and MA in political science at U Chicago [“Djibouti: Outpost of stability in an unstable region,” *The Hill*, 4-10-2015, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/238389-djibouti-outpost-of-stability-in-an-unstable-region>, accessed 8-9-2015]

Last week’s massacre in Kenya of 148 college students underscores the volatility of this eastern African region. In Kenya alone, the slaughter at Garissa University College comes on top of the killings of at least 67 people in a Nairobi shopping mall in 2013 and numerous terrorist incidents dating back to the U.S. embassy bombing, which killed more than 200 people in 1998. Next door, Somalia is in turmoil. Somalia is home to the extremist group al-Shabab, which carried out the attack in Kenya. Although the United States has made good progress in helping root out Somalia’s extremist militants, including the September killing by drone of the al-Shabab commander known as Ahmed Abdi Godane, Somalia remains perilous and rife with extremist elements. Directly across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia, the remnants of Yemen smolder under the weight of the Houthi insurgency. Yemen is—or was—a critical regional U.S. ally occupying the strategically important southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula. In the midst of all this strife lies tiny Djibouti. It is a country that many Americans may not have heard of, but it has emerged as a critical staging ground for promoting stability in east Africa and supporting operations throughout the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, which stretches from Egypt into Central Asia. Last May, the United States re-upped its commitment to Djibouti with a 20-year lease at the country’s Camp Lemonnier, an expansive base of 4,000 American service members and civilians focused on counterterrorism operations. Djibouti is adjacent to Somalia and just 17 miles across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen. There is tremendous demand throughout east Africa for the types of capacity building that are necessary for national and regional security, from detecting and defusing improvised explosive devices to monitoring persistent threats and mitigating the consequences of horrific attacks, such as those that have plagued Kenya. At a minimum, Camp Lemonnier serves as the eyes and ears on Somalia and on militant threats stemming from this region. The camp serves as a combat hub as well, of course. The U.S. operations based here also perform demining and humanitarian missions. The role being played by U.S. forces in Djibouti should be understood as more than the round-the-clock hours of intelligence surveillance, the number of drone strikes, and more than the number of potential terrorist attacks prevented. Since at least 2001, east Africa has been one demonstration of both the geographic extent to which militant jihadism has spread and the operational extent to which it has entrenched itself in vulnerable territories. Confronting this threat has compelled the United States to devise innovative approaches to waging sustained efforts in some of the remotest corners of the world. The collaborative role being played by the United States and Djibouti, therefore, represents the kind of partnerships that are now required in the battle against terrorism, because little-known places like Djibouti are one arena where the battle could be won or lost. In the immediate future, the U.S. role in east Africa will also represent a commitment to a part of the world where security problems continue to grow and where security interests have grown increasingly common among U.S. citizens and Kenyan students.

#### Landmines are structural violence – kill more than all WMD combined. Demining is ongoing, but as long as mines are available, the harm will continue

TEPE 11 Lecturer in European Studies and German at King's College London [Daniela Tepe, December 2011, The Myth about Global Civil Society: Domestic Politics to Ban Landmines] page 77-79

Landmines are among the most deadly weapons in the contemporary world. These weapons have killed more people than nuclear, chemical and biological weapons combined and their development and produc- tion is significantly cheaper. The price to produce a mine generally ranges from US $3 to US $30 per mine (Beier and Crosby 1998: 280). Although it is difficult to assess the precise figures of casualties from landmines (Maslen 2004: 27), the ICRC has estimated that every year 26,000 peo- ple are wounded or killed by landmines, including many civilians (ICRC 1996). Many victims are not included in any data, as the recording of victims relies on them being able to access medical care, which for many is out of reach. Shocking data exists from the most heavily mined countries. Cambodia, for example, recorded more than 54,000 people maimed or killed by mines or unexploded ordnances (UXOs) between 1979 and 2002. Or, as recorded by the Vietnamese Minister of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs in September 1999 ’at least 38,248 people had been killed and 64,064 people injured in landmine/UXO accidents since the end of the Vietnam War in April 1975 - indicting an average of 4448 deaths of injuries a year’ (Maslen 2004: 28). While the majority of victims of anti-personnel mines during actual conflict are men; children and women are disproportionately affected by mines and UXOs follow- ing the cessation of conflict. Among the countries most affected by mines are some of the World’s poorest with exact estimates difficult to make. The landmines campaign decided at a meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, in 1993 that the figure they would deal with would be 100 million mines. In the same year, the US Department of State published a report Called Hidden Killers that supported the campaign’s claim by estimating that between 65 and 110 million mines were hidden in more that 65 countries. The Department of State Report and the UN Secretariat to the General Assembly took on this figure as a reference point. The figure ’has been widely used and reused, a mantra that for several years became an uncontested reality, a compel- ling call to action’ (Maslen 2004: 24). In 1998, the US State Department stated that ’between 85 million and 90 million landmines are currently implanted in the soil of at least 62 nations’ (US State Department 1998, in Vines 1998: 121). It became obvious that the figures Were highly inaccurate, relying mainly on data and estimations provided by affected countries interested in inflating the numbers to claim higher funding for mine clearance. 'As time Went on, even some of those heading the cam- paigns against anti-personnel mines began to realise that the figure of 100 million was inflated, and probably grossly inflated. Yet the decision was taken, rather disingenuously, to remain silent’ (Maslen 2004: 25). No accurate data exists even today. Where several governments, NGOs as well as the UN General Assembly acknowledge that the figure of 100 million is wrong, there remains no indication from reliable sources as to the extent of this inaccuracy. This, nevertheless, does not downsize the problem that explosive devices cause when lying forgotten in the soil. As Maslen (2004: 25) puts it: Yet - and here is the grain of truth that remained obscured - although the 100 million figure for mines appears to have been widely inaccu- rate, the overall global problem of explosive remnants of wars surely surpasses it. No one knows how many abandoned or unexploded bombs, grenades, shells and rockets pollute the earth’s surface, but the figure is certainly gigantic. The variety of mines ranges from small blast mines that explode by foot Contact to so-called butterfly mines that look like toys. In order to explode they must be bent or twisted. The injuries caused also differ between types of mines: While some are designed to affect the lower part of body such as legs and genitals, others are designed to kill everything radius (see Cameron et al. 1998: Zi). The construction of anti-personnel (AP) mines is intended with the aim of maiming rather than killing their victims. ’The reason behind this lies in the macabre logics of the battlefield; it requires more effort to care for an injured soldier than for an already dead one’ (2007: 60) In addition to causing physical harm, mines cause emotional harm to their victims. Examples are the so-Called lifelong phantom pain for the victims or amputations resulting in low self-esteem and/or depression. in addition to the personal costs to the victims and their families and friends, landmines cause socio-economic costs that are just as severe. Landmines destroy life and habitat. Years after a crisis or War, Crucial agricultural and living spaces remain mined and therefore leave civilians unable to return to their routines (Wisotzki and Müller 1997). Furthermore, because of the proliferation of low-intensity warfare since the 1975 the usage of AP mines has increased. Being cheap and easily available to governments as well as guerrilla troops alike, mines, next to automatic rifles, became 'the Weapon of choice’ for both (Vines 1998: 120). Demining is difficult, time consuming, dangerous and costly. According to Wisotzki and Müller, one can buy a cheap plastic mine for no more than US $3 While the removal of one costs between US $300 and US $1000. While demining technology exists, humanitar- ian demining remains the only sufficient method for declaring areas safe. Companies that use or produce landmines are among those who produce the technology for demining. Partly they even receive govern- mental funding for the development of demining techniques. ’In 1996, for example, Westinghouse and Raytheon, the latter being a major producer of AP mines, competed for US Department of Defence con- tracts worth between US $40 million and US $50 million for research and development in the area of airborne detection systems’ (Beier and Crosby 1998: 282). UN standards ask for a clearance rate of 99.6 per cent While mine technology is not able to consistently destroy more than eight mines out of ten (Hubert 1998: 314).

#### AFRICOM (Africa Command) cuts will cause PRIVE MILITARY CORPORATION (PMC) reliance – turns the case.

Jackson 2009 Paul, Professor of African Politics University of Birmingham, Missions and Pragmatism in American Security Policy in Africa Contemporary Security Policy Volume 30, Issue 1, 2009

Given the reliance on strong states to carry out these strategic aims, this raises the second question of how this is to be carried out. AFRICOM has a wide mandate but lacks the basic tools to carry it out. There is to be no allocation of new military units to AFRICOM and given the twin problems of imperial over-reach and collapse of the financial system (and consequent budget cutting), this makes AFRICOM's problems acute. Imperial over-reach in Afghanistan and Iraq have put extreme pressures on the American military establishment and the likelihood that troops can be assigned from either of these theatres to Africa is small. As N'Diaye and Africa point out in this issue, this leaves one key option: private companies. A key example for this approach is Liberia, where, since 2004, DynCorp has been responsible for retraining the Liberian army. This engagement is documented in several sources, but briefly the security sector reform (SSR) programme was divided between DynCorp, with responsibility for the Liberian military, and others with responsibility for specialist training.5 The DynCorp element was primarily training and selection, including vetting recruits for human rights records. Whilst the basic training elements have been largely successful there are relevant issues concerning the lack of local ownership by Liberians of this process and also the lack of integration of the training and armed forces in general into any framework of civil control. This partly goes back to a difference in definition between the United States and other agents engaged in SSR activities, with the United States taking a very narrow view of SSR as training whereas much work on SSR elsewhere by NGOs like the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces or by the British government in Sierra Leone, has been concerned with civilian control over armed forces, that has incorporated, but not been limited to, military training and equipment. The experience of DynCorp in Liberia has not been seen as a particularly positive experience from the point of view of the longer term development goals espoused by Theresa Whelan. The absence of local ownership, the contracting of military training, and the exclusion of many civil society groups from the SSR process has been worsened by the reduction of basic training from 11 to eight weeks with the cutting of elements concerned with civics training. This is clearly worrying in a country with an at best chequered history of military involvement in domestic politics, corruption, and human rights abuse. Given the inability of AFRICOM to carry out many of their activities themselves, this will inevitably lead to an increase in the activities of private military companies (PMCs). McFate, as a former industry insider, points out that this is what the PMC industry is waiting for. The rapid development of a US-sponsored conflict market that started in the 1990s and has escalated in Afghanistan and Iraq needs somewhere to develop as these markets wind down and Africa is an obvious target. In addition, the types of service identified by AFRICOM – training, equipping, logistics, SSR, etc. – are those areas where PMCs have developed skills in current conflicts and can therefore easily match AFRICOM's demand. On one level, one may ask if this is actually a problem. If AFRICOM needs services, and those services are required by African states and PMCs can be contracted to provide those services, then surely this is how markets work. However, it does raise a number of issues related to some of the earlier points about AFRICOM's mission. First, one of the defining features of many African states that are seen as weak is not the ability to control a monopoly of force within sovereign territory, but to exercise the legal authority to contract with transnational firms.6 In practice this enables states to establish control over areas containing resources of interest to extractive industries using private security forces funded out of commercial activities within those regions, e.g. the use of Executive Outcomes by the Angolan government funded by diamonds and oil. What this leaves are parts of the country that are not blessed with commercially viable natural resources that progressively become marginalized. It is a view of the state as predator – not interested in sovereignty, governance, or citizens but in commercial extraction; corruption through force. Second, it is easy to see how such a state can be seen as an effective ally in terms of stability if they were on your side, after all, this is a model that could have been applied to several African regimes during the Cold War. The main issue here is that not only is it against all of the rhetoric of AFRICOM but also it is storing up longer term problems that may lead to greater instability as seen during the early 1990s. Third, a clear consequence of increased use of PMCs may be the broadening of the conflict market across the continent with an associated influx of PMCs from Africa and further afield. This could destabilize the entire continent and the consequences are dire if they cannot be controlled.

### Agamben/Bare Life Answers

#### ‘Wars for humanity’ are an ahistorical myth

Benno Gerhard Teschke 11, IR prof at the University of Sussex, “Fatal attraction: a critique of Carl Schmitt's international political and legal theory”, International Theory (2011), 3 : pp 179-227

For at the centre of the heterodox – partly post-structuralist, partly realist – neo-Schmittian analysis stands the conclusion of The Nomos: the thesis of a structural and continuous relation between liberalism and violence (Mouffe 2005, 2007; Odysseos 2007). It suggests that, in sharp contrast to the liberal-cosmopolitan programme of ‘perpetual peace’, the geographical expansion of liberal modernity was accompanied by the intensification and de-formalization of war in the international construction of liberal-constitutional states of law and the production of liberal subjectivities as rights-bearing individuals. Liberal world-ordering proceeds via the conduit of wars for humanity, leading to Schmitt's ‘spaceless universalism’. In this perspective, a straight line is drawn from WWI to the War on Terror to verify Schmitt's long-term prognostic of the 20th century as the age of ‘neutralizations and de-politicizations’ (Schmitt 1993). But this attempt to read the history of 20th century international relations in terms of a succession of confrontations between the carrier-nations of liberal modernity and the criminalized foes at its outer margins seems unable to comprehend the complexities and specificities of ‘liberal’ world-ordering, then and now. For in the cases of Wilhelmine, Weimar and fascist Germany, the assumption that their conflicts with the Anglo-American liberal-capitalist heartland were grounded in an antagonism between liberal modernity and a recalcitrant Germany outside its geographical and conceptual lines runs counter to the historical evidence. For this reading presupposes that late-Wilhelmine Germany was not already substantially penetrated by capitalism and fully incorporated into the capitalist world economy, posing the question of whether the causes of WWI lay in the capitalist dynamics of inter-imperial rivalry (Blackbourn and Eley 1984), or in processes of belated and incomplete liberal-capitalist development, due to the survival of ‘re-feudalized’ elites in the German state classes and the marriage between ‘rye and iron’ (Wehler 1997). It also assumes that the late-Weimar and early Nazi turn towards the construction of an autarchic German regionalism – Mitteleuropa or Großraum – was not deeply influenced by the international ramifications of the 1929 Great Depression, but premised on a purely political–existentialist assertion of German national identity. Against a reading of the early 20th century conflicts between ‘the liberal West’ and Germany as ‘wars for humanity’ between an expanding liberal modernity and its political exterior, there is more evidence to suggest that these confrontations were interstate conflicts within the crisis-ridden and nationally uneven capitalist project of modernity. Similar objections and caveats to the binary opposition between the Western discourse of liberal humanity against non-liberal foes apply to the more recent period. For how can this optic explain that the ‘liberal West’ coexisted (and keeps coexisting) with a large number of pliant authoritarian client-regimes (Mubarak's Egypt, Suharto's Indonesia, Pahlavi's Iran, Fahd's Saudi-Arabia, even Gaddafi's pre-intervention Libya, to name but a few), which were and are actively managed and supported by the West as anti-liberal Schmittian states of emergency, with concerns for liberal subjectivities and Human Rights secondary to the strategic interests of political and geopolitical stability and economic access? Even in the more obvious cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and, now, Libya, the idea that Western intervention has to be conceived as an encounter between the liberal project and a series of foes outside its sphere seems to rely on a denial of their antecedent histories as geopolitically and socially contested state-building projects in pro-Western fashion, deeply co-determined by long histories of Western anti-liberal colonial and post-colonial legacies. If these states (or social forces within them) turn against their imperial masters, the conventional policy expression is ‘blowback’. And as the Schmittian analytical vocabulary does not include a conception of human agency and social forces – only friend/enemy groupings and collective political entities governed by executive decision – it also lacks the categories of analysis to comprehend the social dynamics that drive the struggles around sovereign power and the eventual overcoming, for example, of Tunisian and Egyptian states of emergency without US-led wars for humanity. Similarly, it seems unlikely that the generic idea of liberal world-ordering and the production of liberal subjectivities can actually explain why Western intervention seems improbable in some cases (e.g. Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen or Syria) and more likely in others (e.g. Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya). Liberal world-ordering consists of differential strategies of building, coordinating, and drawing liberal and anti-liberal states into the Western orbit, and overtly or covertly intervening and refashioning them once they step out of line. These are conflicts within a world, which seem to push the term liberalism beyond its original meaning. The generic Schmittian idea of a liberal ‘spaceless universalism’ sits uncomfortably with the realities of maintaining an America-supervised ‘informal empire’, which has to manage a persisting interstate system in diverse and case-specific ways. But it is this persistence of a worldwide system of states, which encase national particularities, which renders challenges to American supremacy possible in the first place.

### Alliances Bad/Bases Bad Answers

#### Alliances are the best way to deter conflict

Stephen G Brooks, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, and William C Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, **2016,** America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century< Kindle Edition

Deterrence The alliances at the heart of deep engagement are meant to enhance US security by deterring potential adversaries from using force in ways that would undermine American interests**. The scholarly literature on deterrence is one of the oldest and bigges**t in international relations**, benefitting from over a half-century of rigorous theorizing**, quantitative testing, and in-depth case analysis. 8 What does it say about the security commitments of the type the US sustains? Does it predict that they will work as advertised? To start with theoretical logic, **deterrence hinges on assessments of capability and inte**nt. **When contemplating the use of force to challenge the status quo, states assess expected benefits minus costs, which include the capabilities of all potential opponents as well as their willingness to use those capabilities to make good on their deterrent threat**. **Theorists identify multiple logics that may be in play: the defender’s reputation for resolve in general or regarding a specific commitment; the manipulation of commitments and risks to increase any challenger’s estimate of the probability that the defender will follow through on its threat to use force; the intrinsic interests of the parties to fulfill alliance obligations; and the actual capability to thwart or retaliate against the challenger’s use of force**. While theorists debate the relative significance of these various logics, two broad implications are apparent. **First, US alliances tend to have features that trigger all or most of the basic deterrence logics**. **If the framers of US grand strategy after the Cold War had consulted the huge literature on deterrence theory** and then tried to fashion alliances to maximize extended deterrence— without seeking to adjudicate among various schools of thought within this literature, simply weighting all of the various logics roughly equally— **they would have wanted the following features:**

**•A long history and deep institutionalization with allies, reinforcing the inference for potential adversaries that strong mutual interests are engaged** •**Deep nonsecurity relationships with allies on economic and cultural levels, again signaling to potential adversaries that strong intrinsic interests exist •A markedly favorable balance of military forces, especially in the regions where the status quo is being defended, which would both signal real interest and make deterrence intrinsically more credible9 •Actual US forces deployed abroad in order to: •show that both the United States and its allies are willing to bear costs to make the alliance credible, justifying the inference on the part of potential adversaries that the alliance reflects important interests and therefore that the alliance treaty is more than just a piece of paper10 •act as tripwires, generating what Thomas Schelling called “pre-commitment,” strongly raising expectations of US involvement in case of armed conflict and raising the credibility of commitment11 •increase the speed and firepower of early responses to any use of force, decreasing the chances for quick victory by adversaries, thus reducing a crucial precondition for deterrence failure12** •That as many allies as possible— but especially the US— be democracies, because democratic governments may be better able to pre-commit to honor commitments via the well-known “audience cost” mechanism: because leaders of democratic states may suffer political penalties if they back down from a salient public commitment, scholars argue, they are better able than their authoritarian counterparts to make deterrence credible13 Needless to say, alliances with precisely these features are just what the Clinton administration inherited as legacies of the Cold War. **If the US alliances do not fit the conceptual parameters for sustaining deterrence, it is hard to think of any that would**. And the evolution of deterrence theory puts a premium on exactly these properties of the US deterrent posture. The deterrence theorists of the postwar “golden era,” such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, and especially Thomas Schelling, highlighted the hyperrational manipulation of risk, the supremely modulated signaling of commitment, and, above all, the overarching importance of sustaining a reputation for resolve. These works conjured the image of a nuclear-era Bismarck in total control of his rhetoric, moving military forces like chess pieces to create unassailable positions of strength in the tense standoffs of the Cold War. It was reasonable to wonder whether real presidents operating in the competitive pluralism of American domestic politics could possibly measure up. **The trend in the theoretical literature over the last generation, by contrast, has been increased emphasis on the interdependent interests and capabilities logic that emerges from nurturing and sustaining alliance relationships over the long haul.** 14 **Rather than perfectly controlled signaling and obsessive concern with appearing tough and resolute, it is more the natural evolution of alliance ties and the development of close mutual interests that make deterrence work**.

#### Asian and European alliances prevented security competition and war

Stephen G Brooks, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, and William C Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, **2016,** America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century< Kindle Edition

18 Thus, Barry Posen argues that acquiescing to a compellent threat is more likely to invite further predation than giving in to a deterrent threat, and Robert Art maintains that national honor is invoked in acceding to compellence in ways that do not occur with deterrence. 19 Decades of well-established research findings in psychology also show that people fear losses more than they crave gains, and so are far more likely to run risks to prevent loss than to acquire gain. 20 The leaders of a state that is the target of a compellent threat are likely to be willing to run higher risks to avoid losses. The opposite is true of the leaders of the state issuing such a threat in search of gain. The implication strongly supports the weight of scholarship behind the expectation that revising a settled status quo is much harder than defending it. 21 Assurance As chapter 4 made clear, deep engagement’s security alliances have always been about more than deterring potential adversaries; they are also about assuring allies to shape their security policies in ways that enhance US interests in interallied cooperation, avoiding regional tensions and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This mechanism assumed much greater salience after the Cold War’s end. Although the US interests served by assurance are many, at root is the claim that it makes regions more secure than they would otherwise be. **Why should US assurances from the outside be preferable to security provided purely by local actors** in the absence of a Soviet-scale great-power challenge? Ironically, **the answer can be found in realist theory. Realists are among the most numerous and prominent critics of deep engagement**. Many critics question the security benefits of US assurance by relying on propositions that flow from the theory. 22 **Yet realism actually contains strong theoretical arguments for the security benefits of US assurance**. Bearing in mind the difficulty of summarizing such a complex literature, **it is fair to say that the preponderance of contemporary realist theorizing predicts net security gains from US assurance. Let us start with “offensive realism,” a branch of realism whose baseline prediction is a deeply insecure and violence-prone world, with core regions beset by dangerously shifting power balances, preventive war temptations, widespread nuclear proliferation, runs at regional hegemony, great power security competition, and even major-power war**. **According to the theory’s principal proponent, John Mearsheimer, a key reason why this world has not yet emerged is security provision by the “American Pacifier.”** 23 “**There is no question that the presence of US troops in Europe and northeast Asia has played an important role in moderating security competition and promoting stability over the past decade,” he insists**. 24 How? **External security assurance solves the collective action problem among local actors, making it possible to band together in credible coalitions and thereby deter adversaries. The collective action problem is a major reason for states failing to**

together to advance their collective security interests, according to Mearsheimer. Each state’s individual incentive is to try to avoid the costs and risks of balancing by passing the buck to other states and free riding on their efforts. **A credible outside superpower willing and able to overcome this problem by creating and sustaining alliances reduces the expectations of any revisionist that it can take a “divide and rule” path to regional dominance. B**ut the key trick the strategy demands is to generate that certainty without sparking as much security competition as would occur in America’s absence. For Mearsheimer, geography solves this problem. **It makes an overseas superpower like the US more capable than local powers of creating deterrence postures that do not threaten regional hegemony.** The difficulty of projecting military power over long distances and especially across oceans means that a state like the United States cannot seriously contemplate attaining hegemony in a different region. Its aim must remain defensive: to prevent any other power from attaining hegemony in the key regions outside North America. The result is a comparatively nonoffensive defense of the regional status quo that is less likely to stoke security competition than purely local attempts at self-help would. Another branch of realist scholarship, “defensive realism,” provides a more nuanced portrayal of the baseline security problem than its offensive cousin. The theory considers variation in key “structural modifiers,” notably the “offense-defense balance” and the ease with which states can distinguish offensive from defensive military postures. 25 If defense is relatively easy compared to offense, states may be able to secure themselves without threatening others, lessening the overall security problem that figures so prominently in offensive realism. And if states can easily tell the difference between offensive military postures and defensive ones, they may be able to signal that they lack aggressive intentions, reducing the pervasive uncertainty about intentions that drives offensive realism’s grim portrayal of incessant security competition. In particular, nuclear weapons provide defense from threats to states’ core security, and postures can be created that are good for defense and deterrence but little else. In addition, geography and conventional military technology may allow states to construct military postures that are relatively unthreatening to neighbors, reducing the incentives for the cutthroat security competition offensive realism forecasts. The theory thus considers the possibility of strategic settings that allow states to signal that they are “pure security seekers” with no aggressive intentions, thus ameliorating the uncertainty about intentions that drives the security dilemma— and offensive realism’s dire forecasts.

### Allied Economic Development Good/Allied Development Stops Civil Wars

#### The money is wasted, better to spend it at home

Ian Bremmer, September 2016, Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World, Kindle edition, page number at end off card. Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk.. He’s also the President of the Eurasia Group

In fiscal year 2012, the American taxpayer provided 186 countries with a total of $ 42 billion. 5 Many of the governments that receive this help want Washington to guarantee their security— even as they pursue their own agendas. Pakistan received $ 834 million in economic help and $ 361 million for its security services for fiscal year 2013, two years after Osama bin Laden was found hiding in a compound within easy walking distance of Pakistan’s most prestigious military academy. 6 Since 2002, the United States has provided Afghanistan with more than $ 100 billion in financial aid. The American taxpayer will never know exactly how many of the schools and government buildings constructed with their money have survived— and how much of the money has simply been stolen. Imagine what $ 100 billion might have built at home. Bremmer, Ian. Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World (Kindle Locations 810-817). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

### Arms Race Answers

#### Non-unique – There is an arms race in Asia now due to declining US presence. That’s our case.

#### Non—unique – arms race now

**Politico, December 23,** 2016, Trump on Nukes: “Let it Be an Arms Race,” http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-nuclear-arms-race-russia-232944

President-elect Donald **Trump** on Friday **morning escalated his calls for a stronger U.S. nuclear arsenal, saying he was fine with an “arms race**” if it puts the U.S. in a stronger position against foreign adversaries. **“Let it be an arms race … we will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all**,” Trump told MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” during an off-air conversation on Friday

#### They don’t have an alternative – They don’t have any evidence that an arms race can be avoided by capping military spending at current levels. The US alsready has a massive military budget, encouraging arms a races, according to the logic of their argument

#### No major nuclear arms race because other countries can’t sustain an arms race

Lowther & Bonavita, December 8, 2016

Dr. Adam B. Lowther is the Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies (SANDS) at Kirtland, AFB. His latest book is[**Defending the Arsenal: Why America’s Nuclear Modernization Still Matters**](https://www.amazon.com/Defending-Arsenal-Americas-Nuclear-Modernization/dp/1138204544). Maj. Angelo Bonavita is the Deputy Director of SANDS and hold a PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, December 8, 2016, The nuclear threat environment facing the Trump administration, http://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-nuclear-threat-environment-facing-the-trump-administration/

Third, **counter to arguments made by nuclear critics, the United States will not set-off a nuclear arms race by modernizing its nuclear arsenal. With the American economy five times larger than the ailing**[**Russian economy**](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/putins-economic-weakness-10084)**, sustaining an arms race with the United States is not a viable option for Russia. China is limited in its production of nuclear weapons by its relatively small stockpile of**[**fissile material**](http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Nuclear_Weapons_and_Fissile_Materials_Holdings-Uncertainties_and_Concerns_(TESTIMONY).pdf)**. Thus, such arguments are hyperbolic rather than demonstrative of how our adversaries are likely to respond to American modernization**.

#### Russia already developing new nuclear weapons

**Kroening, November 15**, Matthew Kroenig is associate professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is a former strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is currently writing a book on U.S. nuclear strategy, November 15, 2016, Toward a More Flexible NATO nuclear posture, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Toward\_a\_More\_Flexible\_NATO\_Nuclear\_Posture\_web\_1115.pdf

Others will certainly argue that developing new nuclear capabilities would provoke Russia and instigate a new nuclear arms race.40 There was a time when such arguments had an air of plausibility, but, in the face of Russia’s nuclear modernization and saber rattling, they look increasingly untenable.

### Burdensharing Good Answers

#### Turn: increased European defense spending means regional rivalries and war

Stephen Walt, Harvard, 2005, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Priimacy, Kindlg edition

This same motivation is evident today. In Europe, U.S allies continue to favor an American military presence as an insurance policy against any future “renationalization” of foreign policy, a development that could turn Europe back toward rivalry and conflict. Although this possibility might seem remote, the fear has been real enough to convince many Europeans that keeping the American “night watchman” in place is still worth it. Walt, Stephen M.. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U. S. Primacy (Kindle Locations 2887-2890). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

#### Allies won’t share more of the burden

Ian Bremmer, September 2016, Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World, Kindle edition, page number at end off card. Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk.. He’s also the President of the Eurasia Group

No one has more partners, friends, and allies than America. China and Russia have only partners of convenience. But the U.S. government has undermined its ability to persuade allies to share international burdens. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the prison at Guantánamo Bay, and drone strikes inside other countries have all made it harder for foreign leaders to persuade their citizens to support U.S. policy. U.S. spy agencies have made things even more difficult— and not just in Europe. It’s harder for a U.S. president to criticize autocrats for spying on their own people while explaining to Germany’s chancellor and Brazil’s president why American spies are reading their e-mail and listening to their phone calls. Bremmer, Ian. Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World (Kindle Locations 407-408). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

#### WIthdrawal doesn’t create burdensharing, it creates aggression

Kori Schake, January February/2017, Foreign Affairs, The False Logic of Retreat, is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is the editor, with Jim Mattis, of Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/will-washington-abandon-order

**Obama’s promise was that a more modest U.S. role in the world** would lower the risk of terrorism by extracting the United States from places that tend to produce extremism, **would strengthen U.S. allies by forcing them to fend for themselves more, and would foster a more self-regulating international order. But that is not how things turned out**, as Lieber and Cohen both make clear. **That is because retrenchment and offshore balancing can affect only the external actions of states. Such strategies do little to shape how foreign governments rule**—which matters to the United States because in an intensely interconnected world, conflicts within states produce as much instability as conflicts among them. **By retreating from the mission of advancing democracy and protecting individual rights elsewhere in the world, Obama made it more likely that misrule in other countries would make the United States less safe. Obama seems to believe that the lesson of Iraq and Libya is to never intervene, rather than to learn how to intervene better, as the United States did in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, in the Balkan wars in the 1990s, and in Colombia’s struggle against insurgents during the past two decades.**

#### Allies won’t respond fast enough

Kori Schake, January February/2017, Foreign Affairs, The False Logic of Retreat, is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is the editor, with Jim Mattis, of Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/will-washington-abandon-order

There is no question that U.S. allies should do more to provide for their own security. But it’s not likely that they will see trouble coming and quickly respond. As Lieber shows, in crises as urgent and diverse as those that broke out in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s and in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine more recently, regional actors and international institutions failed to act in the absence of active and immediate American management. Cohen makes this point as well, arguing that when dealing with crises and emergent threats, “strategists should build in a large and explicit margin of error.” Liberal hegemony harnesses American power to do just that; offshore balancing, by contrast, would offer fewer buffers against surprise.

#### Allies won’t coordinate with US interests

Kori Schake, January February/2017, Foreign Affairs, The False Logic of Retreat, is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is the editor, with Jim Mattis, of Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/will-washington-abandon-order

Finally, offshore balancing takes for granted that, left to their own devices, U.S. allies will always choose strategies that align with American interests. That, too, has not been borne out in recent years. As the United States has retrenched, it has not inspired U.S. allies to confidently push back against assertive challengers. They have appeased aggressors instead: think of the Philippines’ recent talk of accommodating China in the South China Sea, or the fraying of EU solidarity with Georgia and Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression.

#### We can afford our alliances, burden sharing not necessary

Joseph Nye, Harvard, January/February 2017, Foreign Affairs, Will the liberal order survive? https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/will-liberal-order-survive

Nor will the United States lose the ability to afford to sustain the order. Washington currently spends less than four percent of its GDP on defense and foreign affairs. That is less than half the share that it spent at the height of the Cold War. Alliances are not significant economic burdens, and in some cases, such as that of Japan, it is cheaper to station troops overseas than at home. The problem is not guns versus butter but guns versus butter versus taxes. Because of a desire to avoid raising taxes or further increasing the national debt, the U.S. national security budget is currently locked in a zero-sum tradeoff with domestic expenditures on education, infrastructure, and research and development. Politics, not absolute economic constraints, will determine how much is spent on what.

### Cooperation With Other Countries Better/Multilateralism Better Answers

#### Our argument is that we should fund weapons systems that support our alliances in Asia and cooperate with them

#### US coordination and leadership necessary to effective multilateralism

Bruce **Jone**s, 20**14**, Bruce Jones is a senior fellow and the director of the [Project on International Order and Strategy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/international-order-strategy) at Brookings and a consulting professor at the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, 2014 Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension Between Rivalry and Restraint, Kindle Edition

But more tools will be needed. Changes in the international distribution of power— the phenomenon of rising states— will not make the terrorist challenge harder for the United States; to some degree, these changes should make it easier. **At least there are more states to share the burden.** As long as the emerging powers remain wedded to globalization— and with above 50 percent of their economies deriving from international trade, they have no choice but to be— **they will have important overlapping interests with the** United States to secure the infrastructure of globalization. This is likely to be an enduring feature of the evolving international order, one that creates important incentives for cooperation. In this chapter**, I highlight one example of that— counterpiracy cooperation**. It is an easier challenge than some but illustrates both important overlapping interests and potential approaches to building on them**. It involved using the UN Security Council to create both a legal basis for action**— including actions that override sovereignty— and the political space to allow non-Western powers to contribute; flexible multinational instruments that combine burden sharing with genuine military heft; **and** U.S. coordination and leadership. **It is a model whose major elements are worth trying to replicate in other areas**. Jones, Bruce (2014-03-17). Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint (Kindle Locations 1698-1707). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

#### US allies can’t supply the military force in a major war

Michael **O’Hanlon, 2014**, March 1, Washington Quarterly, “Sizing US Ground Forces: From “2 wars” to “1 war + 2 missions”, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sizing-us-ground-forces-%E2%80%98%E2%80%982-wars%E2%80%99%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98%E2%80%981-war-2-missions%E2%80%99%E2%80%99> (Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow with the [Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=16ab9835fd1545dfad62a538b86ec653&_lang=en&_z=z) and director of research for the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=7e60367e9ea646cd97bdf148dc5e2451&_lang=en&_z=z) program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His most recent book is [*Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence while Cutting the Defense Budget*](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=9ce348403f3e462d84dc3a4bda3edbd5&_lang=en&_z=z) (Brookings Institution Press 2013).

What is the presumed role of U.S. allies in all of the above? And is it possible to encourage them to do more in the future? **Consider the situation in Afghanistan: the other 47 troop-contributing nations in Afghanistan, at the ISAF mission’s peak size in 2011, collectively provided fewer than one-third of all foreign forces; the United States by itself provided more than two-thirds. That simple statistic reveals a great deal about the capacities as well as the limits of U.S. military allies today. A peak of more than 40,000 non-Afghan forces from countries besides the United States is nothing to trivialize, but it was collectively less than half the number of forces provided by the U**nited **S**tates.

The allies took the lead in Libya in 2011. But this may be the exception that proves the rule—the mission that the Europeans led was a very limited air campaign in a nearby country (and arguably everyone has fallen short in the post-conflict period, since no country has done much to help the new Libyan state get on its feet). The French also helped depose a brutal dictator in their former colony of the Ivory Coast in 2011, and helped stabilize northern Mali thereafter. These operations have on balance been courageous and somewhat effective, but limited in scope and size, as has more recent French intervention in the Central African Republic. Some European and Asian allies, as well as other nations, continue to slog away in UN peacekeeping operations in places such as Congo and Lebanon, again in a brave but limited way.

Any hopes that the election of Barack Obama with his more inclusive and multilateral style of leadership would lead U.S. allies to do a great deal more to share the global military burden are proving generally unwarranted. NATO defense spending is slipping downward, from a starting point that was not very impressive. The fraction of GDP that the NATO allies spend on their armed forces declined to about 1.7 percent by 2009, well under half the U.S. figure, and to a bit less today.14 (That 1.7 percent compares to NATO’s average level of 2.2 percent in 2000, and about 2.5 percent in 1990.)15

When allies feel directly threatened, they will contribute. South Korea in particular can be counted on to provide many air and naval forces, and most of the needed ground forces, for any major operation on the peninsula in the future. (South Korea is generally, and understandably, less enthusiastic about being pulled into an anti-China coalition in other places and for other missions.) Taiwan would surely do what it could to help fend off a possible Chinese attack, not leaving the whole job to the U.S. military in the event that terrible scenario someday unfolded. Britain could probably provide a brigade or two—up to 10,000 troops, perhaps, as in Afghanistan—for most major operations that the United States might consider in the future.18 Some new NATO allies like Poland or Romania, and some potential aspirants like Georgia, will try to help where they can, largely to solidify ties to the United States that they consider crucial for their security. The allies also may have enough collective capacity, and political will, to share responsibility for humanitarian and peace operations in the future. However, the record of the entire Western world, including the United States, is patchy at best for such operations.

The United States need not, and should not, accept primary responsibility for future military operations of a peacekeeping or humanitarian character. **But in terms of planning for major war, it will have to assume that its forces—together with those of directly threatened allies—will provide the preponderance of future capability. In specific cases, Washington can always hope for more help. But for planning purposes, it is best not count on it.**

### Colonialism/Imperialism Answers

#### We have a large foreign military presence now in 80 countries. This all occurs in the status quo. We are just arguing for a increases in *ships and high tech weapons,* their argument isn’t about us

#### Reducing US military presence increases Chinese economic colonialism

Brown ’13 (Kyle, Research analyst at the Copenhagen Institute of Futures Studies and consultant with Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Asia Dimension Unit, previously a visiting scholar at the University of Copenhagen and the National University of Singapore, “[Fracturing US foreign policy: America, China, and Africa in the new cold war](http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1625:fracturing-us-foreign-policy-america-china-and-africa-in-the-new-cold-war&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264)" November 15 2013, http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=1625:fracturing-us-foreign-policy-america-china-and-africa-in-the-new-cold-war&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264)

There is no danger of the US being driven out of East Asia, and in response, China is shifting its attention to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa in order to expand its political and strategic arenas of influence.(10) These regions are particularly important to China because of dormant or declining US involvement, and it is in Africa especially that China is moving beyond the pursuit of economic benefits and is looking to increase and reinforce its strategic presence through political and diplomatic means.(11) As reported in a recent publication by the Brookings Institution titled ‘Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States’, “The failure to perceive and prepare for China’s moves would be dangerous, unwise and potentially detrimental for the United States in the near future.”(12) Thus, the **US foreign policy** on Asia on the one hand necessitates a presence in the region, and on the other hand, **necessitates measures to counter or balance the rising influence of China in** other key areas, like **Africa**. **The greater the** economic and, by extension, the ideological or political **influence China maintains in Africa, the more strategically important it becomes for US foreign policy to reflect the need for increased involvement on the continent.** “Seven out of the world's 10 fastest growing economies are African” and in the first decade of the 21st century, the rate of return on foreign investments in Africa was higher than in any other region.(13) And Africa’s biggest economies have grown faster than their Asian counterparts in recent years.(14) China has been quick to capitalise on the opportunities and boasts US$ 198.5 billion in trade volume for 2012, compared to US$ 108.9 billion from US-Africa trade volume.(15) Despite trailing the US in overall value of aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), China maintains the highest relative growth rate of inward FDI to Africa. Observers point out that the American involvement in the Middle East has allowed China to work at establishing trade and investment relations across Africa. While President Obama,(16) and countless others before him,(17) have denied that America feels threatened by China’s growing influence on the continent, commentators propose that a new Cold War with China over Africa is slowly developing.(18) Africa’s richness in natural resources is attractive and important for both the US and China in order to fuel continued growth, yet does not accurately reflect or describe the dynamics of Sino-Africa relations. Rather, “Beijing's ‘one-China’ policy continues to shape its African investments” where “aid is primarily a diplomatic tool.…part of a historical and diplomatic narrative, not simply a stratagem for snapping up Africa's resources.”(19) Further, only 29% of China’s FDI to Africa in 2009 went towards the extractive industry, in contrast to 60% of American FDI.(20) As such, China’s approach to Africa is much less one-dimensional and less focused primarily on resource control. World Bank Economic Adviser, Harry Broadman, explains: “there is far more than oil that is being invested in — and this is an important opportunity for Africa's growth and reduction of poverty because Africa's trade for many years has been concentrated in primary commodities and natural resources.”(21) China’s desire for mutual diplomatic relations and greater political influence in Africa – despite a policy of ‘non-intervention’ – potentially threaten US interests in the region. China’s policy of non-intervention – in which it does not impose political preconditions or intervene in the internal politics of nations – has proved to be more inviting to African nations reluctant of US involvement. As indicated in Figure 1 below, the scope of China’s presence on the continent is not limited by undemocratic regimes or instability. Thus, many African nations tend to view the Chinese as favourable investors, and as a result, prompted renewed US interest in creating more dynamic partnerships with African nations.(22) The US’ response to China’s dominance in Africa includes the establishment of trade and investment initiatives such as the Power Africa Initiative and the Trade Africa Initiative, yet has been **primarily military-based** through part of a ‘regionally aligned force concept’.(25) The concept is part of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) – founded in 2007 – and based on the **new readiness model**, which gives Army units greater time to familiarise themselves with regional cultures, to learn local languages and train for specific threats and missions.(26) Tours are set to continue in 2013, and reflect a post-modern evolvement of traditional military operations. Accordingly, by **teaching military tactics, medicine and logistics, and fighting famine, disease and terrorism**, US Army Africa will seek to further strengthen ties with regional militaries and governments.(27) Thus, the US military focus in Africa is not entirely centred on security, but broadly involves a number of social, cultural, and economic dimensions designed to further **increase relations and consolidate American influence in the region.** For example, **Army doctors have** **replaced eye lenses of cataract patients and medical soldiers have distributed mosquito nets to protect locals from malaria, while Army chaplains teach Africans about dealing with post-traumatic stress** and run family readiness groups.(28) As illustrated in Figure 2, the scope of US military involvement in Africa remains quite limited, however **the impact has been quite substantial, and is expected to continue to increase** over time. This is especially true given the rising influence of China in the region. Concluding remarks The ‘pivot to Asia’ in US foreign policy focuses on realigning strategic resources to the Asia-Pacific in order to secure economic opportunities for the future. By extension, the ‘pivot to Asia’ also includes a greater role for Americans in Africa. It represents the shifting dynamics in international relations and the increasing importance of proactive strategic positioning and economic resilience. As such, the refocus of American foreign policy seeks not only to protect economic and security interests, but also **to counter-balance the growing influence of China** and other Asian firms **in Africa**. However, where China’s strategy in Africa has remained economic and top-down in nature, the US has chosen to pursue a bottom-up military approach to compliment their already dominant, yet increasingly challenged, economic position on the continent. While there exists a divergence of approaches between China and the US on how to best further their presence in Africa and protect their interests, what remains clear is the strategic importance of the continent. What remains less clear is the distinct role each power will adopt and **which will best leverage its position for political and economic gain.**

#### China-based MNCs (Multinational corporateions) FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) is comparatively worse – promotes less sustainable development, accelerates resource exploitation

Tiffen 14 (Adam, “The New Neo-Colonialism in Africa” August 19 2014, http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/19/08/2014/new-neo-colonialism-africa)

The truth is the Chinese approach in Africa is a **new form of colonialism**. Chinese interests in Africa are motivated **solely for China’s benefit**; by combining government action with corporate interests, the Chinese are locking up rights to billions of dollars of valuable commodities. African nations, facing political pressure to show some development progress, are induced to barter what are often their only significant sources of potential wealth for mediocre infrastructure that does little to develop their economies and is worth a tiny fraction of the total value of the resources they sign over to the Chinese. The lack of sustainability in this trading partnership creates an inevitable African dependence upon Chinese largess for future maintenance and rehabilitation of this infrastructure. Corruption and graft, rampant throughout African politics, has also enabled Chinese government backed businesses to influence political decision makers in their economic favor. Needless to say, Chinese construction on the African continent is also undertaken with **little regard for environmental and cultural sustainability**. The resultant **destruction of rainforests, unrestricted mining, and pollution of fresh water supplies will have a lasting negative impact** on the economic and security situation. By contrast, the United States and the European Union have taken a more measured approach. Motivated in part by economic necessity, but also by the desire to help build local capacity within their African trading partners, the U.S. and E.U. have conditioned much of their economic assistance on social and economic reform. In countries like the South Sudan, the contrast is stark. While the U.S., Britain, and Norway are South Sudan’s biggest donor countries in terms of economic assistance, they do not have any stakes in South Sudanese oil production. By requiring political, economic and social reform as a pre-condition of much of U.S. and E.U. assistance, the **true costs of development aid are apparent up-front.** Preconditions are designed to work to the long-term benefit of local governance and indigenous populations, and excesses are often tempered by social and environmental restraints. **While not perfect, this focus on investment (as opposed to exploitation) creates far less excessive imbalances and stands to benefit Africa to a far greater degree over the long term.** China’s approach in Africa is a new form of **economic colonialism**. Chinese state-backed companies will continue to extract precious natural resources with **little to no benefit derived by indigenous populations.** China’s expanding economic influence will result in an increasing dependence that will dominate African economies and politics. **This approach is unsustainable, and likely to have dire consequences.** The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit provided a perfect venue for the United States to reengage in smart, principled investment in Africa that can benefit all parties involved—an opportunity that couldn’t come at a more critical moment.

#### Reductions allow the US to dictate the terms of decolonization and leaves the door open to neocolonial economic domination. The counterplan solves by submitting the US to indigenous law

Sexton, Associate Professor African American Studies School of Humanities @ UC Irvine, 14

(Jared, “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” Critical Sociology 1–15)

The colonial paradigm preserves the colonizer and the colonized as categories of racial difference and maintains the populations in that state, even when relations of production for the political and libidinal economies of colonialism request or require the deployment of genocidal violence. The spatiotemporal logic of colonialism is permanent division in service of hierarchy and the relational logic of what Fanon identifies as colonialism’s characteristically stalled or frozen dialectic is one of interminable encounter (‘something that wants itself ongoing’). Decolonization in this context entails breaking the colonial relation, ending the encounter, and removing the colonizer from the territory in order to destroy the zoning that creates spaces for different ‘species’ and enables such massive exploitation. In this, decolonization destroys the positions of both the colonizer and the colonized. Settler colonialism, by contrast, seeks over time to eliminate the categories of colonizer and colonized through a process by which the former replaces the latter completely, usurping the claim to indigenous residence. ‘You, go away’ can mean the removal of the native population, its destruction through direct killing or the imposition of unlivable conditions, its assimilation into the settler colonial society, or some combination of each. As under the colonial paradigm, settler colonialism may deploy techniques for the production of racial difference, but it need not assume the strong form of permanent division. Likewise, settler colonialism may exploit the labor of the colonized en route, but the disappearance of the native is its raison d’être. The spatiotemporal logic of settler colonialism is transience in service of demographic substitution and its relational logic is one of radical non-encounter (‘something that wants itself terminated’). Decolonization in this context entails articulating the colonial relation, revealing the encounter, and transforming the elementary terms of cohabitation. In this, settler decolonization destroys the positions of both the colonizer and the colonized. However, we should underline a crucial difference between decolonization and settler decolonization. While it is true that decolonization seeks to undermine the conditions of possibility of colonialism, in expelling the colonizer – rather than eliminating him as colonizer – it holds open the possibility of return in the form of neo-colonialism. Settler decolonization, in turn, seeks to undermine the conditions of possibility of settler colonialism, but its trajectory involves consequences that are more severe, as it were, because the colonizer, having taken root on conquered land, must stay and live under a new dispensation. Undergoing conversion to native lifeways and submitting to native sovereignty and its related modes of governance, the erstwhile colonizer ceases to exist as colonizer, having been either taken in by the native community and/or repositioned, materially and symbolically, as a migrant engaged in an open-ended practice of reconciliation. Indeed, ‘the struggle against settler colonialism must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship ongoing’ in order to transform both of the operative terms and not only the relation itself (Veracini, 2011: 7). This may seem like settler decolonization provides a non-violent alternative to the violence of decolonization, but to frame things in this way would be to miss the point entirely. The settler colonial paradigm that informs Native Studies does not only demand specificity in our understanding of colonialism. This is not, in other words, a conceptual distinction among previously conflated varieties or forms of colonialism, but rather the analytic differentiation of heterogeneous political phenomena. Settler colonialism is not a particularly extreme form of colonialism. More to the point, in the space forged by the theoretical object of settler colonialism, in its delineation with respect to colonialism, a radicalization of decolonization is enabled and, in my view, that radicalization is settler decolonization. As a result of discrepant material conditions, settler decolonization must needs not only, like decolonization, reclaim land and resources, assert the sovereignty of the indigenous people, protect or renew decolonial forms of collective life, and establish or reestablish decolonial forms of governance; but also, unlike decolonization, pursue the settler and undercut the very basis of his capacity and even his desire to rule. The project might be phrased as a re-articulation of Captain Richard Pratt’s old Indian-hating maxim: kill the settler in him, and save the man. The analysis of settler colonialism developed within Native Studies is less a friendly amendment or point of clarification for the analysis of colonialism in general – simply broadening its scope – and more a critique and a challenge to contemplate a more profound liberation altogether.

#### The Pro enables strategic renewal of imperialism - bringing the overseas empire back home greases the wheels of intervention

Ali, Editor of New Left Review, 15

(Tariq, “How to End Empire,” https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/02/tariq-ali-imperialism-extreme-centre/)

How can hope be sustained in such a world? First, by shedding all illusions about the capacity of the rulers of the world to reform themselves. The conditions and circumstances that have enabled US imperial power to reach its present level of ascendancy are hardly a secret. And the questions currently being debated are extremely relevant. What are the limits of US power? What factors might contribute to its decline? How is US hegemony exercised today? The answers would take into account America’s size, natural resources, technology, manpower, and military superiority, compared to those of its economic rivals, and also consider how long domestic consent to such an existence is liable to continue. A well-meaning, if obvious, shortcut is to indulge in wishful thinking, which comes in various guises. The simplest of these queries the very notion of an imperial United States of America, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some write of the differences between the old European pattern of colonization and the current variant, employing a sleight of mind to give Washington a clean bill of health. Such a view ignores institutions and emphasizes individuals. To present the aggressive post-9/11 forward march as the initiative of “crazies” (Cheney/Rumsfeld), or a dumb and malign George W. Bush, encourages amnesia. The fact that Obama/Clinton have effectively continued the policies of the preceding administration and, in some cases, gone beyond them suggests that Bush and his associates did not have a monopoly on “craziness.” The political literature on the decline and coming fall of the American Empire has proliferated in recent years, and is equally unsatisfactory. There is an air of desperation. Setbacks are interpreted as crushing defeats, while deluded hopes fasten onto the rise of China, or Putin’s Russia, or even onto political Islam. In reality, the imperial highway is unconquered and unconquerable from without; the only serious exit route lies within the country. What combination of social forces at home can defeat the labyrinthine power structures of the United States? However bleak such a vision might appear at the moment, there is no other on the horizon. A “good” patriot today is made to feel that she must, of necessity, also be pro-imperialist. More skeptical citizens who believe that the Empire’s military bases should be dismantled, its troops brought home, its military expenditure reduced, and America itself redefined as just a large state among others, only using force when it is directly threatened, are viewed as “bad” patriots, which is to say, little more than backstabbing traitors. They are by default the enemy within. They are regarded as such not only at home, but also by those who fear US withdrawal abroad: vassal politicians and states in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the loyal few in South America. The rulers of the only vassal continent — Australia — would, given its geography, be equally disturbed to contemplate independence. Yet in both the Arab world and the heartlands of Western capitalism, the systemic order imposed through the Washington Consensus since the collapse of the Soviet Union has appeared to be in forward flight. The Arab world seeks to escape its recent history, while some European states, in the grip of parliamentary paralysis, dream of external deliverance from the very bankers who were responsible for the crash of 2008. The atrophy of the productive economy in the United States and large swathes of the European Union reveal a malady that was already at an advanced stage, even as some claimed that the disease had been defeated forever. In response, the optimists argued that the US was confronted by an involution similar to the one that had afflicted Britain at the heyday of its empire. Questions long treated as defunct began to be raised again, if only on the margins of the political system. The impact of this doubt on popular consciousness has spread rapidly. The events have laid bare the weaknesses of the system, exposed its bald patches, and revealed yet again that the motive force underlying empires, wars, and conquest for the last two thousand years is not ideology, but the drive to accumulate and monopolize the distribution and flow of wealth by all necessary means. The struggle to extract and transport gold and silver may have been replaced by split-second, push-button transfers on tiny machines, like the Thompson gun has been replaced by the drone, but the masters of our world are playing the same ruthless game as their forebears. 2011 witnessed the concatenation of two crises. One was symbolized by the spate of Arab uprisings challenging indigenous and Western-backed despotisms in the name of freedom. These events were much more reminiscent of the 1848 upheavals in continental Europe than of the “springtime of the peoples” of 1989, which effectively exchanged one form of dependence for another, seeing in neoliberal capitalism the only future. The other blew in like a breeze through public spaces and university campuses once again, and the noise of mass uproar could be heard on more than one continent. Mediterranean Europe in particular was engulfed by general strikes and mass mobilizations numbering millions. Do these disruptions herald the birth of a new social order, inside or outside capitalism? The answer from the upper classes is a resounding “No.” They have been hard at work using the state to bail out (Europe) or stimulate (US) the existing neoliberal system. The notion that there might be a managerial revolt from within the system, a technocrats’ uprising, belongs to the realm of science fiction. It has no precedent in history. Any change from above or within the existing structures is unlikely, unless the threats from below become too strong to resist. The democratic shell within which Western capitalism has, until recently, prospered is showing a number of cracks. Since the nineties democracy has, in the West, taken the form of an extreme center, in which center-left and center-right collude to preserve the status quo; a dictatorship of capital that has reduced political parties to the status of the living dead. How did we get here? Following the collapse of communism in 1991, Edmund Burke’s notion that “in all societies consisting of different classes, certain classes must necessarily be uppermost,” and that “the apostles of equality only change and pervert the natural order of things,” became the wisdom of the age, embraced by servant and master alike. Nevertheless, money corrupted politics. Leading politicians of the extreme center became rich during their years in power. Many were given consultancies as soon as they left office, as part of a “sweetheart deal” with the companies concerned. Throughout the heartlands of capital we have witnessed the convergence of political choices: Republicans and Democrats in the United States, New Labour and Tories in the vassal state of Britain, Socialists and Conservatives in France, the German coalitions, the Scandinavian center-right and center-left, and so on. In virtually each case the two-party system has morphed into an effective national government. The hallowed notion that political parties and the differences between them constitute the essence of modern democracies has begun to look like a sham. Cultural differences persist, and the issues raised are important; but the craven capitulation on the fundamentals of how the country is governed means that cultural liberals, in permanent hock to the US Democrats or their equivalents, have helped to create the climate in which so many social and cultural rights are menaced. A new market extremism has come into play. The symbiosis between politics and corporate capital has become a model for the new-style democracies. It was the politicians who ushered private capital into the most sacred domains of social provision. As 2014 drew to a close, how did the United States fare? Far from appearing overstretched or on the verge of collapse, America was conducting business as usual across the world. The NATO intervention and “victory” in Libya was carried out via a monopoly of air space, sealing Africa Command’s first military triumph, setting the tone for dealing with the rest of the continent in the decade that lies ahead. The Arab East remains unstable; nevertheless, the moderate Islamist forces in the region are only too happy to accommodate most imperial needs, with the odd disagreement on Israel largely for show and not reflecting any fundamental shift in policy. The Taliban and ISIS will do the same when the time comes. Meanwhile, the oil giants — BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and ConocoPhillips — netted profits in the region of $900 billion over the last decade. Elsewhere further advances are dotted on the world map. The traditionally servile Australian elite agreed to a new US military base in Australia with alacrity. This was accompanied by hard anti-Chinese talk in which President Obama underlined the imperial presence in the Far East, stressing that the US was an Asian power and warning the Chinese to “play by the rules of the road.” These are rules that the Chinese know are formulated, interpreted, and enforced by the US. Elsewhere, only South America has experienced a rise of political resistance to imperial hegemony, both political and economic. This is the first time since the Monroe doctrine that four states are without US ambassadors: Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The largest state in the region, Brazil, has asserted a degree of independence lacking in recent decades. State Department functionaries visit Brasilia regularly to reassure the political elite that “Obama is not Bush,” a message greeted with some skepticism. It is hardly a secret that Obama/Clinton approved the coup in Honduras and that death squads are back in favor. Plans to destabilize the Bolivarian states and topple their governments have not been abandoned, as the 2012 overthrow of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay revealed. Washington searches out the weakest link in the enemy camp and then proceeds to destroy it, with military force when necessary, but preferably by using local relays and manipulating the system, as in Asunción, and in Venezuela after Chávez succumbed to cancer. To think that the military-political leadership of the United States is preparing to go back home after organizing a soft dismantling of its overseas empire is eminently comforting and wholly untrue.

#### Removal allows colonialism to reassert itself in more covert ways throughout the African continent

Wilson ’13 (Amrit Wilson is an activist and writer on issues of gender and race. Her books include, ‘[The Threat of Liberation: Imperialism and Revolution in Zanzibar](http://www.plutobooks.com/display.asp?K=9780745334073)’, ‘[Finding a Voice – Asian women in Britain’](http://www.amazon.co.uk/Finding-Voice-Asian-Women-Britain/dp/0860680126) and ‘[Dreams Questions and Struggles –South Asian women in Britain](http://us.macmillan.com/author/amritwilson)’. She is a founder of South Asia Solidarity Group, and board member of Imkaan, a Black, South Asian and minority ethnic women’s organisation dedicated to combating violence against women in Britain, She was also a founder member of Awaz and an active member of OWAAD, “US interventions in East Africa: from the Cold War to the 'war on terror'” November 18 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/amrit-wilson/us-interventions-in-east-africa-from-cold-war-to-war-on-terror)

In Somalia today the US and Britain, with the help of their many proxy fighters and  'peacekeepers' claim to be fighting Al-Shabaab. **Tomorrow, it could be a different terrorist group or a different country** which is targeted. **In Africa**, as elsewhere, **the 'war on terror' can always find ‘terrorists’ to fight** - they could be ordinary people going about their business which happens to stand in the way of corporate loot, or groups which grow under the shadow of imperialism generated by people’s anger against its injustices, or encouraged and created by imperialism itself .

#### The US *put the landmines there in the first place* – if you walked into someone’s backyard and distributed and planted landmines– *you can’t just throw up your hands and leave*

APIC 98—African Campaigns to Ban Landmines, a multi-country coalition representing African governments and NGOs [“Africa: Landmines Campaigns Letter,” *University of Pennsylvania: African Studies Center,* 3/23/98, <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic_32398.html>, accessed 9-10-2015]

Background

The presence of anti-personnel landmines (AP mines) in our continent has created and continues to create a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions. Anti-personnel landmines pose a major obstacle for sustainable community development and agricultural activity. Problems of reconstruction and development, foreign debt and poverty are exacerbated by the presence of these deadly weapons in our soil.

In Africa, the legacy of war and in particular anti-personnel landmines continue to burden the most vulnerable sectors of our societies, amongst them women and children. African people continue to experience first hand the effects and tragedy wrought on civilian populations by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines.

The international community now accepts that mines are no longer a security issue, but a humanitarian crisis of global proportions and have thus united to negotiate a treaty banning these weapons. Besides for countries such as the U.S.A, China, Russia, Pakistan and India, the world has largely been unanimous in its condemnation and revulsion of war and anti-personnel landmines, which have targeted civilian populations.

Africa is a continent that is solidly behind the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction. In fact thirty-eight African nations have signed the Treaty - including all those in the Southern African Development Community. Thus far the Clinton Administration has refused to sign.

As part of President Clinton's official agenda when he travels to several Africa states this month are discussions around the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and an African Peacekeeping Force. It is ironic that President Clinton will come to Africa to discuss economic recovery support when one of the most critical factors impeding economic recovery in Africa are the millions of acres of land that cannot be developed as a result of landmines. President Clinton, whose visit to Africa is the first by an American President in 20 years, will visit six countries who have positively responded to the humanitarian crisis of landmines. All have played significant roles in the international collaborative efforts to create a mine-free world. In May 1997, member states of The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) met in Johannesburg for the First International Conference for African Experts on Landmines.

Representatives from governments and non-governmental organisations agreed to adopt as a common goal the elimination of all anti-personnel landmines in Africa and the establishment of Africa as an anti-personnel landmine free zone.

Senegal, Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda, Botswana and South Africa signed the Brussels declaration, participated in the Oslo treaty negotiations and were in Ottawa in December to sign the Landmines Convention.

Furthermore, Ghana's military forces do not use or have any stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines. Uganda, a former producer of two types on anti-personnel landmines has successfully converted its production infrastructure into a dry cell battery production line. South Africa, a former producer has destroyed over 300 000 of its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles in under six months and prior to its signing of the Convention.

U.S. mines are killing and maiming the people of Africa.

How many more African women, children and men will have their lives destroyed by landmines? How many more hospital beds filled? Prostheses made? How much more agricultural land rendered unusable? How many more roads destroyed? How many more veterans, development, humanitarian, women's, medical, children and religious groups will need to write to you? How many more petitions must be signed and delivered to you before you sign and ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction ?

The United States has manufactured anti-personnel landmines which have left Africa the most severely affected continent in the world. U.S. mines can be found in farmers' fields from the Horn to Southern Africa and as far across the continent as the Bedouin routes of Western Sahara. U.S. manufactured anti-personnel landmines have been found in Ethiopia, Somalia, Morocco, Tunisia, Angola, Malawi, Western Sahara and Zambia. For years, the U.S. supplied mines covertly to rebel groups in Angola and Mozambique, two of the most mined countries in Africa. The U.S. provided mines to UNITA rebels in Angola until 1991. In addition many areas are strewn with unexploded U.S.-manufactured air-delivered anti-personnel and anti-tank sub-munitions.

#### Debt is a larger internal link than militarism-it created the structural conditions for coercive and destructive economic policies in Somalia

Chossudovsky-prof economics at the University of Ottawa-13

http://www.globalresearch.ca/somalia-the-real-causes-of-famine/25725

Somalia: the Real Causes of Famine

For the last twenty years, Somalia has been entangled in a “civil war” amidst the destruction of both its rural and urban economies. The country is now facing widespread famine. According to reports, tens of thousands of people have died from malnutrition in the last few months. The lives of several million people are threatened. The mainstream media casually attributes the famine to a severe drought without examining the broader causes. An atmosphere of “lawlessness, gang warfare and anarchy” is also upheld as one of the major causes behind the famine. But who is behind the lawlessness and armed gangs? Somalia is categorized as a “failed state”, a country without a government. But how did it become a “failed state”? There is ample evidence of foreign intervention as well as covert support of armed militia groups. Triggering “failed states” is an integral part of US foreign policy. It is part of a military-intelligence agenda. According to the UN, a situation of famine prevails in southern Bakool and Lower Shabelle, areas in part controlled by Al Shahab, a jihadist militia group affiliated to Al Qaeda. Both the UN and the Obama administration had accused Al Shahab of imposing “a ban on foreign aid agencies in its territories in 2009″. What the reports do not mention, however, is that Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) (“Movement of Striving Youth”) is funded by Saudi Arabia and supported covertly by Western intelligence agencies. The backing of Islamic militia by Western intelligence agencies is part of a broader historical pattern of covert support to Al Qaeda affiliated and jihadist organizations in a number of countries, including, more recently, Libya and Syria. The broader question is: What outside forces triggered the destruction of the Somali State in the early 1990s? Somalia remained self-sufficient in food until the late 1970s despite recurrent droughts. As of the early 1980s, its national economy was destabilized and food agriculture was destroyed. The process of economic dislocation preceded the onset of the civil war in 1991. Economic and social chaos resulting from IMF “economic medicine” had set the stage for the launching of a US sponsored “civil war”. An entire country with a rich history of commerce and economic development, was transformed into a territory. In a bitter irony, this open territory encompasses significant oil wealth. Four US oil giants had already positioned themselves prior to the onset of the Somali civil war in 1991: Far beneath the surface of the tragic drama of Somalia, four major U.S. oil companies are quietly sitting on a prospective fortune in exclusive concessions to explore and exploit tens of millions of acres of the Somali countryside. According to documents obtained by The Times, nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips in the final years before Somalia’s pro-U.S. President Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown and the nation plunged into chaos in January, 1991. … Officially, the Administration and the State Department insist that the U.S. military mission in Somalia is strictly humanitarian. Oil industry spokesmen dismissed as “absurd” and “nonsense” allegations by aid experts, veteran East Africa analysts and several prominent Somalis that President Bush [Senior], a former Texas oilman, was moved to act in Somalia, at least in part, by the U.S. corporate oil stake. But corporate and scientific documents disclosed that the American companies are well positioned to pursue Somalia’s most promising potential oil reserves the moment the nation is pacified. And the State Department and U.S. military officials acknowledge that one of those oil companies has done more than simply sit back and hope for peace. Conoco Inc., the only major multinational corporation to maintain a functioning office in Mogadishu throughout the past two years of nationwide anarchy, has been directly involved in the U.S. government’s role in the U.N.-sponsored humanitarian military effort.( The Oil Factor in Somalia : Four American petroleum giants had agreements with the African nation before its civil war began. They could reap big rewards if peace is restored. – Los Angeles Times 1993) Somalia had been a colony of Italy and Britain. In 1969, a post-colonial government was formed under president Mohamed Siad Barre; major social programs in health and education were implemented, rural and urban infrastructure was developed in the course of the 1970s, significant social progress including a mass literacy program was achieved. The early 1980s marks a major turning point. The IMF-World Bank structural adjustment program (SAP) was imposed on sub-Saharan Africa. The recurrent famines of the 1980s and 1990s are in large part the consequence of IMF-World Bank “economic medicine”. In Somalia, ten years of IMF economic medicine laid the foundations for the country’s transition towards economic dislocation and social chaos. By the late 1980s, following recurrent “austerity measures” imposed by the Washington consensus, wages in the public sector had collapsed to three dollars a month.

#### security exigencies will always be propped up to justify colonialism and they can’t wish away other structural issues that motivate colonialist behavior at a state-to-state and individual level

de Araujo, professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 14

(Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have giv

en orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

#### AFRICOM cuts will cause PRIVE MILITARY CORPORATION (PMC) reliance – turns the case.

Jackson 2009 Paul, Professor of African Politics University of Birmingham, Missions and Pragmatism in American Security Policy in Africa Contemporary Security Policy Volume 30, Issue 1, 2009

Given the reliance on strong states to carry out these strategic aims, this raises the second question of how this is to be carried out. AFRICOM has a wide mandate but lacks the basic tools to carry it out. There is to be no allocation of new military units to AFRICOM and given the twin problems of imperial over-reach and collapse of the financial system (and consequent budget cutting), this makes AFRICOM's problems acute. Imperial over-reach in Afghanistan and Iraq have put extreme pressures on the American military establishment and the likelihood that troops can be assigned from either of these theatres to Africa is small. As N'Diaye and Africa point out in this issue, this leaves one key option: private companies. A key example for this approach is Liberia, where, since 2004, DynCorp has been responsible for retraining the Liberian army. This engagement is documented in several sources, but briefly the security sector reform (SSR) programme was divided between DynCorp, with responsibility for the Liberian military, and others with responsibility for specialist training.5 The DynCorp element was primarily training and selection, including vetting recruits for human rights records. Whilst the basic training elements have been largely successful there are relevant issues concerning the lack of local ownership by Liberians of this process and also the lack of integration of the training and armed forces in general into any framework of civil control. This partly goes back to a difference in definition between the United States and other agents engaged in SSR activities, with the United States taking a very narrow view of SSR as training whereas much work on SSR elsewhere by NGOs like the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces or by the British government in Sierra Leone, has been concerned with civilian control over armed forces, that has incorporated, but not been limited to, military training and equipment. The experience of DynCorp in Liberia has not been seen as a particularly positive experience from the point of view of the longer term development goals espoused by Theresa Whelan. The absence of local ownership, the contracting of military training, and the exclusion of many civil society groups from the SSR process has been worsened by the reduction of basic training from 11 to eight weeks with the cutting of elements concerned with civics training. This is clearly worrying in a country with an at best chequered history of military involvement in domestic politics, corruption, and human rights abuse. Given the inability of AFRICOM to carry out many of their activities themselves, this will inevitably lead to an increase in the activities of private military companies (PMCs). McFate, as a former industry insider, points out that this is what the PMC industry is waiting for. The rapid development of a US-sponsored conflict market that started in the 1990s and has escalated in Afghanistan and Iraq needs somewhere to develop as these markets wind down and Africa is an obvious target. In addition, the types of service identified by AFRICOM – training, equipping, logistics, SSR, etc. – are those areas where PMCs have developed skills in current conflicts and can therefore easily match AFRICOM's demand. On one level, one may ask if this is actually a problem. If AFRICOM needs services, and those services are required by African states and PMCs can be contracted to provide those services, then surely this is how markets work. However, it does raise a number of issues related to some of the earlier points about AFRICOM's mission. First, one of the defining features of many African states that are seen as weak is not the ability to control a monopoly of force within sovereign territory, but to exercise the legal authority to contract with transnational firms.6 In practice this enables states to establish control over areas containing resources of interest to extractive industries using private security forces funded out of commercial activities within those regions, e.g. the use of Executive Outcomes by the Angolan government funded by diamonds and oil. What this leaves are parts of the country that are not blessed with commercially viable natural resources that progressively become marginalized. It is a view of the state as predator – not interested in sovereignty, governance, or citizens but in commercial extraction; corruption through force. Second, it is easy to see how such a state can be seen as an effective ally in terms of stability if they were on your side, after all, this is a model that could have been applied to several African regimes during the Cold War. The main issue here is that not only is it against all of the rhetoric of AFRICOM but also it is storing up longer term problems that may lead to greater instability as seen during the early 1990s. Third, a clear consequence of increased use of PMCs may be the broadening of the conflict market across the continent with an associated influx of PMCs from Africa and further afield. This could destabilize the entire continent and the consequences are dire if they cannot be controlled.

### Counterbalancing Answers

#### No balancing

**Levy and Thompson 10** (Jack S., Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, & William R., Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing\_on\_Land\_and\_at\_Sea.pdf

Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signiªcantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases out of a total of 544 possible opportuni ties, or about 16 percent of the time. This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power. In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1’s implication that great powers are signiªcantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power.

**No evidence of balancing – too many incentivize to maintain unipolarity for other countries**

**Lieber 9** - Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (March 2009, Robert J., "Persistent primacy and the future of the American era," International Politics, Vol. 46, Iss. 2-3, pg. 119)

Despite expectations that a period of unipolarity would trigger balancing behavior or that French-German-Russian opposition to the American-led intervention in Iraq would stimulate the formation of such a coalition, effective balancing against the United States has yet to occur. President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder could not speak for all their EU partners, and it is worth recalling that in the early months of 2003, on the eve of the American-led coalition intervention against Saddam Hussein, some two-thirds of the member governments of both the EU and NATO supported the Bush administration's decision. 3 Despite arguments about 'soft-balancing', not only has balancing not occurred, but also principal European leaders have either maintained (as in the case of Britain) or reasserted (Germany and France) pragmatic Atlanticist policies, and five of the largest EU member states (that is, all except Spain) are currently governed by avowedly Atlanticist presidents or prime ministers. 4 And for its part, the EU has not distanced itself from the United States let alone emerged as a strategic competitor. 5 There are good reasons for this long-term continuity, including shared interests and values as well as the inability of the EU member countries to create a military force with sufficient funding, advanced military technology, power projection and the unity of command that would enable it to play the kind of role in the security realm that Europe's size, population and wealth would otherwise dictate. Other major powers have actually tightened their bonds with Washington, especially in Asia, where anxiety about the rise of China has shaped behavior. For example, India in June 2005 signed a 10-year defense pact ('New Framework of the US-India Defense Relationship.'). In addition, it successfully concluded an historic agreement on nuclear technology with Washington. Japan has developed closer ties with the United States than at any time in the past, especially in the realm of defense. The Philippines, after having ousted the United States from its longtime air and naval bases there, recently welcomed a return naval visit, and Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore and others also have leaned more toward than away from America. Despite a rise in expressions of anti-Americanism as indicated in opinion polls (and more reflective of disagreement with Bush administration policies than rejection of America itself), it would be a mistake to assume that the world has turned against the United States. Indeed, wide-spread positive reactions to Barack Obama's election suggest otherwise. As for the leading authoritarian capitalist powers, Russia has adopted a much more critical and assertive stance, but the financial crisis has impacted Moscow in ways that are likely to encourage restraint. Russia's currency, banking, credit sectors and commitments by foreign investors have been very significantly affected, and with world oil prices having dropped by two-thirds between the summer and autumn of 2008, the Putin regime is likely to have less latitude than when it was flush with oil revenues. For its part, China, despite its booming economy and rapidly modernizing armed forces, has yet to take an overtly antagonistic position toward the United States. Its huge domestic export sector has been seriously affected by changes in the world economy and Beijing has urged greater cooperation with the United States and other countries to address the impact of the financial crisis. Although a major balancing coalition against the United States has not taken shape, the incoming Obama administration faces formidable challenges. Though Moscow and Beijing have not formed an alliance against Washington, not least because of their mutual distrust, both have acted to support regional states that pose significant problems for the United States. For example, Russia has engaged in talks about the sale of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran and Syria, and has been discussing a major weapons sale to Venezuela and an air defense system for Cuba. And neither Russia nor China is likely to accede to Western urging for truly effective measures against Iran's nuclear program or Sudan's depredations in Darfur. National power itself by no means guarantees the achievement of desired outcomes. Nuclear proliferation constitutes a severe and growing menace. Iran, Venezuela and Syria have proved difficult to influence or coerce. The war in Afghanistan has no end in sight, and the willingness and ability of NATO allies to provide sufficient numbers of effective troops remains limited. American forces are likely to disengage gradually from Iraq as its government gains greater authority and local forces assume more of the responsibility for security throughout the country. During the 2008 election campaign, candidate Obama committed himself to a more rapid drawdown than the Bush administration or candidate McCain preferred. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is likely to find that redeployment will take considerable time, especially if American military commanders caution against the consequences of a too rapid withdrawal, and this will constrain its ability to put more emphasis on Afghanistan, where the Taliban has become an increasing threat and al-Qaeda has reestablished itself in the tribal areas of Western Pakistan and the adjacent border regions. Meanwhile, despite the desirability of progress toward a meaningful agreement, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolvable in the absence of a coherent Palestinian leadership with the capacity and authority to act on behalf of its population as well as the will to end terrorism and to work toward a two-state solution and a durable peace. In sum, the international environment in which the United States finds itself is one in which there are both stubborn and lethal threats. Multilateral and international mechanisms for responding to these perils can be effective, but they are difficult to achieve. Meanwhile, in the absence of an effective counterbalance, America maintains a position of primacy. The extent to which it can continue to do so is, however, as much or more dependent on internal and domestic considerations as it is on the difficulties it faces abroad.

**Regional balancing prevents balancing the US**

**Walt, 09 –** professor of international affairs at Harvard (Stephen, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, January, project muse)

Even if other states now worry about the unipole’s dominant power position, the condition of unipolarity also creates greater obstacles to the formation of an effective balancing coalition. When one state is far stronger than the others, it takes a larger coalition to balance it, and assembling such a coalition entails larger transaction costs and more daunting dilemmas of collective action. In particular, each member of the countervailing coalition will face greater incentives to free ride or pass the buck, unless it is clear that the unipolar power threatens all of them more or less equally and they are able to develop both a high degree of trust and some way to share the costs and risks fairly. Moreover, even if a balancing coalition begins to emerge, the unipole can try to thwart it by adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy: punishing states that join the opposition while rewarding those that remain aloof or support the unipole instead.

These structural obstacles would exist regardless of who the single superpower was, but a counterhegemonic alliance against the United States faces an additional nonstructural barrier. The United States is **[End Page 96]** the sole great power in the Western hemisphere, while the other major powers are all located on the Eurasian landmass. As a result, these states tend to worry more about each other; furthermore, many have seen the United States as the perfect ally against some nearby threat. Accordingly, they are even less likely to join a coalition against the United States, even if U.S. power is substantially greater. Assembling a vast counter-American coalition would require considerable diplomatic virtuosity and would probably arise only if the United States began to pose a genuine existential threat. It is unlikely to do so, however, in part because this same geographic isolation dampens American concerns about potential Eurasian rivals.30 America’s geopolitical isolation has been an advantage throughout its history, and it remains an important asset today.31

### Deficits Answers

#### Non-unique – We have a $19 trillion deficit and it increases ever year. The Republicans are going to pass massive tax cuts and those will increase the deficit

Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/12/05/trump-deficit-spending-may-not-impress-the-market/

Mr. **Trump has said that he will seek to boost economic growth through a series of tax cuts and fiscal spending**. Already, analysts are forecasting a broad rise in corporate earnings due to tax cuts, which could have especially large impacts on sectors like [banks](http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/11/23/how-a-trump-tax-cut-could-boost-banks/?mod=ST1)and [retailers](http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/11/29/investors-in-retail-stocks-bet-on-lower-corporate-taxes/?mod=ST1). That could support the next leg higher in many stocks, the thinking goes.

But **the tax plan Mr. Trump has proposed would cause the budget deficit to expand to nearly $1 trillion in 2017 from about $590 billion this year**, the bank’s researchers believe.

#### They don’t have any impact to the INCREMENT of the deficit increase that would accompany the spending increase that we are advocating. Their impacts assume the TOTAL deficit, which is not cause by the Pro

#### Turn – military spending massively increases economic growth .These jobs would generate tax revenue through economic activity

National Conference on State Legislatures, September 9, 2016, Military’s Impact on State Economies, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/military-s-impact-on-state-economies.aspx>

The Department of Defense (DoD) operates more than 420 military installations in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico. These installations—which may also be referred to as bases, camps, posts, stations, yards or centers—sustain the presence of U.S. forces at home and abroad. Installations located within the United States and its territories are used to train and deploy troops, maintain weapons systems and care for the wounded. Installations also support military service members and families by providing housing, health care, childcare and on-base education. **The DoD contributes billions of dollars each year to state economies through the operation of military installations. This spending helps sustain local communities by creating employment opportunities across a wide range of sectors, both directly and indirectly. Active duty and civilian employees spend their military wages on goods and services produced locally, while pensions and other benefits provide retirees and dependents a reliable source of income. States and communities also benefit from defense contracts with private companies for equipment, supplies, construction and various services such as health care and information technology.** The economic benefits created by military installations are susceptible to change at both the federal and state levels. Recent events such as the drawdown of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, federal budget cuts, and potential future rounds of Base Realignment and Closure have left government officials uncertain of the future role and sustainability of military installations. These trends have been a driving force behind many states’ decisions to commission studies that define the military activity and infrastructure that exists in the state and measure the economic impact of military presence. Economic impact studies allow states to better advocate on behalf of their installations and plan for future growth or restructuring. At least 26 states have recently completed or are in the process of completing military economic impact studies. Impacts generally include salaries and benefits paid to military personnel and retirees, defense contracts, local business activity supported by military operations, tax revenues and other military spending. **In 2015, for example, military installations in North Carolina supported 578,000 jobs, $34 billion in personal income and $66 billion in gross state product. This amounts to roughly 10 percent of the state’s overall economy. In Kentucky the military spent about $12 billion from 2014 to 2015, which was a reduction of $3.5 billion since the last report in 2012. With around 38,700 active duty and civilian employees,** the military is the largest employer in Kentucky by more than 21,000 jobs. They also support the highest payroll with a total of $3.85 billion, $80 million higher than the second largest industry in Kentucky. Even states with relatively small military footprints have reported significant economic impacts. A study in Massachusetts, for example, found that by investing $9.1 billion in FY 2011, military installations contributed another $4.6 billion in spending and added more than 30,600 jobs to the state economy. The table below is a representation of military economic impact studies done on behalf of each of the 50 states. Most of the studies were done internally or commissioned by state organizations, while others were sourced from regional or national analyses or other publications. At least 23 states – Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington – utilize numbers that were gathered by internally commissioned studies.

#### World War II proves the military spending is a massive economic boost

Douglas J. Amy, Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College, 2010, The Deficit Scare: Myth vs. Reality, <http://www.governmentisgood.com/articles.php?aid=30&print=1>

**Conservatives are also wrong when they argue that deficit spending and a large national debt will inevitably undermine economic growth. To see why, we need to simply look back at times when we have run up large deficits and increased the national debt. The best example is World War II when the national debt soared to 120% of GDP – nearly twice the size of today’s debt. This spending not only got us out of the Great Depression but set the stage for a prolonged period of sustained economic growth in the 50s and 60s. Massive investments were made in science and technology, American workers were re-trained and re-employed, private investment was encouraged, and consumer purchasing power was increased. That 25-year post-war economic boom, with the most rapid increase in living standards in our history, would not have happened without the stimulus of all this deficit spending.**

### Deterrence Wrong Answers

#### Deterrence is effective and empirically verifiable

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, page 27-31.

As so broadly conceived, there is strong evidence that deterrence, that is, the effect of external factors on the decision to go to war, is the missing link in the war/peace equation. In my War/Peace Seminar, I have undertaken to examine the level of deterrence before the principal wars of the twentieth century.10 This examination has led me to believe that in every case the potential aggressor made a rational calculation that the war would be won, and won promptly.11 In fact, the longest period of time calculated for victory through conventional attack seems to be the roughly six reeks predicted by the German General Staff as the time necessary ) prevail on the Western front in World War I under the Schlieffen Plan. Hitler believed in his attack on Poland that Britain and France could not take the occasion to go to war with him. And he believed his 1941 Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union that “[w]e have only to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."12 In contrast, following Hermann Goering's failure to obtain air superiority in the Battle of Britain, Hitler called off the invasion of Britain and shifted strategy to the nighttime bombing of population centers, which became known as the Blitz, in a mistaken effort to compel Britain to sue for peace. Calculations in the North Korean attack on South Korea and Hussein’s attack on Kuwait were that the operations would be completed in a matter of days. Indeed, virtually all principal wars in the twentieth century, at least those involving conventional invasion, were preceded by what I refer to as a "double deterrence absence." That is, the potential aggressor believed that they had the military force in place to prevail promptly and that nations that might have the military or diplomatic power to prevent this were not dined to intervene. This analysis has also shown that many of the perceptions we have about the origins of particular wars are flatly wrong. Anyone who seriously believes that World War I was begun by competing alliances drawing tighter should examine the al historical record of British unwillingness to enter a clear military alliance with the French or to so inform the Kaiser! Indeed, this pre-World War I absence of effective alliance and resultant war contrasts sharply with the later robust NATO alliance and absence of World War III.14¶ Considerable other evidence seems to support this historical analysis as to the importance of deterrence. Of particular note, Yale Professor Donald Kagan, a preeminent United States historian who has long taught a seminar on war, published in 1995 a superb book On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace.15 In this book he conducts a detailed examination of the Peloponnesian War, World War I, Hannibal's War, and World War II, among other case studies. A careful reading of these studies suggests that each war could have been prevented by achievable deterrence and that each occurred in the absence of such deterrence.16 Game theory seems to offer yet further support for the proposition that appropriate deterrence can prevent war. For example, Robert Axelrod's famous 1980s experiment in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, which is a reasonably close proxy for many conflict settings in international relations, repeatedly showed the effectiveness of a simple tit for tat strategy.17 Such a strategy is at core simply a basic deterrent strategy of influencing behavior through incentives. Similarly, much of the game-theoretic work on crisis bargaining (and danger of asymmetric information) in relation to war and the democratic peace assumes the importance of deterrence through communication of incentives.18 The well-known correlation between war and territorial contiguity seems also to underscore the importance of deterrence and is likely principally a proxy for levels of perceived profit and military achievability of aggression in many such settings.¶ It should further be noted that the democratic peace is not the only significant correlation with respect to war and peace, although it seems to be the most robust. Professors Russett and Oneal, in recently exploring the other elements of the Kantian proposal for "Perpetual Peace," have also shown a strong and statistically significant correlation between economically important bilateral trade between two nations and a reduction in the risk of war between them. Contrary to the arguments of "dependency theorists," such economically important trade seems to reduce the risk of war regardless of the size relationship or asymmetry in the trade balance between the two states. In addition, there is a statistically significant association between economic openness generally and reduction in the risk of war, although this association is not as strong as the effect of an economically important bilateral trade relationship.° Russett and Oneal also show a modest independent correlation between reduction in the risk of war and higher levels of common membership in international organizations.20 And they show that a large imbalance of power between two states significantly lessens the risk of major war between them.21 All of these empirical findings about war also seem to directly reflect incentives; that is, a higher level of trade would, if foregone in war, impose higher costs in the aggregate than without such trade,22 though we know that not all wars terminate trade. Moreover, with respect to trade, a, classic study, Economic Interdependence and War, suggests that the historic record shows that it is not simply aggregate levels of bilateral trade that matters, but expectations as to the level of trade into the future.23 This directly implicates expectations of the war decision maker as does incentive theory, and it importantly adds to the general finding about trade and war that even with existing high levels of bilateral trade, changing expectations from trade sanctions or other factors affecting the flow of trade can directly affect incentives and influence for or against war. A large imbalance of power in a relationship rather obviously impacts deterrence and incentives. Similarly, one might incur higher costs with high levels of common membership in international organizations through foregoing some of the heightened benefits of such participation or otherwise being presented with different options through the actions or effects of such organizations.¶ These external deterrence elements may also be yet another reason why democracies have a lower risk of war with one another. For their freer markets, trade, commerce, and international engagement may place them in a position where their generally higher level of interaction means that aggression will incur substantial opportunity costs. Thus, the "mechanism" of the democratic peace may be an aggregate of factors affecting incentives, both external as well as internal factors. Because of the underlying truth in the relationship between higher levels of trade and lower levels of war, it is not surprising that theorists throughout human history, including Baron de Montesquieu in 1748, Thomas Paine in 1792, John Stuart Mill in 1848, and, most recently, the founders of the European Union, have argued that increasing commerce and interactions among nations would end war. Though by themselves these arguments have been overoptimistic, it may well be that some level of "globalization" may make the costs of war and the gains of peace so high as to powerfully predispose to peace. Indeed, a 1989 book by John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday,24 postulates the obsolescence of major war between developed nations (at least those nations within the "first and second worlds") as they become increasingly conscious of the rising costs of war and the rising gains of peace.¶ In assessing levels of democracy, there are indexes readily available, for example, the Polity III25 and Freedom House 26 indexes. I am unaware of any comparable index with respect to levels of deterrence that might be used to test the importance of deterrence in war avoidance?' Absent such an accepted index, discussion about the importance of deterrence is subject to the skeptical observation that one simply defines effective deterrence by whether a war did or did not occur. In order to begin to deal with this objection and encourage a more objective methodology for assessing deterrence, I encouraged a project to seek to develop a rough but objective measure of deterrence with a scale from minus ten to plus ten based on a large variety of contextual features that would be given relative weighting in a complex deterrence equation before applying the scaling to different war and nonwar settings.28 On the disincentive side of the scale, the methodology used a weighted calculation of local deterrence, including the chance to prevent a short- and intermediate-term military victory, and economic and political disincentives; extended deterrence with these same elements; and contextual communication and credibility multipliers. On the incentive side of the scale, the methodology also used a weighted calculation of perceived military, economic, and political benefits. The scales were then combined into an overall deterrence score, including, an estimate for any effect of prospect theory where applicable.2 This innovative first effort uniformly showed high deterrence scores in settings where war did not, in fact, occur. Deterring a Soviet first strike in the Cuban Missile Crisis produced a score of +8.5 and preventing a Soviet attack against NATO produced a score of +6. War settings, however, produced scores ranging from -2.29 (Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in the Gulf War), -2.18 (North Korea's decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War), -1.85 (Hitler's decision to invade Poland in World War II), -1.54 (North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords), -0.65 (Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo), +0.5 (the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor), +1.25 (the Austrian decision, egged on by Germany, to attack Serbia, which was the real beginning of World War I), to +1.75 (the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I). As a further effort at scaling and as a point of comparison, I undertook to simply provide an impressionistic rating based on my study of each pre-crisis setting. That produced high positive scores of +9 for both deterring a Soviet first strike during the Cuban Missile Crisis and NATO's deterrence of a Warsaw Pact attack and even lower scores than the more objective effort in settings where wars had occurred. Thus, I scored North Vietnam's decision to invade South Vietnam following the Paris Accords and the German decision to invade Poland at the beginning of World War II as -6; the North Korean/Stalin decision to invade South Korea in the Korean War as -5; the Iraqi decision to invade the State of Kuwait as -4; Milosevic's decision to defy NATO in Kosovo and the German decision to invade Belgium and France in World War I as -2; and the Austrian decision to attack Serbia and the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor as -1. Certainly even knowledgeable experts would be likely to differ in their impressionistic scores on such pre-crisis settings, and the effort at a more objective methodology for scoring deterrence leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, both exercises did seem to suggest that deterrence matters and that high levels of deterrence can prevent future war.¶ Following up on this initial effort to produce a more objective measure of deterrence, two years later I encouraged another project to undertake the same effort, building on what had been learned in the first iteration. The result was a second project that developed a modified scoring system, also incorporating local deterrence, extended deterrence, and communication of intent and credibility multipliers on one side of a scale, and weighing these factors against a potential aggressor's overall subjective incentives for action on the other side of the scale.3° The result, with a potential range of -5.5 to +10, produced no score higher than +2.5 for eighteen major wars studied between 1939 and the 1990 Gulf War.31 Twelve of the eighteen wars produced a score of zero or below, with the 1950-53 Korean War at -3.94, the 1965-75 Vietnam War at -0.25, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War at -1.53, and the 1990-91 Gulf War at -3.83. The study concluded that in more than fifty years of conflict there was "no situation in which a regime elite/decision making body subjectively faced substantial disincentives to aggressive military action and yet attacked."32¶ Yet another piece of the puzzle, which may clarify the extent of deterrence necessary in certain settings, may also assist in building a broader hypothesis about war. In fact, it has been incorporated into the just-discussed efforts at scoring deterrence. ¶ That is, newer studies of human behavior from cognitive psychology are increasingly showing that certain perceptions of decision makers can influence the level of risk they may be willing to undertake, or otherwise affect their decisions.33 It now seems likely that a number of such insights about human behavior in decision making may be useful in considering and fashioning deterrence strategies. Perhaps of greatest relevance is the insight of "prospect theory," which posits that individuals evaluate outcomes with respect to deviations from a reference point and that they may be more risk averse in settings posing potential gain than in settings posing potential loss.34 The evidence of this "cognitive bias," whether in gambling, trading, or, as is increasingly being argued, foreign policy decisions generally, is significant. Because of the newness of efforts to apply a laboratory based "prospect theory" to the complex foreign policy process generally, and particularly ambiguities and uncertainties in framing such complex events, our consideration of it in the war/peace process should certainly be cautious. It does, however, seem to elucidate some of the case studies.¶ In the war/peace setting, "prospect theory" suggests that deterrence may not need to be as strong to prevent aggressive action leading to perceived gain. For example, there is credible evidence that even an informal warning to Kaiser Wilhelm II from British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, if it had come early in the crisis before events had moved too far, might have averted World War I. And even a modicum of deterrence in Kuwait, as was provided by a small British contingent when Kuwait was earlier threatened by an irredentist Iraqi government in 1961, might have been sufficient to deter Saddam Hussein from his 1990 attack on Kuwait. Similarly, even a clear United States pledge for the defense of South Korea before the attack might have prevented the Korean War. Conversely, following the July 28 Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia in World War I, the issue for Austria may have begun to be perceived as loss avoidance, thus requiring much higher levels of deterrence to avoid the resulting war. Similarly, the Rambouillet Agreement may have been perceived by Milosevic as risking loss of Kosovo and his continued rule of Serbia and, as a result, may have required higher levels of NA-TO deterrence to have prevented Milosevic's actions in defiance. Certainly NATO's previous hesitant responses in 1995 against Milosevic in the Bosnia phase of the Yugoslav crisis and in 1998-99 in early attempts to deal with Kosovo did not create a high level of deterrence.35 One can only surmise whether the killing in Kosovo could have been avoided had NATO taken a different tack, both structuring the issue less as loss avoidance for Milosevic and considerably enhancing deterrence. Suppose, for example, NATO had emphasized that it had no interest in intervening in Serbia's civil conflict with the KLA but that it would emphatically take action to punish massive "ethnic cleansing" and other humanitarian outrages, as had been practiced in Bosnia. And on the deterrence side, it made clear in advance the severity of any NATO bombardment, the potential for introduction of ground troops if necessary, that in any assault it would pursue a "Leadership Strategy" focused on targets of importance to Milosevic and his principal henchmen (including their hold on power), and that it would immediately, unlike as earlier in Bosnia, seek to generate war crime indictments of all top Serbian leaders implicated in any atrocities. The point here is not to second-guess NATO's actions in Kosovo but to suggest that taking into account potential "cognitive bias," such as "prospect theory," may be useful in fashioning effective deterrence. "Prospect theory" may also have relevance in predicting that it may be easier to deter (that is, lower levels are necessary) an aggression than to undo that aggression. Thus, much higher levels of deterrence were probably required to compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait than to prevent him initially from invading that state. In fact, not even the presence of a powerful Desert Storm military force and a Security Council Resolution directing him to leave caused Hussein to voluntarily withdraw. As this real-world example illustrates, there is considerable experimental evidence in "prospect theory" of an almost instant renormalization of reference point after a gain; that is, relatively quickly after Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, a withdrawal was framed as a loss setting, which he would take high risk to avoid. Indeed, we tend to think of such settings as settings of compellance, requiring higher levels of incentive to achieve compulsion producing an action, rather than deterrence needed for prevention.¶ One should also be careful not to overstate the effect of "prospect theory" or to fail to assess a threat in its complete context. We should remember that a belated pledge of Great Britain to defend Poland before the Nazi attack did not deter Hitler, who believed under the circumstances that the British pledge would not be honored. It is also possible that the greater relative wealth of democracies, which have less to gain in all out war, is yet another internal factor contributing to the "democratic peace."36 In turn, this also supports the extraordinary tenacity and general record of success of democracies fighting in defensive settings as they may also have more to lose.¶ In assessing adequacy of deterrence to prevent war, we might also want to consider whether extreme ideology, strongly at odds with reality, may be a factor requiring higher levels of deterrence for effectiveness. One example may be the extreme ideology of Pol Pot leading him to falsely believe that his Khmer Rouge forces could defeat Vietnam.37 He apparently acted on that belief in a series of border incursions against Vietnam that ultimately produced a losing war for him. Similarly, Osama bin Laden's 9/11 attack against America, hopelessly at odds with the reality of his defeating the Western World and producing for him a strategic disaster, seems to have been prompted by his extreme ideology rooted in a distorted concept of Islam at war with the enlightenment. The continuing suicide bombings against Israel, encouraged by radical rejectionists and leading to less and less for the Palestinians, may be another example. If extreme ideology is a factor to be considered in assessing levels of deterrence, it does not mean that deterrence is doomed to fail in such settings but only that it must be at higher levels (and properly targeted on the relevant decision elites behind the specific attacks) to be effective, as is also true in perceived loss or compellance settings.38 Even if major war in the modern world is predominantly a result of aggression by nondemocratic regimes, it does not mean that all nondemocracies pose a risk of war all, or even some, of the time. Salazar's Portugal did not commit aggression. Nor today do Singapore or Bahrain or countless other nondemocracies pose a threat. That is, today nondemocracy comes close to a necessary condition in generating the high risk behavior leading to major interstate war. But it is, by itself, not a sufficient condition for war. The many reasons for this, of course, include a plethora of internal factors, such as differences in leadership perspectives and values, size of military, and relative degree of the rule of law, as well as levels of external deterrence.39 But where an aggressive nondemocratic regime is present and poses a credible military threat, then it is the totality of external factors, that is, deterrence, that become crucial.

#### And it doesn’t cause war, lashout, or any of their other impacts

Stuart J Kaufman 9, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, p. 433

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side’s felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence.¶ A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

### Diplomacy Better/Military Spending Trades-Off with Diplomacy Answers

#### 1 -- There is no solvency for the status quo (a) They have no evidence that diplomacy can resolve the scenarios we’ve isolated

#### (b) There is no evidence that State Department can resolve current conflicts with the money they have

#### © The budget is already low and (2) increasing spending for the military in the most recent budget didn’t reduce the State Department’s budget.

#### And, 3, turn, increased funding for the military means more *military diplomacy*

Jonathan Broder, June 29, 2016, Newsweek, Why the US Spends More Money on War than it Does on Diplomacy, http://www.newsweek.com/2016/07/08/state-department-pentagon-diplomacy-475655.html

President Barack Obama has long insisted that force alone can’t resolve America’s toughest challenges abroad. But **if budgets are a window into a nation’s priorities, the U.S. values its soldiers far more than its diplomats.** For fiscal 2016, **the Pentagon has had nearly $600 billion at its disposal**. **That’s** twice the size of the defense budget before the 9/11 attacks and more than **10 times the amount the State Department received for diplomacy. The ratio is widening.** F**or** fiscal 2017, **Obama has asked Congress to increase Pentagon spending by $22 billion, while his State Department request has remained flat, at $50 billion**. In fact, the Pentagon has more members of the armed forces serving in marching bands than the State Department has career diplomats. Historically, Congress has always provided more money for defense than diplomacy; weapons, after all, cost far more than foreign aid. But the gap has widened dramatically, says Charles Stevenson, a former State Department policy planner who teaches at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. After World War II, he notes, Congress passed the Marshall Plan, which provided billions in foreign assistance to help rebuild Western Europe. During the Cold War, Congress also funded influential programs like the U.S. Information Agency, which disseminated news and information about American culture behind the Iron Curtain. Back then, the State Department’s budget was half the Pentagon’s. In more recent years, budgets for diplomacy have shrunk as lawmakers pushed for more money to cover the military’s generous health care benefits and pay for new weapons and technology. Pork also plays a role. Lawmakers appropriate money for weapons the military no longer needs to keep constituents employed. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin is overseeing the manufacture of the next-generation F-35 fighter jet in nearly all 50 states. That guarantees the program, which has cost more than $500 billion so far, maintains strong support in Congress. Another factor in the growing gap between defense and diplomatic spending is partisan dysfunction on Capitol Hill. **Since 1986, constant bickering over social issues such as abortion has rendered Congress incapable of passing a key foreign policy measure that would authorize some of the State Department’s top priorities.** The default approach, Stevenson notes, has been to attach those priorities to a separate measure that funds the nation’s defenses—and passes every year. **The result has been that the military—and theintelligence community, *whose funding is secretly folded into the defense budget—increasingly performs diplomatic tasks that once were the State Department’s specialty***. For instance, knowledgeable sources tell *Newsweek* that **the CIA, not the State Department, is midwifing secret negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Houthi rebels to end the civil war in Yemen.** Some lawmakers are now trying to address the gap between Pentagon and State. One idea: proposing cutbacks in the number of military marching bands. Yet even that suggestion is meeting stiff resistance. Opponents on Capitol Hill argue band reductions actually will increase the Pentagon’s costs because the remaining military bands will have to travel more often. “Pentagon program don’t die,” quips a House Armed Services Committee aide, who was not authorized to speak on the record. “They don’t even fade away.”

#### 4 – Turn -- State Department alone can’t build leverage needed for negotiations, the military needs to do that

Michael Rubin, **December 29, 2016**, Why Was John Kerry Such a Bad Secretary of State? http://www.aei.org/publication/john-kerry-such-a-bad-secretary-of-state/ Michael Rubin is a former Pentagon official whose major research areas are the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and diplomacy. Rubin instructs senior military officers deploying to the Middle East and Afghanistan on regional politics, and teaches classes regarding Iran, terrorism, and Arab politics on board deploying U.S. aircraft carriers. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, both pre- and post-war Iraq, and spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. His newest book, [Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes](https://www.aei.org/publication/dancing-with-the-devil-the-perils-of-engaging-rogue-regimes/" \t "_blank) examines a half century of U.S. diplomacy with rogue regimes and terrorist groups.

The question to ask, then, is why Kerry has been such an ineffective if not counterproductive secretary. Why has he [been like Charlie Brown](http://movieboozer.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/lucy-football.jpg), endlessly trusting Lucy to hold the football steady no matter how many times she humiliates him? Here, the Los Angeles Times may provide a clue. From a December 27 [retrospective of Kerry](http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-kerry-diplomatic-legacy-20161222-story.html): Kerry says he is undaunted by the challenges he has faced. “I’m a believer in diplomacy; that’s the job I do,” Kerry told reporters during a recent trip to Colombia for the signing of a peace accord ending the hemisphere’s longest civil war. “And there are plenty of people around who could start conflicts. I try to prevent them or end them.” Asked about his frustrations, Kerry cited President Reagan’s sitting down with Mikhail Gorbachev, then the leader of the Soviet Union, and President Nixon’s going to Communist China after decades of hostility, as examples of attempting what might seem like quixotic forays into diplomacy. Kerry may see himself as a student of history, but he appears largely ignorant of it. I**t is true that both Nixon and Reagan talked to enemies but neither did so without first seeking to win maximum advantage by establishing leverage to win the best possible deal**. Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s secretary of state, played upon mutual fears of the Soviet Union to win agreement, but Kerry never convinced his negotiating partners that they would face worse foes unless they made compromise. As for Reagan, he spent years building up US military might in order to grind the Soviet Union into submission. Contrast that with Kerry on Iran: Prior to the start of negotiations, Iran’s [economy had declined 5.4%](http://www.newsweek.com/iran-chooses-guns-over-butter-every-time-366848" \t "_blank) according to Iranian statistics. Rather than [exploit Iran’s desperation](https://www.aei.org/publication/yes-mr-president-there-is-an-alternative-to-the-iran-deal/" \t "_blank), Kerry worked to alleviate it: The Obama administration offered Iran billions of dollars just to come to the table. Nor did Kerry (or Obama) once enunciate what the [best alternative to a negotiated agreement](https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/kerrys-bungling-negotiations/" \t "_blank) was, leading his Iranian counterparts to conclude correctly that they had the upper hand in talks. After all, if Obama and Kerry castigated their critics as warmongers, then how likely were they to join their critics if they believed war the only alternate? Can Kerry alone be blamed? No: US strategy has been incoherent across administrations. **Secretaries of State might opine but if there is no unity of effort to ensure that their diplomacy is set up to succeed, then it won’t be successful. The State Department cannot alone build leverage — that is the job of the Pentagon** and perhaps Central Intelligence Agency and should be coordinated by the National Security Council. Kerry’s problem was ego: Perhaps it was his decades immersed in the culture of the Senate, but he seems to have come to believe that his own good faith and rhetoric could substitute for the hard work of crafting coherent strategy. Essentially, his tenure was one giant short-cut. He worked hard, but not effectively. Staff and close advisors who might have offered him a reality check instead recognized that their path to recognition and promotion was to affirm whatever Kerry thought, no matter how destructive or, in some case, factually challenged it could be. Kerry, himself, has always been handicapped by his credulity: He believes what he is told. His adversaries understand that personal charm can lead Kerry to dismiss the accumulated wisdom of those more experienced or knowledgeable than he. **Diplomacy that diverges from reality is seldom successful. Kerry did not live in the real world. Nor does diplomacy absent leverage** [**ever work with adversaries or rogue regimes**](https://www.amazon.com/Dancing-Devil-Perils-Engaging-Regimes/dp/1594037973)**. It is a lesson Kerry never learned**, and history will condemn him for it. He has left the United States and its allies in a far worse position than had he done nothing.

#### 5 –Our turn is u unique -- US threat of force is not credible now

**Dobriansky, December 26,** 2016, , National Interest, Trump Will Face a Cornocopia of Global Threats, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/trump-will-face-cornucopia-global-threats-18877> *Paula J. Dobriansky, a former under secretary of state for global affairs (2001–09), is a senior fellow in the “Future of Diplomacy Project” at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,*

**IN 2017, the global environment is more dangerous than at any time since the end of World War II** **and is beset by numerous unfolding regional and global crises. Several countries seek to overturn the existing international order; no major power, except for the United States, appears to be seriously committed to its maintenance**. Instead of facing a single foreign-policy problem, President-elect Donald Trump will be confronted with an unprecedented array of diverse international challenges. **These include: North Korea’s erratic leader Kim Jong-un and his** [**nuclear saber rattling**](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/12/14/North-Korea-diplomats-say-US-to-blame-for-nuclear-issue/2111481723464/)**; an irredentist and reckless Russia that has** [**annexed**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-putin-took-crimea) **Crimea, is** [**committing**](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38320647) **war crimes whilst waging war in eastern Ukraine and Syria, and seems poised to engage in further acts of aggression against neighboring countries; a Europe that is afflicted by the refugee crisis and continued economic and political malaise; a China that is engaged in a campaign of intimidation against its neighbors, is assertively pressing maritime claims and seeking to reduce, and eventually exclude, American influence from Asia; Iran’s efforts to dominate the Middle East and the rising tide of Sunni-Shia strife and destabilization in the region; and the jihadi terrorist threat. *The United States now is neither feared nor respected. Its enemies have been emboldened and are working together;*** the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran axis is the most significant example. They seek not just to inflict a series of humiliating defeats on the United States, but also to discredit the entire American approach to global and domestic governance. And, unfortunately, they have attained some success in these efforts. **America’s friends feel neglected, marginalized and alienated; its alliances have been weakened. Having repeatedly drawn “lines in the sand” and having repeatedly retreated from them, America’s credibility has been** [**greatly damaged**](http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/obama-clinton-syria-red-line-228585) **and its global influence diminished**. The Obama administration’s [flirtation](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/science/obama-unlikely-to-vow-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons.html) with a no-first-use nuclear-weapons policy has been particularly damaging in undermining extended-deterrence guarantees. The president-elect is also faced with a major decline in domestic support for an assertive foreign policy. While there has always been an isolationist streak in the American body politic, a major portion of the electorate now questions the value of U.S. global leadership. Many Americans have also turned sharply against free trade, which has been a major component of American postwar global strategy. Many disdain U.S. alliances and global institutions as irrelevant at best and dangerous at worst. While these challenges are daunting, they can be managed. The United States remains the world’s strongest economic and military power, with a tremendous capacity for rejuvenation. The American people remain intensely curious about the world, idealistic and, with appropriate encouragement, willing to embrace an engaged foreign policy. America’s fo**es are plagued by numerous domestic problems, such as an acute legitimacy deficit, that can be exploited by an adroit foreign policy. Accordingly, there are a number of steps that need to be taken**. First, the new president must put forth a strategy that clearly lays out the fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy and elaborates why vital national interests require American global leadership. Second, the United States must lead internationally and engage both allies and friends and deter foes. Toward this end, the president must pledge to honor treaty commitments. Given finite domestic resources, burden sharing and alliance management are essential. Third, America should commit itself to maintaining a stable and rule-based international order. Our core values and moral narrative must be neither forsaken nor imposed. Fourth, **recognizing that a strong domestic economy and defense are key to America’s power globally, President-elect Trump should concentrate heavily on both.**

#### 6- Force must be credible for diplomacy to work

Ian Bremmer, September 2016, Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World, Kindle edition, page number at end off card. Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk.. He’s also the President of the Eurasia Group

The toughest choice any president makes is whether to go to war, and our past reluctance to fight has served us well. Those who support the Independent America argument are right that it wasn’t simply victory in the two world wars but our late entry into them that made the United States a superpower. By waiting as long as we could before joining these fights in faraway lands, we enhanced America’s political influence and economic power relative to every potential rival. Yet we mustn’t forget the years between the wars when isolationist U.S. policymakers thought Americans could simply retreat to a world that didn’t need American leadership. Washington should never wage war where it’s not vital to U.S. interests, but nor should we shrink from any fight when it’s clear that our safety and prosperity are at stake. Let’s also remember that **the credible threat of force is an essential element of successful diplomac**y. Bremmer, Ian. Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World (Kindle Locations 1293-1299). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

#### 7- Turn -- De-emphasizing military spending for diplomacy fails to arrest conflict – Obama empirical proves and their evidence is theoretical Zalmay Khalilzad, a former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense, was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 2017, National Interest, January-February, America Needs a Bipartisan Foreign Policy. Donald Trump Can Make it Happen. http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/america-needs-bipartisan-foreign-policy-donald-trump-can-18820

Some retrenchment was to be expected after the George W. Bush era, which had seen almost eight years of war, two regime-change operations and two large simultaneous nation-building projects. Arguably, though, some of President **Obama’s policies overcompensated, creating power vacuums** that were soon filled by hostile powers and negative forces. Obama believed that in the twenty-first century, unlike earlier times, it was less than optimal to use military power to achieve geopolitical goals. He therefore sought to disengage from key regions. He made a great effort to engage adversaries, such as Russia, China and Iran, hoping that reasonable compromises could be found and that diplomacy alone could be a sufficient tool. The results have been mixed. In Syria, for example, his decision to draw, but ultimately not enforce, a “[red line](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/?utm_term=.5f2ce6281e16" \t "_blank)” reverberated around the world and undermined U.S. credibility. Too often, **his emphasis on diplomacy alone was read as a weakness by revisionist powers, and they felt encouraged to press forward with aggressive agendas.**

Kori Schake, January February/2017, Foreign Affairs, The False Logic of Retreat, is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. She is the editor, with Jim Mattis, of Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/will-washington-abandon-order

**Lieber, a political scientist and professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown** University, **takes aim at Obama’s belief that conciliation with U.S. adversaries would “produce a benign change in their policies**” and Obama’s assumption that if the United States stepped back, its allies would step up and take more responsibility for the upkeep of the liberal order. **In his illuminating book, Lieber relentlessly arrays evidence showing those premises to be faulty and concludes that as a result of Obama’s choices, the United States now faces “a far more dangerous and disorderly world,” in which the country’s adversaries are emboldened, its allies enfeebled, and its credibility in tatters. Cohen is a professor of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University** and served as a high-level State Department official during the final two years of the George W. Bush administration. His more discursive but no less insightful book pushes back against another feature of Obama’s view of U.S. foreign policy: the president’s deep skepticism about the ability of U.S. military force to achieve meaningful or lasting political objectives. Cohen provides a clear-eyed review of the wars launched after the 9/11 attacks against the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Iraq and reaches a number of “dismal conclusions” regarding the flaws they revealed in U.S. strategy. But he also points out some less frequently acknowledged achievements of those wars, places the conflicts in the context of the long sweep of U.S. military history, and warns that Washington should not overlearn the lessons they offer. He **goes on** to detail the numerous and durable advantages the United States continues to enjoy over its adversaries and **to explain why robust applications of “hard power” will remain vital to confronting the threats the United States will face in the decades to come: a growing rivalry with China, an aggrieved and assertive Russia, aggressive middle powers such as Iran, jihadist terrorism, and risks to the global commons, including cyberspace.**

#### 8 -- If allies perceive us backing down on China, they pressure India to fill in—causes military modernization and spread of Brahmos cruise missiles

Mohan, 15—consulting editor on foreign affairs for ‘The Indian Express’ and a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation (C. Raja, “Raja-Mandala: Why Delhi must not be at sea,” <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/raja-mandala-china-philippines-maritime-dispute-why-delhi-must-not-be-at-sea/>, dml)

But can Delhi go beyond diplomatic statements and help China’s neighbours to stand up to Beijing? The Philippines and Vietnam fully understand that only Washington has the power to constrain Beijing. But they also fear that America and China might work out a mutual accommodation on the question of freedom of navigation and leave them in the lurch on the territorial disputes with Beijing.

As they look to diversify their security partnerships and build national capabilities for deterrence against China, Manila and Hanoi would like to see Delhi be a little more forthcoming with its hard power. Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia had expressed their interest in acquiring the Brahmos missiles that India had developed in partnership with Russia. Manila has now joined that list.

#### 9 -- India military buildup goes nuclear

Zahid and Ehtisham, 15—School of Politics and International Relations AND Department of Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University (Ahsan Ali and Hasan, “An ocean of benefits or conflicts?,” <http://tribune.com.pk/story/914385/an-ocean-of-benefits-or-conflicts/>, dml)

The Indian Ocean can be saved from becoming a zone of conflicts if India stops thinking it owns it. If the West encourages New Delhi to build a blue-water navy, it would only be a matter of time before it ends up becoming a nightmare for the West itself. The Indian Ocean ranks as the fifth largest ocean, covering 20 per cent of the water on Earth. It consists of 60 islands owned by different states and has four major waterways — the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el Mandeb and the Suez Canal.

Interestingly, the Indian Ocean had never been nuclearised even during the Cold War. The shifting of Indian nuclear weapons capabilities from land to sea, in their deployment against Pakistan and China, could end up initiating a three-party nuclear competition. India is modernising its navy at a rapid pace, and allocated it a budget of $4.8 billion in 2011. China, on the other hand, is not in a position right now to generate a stir in the contemporary strategic balance in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). India dragged the IOR into an intense arms race by introducing a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, in 2014; it is also in the process of building two more Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear submarines. India now has two platforms, INS Subhadra and INS Suvarna, to launch Dhanush missiles. The Indian Navy also has the ability to launch BrahMos missile, a joint venture between Russia and India, which can carry both conventional and nuclear payloads. In short, India is playing a dangerous game in pursuit of prestige and international recognition in the IOR where confidence-building measures or institutionalised conflict-resolution seem to be totally absent.

In the backdrop of the traditional rivalries in this region, the addition of nuclear-capable submarines in the Indian naval fleet is a serious threat to Pakistan and China. This provocation could force Pakistan and other regional states to launch drives to acquire similar capability, thus initiating an arms race in South Asia. It is not surprising that China is willing to sell eight diesel-electric, and not nuclear, submarines to Pakistan. As stated earlier, South Asia has no institutional mechanism that can be used to deal with confrontational behaviour that regional states may indulge in the IOR. If India is resolute about taking the route of sea-based nuclear strike capability, then it is highly unlikely that any possible escalation could be controlled. Pakistan needs to work on sea-based deterrence as this can provide it with strategic advantages, which could serve many implicit opportunities. The most vulnerable part of the Indian defence is its coastal belt, which the Pakistan Navy can exploit through the element of surprise.

#### 10 -- US diplomacy will be soft and China will run us over

*Ross Babbage, December 14, 2016, Baggage is a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, December 14, 2016, Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea: Strategy Options for the Trump Administration*, http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/countering-chinas-adventurism-in-the-south-china-sea-strategy-options-for-t*

An eighth contributing factor to the timid Western response is largely cultural**. The experience of the last decade suggests that Western electorates are more fearful of triggering confrontation and the escalation of an argument than their Chinese counterparts. This thinking is reflected in a concentrated form in some Western bureaucracies by their deep risk aversion**. **If the Western interest is the avoidance of confrontation and the preservation of peace at any price, that price is likely to be extremely high. When confronted by an expansionist, non-democratic peer competitor, the repeated avoidance of confrontation results in the loss of important strategic positions and the evaporation of much international credibility.**

#### 11- Strengthening US military capabilities critical effective diplomacy that will stop Russian aggression and accidental conflict escalation

**Allison & Simes, 2017,** January-February, National Interest, A Blueprint for Trump to fix relations with Russia, Januaryhttp://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/blueprint-donald-trump-fix-relations-russia-18776?page=**show** Graham T. Allison is director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans. He is the author of the forthcoming book**[Destined for War: America, China and Thucydides’s Trap](http://amzn.to/2hFd8fc" \t "_blank)**.Dimitri K. Simes, publisher and CEO of the**National Interest**, is president of the Center for the National Interest.

**A genuinely different approach toward the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts should incorporate *credible strength and creative diplomac*y to produce outcomes favorable to the U**nited **S**tates. To demonstrate its strength, America should use military deployments and private warnings (so as to avoid publicly cornering Putin) to communicate to Moscow that unilateral solutions will not work in either Syria or Ukraine. **The key is to show that the United States and its allies will be able to provide enough support to the rebels in Syria and to the government in Kiev to make sure that both conflicts are unsolvable on Moscow’s terms without prohibitive costs to Russia**. This also means showing that whoever the United States chooses to support will gain strength over time, which encourages serious negotiations sooner rather than later. Sixth, **you should strengthen U.S. military capabilities in ways that simultaneously dissuade Russia from aggression (both overt and covert) against NATO allies in Europe and respect Russia’s legitimate interest in ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet Union. It is almost impossible for the United States to have too big a stick**. But **by far the most likely paths to military conflict with Russia begin not with a premeditated Russian attack, but with an unintended event, for example, an incident between nationals and ethnic Russians in one of the Baltics that creates a crisis in which Putin concludes he must intervene.** NATO is the greatest alliance in history and played an essential role in America’s Cold War victory. But today, it stands in need of substantial reform. Europe is presently itself in crisis. The failure of the EU economies to grow since the Great Recession, Brexit, uncertainties about who may be Nexit, an unending stream of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, and an inability to control its own borders—all these raise fundamental questions about the viability of the European project. Given these challenges, the United States should not allow itself to become a lightning rod—or scapegoat. Thus we urge you to reiterate America’s commitment to NATO, including Article Five security guarantees, at the outset. But Washington should also propose that NATO members undertake a zero-based reassessment of the alliance. In his inaugural address, JFK urged Americans not to ask what their government could do for them but to “ask what you can do for your country.” European leaders should ask less what America can do for them and more what they can do for European security. ***Your effort will be aided by an overall increase in U.S. military capabilities***, **much as President Ronald Reagan’s *diplomatic outreach* to the Soviet Union benefited from a perception in Moscow that the United States was changing the balance of power in its favor after a period of decline**. **This is especially important at a time when Russia’s defense production is poised to grow by 10 percent this year, *despite economic pressure***. Combining investment in U.S. capabilities with calculated use of your reputation for unpredictability could be particularly useful, much as Nixon cultivated the image of a “madman” to enhance his leverage in Southeast Asia. An early demonstration of your resolve might also be necessary—when suitable circumstances arise—to change Russian perceptions of the costs of ignoring U.S. preferences. At the same time, we urge you to follow through on your campaign pledge to persuade Europe to contribute more to the alliance. Since European NATO members are the principal beneficiaries of the security guarantee, and they collectively exceed the United States in population and rival it in gross domestic product, they should pay a significantly larger share of the costs. We should put an end to the illusion that, as the Financial Times [put it](https://www.ft.com/content/6dd583cc-acd2-11e6-9cb3-bb8207902122" \t "_blank), “the U.S. commitment to defend even the newest and smallest NATO members must remain unconditional.” Like all alliances, NATO is valuable to the extent that it advances and defends other American national interests—it is an instrument, not the icon that some in Europe (and particularly Central Europe) would understandably like it to be. Accordingly, the United States should reiterate its commitment to defend the Baltic states from naked aggression, in concert with other allies, but insist that the Baltic governments themselves attempt to normalize relations with Moscow and meet the highest international standards in ensuring the rights of ethnic Russians. The goal must be to prevent incidents that could provide a temptation—or excuse—for Russian intervention. There should be no illusions that America accepts responsibility for allies who provoke conflict and then request assistance and reassurance to deal with the consequences.

#### 12 -- US-Russian war goes nuclear

**Allison & Simes, 2017,** January-February, National Interest, A Blueprint for Trump to fix relations with Russia, Januaryhttp://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/blueprint-donald-trump-fix-relations-russia-18776?page=**show** Graham T. Allison is director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a former assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans. He is the author of the forthcoming book**[Destined for War: America, China and Thucydides’s Trap](http://amzn.to/2hFd8fc" \t "_blank)**.Dimitri K. Simes, publisher and CEO of the**National Interest**, is president of the Center for the National Interest.

THE TWO Chinese characters that make up the word “crisis” can be interpreted as meaning both “danger” and “opportunity.” Russia today offers your administration not only a serious challenge but a significant opportunity.

Russia is no longer the Evil Empire the United States confronted over decades of Cold War. Nonetheless, Russia remains a player whose choices affect vital U.S. interests profoundly across the agenda of global issues. First and foremost, **Russia remains the only nation that can *erase the U****nited* ***S****tates* ***from the map in thirty minutes.*** *Second,* ***Russia is key to preventing nuclear terrorism as well as proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and missile-delivery systems****. Third,* ***Russia*’s decisions on whether to share intelligence, or withhold it, significantly affect odds of preventing attacks by terrorists on U.S. citizens** and assets across the world. Fourth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, bordering China to the East, Poland in the West, and the United States across the Arctic. (Thus, claims that it is only a “regional” power miss the fact that it abuts every important region.) Fifth, **Russia’s Soviet-era scientific establishment and post-Soviet achievements make it a global leader in science and technology, particularly in high-tech military hardware. These talents allow it to mount formidable cyber capabilities**, second only to the United States, and to produce impressive weapons. The only way U.S. astronauts can currently travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The cofounder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergey Brin. Sixth, Russia is prepared to fight: it has demonstrated both the capability and the will to use military force to achieve its objectives, from annexing Crimea to bolstering Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Seventh, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate—from selling advanced systems like S-300 air defenses to Iran to aligning militarily with China. **On their current trajectory**, **the U**nited **S**tates and **Russia face a serious risk of stumbling into a war neither side wants and which would be catastrophic for both**. You have been elected to change the way Washington does business, and nowhere is that needed more than in dealing with Moscow. While the mainstream press and punditry have panned your campaign pledge to put “America First,” we suggest you remind everyone of the mantra under which both Democratic and Republican presidents fought the Cold War. It affirmed that Americans’ primary purpose in the world was to “preserve the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact.” To that end, they set about building a new world order aimed at advancing the cause of peace, prosperity and freedom for all: for Americans, their allies and other nations, in that order. While some now see that hierarchy as shortsightedly selfish or unworthy of a great power, the brute fact is that the survival and success of the United States is the essential prerequisite for American power to be applied to achieve any other objective in the world. As part of your America First doctrine, we urge you to prioritize America’s most vital interests and, from that foundation, engage Russia on what matters most to American citizens’ survival and well-being. IN ORDER to understand the way ahead, it may be useful to briefly review how America arrived at the current impasse. Ironically, as we mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the disappearance of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991, U.S. relations with Russia are in their worst state since the high Cold War. All three post–Cold War administrations—Bill Clinton’s, George W. Bush’s and Barack Obama’s—entered office seeking to improve relations with Moscow. Each left office with the relationship in worse condition than when he arrived. President Obama began by announcing a “reset” in relations with Russia to secure Moscow’s cooperation on a number of priorities, including his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. As his term ends, U.S. and Russian aircraft are operating in close proximity, attacking targets in Syria with minimum communication and no coordination. This risks an unintended collision that could lead to direct conflict. **The United States has deployed a “tripwire” force of more than one thousand combat troops between the three frontline Baltic states, and Russia has responded by deploying advanced air defenses and nuclear-capable short-range missiles to its enclave in Kaliningrad**. For the first time since the 1980s, ***military planners on both sides have been reexamining options that include the actual use of nuclear weapons.*** This outcome serves as a stark reminder that aspirations, however worthy, are not enough. Detached from coherent strategy and sustained operational execution, such aspirations not only predictably fail, but also dash hopes and incite suspicions.

#### 13- Nuclear weapons modernization has been cut, increased funding needed

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card.

Modernization is the next big question in U.S. nuclear policy. **During the Cold War, U.S. nuclear forces were modernized on a continuing basis** in competition with the Soviet Union, **so that new nuclear warheads, new delivery systems, and new command-and-control capabilities regularly replaced their aging predecessors. With the end of the Cold War, this process stopped. For the last twenty-five years or so, the United States has spent essentially just the money needed to operate and maintain standing forces.** Moreover, as part of its strategy to end the nuclear confrontation following the end of the Cold War, the George H. W. Bush administration retired the newest generation of ballistic missiles; today, the newest ICBM in the existing force was placed in the ground in 1971. **Additionally, the replacement of B-52s by B-2 bombers was curtailed, with only twenty B-2 bombers coming into nuclear service**. **The newest B-52 in the existing force came into service in 1962. The newest U.S. nuclear warhead went into service in 1989.** **Accordingly**, although the forces are maintained adequately to ensure operational effectiveness today, they **are** also **aging well past their original intended service lives**. **Over the next two decades, the entire remaining inventory will have to be modernized in some way. The triad of delivery systems will have to be modernized or replaced**. Every nuclear bomb and missile warhead is either being rebuilt now or will have to be rebuilt to extend its service life or replaced with something new. ***The associated command-and-control system that ensures presidential control of all decisions to employ nuclear weapons must also be modernized.*** During the Cold War, the United States spent significant resources to develop, maintain, and modernize nuclear forces— on average approximately 20 percent of defense spending. 107 The cycle of sustainment and modernization ahead, assuming it is completed, will not require investments at Cold War levels. The force is much smaller today than in decades past, and there is no significant competitive aspect driving an arms race and a need for significant qualitative improvements. But **it won’t be inexpensive, with estimates ranging from $ 500 billion to $ 1 trillion over the next two to three decades.** 108 These are large sums. But they are only approximately 5 percent of projected defense spending over the same period. 109 By way of comparison, the portion of the defense budget currently spent to maintain and operate nuclear forces is approximately 2 percent. 110 Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (pp. 43-44). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition.

#### 14- Draw-down causes prolif, undermining nuclear negotiations

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card

A third lesson is that **the U.S. nuclear posture isn’t simply a barrier to more effective international cooperation** in the NPT framework, where many states complain about the slow pace of the nuclear weapon states in reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals. **The U.S. nuclear posture is also a tool of nonproliferation, in that the guarantees the United States has provided to others have played a critical role in leading them to conclude that they do not need nuclear deterrents of their own. Reducing the effectiveness of extended U.S. nuclear deterrence by eliminating key capabilities in the name of disarmament could actually unleash a new wave of proliferation— but among U.S. friends and allies rather than among its foes**. Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Kindle Locations 4799-4804).

#### 15 -- Diplomacy hasn’t worked in the South China Sea

*Ross Babbage, December 14, 2016, Baggage is a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, December 14, 2016, Countering China’s Adventurism in the South China Sea: Strategy Options for the Trump Administration*, http://csbaonline.org/research/publications/countering-chinas-adventurism-in-the-south-china-sea-strategy-options-for-t*

Then on the day after the release of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision, the Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, and the Foreign Minister, Julie Bishop, held a joint press conference in which Malcolm Turnbull said the following: Now as Julie has said, and we have both said on many occasions, we have no position on the competing claims for sovereignty. We have no claims of our own. But we insist that it is absolutely vital that all countries abide by international law, settle disputes peacefully and in the context of this particular dispute, that has been the subject of the decision last night that both countries abide by the decision of the tribunal. It is an important test case for how the region can manage disputes peacefully. It is an opportunity for all parties in the region to come together and for claimants to re-engage in dialogue with each other based on greater clarity around maritime rights. So both of us have been urging claimants to refrain from coercive behavior and any unilateral actions designed to change the status quo in the disputed areas. As I have said many times, every nation in our region has benefitted enormously from the many, many decades of relative peace and tranquility in this region. It is vital that that is maintained. There is so much at risk in the event of conflict, in the event of heightened tensions, so this is an important decision, it is one that has been made in accordance with international law and it should be respected by both parties and indeed by all parties and all claimants.73 In sum, the leaders of the close allies have responded to China’s seizure of effective sovereignty over most of the South China Sea with a series of one-dimensional and highly predictable diplomatic statements, supported by occasional temporary transits of military ships and aircraft through the region. It is certainly the case that these statements were not the only actions taken by the U.S., Japanese, and Australian governments in the region since 2012. The United States negotiated a new military access agreement with the Philippines, expanded the scale and frequency of its military exercises in the region, worked to rally diplomatic resistance to China’s assertiveness, and supported the Philippines’ referral of its legal case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Japan supplied new maritime security vessels to the Philippines and offered a range of other security assistance to both the Philippines and Vietnam. Australia maintained its pattern of maritime air patrols through the South China Sea, transferred some heavy landing craft to the Philippines’ Navy, negotiated a substantial expansion of its training and logistic support arrangements with Singapore, and continued many cooperative security programs with all the ASEAN maritime states. The United States, Japan, and Australia further enhanced their combined exercises and broader security activities in the region.

However, it is timely to ask how successful the approach of the United States, Japan, and Australia has been. What is the state of the scorecard? How effective have the key Western allies been in securing a cessation and then a roll-back of Chinese land creation, militarization, and effective control of the South China Sea? There have been many expressions of displeasure, appeals to international law, some demonstrations of continued freedom of navigation, and some modest efforts to boost the maritime security of Southeast Asian allies and partners. But the reality is that these actions have had little practical impact on the Chinese position on the ground, the assertive operations of Chinese maritime and air forces, or on international perceptions of China’s power and authority. To the contrary, Beijing’s accelerated activities in the South China Sea and the associated information operations have been popular with the Chinese public and reinforced regional perceptions of China’s re-emergence as a major, if not the pre-eminent, regional power. The damage to regional confidence in the United States and the other Western allies has already been substantial, and it could get worse. Western decision-makers should not assume that regional states will automatically move to counter the assertiveness of China by moving closer to the allies. In fact, some countries that were already close to Beijing, such as Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, have moved closer. The Philippines appears to be shifting its stance to one much closer to China, Malaysia is deepening its ties with Beijing, and several other regional countries are equivocal and reviewing their positions. What level of success, then, can current Western policy in the South China Sea be said to have achieved? This paper argues that the approach of the United States and the close allies in this theater has been a failure, reflecting timidity and naivety. Their consistently weak and ineffectual approach is delivering incremental capitulation.

#### 16 -- Diplomacy with North Korea fails

Geoff Dyer writes about U.S. foreign policy for the**Financial Times**and is the former bureau chief in China and Brazil. He is the author of[The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China—and How America Can Win](http://amzn.to/2gJZg3m" \t "_blank), National Interest, January-February 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/the-time-strategic-patience-over-donald-trump-must-confront-18864

Alternatively, Trump could order his administration to swallow its pride and return to the negotiating table—before North Korea has made any concessions. He could frame this as recognition of reality and argue that no one has actually tested Kim Jong-un to see if he has any room for flexibility. And what about the potential theater of a Trump-Kim summit? He would own cable news for a week. But the objective of a new round of talks is unclear. If the argument were that the United States needs a new approach because North Korea is on the verge of becoming an undeniable nuclear power, why would it make concessions in new negotiations? Pyongyang would likely push for a series of commitments from Washington that would upend security arrangements for the entire region. And although the United States would issue a denial, it would look to the world as if Washington were recognizing North Korea as a legitimate nuclear power—Pyongyang’s ultimate objective.

#### 17-- Diplomacy alone won’t cut it in Asia and Europe, we need hard power

[*Robert D. Kaplan*](http://www.stratfor.com/about/analysts/robert-kaplan), Chief Geopolitical Analyst at [*Stratfor*](http://www.stratfor.com/about), May 22, 2013, The Virtues of Hard Power, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stratfor/2013/05/22/the-virtues-of-hard-power/#61bec03b35b8

The fact is that **hard power is supremely necessary in today's world**, for reasons having nothing to do with humanitarian intervention. Indeed, the Harvard professor and former government official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who, in 2004, actually coined the term "soft power" in an eponymous book, has always been subtle enough in his own thinking to realize how relevant hard power remains. As I write, **the two areas of the world that are most importan**t in terms of America's long-term economic and political interests -- **Asia and Europe -- are undergoing power shifts**. [The growth of Chinese air and naval power](https://www.stratfor.com/node/189170) is beginning to rearrange the correlation of forces in Asia, while **the** [**weakening of the European Union in geopolitical terms**](https://www.stratfor.com/node/195877) -- because of its ongoing fiscal crisis -- **is providing an opportunity for a new Russian sphere of influence to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe**. Of course, ***both challenges require robust diplomacy on America's part. But fundamentally what they really require is a steadfast commitment of American hard power***. And the countries in these two most vital regions are not bashful about saying so. **[Security](http://www.forbes.com/security/" \t "_self) officials in countries as diverse as Japan and Poland, Vietnam and Romania desperately hope that all this talk about American soft power overtaking American hard power is merely that -- talk.** For it is American warships and ground forces deployments that matter most to these countries and their officials. Indeed, despite **the disappointing conclusions to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, rarely before has American hard power been so revered in places that actually matter**. **Asia is the world's demographic and economic hub**, as well as the region [where the great sea lines of communication coalesce](https://www.stratfor.com/node/194257). And unless China undergoes a profound political and economic upheaval -- of a degree not yet on the horizon -- the Middle Kingdom will present the United States with its greatest 21st century competitor. In the face of China's military rise, [Japan is shedding its quasi-pacifistic orientation](https://www.stratfor.com/node/195745) and adopting a positive attitude toward military expansion. In a psychological sense, Japan no longer takes the American air and naval presence in Northeast Asia for granted. It actively courts American hard power in the face of a territorial dispute with China over islands in the East China Sea. Japan knows that, ultimately, it is only American hard power that can balance against China in the region. For South Korea, too, American hard power is critical. Though the South Korean military can ably defend itself against North Korea's, again, **it is America's air and naval presence in the region that provides for a favorable balance of power that defends Seoul against** [**Pyongyang and its ally in Beijing**](https://www.stratfor.com/node/196799)**. As for Taiwan, its very existence as a state** [**depends on the American military's Pacific presence**](https://www.stratfor.com/node/2891)**.** Don't tell officials in the Philippines that American hard power is any less relevant than in previous decades. Like Japan, after years of taking the U.S. Navy and Air Force for granted, Manila is literally [desperate for American military support](https://www.stratfor.com/node/191996) and presence against China, with which it disputes potentially resource-rich islands and geographical features in the South China Sea. Like Japan and South Korea, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States: that is to say, these countries matter. As for Taiwan, it is arguably one of the finest examples of a functioning democracy in the world beyond the West, as well as geopolitically vital because of its position on the main sea lines of communication. Thus, Taiwan too, matters greatly. Vietnam, for its part, has emerged as a critical de facto ally of the United States. It is the single most important Southeast Asian country preventing China's domination of the strategically crucial South China Sea. And what is Vietnam doing? It is refitting [Cam Ranh Bay as a deep-water harbor](https://www.stratfor.com/node/189792), officially to attract navies from India, Russia and elsewhere; but especially to attract the U.S. Navy. Malaysia plays down its close relationship with the United States, as part of a delicate diplomatic minuet to get along with both China and the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the number of visits of American warships to Malaysian ports has jumped from three annually in 2003 to well over 50. As for Singapore, one of its diplomats told me: "We see American hard power as benign. The U.S. Navy defends globalization by protecting the sea lanes, which we, more than any other people, benefit from. To us, there is nothing dark or conspiratorial about the United States and its vast security apparatus." In 1998, the Singaporeans built Changi Naval Base solely to host American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. In 2011, there were 150 American warship visits to Singapore. Then there are the four American littoral combat ships that, it was announced in 2011, would be stationed in Singapore. At the other end of Eurasia, whatever their public comments, diplomats from countries in Central and Eastern Europe are worried about any American shift away from hard power. In the 1990s, the security situation looked benevolent to them. They were in the process of joining NATO and the European Union, even as Russia was weakened by chaos under Boris Yeltsin's undisciplined rule. Following centuries of interminable warfare, they were finally escaping history, in other words. Now NATO and the European Union -- so vigorous and formidable in the 1990s -- [look fundamentally infirm](https://www.stratfor.com/node/197327). Meanwhile, Russia has been, for the moment, revitalized through a combination of natural gas revenues and [Vladimir Putin](http://www.forbes.com/profile/vladimir-putin/" \t "_self)'s dynamic authoritarianism-lite. Russia once again beckons on the doorstep of Europe, and the Poles, Romanians and others are scared. Forget NATO. With declining defense budgets of almost all European member states, NATO is to be taken less and less seriously. The Poles, Romanians and so on now require unilateral U.S. hard power. For years already, the Poles and Romanians have been participating in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa. They have been doing so much less because they actually believe in those missions, but in order to prove their mettle as reliable allies of the United States -- so that the United States military will be there for them in any future hour of need. As for the Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries all desperately require U.S. hard power: If not specifically for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, then certainly in order to promote a [balance of power unfavorable to Iran's regional hegemony](https://www.stratfor.com/node/192438). Soft power became a trendy concept in the immediate wake of America's military overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. But **soft power was properly meant as a critical accompaniment to hard power** and as a shift in emphasis away from hard power, not as a replacement for it. Hard power is best employed not when America invades a country with its ground troops but when it daily projects military might over vast swaths of the earth, primarily with air and naval assets, in order to protect U.S. allies, world trade and a liberal maritime order. American hard power, thus, must never go out of fashion.

#### 18 - Increasing diplomatic ties with China perceptually signals US abandonment of security guarantees

Santoro and Warden, 15—senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS AND WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS (David and John, “Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age,” The Washington Quarterly • 38:1 pp. 147–165)

The decoupling challenge vis-a`-vis China is far more complex. To start, the military cost of a U.S.– China war continues to rise. China has long had the capability to reliably strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons, and unlike with North Korea, the United States cannot obviate this fact. China’s technological sophistication and vast resources ensure that “the combined strategic capabilities of the United States are not, and realistically cannot be, sufficiently numerous and reliable to deny China the ability to deliver nuclear warheads to the continental United States, no matter how much surprise the United States may achieve.”56 Moreover, while the United States retains a large absolute conventional military advantage over China, the relative advantage is narrowing.57 Of particular worry to U.S. allies is China’s investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that will limit the U.S. ability to project power in Asia. According to a former Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, “the conventional superiority advantage is critical, because it obviates the whole debate about whether or not Washington would ‘sacrifice Los Angeles to save Tokyo’ in a nuclear exchange.”58 At the same time, the economic and political costs of a war between the United States and China continue to grow. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is a competitor and potential adversary of the United States, but also a critical partner. The U.S. and Chinese economies are more integrated than ever before, and China works with the United States to solve global challenges such as climate change, infectious disease, and piracy. Together, China’s growing military power and political influence unnerve U.S. allies. They worry that because of the narrowing conventional military balance between the United States and China, the United States may prove unwilling to endure the costs of even a limited war with China, instead opting to concede on their core interests to prevent escalation. Tokyo in particular is concerned that the United States might begin to think that the U.S.–China relationship is more important than the U.S.–Japan alliance. As Ambassador Linton Brooks puts it, “a closer U.S. relationship with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japan’s security perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment.”59 For the United States, there is no easy solution to these assurance challenges, but there are important steps that can help mitigate allied anxiety. A large part of the allied perception that the United States is in decline relative to China comes from weakness at home. The U.S. economy continues to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, but has still not reclaimed its international reputation as the robust, resilient engine of global growth. Even worse, U.S. defense austerity combined with renewed calls for U.S. military engagement in Europe and the Middle East have caused Japanese officials and experts to doubt whether the United States has the will and capacity to maintain a long-term commitment in East Asia.60 The 2013 defense sequester continues to shortchange military investment and cripple effective long-term planning, and allies question whether the dysfunctional U.S. political system can right the ship. Ideally, the U.S. economy will continue to grow stronger, easing constrains on defense spending. But even if austerity persists in some form, the United States can do more to signal its continued commitment to maintaining a favorable military balance in Asia. First and foremost, it should make the investments necessary to preserve its military-technological edge. Then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel took an important step in this regard when he announced the Defense Innovation Initiative, which will emphasize the development of next-generation technologies like robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, and three-dimensional printing.61 But for this initiative to be successful, the Pentagon, with the support of the entire U.S. government, must ensure that focused research and development, prototyping, and eventually procurement of potentially game-changing technologies and weapons systems remain a top priority over the next decade. Second, Washington should sustain high-level political commitment to the rebalance and ensure that recent increases in U.S. political, economic, and military engagement in the Asia–Pacific become a long-term trend.62 It should counter the perception that it is more concerned with relations with China than preserving the interests of Japan and South Korea by continuing to tout the positive role that the U.S.–Japan and U.S.–ROK alliances play in promoting U. S. interests and regional security. Washington should also ensure that, through agreements like the TPP, economic integration between the United States and both Japan and South Korea increases and that, by maintaining a robust troop presence in each country, military coupling is sustained. In the strategic realm, the United States should make clear that it is not prioritizing strategic stability with China over its relationship with Japan and South Korea. Mutual nuclear vulnerability between the United States and China is a fact, and Beijing likely knows this— yet it continues to call for public U.S. acknowledgement in part to antagonize U.S. allies. Therefore, for the time being, Washington should avoid taking a step that would “have a deleterious influence on U.S. assurance efforts with respect to Japan and other important allies and partners.”63 Over the long run, however, the United States should convince allies that extended deterrence remains credible in a condition of mutual vulnerability. Publicly acknowledging a fact should not strain U.S. alliances. Finally, the United States should ensure that actions it takes to strengthen regional security architectures are not perceived as a sign of decline. If the United States is, by contrast, viewed as calling on its allies to fill a role that it can no longer handle, it would weaken both extended deterrence and assurance. Multi-layer Assurance and Deterrence While the end of the Cold War has reduced the risk of global nuclear war, it has also created a more complex, multipolar nuclear order that is more unnerving to many U.S. allies. To fully assure allies in the second nuclear age, the United States must convince them that extended deterrence works simultaneously for multiple nuclear-armed adversaries, with some of whom the U.S. relationship is far more complex than its relationship with the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. It must also show allies that extended deterrence remains credible, even in a world where U.S. nuclear weapons are far less salient. Recognizing the new assurance imperative and the consequences should assurance fail, the Obama administration has worked relentlessly to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance in Northeast Asia. The administration has taken steps to strengthen extended deterrence while increasing its political, economic, and military engagement, including establishing regular extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea. These efforts have achieved considerable progress, but important assurance challenges remain. To keep extended deterrence credible in the eyes of allies, the United States must address their anxiety about low-level provocations and decoupling pressures by sustaining key conventional and nuclear capabilities, maintaining dialogue and consultations, effectively signaling U.S. interests and resolve, and deepening political and economic integration. Failing to do so would jeopardize regional security, weaken the U.S. alliance system, and risk driving allies to develop nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.

#### 19 --  Turn – diplomacy fails without hard power

NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 2002, Keynote speech, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020517a.htm

These **dramatic changes were not brought about by "soft power" or moral appeals. They were brought about by military force** - applied in a determined and bold fashion, and embedded in what amounts to a political masterstroke: an almost global coalition against terror. Don't get me wrong. **There is also a vital role for the application of "soft power**", for humanitarian assistance, economic re-construction, and the development of civilian institutions. In Afghanistan, the time for applying soft power has now come. **But the fact remains that without serious military capabilities, we would have had no serious influence on the situation.** **There can be no doubt, therefore, that effective military means will remain a precondition for our security. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once memorably put it: "You can do a lot with diplomacy, but much more with diplomacy backed by effective military force".**

#### 20 -- Soft power not sufficient, need hard power

National Defense Panel, 2014, National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future, William Perry, John Abizaid, Co-Chairs, http://www.usip.org/publications/national-defense-panel-releases-assessment-of-2014-quadrennial-defense-review

The growing gap between the strategic objectives the U.S. military is ex- pected to achieve and the resources required to do so is causing risk to accumulate toward unacceptable levels. There are many tools the United States uses to reduce risk and execute its foreign and national security policy. Among these are “soft” power tools, including diplomacy, economic and trade relations, foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and partnerships with other nations for common goals. All of these are important, but they cannot be fully effective unless they operate in concert with a robust capability to deter or defeat aggression against the United States or its allies abroad. With regard to national security, risk is the possibility that the U.S. mili- tary may not be able to carry out some part of the national military strategy. That possibility is increasing as the global threat environment worsens, American military readiness declines, and invest- ment in future military capabilities is cut. Without a robust, ready, and forward deployed military, the United States will not long retain leadership and direction of the liberal international order so vital to American security and prosperity. We have already discussed the increasing global threats in this period of profound strategic change and uncertainty. The bipolar constancy of the Cold War era has yielded to regional forces of instability and new strategic challenges to U.S. interests and security, as we have detailed earlier in this report. Risk is heightened as the delta between threats and capabilities grows, and that gap is expanding today. Shortfalls adding to risk include reduced capacity—the availability of forces—and reduced readiness among units re- quired for rapid response to crisis. In addition, cuts to investment in needed future capabilities translate into additional risk in the future.

#### 21-Trump means countries won’t cooperate

David Makamura, December 29, 2016, Washington Post, Trump to focus on peace through strength over soft power, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-focus-on-peace-through-strength-over-obamas-soft-power-approach/2016/12/28/286770c8-c6ce-11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63\_story.html?hpid=hp\_rhp-top-table-main\_softpower-1150a%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm\_term=.d4701c3fedb7T

**Trump** has expressed skepticism of the Bush-era U.S. military interventionism to force regime change or resolve sectarian clashes. But he also **has discarded Obama’s caution over using terms such as “radical Islam” to describe terrorist threats emanating from Muslim nations.** Obama has warned that such language will perpetuate the terrorists’ goals of inflaming a clash of religions and will radicalize more disaffected young people in the Middle East. **Last week, Trump reacted to a deadly truck attack in Germany by labeling it an Islamic attack on Christianity** — well before authorities had determined a motive or had a definitive suspect. During the campaign, he proposed a ban on Muslims entering the United States and spoke approvingly of the use of torture on terrorism suspects. **Vali Nasr, who served as a State Department senior adviser for Afghanistan and Pakistan** in the Obama administration, **accused Trump of “cavalierly dispensing with America’s soft power.” “The ‘America first’ rhetoric, combined with the anti-Muslim rhetoric, will constrain America’s ability to persuade world powers to work with us,”** **said Nasr, now the dean of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.**

### Drones Bad Answers

#### We aren’t defending an increase in drones. We are defending a larger navy and capabilities to defeat A2/AD

#### Drones exist now. They haven’t identified a unique harm to the increase. Their own evidence says drone spending is prioritized even among budget cuts.

#### Drones smash terrorists

Lawrence **Kapp, September 2,** Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf

A focused, light-footprint approach proved devastatingly effective against core al-Qaeda, for example. Obama’s first term saw an estimated 400 U.S. drone strikes, compared to roughly 50 during Bush’s entire presidency. Those strikes, along with SOF raids and other tools, killed dozens of al-Qaeda leaders and hundreds of midlevel operatives, and severely disrupted al-Qaeda’s operations. “Drones have turned al-Qaeda’s command and training structures into a liability,” wrote terrorism and Middle East expert Daniel Byman, “forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.” 36 There were other successes, too. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) took a beating from drone strikes, assistance to local security forces, and other light-footprint methods prior to 2015. Similarly, and although the rise of IS was a tremendous setback for U.S. policy, a light-footprint strategy centered on airpower, SOF, and other enablers allowed Syrian and Iraqi partner-forces to roll back IS gains from 2014 onward. By late 2016, U.S. operations had helped those partners liberate key points from Manbij to Fallujah, while also killing perhaps 45,000 IS fighters, in exchange for a handful of American combat deaths.37 In these cases, Obama’s approach leveraged unique U.S. capabilities to wage a cost-effective War on Terror.

#### Drones save more lives than they harm

Weiner and Sherman 2014 (Robert and Tom; Drones spare troops, have powerful impact; Oct 9; www.utsandiego.com/news/2014/oct/09/drones-troops-impact/; kdf)

A note from Osama bin Laden discovered at his Abbottabad residence by U.S. Seal Team Six during the U.S. raid on May 2, 2011, revealed, “Brothers said they were frankly exhausted from the enemy’s air bombardments.” Osama bin Laden hated drones, because they work. Drones save American troops from risk of death, kill far fewer civilians than ground troops operations, and make our military more effective against enemy combatants. Regardless, drones are often decried by many liberals as too invasive, too impersonal and too deadly to innocent civilians. Southern California has been a national leader of the drone industry, ever since the San Diego-based General Atomics pioneered the first Predator drone development more than two decades ago. Currently, 13 California drone manufacturers operate across the state, including 3D Robotics of San Diego and Datron Communication Systems of Vista. Pentagon officials initially purchased 10 drones from General Atomics — that number has now swelled to over 10,000 drones currently under Pentagon control, according to The Washington Post, and unknown numbers in CIA hands; a Defense News report estimates at least 80. “The defense industry has been a huge incubator of jobs in California, especially Southern California,” said Assemblyman Steven Bradford, D-Gardena, last year. “We want these well-paying, high-tech manufacturing jobs to continue to grow here in California.” Californians, whether liberal or conservative, should champion drone programs that save American troops from having a larger footprint and having to put their lives in danger in foreign territories. Drones reduce ground troops, yet they have as powerful an impact. Hillary Clinton points out, in her recent memoir “Hard Choices,” that during her tenure as secretary of state, drone programs were “one of the most effective and controversial elements of the Obama administration’s strategy against Al Qaeda and like-minded terrorists … bin Laden himself worried about the heavy losses that drones were inflicting.” It is a key plus for drones that U.S. troops are three times safer from friendly fire attacks when deployed in war zones covered by drones compared with traditional warfare. During the Gulf War, American casualties totaled 382 in-theater deaths, of which nearly 62 percent were due to either friendly fire or other accidents, according to Navy research. However, during the current age of drones, only 21.5 percent of casualties are classified as “non-hostile,” according to Pentagon stats. America and our allies are sometimes literally our own worst enemy on the battlefield. Drones protect our troops from their own traditional battlefield errors. In a letter to President Obama in 2012, 25 congressmen stated, “We are concerned that the use of such “signature” strikes could raise the risk of killing innocent civilians or individuals who may have no relationship to attacks on the United States.” They are just wrong. In fact, it is a myth that drones disproportionately kill civilians. After a review of the deaths inflicted by American drones since 2004, the Pakistani Defense Ministry concluded that citizen fatalities occurred at a rate of 3 percent of total kills — a total of 67 innocent civilians.

#### Signature drone strikes have reduced terrorism

Philip Mudd was a senior official at the CIA and the FBI. He is now director of global risk at SouthernSun Asset Management, May 24, 2013, Foreign Policy, “Fear Factor: In Defense of Obama’s Deadly Signature Strikes,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/fear_factor_signature_strikes>

The impact of armed drones during the decade-plus of this intense global counterterrorism campaign is hard to overestimate: Without operational commanders and visionary leaders, terror groups decay into locally focused threats, or disappear altogether. Targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders and commanders in the years immediately after 9/11 deprived the group of the time and stability required to plot a major strike. But the London subway attacks in July 2005 illustrated the remaining potency of al Qaeda's core in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The threat was fading steadily. But not fast enough. So-called signature strikes -- in which target selection is based not on identification of an individual but instead on patterns of behavior or unique characteristics that identify a group -- accelerated this decline for simple reasons. Targeting leadership degrades a small percentage of a diffuse terror group, but developing the tactical intelligence required to locate an individual precisely enough to stage a pinpoint strike, in a no-man's land half a world away, is time-consuming and difficult. And it's not a perfect science; the leaders of groups learn over time how to operate more securely. Furthermore, these leaders represent only a fraction of the threat: Osama bin Laden might have been the public face of al Qaeda, but he was supported by a web of document-forgers, bombmakers, couriers, trainers, ideologues, and others. They made up the bulk of al Qaeda and propelled the apparatus that planned the murder of innocents. Bin Laden was the revolutionary leader, but it was the troops who executed his vision. Signature strikes have pulled out these lower-level threads of al Qaeda's apparatus -- and that of its global affiliates -- rapidly enough that the deaths of top leaders are now more than matched by the destruction of the complex support structure below them. Western conceptions of how organizations work, with hierarchal structures driven by top-level managers, do not apply to al Qaeda and its affiliates. These groups are instead conglomerations of militants, operating independently, with rough lines of communication and fuzzy networks that cross continents and groups. They are hard to map cleanly, in other words. Signature strikes take out whole swaths of these network sub-tiers rapidly -- so rapidly that the groups cannot replicate lost players and their hard-won experience. The tempo of the strikes, in other words, adds sand to the gears of terror organizations, destroying their operational capability faster than the groups can recover. There are other rationales for these attacks, though. Part of the reason signature strikes have become so prominent in this global counterterror war is, simply put, geography. Local terrorist groups only become international threats if they have leadership that can execute a broad, globalist vision, and if that leadership has the time and space to plot without daily distractions from armies and security services -- as in safe havens like Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, and the tribal areas of Pakistan. These are exactly the places where the United States cannot apply conventional force and where local governments lack the capability or will to counter the threat. Exactly the places where drones offer an option to eviscerate a growing terror threat that has a dispersed, diffuse hierarchy. The places where signature strikes have proven effective. With more capable security partners, the brutal destruction from drones above might come from more conventional operations on the ground. But, by definition, safe havens aren't penetrable by capable security services. There is an intangible factor that reinforces the effectiveness of signature strikes: the fear factor, coupled with the suspicions and paranoia that result from organizations searching desperately among their ranks to find out who is providing the Americansinformation so detailed that we can wreak such havoc over such a long period of time. Time and again, intelligence has clearly told us that the adversary dreads these operations -- lethal strikes that come anytime, anywhere, and that eliminate entire swaths of organizations. And these same organizations then turn around and further degrade their operational capability by engaging in savage hunts for leaks. Despite such success, questions about how we should employ them -- or whether we should use them at all -- are coming to dominate debates about signature strikes. When do they end? And is it appropriate to strike groups of people not because we can identify a dangerous individual terrorist among them, but instead simply because a cluster of people bears clear hallmarks -- the "signature" -- that is associated with a terror group. This emerging debate will be colored, rightly, by the fact that, in just a decade, drone technology has proliferated. The technology and its use has far outpaced the development of policy that balances national security, morality, and the certainty that whatever precedent we set will be used, and abused, by the rogues and despots who no doubt will acquire this capability. Before the pendulum swings too far in the other direction, though, away from the unquestionably aggressive use of drones by two consecutive presidents and toward a model that imposes tight limits, we are going to have to answer a simple question or two: When the president receives information that a new group -- maybe not a terror organization, but an evolving militant group -- is plotting to strike America at home or abroad, what do we do? If we strike too soon, we risk alienating a local population and increasing its motivation to target New York. If we strike too late, a nascent group of violent extremists will become operational, a lesson we learned too well 12 years ago. So take off the table the 20th-century notion that drones will become part of a more conventional military structure; they won't. The question for the 21st century is easy to state but hard to answer: Given the lessons of 9/11 and Iraq, when should a president choose preemption? And where? What are the rules for this new war?

[Note: There is a separate drones good file on Millenial]

### End Strength Increase Bad/Light Footprint Good Answers

#### Light footprint fails, need to expand the footprint

Lawrence **Kapp, September 2,** Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf

Yet the light footprint was no panacea. It disrupted extremist organizations, but did little to address the underlying failures of governance that allowed terrorist groups to thrive. In 2013–14, Obama was touting progress against AQAP as the very model of a newer, smarter counter-terrorism strategy. By early 2015, however, Yemen was disintegrating amid chaos so severe that the U.S. military mission had to withdraw from the country. As AQAP exploited this chaos to seize a greater territorial foothold, it seemed fair to ask whether the light-footprint had achieved anything more than simply “mowing the grass.” 38 The weaknesses of the light footprint were equally apparent in other contexts. The Libyan intervention was an early archetype of this approach, featuring an emphasis on allied contributions and a reliance on precision airpower and U.S. enablers. This campaign succeeded in halting Qaddafi’s onslaught and eventually pushing him from power. Yet even as American officials were hailing the war as “the right way to run an intervention,” the same light-footprint approach was depriving the United States and its coalition partners of the ability to influence events or provide security following Qaddafi’s demise.39 The strategic upshot of the intervention, then, was not the emergence of stable democracy, but a rapid erosion of internal order, the unleashing of instability that created a haven for extremists and spilled over into neighboring countries, and the need for two subsequent military interventions—one by France in Mali, one by the United States in Libya—to address the mess left by the original conflict. The light footprint may have limited the short-term military costs of intervention in Libya, but it contributed to the higher, longer-term geopolitical costs that conflict produced.40 Obama’s presidency thus showed that the light footprint offered a way of utilizing U.S. military power while containing the country’s near-term exposure—no small benefit after Iraq. It also showed, however, that limited investments could produce limited—and sometimes strategically counterproductive—results.

### Foreign Military Aid Bad Answers

### Free Riding Answers

#### Non-unique – We have a $615 billion defense budget. We are just arguing for an increase. If allies free ride, they will free ride in the status quo.

#### Doesn’t apply to deterrence against Russia or China. Other countries are small and are not great powers. They don’t have the capability to deter Russia and China on their own. Our evidence says the US is key.

#### We aren’t arguing for more alliances. We are arguing for deploying more military assets in East Asia

#### There is no impact to this argument. Who cares if allies free ride when it reduces war risks and alliances are good

Daniel Benaim is a CFR international affairs fellow at the Center for American Progress. He most recently served as foreign policy speechwriter and Middle East adviser to Vice President Joe Biden, March 28, 2016, What Donald Trump Doesn’t Get About Alliances, https://newrepublic.com/article/132093/donald-trump-doesnt-get-alliances

From our founding and especially until the Second World War, Americans debated the merits of entangling alliances, and for most of our history chose to avoid them entirely. But since the Second World War, **America’s leadership through Atlantic and Pacific alliances allowed the world to move beyond an era when global conflagrations claimed tens of millions of lives and into one of steadily increasing peace, prosperity, and democratic advances**. For decades, Republicans and Democrats alike recognized that the unrivaled breadth and depth of our alliances, backstopped by U.S. preeminence, has kept large-scale global aggression in check. But today these benefits can seem abstract. And Donald Trump is ready to call them starkly into question. If America’s leaders cannot explain the value of its alliance partners, the nation could well step back toward a nineteenth-century conception of power rooted in nationalism and mercantilism that would leave us less safe and less prosperous. The case against America’s alliances, as articulated by Trump and others, rests on a few important misconceptions. First, **America is not a “poor country,” as Trump asserts when he claims our allies are ripping us of**f. And we’re not in decline. On the contrary, we weathered a terrible global recession to create 14 million new private sector jobs since 2008, massively cut the deficit as a share of GDP, and became the world’s largest producer of oil and gas. We have major investments to make at home, from rebuilding our infrastructure to strengthening our social safety net. But we can afford to do both. It’s astounding to hear a candidate call for [nearly $10 trillion](http://www.wsj.com/articles/analysis-of-trumps-tax-plan-shows-big-cuts-in-taxes-federal-revenue-1450807194" \t "_blank) in tax cuts, mostly for the rich, and then plead poverty when the bill comes due for a more secure world. Should America coax, cajole, and even arm-twist allies to do more? Absolutely. But **we can afford to do our part** as well. **Second, the full value of America’s alliances cannot be assessed in purely transactional terms**. It’s true that one measure of alliance value is burden-sharing. Many Americans know how quickly the “coalition of the willing” fell apart in Iraq. Fewer know, for example, that in Afghanistan over 1,000 allied forces gave their lives alongside U.S. and Afghan troops. **But the value proposition of America’s alliances extends beyond how much South Korea compensates us to sustain our troop presence there,** beyond whether Latvia spends 2 percent of its GDP on defense—even beyond who carries the painful burdens of war. Failing to see beyond the transactional is not hardheaded—it’s shortsighted. **The value of our alliances is also about *the wars they prevent by deterring aggression.* They work because would-be aggressors know America will stand by its treaty allies, from jostling powers of Northeast Asia to the small Eastern European democracies that escaped the Iron Curtain.** In other words, when it comes to commitments, we are “predictable.” In bargain-hunting, we shouldn’t lose track of that. In a world full of complex crises, **alliances also play a catalyzing role in diplomacy— lowering the bar to collective action, providing readymade coalitions, giving us influence over other nations’ decisions, and legitimizing the actions we then take around the world. Another under-appreciated benefit of U.S. alliances has been their role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.** In a region like Northeast Asia, without our security guarantees, scientifically advanced countries like Japan and South Korea would feel compelled to build their own nuclear arsenals and start an East Asian arms race. Why don’t they? Because they know America is committed to protecting them. To Trump’s credit, [he was honest](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?_r=0" \t "_blank)—if strangely cavalier—that his policies would likely spark a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. Likewise, Trump boasts about threatening Saudi Arabia over its wealth and Wahhabism, but overlooks that U.S. security guarantees against external threats are perhaps the single most important reason why the kingdom does not acquire a nuclear bomb of its own. And it’s not just the downside risks that make America’s alliances valuable. They are a unique attribute of America’s global leadership—a vision based not just on self-interest, but on a belief that international security and growth can create win-win outcomes. No other country—not China, not Russia—can boast a similar array of enduring friendships in every region on Earth. Other great powers wish they could create the same bonds—and they try, through Putin’s Eurasian Union or China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization. But it’s not even close. And it shows in the difficulty these great powers have in finding support for their stances on contentious issues such as Crimea or the South China Sea. Effectively defending U.S. alliances requires being honest about their real shortcomings and working to make them better. The next U.S. president is likely to survey the problems of the world and seek more help than we’re currently getting. And in many cases the structures in place will not be up to the challenge, from European intelligence services’ ability to track foreign fighters who would target Americans, to NATO members’ defense spending as a share of GDP, to enduring suspicion between key East Asian allies like Japan and South Korea, to mutual frustrations with traditional Arab Gulf partners. How to get the most from our allies and partners is a longstanding question and never-ending challenge. But to have the likely presidential nominee of a major party fundamentally questioning the basic value of these alliances is new. In diplomacy, as in a business transaction, the willingness to walk away can be an important point of leverage. But our most important alliances function best on firmer footing. Donald Trump’s views on alliances are dangerous in part because they tap into real frustrations and offer temptingly simple solutions. To some, it might be emotionally satisfying to go alliance by alliance and threaten to walk away unless you get exactly what you want. The problem is that precipitating crises in all of America’s alliances at once would also do serious damage to decades of work by several American presidents to build our credibility around the world. We do need to use our leverage to elicit a greater effort from others. But when our friends and partners can’t rely on us—as Donald Trump [specifically says they shouldn’t](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html" \t "_blank)—that saps our influence and injects new risk into an already too volatile world. Alliances are part of what keeps America great. Systematically threatening them would make the world more dangerous, and that would be no bargain at all.

#### Free riding decreasing

Tobin Harshaw, March 28, 2016, Bloomberg, Those “Free Rider Allies” Are Paying Up, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-03-28/those-free-rider-allies-are-paying-up

Both men also seem to ignore that 2015 may be seen as the year the allies moved out of Mom and Dad's basement and took some responsibility. Consider NATO. According to the latest annual report from Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 16 members spent more on defense last year than in 2014. While the Baltic states and other smallish countries living in Russia's shadow generally had the largest percentage increases, Germany has approved boosts of [$2.1 billion](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-18/germany-defense-spending-rises-as-nato-commitments-grow) per year through 2019, and the U.K. has pledged an additional [$18 billion](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/world/europe/david-cameron-says-he-will-increase-britains-military-spending.html) over a decade. More important, perhaps, NATO nations are spending a lot more on actual fighting equipment rather than staffs and pensions -- eight allocated more than 20 percent of their military budgets to hardware. Readiness is also being stressed: Last year's Exercise Trident Juncture in Southern Europe was the largest joint drill in over a decade, involving 36,000 troops, 140 aircraft and 60 ships. Just as Russia has shaken Europe out of its defense stupor, so have China and North Korea energized the rest of East Asia. Japan has allocated a record [$42 billion](http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/280215.pdf) in fiscal 2016 (although a sluggish yen means its global spending power has increased at a lower rate). The [budget](http://news.usni.org/2015/12/24/cabinet-approves-record-42-1-billion-2016-japanese-defense-budget) includes purchases of six next-generation Lockheed-Martin F-35s and three Global Hawk drones, and funding for building a new guided missile destroyer. More than money, though, Japan's seriousness should be judged by its structural reforms, arguably the most significant since its self-defense force was created after World War II. Last April, Tokyo and Washington reached significant agreements on increased Japanese support for ballistic-missile defense, maritime security and intelligence sharing. Japanese defense forces can now use military action to protect the U.S. even if their own islands are not under direct threat. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pushing other measures to loosen restrictions, and continues to [fight local opposition](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/world/asia/japan-shinzo-abe-okinawa-futenma.html) to building a new U.S. base on the island of Okinawa, to which Japan will contribute $3 billion. South Korea, contra Trump's assertion that "we get nothing," contributes $866 million a year for the U.S. presence. No, that doesn't offset the full expense for the 29,000 Americans stationed there. But the Koreans also have half a million troops of their own protecting against Kim Jong Un's hungry hordes. Seoul has steadily expanded defense spending this decade, and is now set for a binge, increasing outlays by $215 billion between now and 2020, or 7 percent annually. The big-ticket item under consideration is a new air- and missile-defense system, a homemade substitute for deploying America's Thaad missile shield, which has been held up by Chinese objections. The Gulf Arabs, worried about Iran's oil windfall after the nuclear deal lifts sanctions, seem intent on getting "skin in the game." I've written repeatedly on this -- see [here](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-08-06/iran-deal-didn-t-trigger-the-middle-east-arms-race) and [here](http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-11-12/fight-their-own-wars-the-gulf-states-are-above-it) -- but major recent arms buys include 28 Apache helicopters by Saudi Arabia, 24 French-made Rafale fighters by Qatar, two Boeing Globemaster transport planes by the United Arab Emirates Patriot missile batteries by Kuwait. While the Gulf Cooperation Council's war against the Houthi rebels has been carried out with a minimum of competence, neither Obama nor Trump can deny that it showed some initiative.

#### US allies can’t supply the military force in a major war

Michael **O’Hanlon, 2014**, March 1, Washington Quarterly, “Sizing US Ground Forces: From “2 wars” to “1 war + 2 missions”, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sizing-us-ground-forces-%E2%80%98%E2%80%982-wars%E2%80%99%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98%E2%80%981-war-2-missions%E2%80%99%E2%80%99> (Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow with the [Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=16ab9835fd1545dfad62a538b86ec653&_lang=en&_z=z) and director of research for the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=7e60367e9ea646cd97bdf148dc5e2451&_lang=en&_z=z) program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His most recent book is [*Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence while Cutting the Defense Budget*](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=9ce348403f3e462d84dc3a4bda3edbd5&_lang=en&_z=z) (Brookings Institution Press 2013).

What is the presumed role of U.S. allies in all of the above? And is it possible to encourage them to do more in the future? **Consider the situation in Afghanistan: the other 47 troop-contributing nations in Afghanistan, at the ISAF mission’s peak size in 2011, collectively provided fewer than one-third of all foreign forces; the United States by itself provided more than two-thirds. That simple statistic reveals a great deal about the capacities as well as the limits of U.S. military allies today. A peak of more than 40,000 non-Afghan forces from countries besides the United States is nothing to trivialize, but it was collectively less than half the number of forces provided by the U**nited **S**tates. The allies took the lead in Libya in 2011. But this may be the exception that proves the rule—the mission that the Europeans led was a very limited air campaign in a nearby country (and arguably everyone has fallen short in the post-conflict period, since no country has done much to help the new Libyan state get on its feet). The French also helped depose a brutal dictator in their former colony of the Ivory Coast in 2011, and helped stabilize northern Mali thereafter. These operations have on balance been courageous and somewhat effective, but limited in scope and size, as has more recent French intervention in the Central African Republic. Some European and Asian allies, as well as other nations, continue to slog away in UN peacekeeping operations in places such as Congo and Lebanon, again in a brave but limited way. Any hopes that the election of Barack Obama with his more inclusive and multilateral style of leadership would lead U.S. allies to do a great deal more to share the global military burden are proving generally unwarranted. NATO defense spending is slipping downward, from a starting point that was not very impressive. The fraction of GDP that the NATO allies spend on their armed forces declined to about 1.7 percent by 2009, well under half the U.S. figure, and to a bit less today.14 (That 1.7 percent compares to NATO’s average level of 2.2 percent in 2000, and about 2.5 percent in 1990.)15 When allies feel directly threatened, they will contribute. South Korea in particular can be counted on to provide many air and naval forces, and most of the needed ground forces, for any major operation on the peninsula in the future. (South Korea is generally, and understandably, less enthusiastic about being pulled into an anti-China coalition in other places and for other missions.) Taiwan would surely do what it could to help fend off a possible Chinese attack, not leaving the whole job to the U.S. military in the event that terrible scenario someday unfolded. Britain could probably provide a brigade or two—up to 10,000 troops, perhaps, as in Afghanistan—for most major operations that the United States might consider in the future.18 Some new NATO allies like Poland or Romania, and some potential aspirants like Georgia, will try to help where they can, largely to solidify ties to the United States that they consider crucial for their security. The allies also may have enough collective capacity, and political will, to share responsibility for humanitarian and peace operations in the future. However, the record of the entire Western world, including the United States, is patchy at best for such operations. The United States need not, and should not, accept primary responsibility for future military operations of a peacekeeping or humanitarian character. **But in terms of planning for major war, it will have to assume that its forces—together with those of directly threatened allies—will provide the preponderance of future capability. In specific cases, Washington can always hope for more help. But for planning purposes, it is best not count on it.**

### Gender Violence Answers

#### Gendered violence not a root cause of war

**Bell**, senior lecturer – Department of Politics and International Studies @ Cambridge University, **‘6**

(Duncan, “Beware of false prophets: biology, human nature and the future of International Relations theory,” *International Affairs* 82, 3 p. 493–510)

Writing in *Foreign Aff airs* in 1998, Francis Fukuyama, tireless promulgator of the ‘end of history’ and now a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, employed EP reasoning to argue for the central role in world politics of ‘masculine values’, which are ‘rooted in biology’. His argument starts with the claim that male and female chimps display asymmetric behaviour, with the males far more prone to violence and domination. ‘Female chimps have relationships; male chimps practice realpolitik.’ Moreover, the ‘line from chimp to modern man is continuous’ and this has signifi cant consequences for international politics.46 He argues that the world can be divided into two spheres, an increasingly peaceful and cooperative ‘feminized’ zone, centred on the advanced democracies, and the brutal world outside this insulated space, where the stark realities of power politics remain largely masculine. This bifurcation heralds dangers, as ‘masculine policies’ are essential in dealing with a masculine world: ‘In anything but a totally feminized world, feminized policies could be a liability.’ Fukuyama concludes the essay with the assertion that the form of politics best suited to human nature is—surprise, surprise—free-market capitalist democracy, and that other political forms, especially those promoted by feminists and socialists, do not correspond with our biological inheritance.47 Once again **the authority of science is invoked in order to naturalize a** particular **political objective.** This is a pattern that has been repeated across the history of modern biology and remains potent to this day.48 It is worth noting in brief that Fukuyama’s argument is badly flawed even in its own terms. As anthropologist R. Brian Ferguson states, Fukuyama’s claims about the animal world display ‘a breathtaking leap over a mountain of contrary evidence’.49 Furthermore, Joshua Goldstein concludes in **the most detailed analysis of the data on war and gender** that although biological differences do play a **minor role,** focusing so heavily on them is **profoundly misleading**.50 The simplistic claims, crude stereotyping and casual use of evidence that characterize Fukuyama’s essay unfortunately recur throughout the growing literature on the biology of international politics.

### A2: Intervention Bad/Genocide

#### We have a military now that is funded at $600+ billion. We could easily choose to intervene to stop genocide *if we wanted to*. They don’t have a single card that says we want to stop genocide and that we’d be willing to do so if we had the military resources to do it.

Jayshree Bajoria, and [Robert McMahon](http://www.cfr.org/experts/world/robert-mcmahon/b11891), Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2013, The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524

#### There is no evidence that President Trump cares at all about genocide prevention or taking action to stop it. Historically, we have not intervened to prevent genocide. We did nothing in Rwanda, Bosnia, etc. There is probably genocide occurring in Syria but we won’t do anything because there is no political support for military intervention and we don’t want to risk a war with Russia.

#### Primacy fills in for powerless institutions—key to solve genocide and mass violence globally

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 51-52, WEA)

The United States possesses the military and economic means to act assertively on a global basis, but should it do so, and if so, how? In short, if the United States conducts itself in this way, will the world be safer and more stable, and is such a role in America’s national interest? Here, the anarchy problem is especially pertinent. The capacity of the United Nations to act, especially in coping with the most urgent and deadly problems, is severely limited, and in this sense, the demand for “global governance” far exceeds the supply. Since its inception in 1945, there have only been two occasions (Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1991) when the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force, and in both instances the bulk of the forces were provided by the United States. In the most serious cases, especially those involving international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic cleansing, civil war, and mass murder, if America does not take the lead, no other country or organization is willing or able to respond effectively. The deadly cases of Bosnia (1991–95) and Rwanda (1994) make this clear. In their own way, so did the demonstrations by the people of Liberia calling for American intervention to save them from the ravages of predatory militias in a failed state. And the weakness of the international reaction to ethnic cleansing, rape, and widespread killing in the Darfur region of Western Sudan provides a more recent example.

#### We have a responsibility to intervene if governments don’t protect their own people

Gareth Evans is president of the International Crisis Group and was co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, a group which has laid out for the world community a new framework and new ground rules on when to intervene in humanitarian crises. Read its report *[The Responsibility to Protect](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp" \t "links)*., 2004, Banashing the Rwanda Nightmare: The Responsibity to Protect, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/protect.html

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT"

It was against this background, and to respond to this policy challenge, that the Government of Canada -- on the initiative of then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy -- with the support of several major U.S. foundations, the assistance of the British and Swiss Governments and the cooperation of many others, established in September 2000 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which I co-chaired along with the Algerian diplomat and U.N. Special Adviser Mohamed Sahnoun. The Commission published its final report in December 2001.

The Commission's most important single contribution was its reconceptualisation of the core concept of "the right to intervene" as, rather, "the responsibility to protect." To put the issue in this way immediately places the focus where it always ought to be -- not on those exercising power, for better or worse, but on the victims of conflict, who need the assistance of others if they are to be protected from suffering.

We argued that the primary responsibility for that protection lies with the sovereign state. But if that state is unable or unwilling to protect its population, or is itself the cause of the threat, the responsibility to protect those people shifts to the international community of states.

The ICISS Commission did not see the responsibility to *react*, including through military intervention, as the only way to fulfil the responsibility to protect. There is an initial and overriding responsibility to prevent the risk to the population arising in the first place, both through longer-term development assistance or shorter-term political, diplomatic or economic responses. And if prevention fails, and a more coercive intervention must take place, then there is also a responsibility to follow through and rebuild, with the time and effort necessary to ensure that the original problem does not recur.

The threshold for military intervention must also be high: large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, or large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, pursued by forced expulsion or other means. And it must always be carried out in a principled way, having regard always to prudential criteria of right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospect of the benefit of an intervention clearly outweighing its harm.

If military intervention does become necessary, every reasonable effort should be made to obtain the authorization of the U.N. Security Council. Where the Council drags its heels, action by regional organizations within their area of jurisdiction, subject to getting subsequent approval by the Security Council, is another option consistent with the Charter, as would be approval by the General Assembly. But the Security Council itself is the most clearly empowered and capable source of authority, and it should be prepared to exercise that authority in appropriate cases.

If it does not -- in particular, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect by authorizing action in conscience shocking situations crying out for it -- the Security Council has to face the prospect that one or more concerned states will act without the U.N.'s authority. And they will have to further confront the reality that if such action is seen to be successful, the stature and credibility of the U.N. will be bound to suffer. This is not a legal discipline, but it may be an effective political one.

The report does not seek formal changes to the Charter, or new formal instruments, but it does argue for some fundamental changes in practice, including the adoption of a set of guidelines by the Security Council for dealing with (and using the veto in relation to) military intervention for human protection purposes. It also argues for the General Assembly adopting a declaratory resolution laying out the relevant principles of action, as a useful step toward their ultimate acceptance as customary international law.

"NO MORE RWANDAS"

The last decade was not, on any view, a proud one. The beginning of a new century, here as elsewhere, gives us the psychological chance to wipe the slate clean -- to think through the issues afresh, to find new common ground, and to ensure, above all, that when the international community is needed to protect people at large scale risk of losing their lives or identities, it will be there.

As much as we might hope otherwise, nothing is more certain than that the international community will be confronted again, sooner or later, by events all too resonant of the 1990s agonies in Rwanda, the Balkans, Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, East Timor and elsewhere. Reacting to these situations in the ad hoc, usually ineffective and often counter-productive way that we have in the past is no longer the kind of luxury we can afford as interdependent global neighbours.

If the ICISS Commission's report, with its new emphasis on "the responsibility to protect" as the central governing theme, can help bring about a more systematic, balanced and less ideological debate of the main issues by the international community -- and even more if it can provide an accepted framework for dealing with these matters as they arise in future in concrete and positive ways -- then we won't have been wasting our time.

There must be no more Rwandas. As the Commission concluded its report by saying, if we believe that all human beings are equally entitled to be protected from acts that shock the conscience of us all, then we must match rhetoric with reality, principle with practice. We cannot be content with reports and declarations. We must, as an international community, be prepared to act. We won't be able to live with ourselves if we do not.

**U.S. leadership is vital to preventing terrorism, proliferation and genocide—relying on realist balance of power calculations guarantees failure**

**Marshall, 11/10/06** (Will, director of the Progressive Policy Institute, “On Might, Ethics and Realism: An Exchange”, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=12992)

You warn of the “terrible things” that may happen if others fail to follow America’s lead, or if we engage in guerrilla wars, or intervene to avert humanitarian disasters in faraway countries of which we know little, such as Somalia. Let me stipulate again that in reacting to overseas crises, the United States will make mistakes, sometimes big ones. But let’s not confuse cause and effect. Misapplications of American power are not the main source of instability and conflict in the world, or of danger to the United States. Much more terrible is the all-too-likely prospect of further mass casualty terrorist attacks, the spread of nuclear technology to scofflaw regimes in Iran and North Korea and a worsening bloodbath in Darfur. Neither your letter nor your book is clear on how limiting the scope of American power, as ethical realism prescribes, would help to avert these threats. Would a posture of “national modesty” have prevented 9/11? On the contrary, U.S. forbearance in the face of mounting attacks by Al-Qaeda only emboldened them to up the ante. And even if we had not invaded Iraq, we’d still be facing an upsurge of violence in Afghanistan as Al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants regrouped in the relative safety of Pakistan’s lawless border regions. I agree with your point that guerilla warfare always confronts democracies with tough moral dilemmas. But we didn’t pick this fight. Salafist extremists did, and before any U.S. troops set foot in Afghanistan or Iraq. We share the view that President Bush has been deaf to the legitimate interests of other countries whose help we need to defeat jihadism. But it isn’t true that Democrats don’t understand the value of reciprocity. Instead of splitting Europe into “old” and “new” camps, Ron Asmus in With all our might argues for embracing the European Union to strengthen Europe’s political cohesion, so that it can play a truly global role in advancing our mutual security interests. Instead of treating the United Nations as an irrelevant nuisance, Anne Marie Slaughter calls for expanding the un Security Council to accommodate rising powers, so that the international system’s “steering committee” reflects the world of 2006, not the world of 1946. Ken Pollack and Graham Allison fault the White House for failing to negotiate seriously with Iran and North Korea, and propose bigger carrots, such as security guarantees, to facilitate agreements. But diplomacy isn’t foolproof either. Realism assumes we’re dealing with rational actors, but the real world often confronts us with delusional dictators and regimes driven at least as much by ideology (or religion) as by unsentimental calculations of national interest. When diplomacy fails, someone has to apply pressure along a continuum that runs from economic sanctions and political isolation to the use of military force. By virtue of its unmatched combination of strengths—military, economic and moral—the United States inevitably will be called upon to act. The notion that we can somehow hand off our leadership responsibilities to as-yet nonexistent regional concerts of power, as your book proposes, seems anything but realistic. Instead of limiting American power, progressive internationalists want to embed it in an expanding global alliance of democracies, as well as in a modernized collective security system. These overlapping networks of power and legitimacy, in which America will often play a catalytic and enabling role, should take on the tasks of stabilizing failed states, spurring trade and development, combating global terrorism and proliferation and enforcing the international community’s “responsibility to protect” people from genocidal violence.

#### This is has reduced violence across the board

Pinker 11 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"

But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"

Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species.

The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.

This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.

Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.

Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.

The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.

For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.

These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.

It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.

The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.

The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.

Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors.

The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.

The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace.

Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).

Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.

The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.

The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.

The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.

The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.

Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends.

In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.

Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?

This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.

It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels.

The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.

We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.

Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.

For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.

A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.

These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

#### ?We must take a stand against genocide and crimes against humanity – they can be stopped only when there is a clear message that it will not be tolerated

Trimel 13Suzanne Trimel, Amnesty International USA, et al July 16, 2013Press ReleaseOn International Justice Day, Survivors of Mass Atrocities Join Human Rights Leaders and Governments at U.N. for Discussion on Accountability and Justice

Global leaders unite in support of atrocity prevention through justice and accountability<http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/on-international-justice-day-survivors-of-mass-atrocities-join-human-rights-leaders-and-governments>

Keynote remarks will feature the Ambassadors of the sponsoring missions, alongside AdamaDieng, Undersecretary General and U.N. Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention, and Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador of the US Department of State Office of Global Criminal Justice.

"Mass murder, mass rape, and mass mutilation are not acts of spontaneous violence,”said Ambassador Rapp. "They are planned and executed as means to gain or retain power. These wrongs will end when we assure that their perpetration will lead not to power but to prosecution and punishment."¶ In recent history, millions of individuals have been the victims of genocide, crimes against humanity, and warcrimes, yet only very rarely have those responsible been held accountable. In the last two decades, however, notable progress has been made towards reversing this trend of impunity; with the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002, a clear message was sent around the world that failure to investigate and prosecute such crimes at the national level will not be tolerated.¶ Yet, every hopeful step is met with new and compelling challenges. Political alliances sometimes supersede international legal and moral obligations, shielding indictees such as Omar al-Bashir, the sitting President of Sudan, from appearing before a court of law to answer for their alleged crimes.¶ "The price of impunity for atrocity crimes, more than any other crimes, is too high," said AdamaDieng. "It fragments the social fabric of societies and perpetuates mistrust among communities or towards the State. A fragmented or frustrated society is a society that cannot live in peace."¶ Yet, the ongoing crises in Sudan, the crisis in Syria and the ongoing impunity for atrocities committed in Kenya, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Sri Lanka and Yemen, to name just a few of the countries impacted by the gravest crimes under international law – continue to elude the moral conscience and legal obligations of the UN Security Council and far too many member countries.¶ On International Justice Day, the sponsors of the event, the American Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Amnesty International USA, the International Coalition for the ICC, the International Justice Project, Physicians for Human Rights and United to End Genocide and countries from around the world, stand in solidarity to represent a global constituency. They demand that survivors of mass atrocities have access to justice, truth and full reparations - and call for an end to the impunity that allows the perpetrators of these grave crimes to remain free.¶

### Hegemony Bad Answers

#### Non-unique – We are a hegemon now. We have a $615 billion defense budget. We are just arguing for an increase in that for a particular reason

#### Every credible measure of study shows violence is down because of everything consistent with the aff---heg, democracy, liberal trade---it’s only a question of sustaining current dynamics and preventing shocks to the system

Pinker 11 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"

But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"

Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species.

The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.

This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.

Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.

Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.

The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.

For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.

These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.

It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.

The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.

The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.

Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors.

The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.

The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace.

Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).

Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.

The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.

The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.

The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.

The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.

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For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.

A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.

These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason

#### U.S. hegemonic decline causes global great-power war, collapses trade and spreads economic nationalism and protectionism

Zhang & Shi 11 – Yuhan Zhang, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Lin Shi, Columbia University, independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and consultant for the World Bank, January 22, 2011, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” East Asia Forum, online: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts.

However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid.

As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law.

Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations.

However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way.

Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations.

For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy.

Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973).

A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Trade eliminates the only rational incentives for war

Gartzke 11 Erik Gartzke is an associate Professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego PhD from Iowa and B.A. from UCSF "SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD" www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/09/erik-gartzke/security-in-an-insecure-world/

Almost as informative as the decline in warfare has been where this decline is occurring. Traditionally, nations were constrained by opportunity. Most nations did not fight most others because they could not physically do so. Powerful nations, in contrast, tended to fight more often, and particularly to fight with other powerful states. Modern “zones of peace” are dominated by powerful, militarily capable countries. These countries could fight each other, but are not inclined to do so. At the same time, weaker developing nations that continue to exercise force in traditional ways are incapable of projecting power against the developed world, with the exception of unconventional methods, such as terrorism.

The world is thus divided between those who could use force but prefer not to (at least not against each other) and those who would be willing to fight but lack the material means to fight far from home. Warfare in the modern world has thus become an activity involving weak (usually neighboring) nations, with intervention by powerful (geographically distant) states in a policing capacity. So, the riddle of peace boils down to why capable nations are not fighting each other. There are several explanations, as Mack has pointed out.

The easiest, and I think the best, explanation has to do with an absence of motive. Modern states find little incentive to bicker over tangible property, since armies are expensive and the goods that can be looted are no longer of considerable value. Ironically, this is exactly the explanation that Norman Angell famously supplied before the World Wars. Yet, today the evidence is abundant that the most prosperous, capable nations prefer to buy rather than take. Decolonization, for example, divested European powers of territories that were increasingly expensive to administer and which contained tangible assets of limited value.

Of comparable importance is the move to substantial consensus among powerful nations about how international affairs should be conducted. The great rivalries of the twentieth century were ideological rather than territorial. These have been substantially resolved, as Francis Fukuyama has pointed out. The fact that remaining differences are moderate, while the benefits of acting in concert are large (due to economic interdependence in particular) means that nations prefer to deliberate rather than fight. Differences remain, but for the most part the capable countries of the world have been in consensus, while the disgruntled developing world is incapable of acting on respective nations’ dissatisfaction.

While this version of events explains the partial peace bestowed on the developed world, it also poses challenges in terms of the future. The rising nations of Asia in particular have not been equal beneficiaries in the world political system. These nations have benefited from economic integration, and this has proved sufficient in the past to pacify them. The question for the future is whether the benefits of tangible resources through markets are sufficient to compensate the rising powers for their lack of influence in the policy sphere. The danger is that established powers may be slow to accommodate or give way to the demands of rising powers from Asia and elsewhere, leading to divisions over the intangible domain of policy and politics. Optimists argue that at the same time that these nations are rising in power, their domestic situations are evolving in a way that makes their interests more similar to the West. Consumerism, democracy, and a market orientation all help to draw the rising powers in as fellow travelers in an expanding zone of peace among the developed nations. Pessimists argue instead that capabilities among the rising powers are growing faster than their affinity for western values, or even that fundamental differences exist among the interests of first- and second-wave powers that cannot be bridged by the presence of market mechanisms or McDonald’s restaurants.

If the peace observed among western, developed nations is to prove durable, it must be because warfare proves futile as nations transition to prosperity. Whether this will happen depends on the rate of change in interests and capabilities, a difficult thing to judge. We must hope that the optimistic view is correct, that what ended war in Europe can be exported globally. Prosperity has made war expensive, while the fruits of conflict, both in terms of tangible and intangible spoils have declined in value. These forces are not guaranteed to prevail indefinitely. Already, research on robotic warfare promises to lower the cost of conquest. If in addition, fundamental differences among capable communities arise, then warfare over ideology or policy can also be resurrected. We must all hope that the consolidating forces of prosperity prevail, that war becomes a durable anachronism.

**Hegemony trumps every alternative—solves nuclear great power wars**

**Kagan, 07 –** senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, 7/19, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end\_of\_dreams\_return\_of\_histor.html)

This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which all the world's powers would be peace–loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world, therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an American–dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post–American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. The return of great powers and great gamesIf the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is passé; hence their now two–decades–long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power, including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a nation. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power –– with its pacifist constitution and low defense spending –– now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented, the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian foreign policy, too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great–power considerations, including the pursuit of those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is the entire post–Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan–European national ambition to play a significant role in the world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam, including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including self–respect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation." Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe,

Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would–be nations is a second defining feature of the new post–Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying –– its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant Nval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of **world war.** People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world's great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene –– even if it remained the world's most powerful nation –– could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe –– if it adopted what some call a strategy of "offshore balancing" –– this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even–handed" policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn't change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn 't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

#### Hegemony is key to global peace, preventing terrorism, trade wars, and prolif—rising powers and replacement strategies fail and the transition alone triggers the impact

Robert **Kaplan 12/5**/2010, Center for a New American Security senior fellow, The Atlantic Correspondent, "A world with no one in charge," http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120306537.html, 12/6/2010

Currency wars. Terrorist attacks. Military conflicts. Rogue regimes pursuing nuclear weapons. Collapsing states. And now, massive leaks of secret documents. What is the cause of such turbulence? The absence of empire. During the Cold War, the world was divided between the Soviet and U.S. imperial systems. The Soviet imperium - heir to Kievan Rus, medieval Muscovy and the Romanov dynasty - covered Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia and propped up regimes in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The American imperium - heir to maritime Venice and Great Britain - also propped up allies, particularly in Western Europe and East Asia. True to the garrison tradition of imperial Rome, Washington kept bases in West Germany, Turkey, South Korea and Japan, virtually surrounding the Soviet Union.

The breakup of the Soviet empire, though it caused euphoria in the West and led to freedom in Central Europe, also sparked ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus that cost hundreds of thousands of lives and created millions of refugees. (In Tajikistan alone, more than 50,000 people were killed in a civil war that barely registered in the U.S. media in the 1990s.)

The Soviet collapse also unleashed economic and social chaos in Russia itself, as well as the further unmooring of the Middle East. It was no accident that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait less than a year after the Berlin Wall fell, just as it is inconceivable that the United States would have invaded Iraq if the Soviet Union, a staunch patron of Baghdad, still existed in 2003. And had the Soviet empire not fallen apart or ignominiously withdrawn from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden never would have taken refuge there and the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, might not have happened. Such are the wages of imperial collapse.

Now the other pillar of the relative peace of the Cold War, the United States, is slipping, while new powers such as China and India remain unready and unwilling to fill the void. There will be no sudden breakdown on our part, as the United States, unlike the Soviet Union, is sturdily maintained by economic and political freedom. Rather, America's ability to bring a modicum of order to the world is simply fading in slow motion.

The days of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency are numbered, just as our diplomacy is hobbled by wide-ranging security leaks that are specific to an age of electronic communication, itself hostile to imperial rule.

Then there is America's military power. Armies win wars, but in an age when the theater of conflict is global, navies and air forces are more accurate registers of national might. (Any attack on Iran, for example, would be a sea and air campaign.) The U.S. Navy has gone from nearly 600 warships in the Reagan era to fewer than 300 today, while the navies of China and India grow apace. Such trends will accelerate with the defense cuts that are surely coming in order to rescue America from its fiscal crisis. The United States still dominates the seas and the air and will do so for years ahead, but the distance between it and other nations is narrowing.

Terrorist acts, ethnic atrocities, the yearning after horrible weaponry and the disclosure of secret cables are the work of individuals who cannot escape their own moral responsibility. But the headlines of our era are written in a specific context - that of one deceased empire that used to be the world's preeminent land power and of another, the world's preeminent sea power, that finds itself less able to affect events than ever before, even as it is less sure than ever of the cause toward which it struggles.

This is no indictment of President Obama's foreign policy. There is slim evidence of a credible alternative to his actions on North Korea, Iran and Iraq, while a feisty debate goes on over the proper course in Afghanistan. But there is simply no doubt that the post-imperial order we inhabit allows for greater disruptions than the Cold War ever permitted.

Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer: that is, lurking with our air and sea forces over the horizon, intervening only when outrages are committed that unquestionably threaten our allies and world order in general. While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies, given that rogue regimes are the organizing principles for some pivotal parts of the world.

North Korea already plows onward with its nuclear weapons program, even as it lobs artillery shells on a South Korean island, demonstrating the limits of both U.S. and Chinese power in a semi-anarchic world. During the Cold War, North Korea was kept in its box by the Soviet Union while the U.S. Navy dominated the Pacific as though it were an American lake. Now China's economic dominance of the region, coupled with our distracting land wars in the Middle East, is transforming the western Pacific from a benign and stable environment to a more uncertain and complex one.

China's navy is decades behind America's, but that should offer little consolation. The United States, having just experienced asymmetric warfare on land, should now expect asymmetric challenges at sea. With its improving mine-warfare capability, seabed sonar networks and cyber-warfare in the service of anti-ship ballistic missiles, not to mention its diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, China will make U.S. Navy operations more dangerous over the coming years.

As for Taiwan, China has 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles pointed at the island, even as hundreds of commercial flights each week link Taiwan with the mainland in peaceful commerce. When China effectively incorporates Taiwan in the years to come, that will signal the arrival of a truly multipolar and less predictable military environment in East Asia.

In the Middle East we see the real collapse of the Cold War imperial order. The neat Israeli-Arab dichotomy that mirrored the American-Soviet one has been replaced by a less stable power arrangement, with a zone of Iranian influence stretching from Lebanon to western Afghanistan, pitted against both Israel and the Sunni Arab world, and with a newly Islamic, and no longer pro-Western, Turkey rising as a balancing power.

Yes, empires impose order, but that order is not necessarily benevolent, as Iran's budding imperial domain shows. U.S. threats against Iran lack credibility precisely because of our imperial fatigue resulting from Iraq and Afghanistan. Out of self-interest we will probably not involve ourselves in another war in the Middle East - even as that very self-interest could consign the region to a nuclear standoff.

One standard narrative is that as we recede, China will step up as part of a benign post-American world. But this presupposes that all imperial powers are the same, even when history clearly demonstrates that they are not. Nor does one empire sequentially fill the gap left by another.

While the Soviet Union and the United States were both missionary powers motivated by ideals - communism and liberal democracy - through which they might order the world, China has no such grand conception. It is driven abroad by the hunger for natural resources (hydrocarbons, minerals and metals) that it requires to raise hundreds of millions of its citizens into the middle class.

This could abet the development of a trading system between the Indian Ocean, Africa and Central Asia that might maintain peace with minimal American involvement. But who is to fill the moral void? Does China really care if Tehran develops nuclear weapons, so long as it has access to Iran's natural gas? And Beijing may not be entirely comfortable with the North Korean regime, which keeps its population in a state of freeze-frame semi-starvation, but China props it up nevertheless.

It can be argued that with power comes moral responsibility, but it will probably be decades before China has the kind of navy and air force that would lead it to become an authentic partner in an international security system. For the moment, Beijing gets a free ride off the protection of the world's sea lanes that the U.S. Navy helps provide, and watches us struggle to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan so that China can one day extract their natural resources.

If the Cold War was an epoch of relative stability, guaranteed by a tacit understanding among empires, we now have one waning empire, that of the United States, trying to bring order amid a world of rising and sometimes hostile powers.

Looming over all of this is the densely crowded global map. Across Eurasia, rural populations have given way to megacities prone to incitement by mass media and to destruction by environmental catastrophe. Lumbering, hard-to-deploy armies are being replaced with overlapping ballistic missile ranges that demonstrate the delivery capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. New technologies make everything affect everything else at a faster and more lethal rate than ever before. The free flow of information, as the WikiLeaks scandal makes clear, and the miniaturization of weaponry, as the terrorist bombings in Pakistani cities make clear, work against the rise and sustenance of imperial orders.

The American empire has always been more structural than spiritual. Its network of alliances certainly resembles those of empires past, and the challenges facing its troops abroad are comparable to those of imperial forces of yore, though the American public, especially after the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, is in no mood for any more of the land-centric adventures that have been the stuff of imperialism since antiquity.

Americans rightly lack an imperial mentality. But lessening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities.

### Human Rights Framework Answers

#### Our argument is empirically true- China takes over African resources with little to no benefit to Africa and supports corruption and labor abuse in the region- Zambia proves

Okeowo 13([Alexis Okeowo](http://www.newyorker.com/contributors/alexis-okeowo), “China in Africa: The New Imperialists?” June 12, 2013 http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/china-in-africa-the-new-imperialists)

**It happened in Zambia like it could happen elsewhere in Africa.** Chinese investors made deals with the government to mine its natural resources, filling federal coffers with billions of dollars. Chinese immigrants moved into cities and rural towns. They started construction companies; opened copper, coal, and gem mines; and built hotels and restaurants, all providing new jobs. They set up schools and hospitals. But then instances of corruption, labor abuse, and criminal coverups began to set the relationship between the Chinese and the Africans aflame. The Chinese have managed to accomplish at least one impressive thing in Africa—they have made everyone else uncomfortable. The Americans are uneasy, worried about (and perhaps jealous of) China’s rapid and profitable investments throughout the continent, and the developmental assistance that it has started to provide in some areas. Europeans have only to look at trade figures: the share of Africa’s exports that China receives has [shot from one to fifteen per cent](http://carnegieendowment.org/ieb/2012/02/09/china-s-growing-role-in-africa-myths-and-facts/9j5q" \t "_blank) over the past decade, while the European Union’s share fell from thirty-six to twenty-three per cent. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner. Some Africans have become resentful, though, unhappy with **unbalanced relationships** in which China has taken proprietorship of African natural resources using Chinese labor and equipment without transferring skills and technology. “China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. **This was** also **the essence of colonialism**,” Lamido Sanusi, the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, wrote in the Financial Times earlier this year.

#### Reducing US military presence increases Chinese economic colonialism

Brown ’13 (Kyle, Research analyst at the Copenhagen Institute of Futures Studies and consultant with Consultancy Africa Intelligence’s Asia Dimension Unit, previously a visiting scholar at the University of Copenhagen and the National University of Singapore, “[Fracturing US foreign policy: America, China, and Africa in the new cold war](http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1625:fracturing-us-foreign-policy-america-china-and-africa-in-the-new-cold-war&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264)" November 15 2013, http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=1625:fracturing-us-foreign-policy-america-china-and-africa-in-the-new-cold-war&catid=58:asia-dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264)

There is no danger of the US being driven out of East Asia, and in response, China is shifting its attention to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa in order to expand its political and strategic arenas of influence.(10) These regions are particularly important to China because of dormant or declining US involvement, and it is in Africa especially that China is moving beyond the pursuit of economic benefits and is looking to increase and reinforce its strategic presence through political and diplomatic means.(11) As reported in a recent publication by the Brookings Institution titled ‘Top Five Reasons Why Africa Should Be a Priority for the United States’, “The failure to perceive and prepare for China’s moves would be dangerous, unwise and potentially detrimental for the United States in the near future.”(12) Thus, the **US foreign policy** on Asia on the one hand necessitates a presence in the region, and on the other hand, **necessitates measures to counter or balance the rising influence of China in** other key areas, like **Africa**. **The greater the** economic and, by extension, the ideological or political **influence China maintains in Africa, the more strategically important it becomes for US foreign policy to reflect the need for increased involvement on the continent.** “Seven out of the world's 10 fastest growing economies are African” and in the first decade of the 21st century, the rate of return on foreign investments in Africa was higher than in any other region.(13) And Africa’s biggest economies have grown faster than their Asian counterparts in recent years.(14) China has been quick to capitalise on the opportunities and boasts US$ 198.5 billion in trade volume for 2012, compared to US$ 108.9 billion from US-Africa trade volume.(15) Despite trailing the US in overall value of aid and foreign direct investment (FDI), China maintains the highest relative growth rate of inward FDI to Africa. Observers point out that the American involvement in the Middle East has allowed China to work at establishing trade and investment relations across Africa. While President Obama,(16) and countless others before him,(17) have denied that America feels threatened by China’s growing influence on the continent, commentators propose that a new Cold War with China over Africa is slowly developing.(18) Africa’s richness in natural resources is attractive and important for both the US and China in order to fuel continued growth, yet does not accurately reflect or describe the dynamics of Sino-Africa relations. Rather, “Beijing's ‘one-China’ policy continues to shape its African investments” where “aid is primarily a diplomatic tool.…part of a historical and diplomatic narrative, not simply a stratagem for snapping up Africa's resources.”(19) Further, only 29% of China’s FDI to Africa in 2009 went towards the extractive industry, in contrast to 60% of American FDI.(20) As such, China’s approach to Africa is much less one-dimensional and less focused primarily on resource control. World Bank Economic Adviser, Harry Broadman, explains: “there is far more than oil that is being invested in — and this is an important opportunity for Africa's growth and reduction of poverty because Africa's trade for many years has been concentrated in primary commodities and natural resources.”(21) China’s desire for mutual diplomatic relations and greater political influence in Africa – despite a policy of ‘non-intervention’ – potentially threaten US interests in the region. China’s policy of non-intervention – in which it does not impose political preconditions or intervene in the internal politics of nations – has proved to be more inviting to African nations reluctant of US involvement. As indicated in Figure 1 below, the scope of China’s presence on the continent is not limited by undemocratic regimes or instability. Thus, many African nations tend to view the Chinese as favourable investors, and as a result, prompted renewed US interest in creating more dynamic partnerships with African nations.(22) The US’ response to China’s dominance in Africa includes the establishment of trade and investment initiatives such as the Power Africa Initiative and the Trade Africa Initiative, yet has been **primarily military-based** through part of a ‘regionally aligned force concept’.(25) The concept is part of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) – founded in 2007 – and based on the **new readiness model**, which gives Army units greater time to familiarise themselves with regional cultures, to learn local languages and train for specific threats and missions.(26) Tours are set to continue in 2013, and reflect a post-modern evolvement of traditional military operations. Accordingly, by **teaching military tactics, medicine and logistics, and fighting famine, disease and terrorism**, US Army Africa will seek to further strengthen ties with regional militaries and governments.(27) Thus, the US military focus in Africa is not entirely centred on security, but broadly involves a number of social, cultural, and economic dimensions designed to further **increase relations and consolidate American influence in the region.** For example, **Army doctors have** **replaced eye lenses of cataract patients and medical soldiers have distributed mosquito nets to protect locals from malaria, while Army chaplains teach Africans about dealing with post-traumatic stress** and run family readiness groups.(28) As illustrated in Figure 2, the scope of US military involvement in Africa remains quite limited, however **the impact has been quite substantial, and is expected to continue to increase** over time. This is especially true given the rising influence of China in the region. Concluding remarks The ‘pivot to Asia’ in US foreign policy focuses on realigning strategic resources to the Asia-Pacific in order to secure economic opportunities for the future. By extension, the ‘pivot to Asia’ also includes a greater role for Americans in Africa. It represents the shifting dynamics in international relations and the increasing importance of proactive strategic positioning and economic resilience. As such, the refocus of American foreign policy seeks not only to protect economic and security interests, but also **to counter-balance the growing influence of China** and other Asian firms **in Africa**. However, where China’s strategy in Africa has remained economic and top-down in nature, the US has chosen to pursue a bottom-up military approach to compliment their already dominant, yet increasingly challenged, economic position on the continent. While there exists a divergence of approaches between China and the US on how to best further their presence in Africa and protect their interests, what remains clear is the strategic importance of the continent. What remains less clear is the distinct role each power will adopt and **which will best leverage its position for political and economic gain.**

#### Best and most recent statistical analysis indicates Chinese influence in Africa strengthens repressive regimes in the region and leads to comparatively more instances of state-sponsored violence – not from US establishment, no incentive to make them look better

Kishi et al ’15 (Roudabeh Kishi and Clionadh Raleigh, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, “Chinese Aid and Africa’s Pariah States”, http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLED\_Working-Paper\_Chinese-Aid-paper\_final.pdf)

The results of the count models confirm that there are clear differences in the correlations between traditional and Chinese aid flows (i.e., aid with and without conditions) and conflict rates, specifically in **increasing** **the rate of violent behavior by the state**. Table 3 presents the negative binomial model results for the various measures of conflict and violence as shaped by aid flows from various donors. In support of Hypothesis 1, Chinese aid leads to a (higher) increase in all levels of armed violence relative to aid from traditional donors. Model 1 in Table 3 reports a statistically significant and positive relationship between an increase in the proportion of Chinese aid, relative to a state’s GDP, and the number of organized, armed conflict events the following year. Model 2 suggests that this effect is absent when solely considering aid from traditional donors. Models 3 through 12 explore Hypotheses 2A, 2B, and 2C, and confirm the conflict inducing relationship between levels of Chinese aid, and increased conflict by the state and the number of armed, organized actors operating against the state. Chinese aid does not influence the likelihood of non-state events. Model 3 confirms Hypothesis 2A: state leaders can use aid packages without conditions to bolster the capacity of the central regime, and the number of armed conflict events involving the state rises in tandem with increasing levels of Chinese aid. Model 4 reports that state conflict events are not affected by traditional aid flows, however, suggesting that using aid money to strengthen the central regime is more difficult with conditional aid flows. State violence allows a central regime to reinforce its authority by crushing opposition, competitors, and civilians who may support competitors. Model 5 finds support for Hypothesis 2B – that an increase in the proportion of Chinese aid will lead to an increase in instances of violence against civilians by the state; Models 7 through 12 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 2C: Chinese aid will lead to increases in state violence against armed competitors relative to aid from traditional donors. We find that the number of battles pitting the state against armed competitors (e.g., rebel groups, militias) increases (Model 7) with an increase in the proportion of Chinese aid.11 Model 6 suggests that civilian targeting by the state does not increase with higher levels or proportions of traditional aid flows, again suggesting that the lack of conditions with Chinese aid flows allows states to strengthen their regime through repressing opposition support. Model 8 does not confirm the variation in increased state violence is influenced by traditional aid flows. The findings of state violence are more significant in light of the lack of influence Chinese or traditional aid exerts on non-state actors and levels of violence. There is neither a statistically significant effect on the number of conflict events involving rebel groups (Model 9) nor on the number of conflict actors taking up arms against the state (Model 11) with an increase in the proportion of Chinese aid. The same is true of traditional aid flows (Models 10 and 12, respectively). In short, Chinese aid increases the ability of the state to repress domestic competition, opposition and civilians. Compared to traditional aid, the effect is limited to state forces and goals. Conclusion Our findings support our hypotheses that **Chinese aid impacts conflict in Africa, specifically by increasing the ability of the state to engage in violence.** We find a statistically significant and positive effect of Chinese aid flows on state conflict events: an increase in Chinese aid, normalized as a proportion of a state’s GDP, leads to **increased state violence against civilians and to a larger number of battles between state forces and competitors.** We do not see a similar statistically significant effect when examining ‘traditional’ aid flows. Furthermore, we find no statistically significant support for an effect of Chinese aid flows when rebel behavior is isolated from general political armed violence or considering the number of conflict actors taking up arms against the state (see Table 3). While the literature on ‘traditional’ aid flows contends that aid impacts conflict through fueling rebellion – making the ‘prize’ of state rents more attractive to insurgents – we find that the effect of Chinese aid is not through the attraction of ‘state capture’. Chinese aid impacts state violence **as a function of its unconditionality, which make aid flows highly fungible**; it is typically directed towards bolstering the central state, and regimes can **use these aid resources to repress competition.** This is arguably more difficult to do with ‘traditional’ and conditional aid flows. State violence against challengers and civilians increases as regimes seek to secure their authority. Increased actions against civilians and militias operating throughout the state do not constitute large conflict operations, but these actors overwhelmingly experience repression and abuses by the state. States that receive high and increasing levels of Chinese aid may falter on a democratizing and human rights agenda. Yet, these effects may be both direct and indirect, as states may balance the effects of traditional and Chinese aid in their actions. Consider the case of Ethiopia: this state has been criticized for human rights abuses and the forced migration of people living in the Eastern area where it intends on developing large infrastructure for solar, wind and water energy projects which will position it as a major power producer. Aid from traditional donors often involves specific conditions on the movement of communities and environmental/social assessments before assistance is forthcoming. Chinese aid does not require that the state report or engage in these activities. As a result, a higher rate of violence against civilians may be reported in areas where the Ethiopian state has directed its Chinese aid over traditional aid packages, even if the aid package was not earmarked for this purpose originally. Another example is Zimbabwe, which has long upset traditional donors. President Mugabe and his support base in the ZANU-PF political party have long been accused of human rights abuses against opposition supporters, and have engaged in a corrupt land transfer program. In response, Mugabe lambasts Western governments, while he seeks support from alternative donors like the Chinese. Finally, consider Uganda: when faced with a revolt of traditional donors over scandals relating to the use of aid and legalization outlawing homosexuality, Uganda began to focus more on encouraging Chinese aid.12 These cases illustrate two critical components of our argument: China supports many forms of African regimes, and their direct and indirect effects on political violence vary depending on country specific circumstances. Only rarely do we observe an increase in more organized forms of conflict – such as rebel events – in line with Chinese support. Far more often, it is smaller and dispersed events that underscore the need to the state to assert authority and control. States have fewer constraints in engaging in these acts when Chinese (unconditional) aid is forthcoming, over traditional (conditional) aid. These effects are **not a function of specific characteristics of recipient states** that may make them more prone to violence: both the political institutions and economic characteristics of states are considered as possible alternative explanations or biased cases. China’s agenda of non-interference and unconditionality is confirmed given that Chinese aid targets are not preconditioned by the recipient state. Rather, aid is directed to states where it will produce the most economic and political benefits for the Chinese. This agenda is much more amenable to African leaders who seek to remain in power, especially through repressing competition. The increased appeal of China over ‘traditional’ donors by African leaders is symbolic of this growing trend and influence of China in the region. Though China isn’t specifically giving aid to ‘pariah states’, it is making states into pariahs through providing resources to state leaders who are not afraid to use repression as a means to quell competition.

#### Authoritarian states don’t follow norms

**McGinnis et al., Northwestern law professor, 2007**

(John, “Global Constitutionalism: Global Influence On U.S. Jurisprudence: Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?”, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1175, lexis, ldg)

The second benefit to foreigners of distinctive U.S. legal norms is information. The costs and benefits of our norms will be visible for all to see. n268 Particularly in an era of increased empirical social science testing, over time we will be able to analyze and identify the effects of differences in norms between the United States and other nations. n269 Such diversity benefits foreigners as foreign nations can decide to adopt our good norms and avoid our bad ones. The only noteworthy counterargument is the claim that U.S. norms will have more harmful effects than those of raw international law, yet other nations will still copy them. But both parts of this proposition seem doubtful. First, U.S. law emerges from a democratic process that creates a likelihood that it will cause less harm than rules that emerge from the nondemocratic processes [\*1235] that create international law. Second, other democratic nations can use their own political processes to screen out American norms that might cause harm if copied. Of course, many nations remain authoritarian. n270 But our norms are not likely to have much influence on their choice of norms. Authoritarian states are likely to select norms that serve the interests of those in power, regardless of the norms we adopt. It is true that sometimes they might cite our norms as cover for their decisions. But the crucial word here is "cover." They would have adopted the same rules, anyway. The cover may bamboozle some and thus be counted a cost. But this would seem marginal compared to the harm of allowing raw international law to trump domestic law.

#### No one follows norms for norms sake-question of domestic salience which the plan doesn’t effect

**Walter et al., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011**

(Andrew, “Global norms and major state behaviour: The cases of China and the United States”, European Journal of International Relations, 19.2, SAGE, ldg)

However, as we have shown, global norms are not sufficient causes of behavioural outcomes for major countries — rather, in matters of high domestic social and political salience, it is the degree of fit between such norms and dominant domestic norms that is crucial. Although global norms are thus often not fully constraining for major states, they nevertheless often try to justify their behaviour — not least to domestic audiences — by appealing to global norms. When they diverge from these norms, they often cast doubt on the legitimacy of global normative frameworks. Global norms thus remain an inescapable and important part of the decision-making environment of governments. This is partly because domestic salience is always a matter of degree rather than a simple binary condition, and because salience can be increased by political action and sometimes by events outside the control of actors. Even for powerful states such as China and the United States, norms often serve as benchmarks or as framing devices around which domestic and international debate, interactions and negotiations revolve. States can and do use norms strategically and for purposes for which they were not directly designed — for example, to enhance social status and international image or to rebuke the behaviour of others and to cast doubt on the legitimacy of their words or deeds. But they are much more than tactically useful weapons for political elites. The fact that states see value in using norms for ostensibly unintended purposes suggests that they have vital social significance in the global system and in domestic politics. Nor are attempts to justify departures from or reinterpretations of global norms necessarily successful, even for the most powerful states. For example, US attempts to reinterpret norms in areas like climate change and the use of force during the George W. Bush administration failed because other actors — both international and domestic — defended prevailing interpretations. Even after the Bush administration took the United States out of the Kyoto process it felt compelled to create in its stead the Major Economies Forum. In China’s case, norms have been important signalling tools as it has tried to give content to its desire to be seen as a responsible great power engaged in a peaceful rise and vital domestic reform. This has sometimes persuaded Beijing to accept a greater degree of behavioural consistency than dictated by strategic arguments alone. Thus, the Non-Aligned Movement, in stressing its support for activities that diminished the significance of nuclear weapons in state strategies, helped persuade the Chinese government to sign the CTBT even at some perceived strategic cost to itself (Johnston, 2008: 99–117). Our argument also demonstrates that the enforcement mechanisms attached to most global normative frameworks are not the key to understanding the sources of behaviour that produce global order. Indeed, attempts at enhancing enforcement can sometimes exacerbate concerns about the procedural illegitimacy of global frameworks, discouraging behavioural consistency, as China’s position in the debate over the 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance within the IMF shows. Equally, the question of which among major powers is a norm-maker and which a norm-taker is less important than might be assumed. For China, the question of resonance with domestic norms and priorities has been much more important in determining its willingness to abide by global norms. China’s tolerance of norms, rules and standards produced by global economic institutions in which its influence has been negligible has in fact been remarkable. As for the United States, though often a norm-maker, it has not been willing consistently to abide by rules that it played a central role in establishing, Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and the NPT regime being two examples. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to develop in depth the implications of our argument for the future of global order, it is clear that both the United States and China create particular challenges for the maintenance and enhancement of global order. Many still look to the United States for leadership despite the travails of recent years, but its preponderance and deep confidence in its own domestic values (albeit somewhat diminished since 2008) have often made it inattentive to the sources of global legitimacy. Many global institutions and outcomes are still associated by others with American dominance, and US reluctance to recognize the validity of competing values has limited the global legitimacy of US initiatives even when these took a strongly solidarist form. The Obama administration has seemed to understand this problem, but domestic society and politics still place substantial limits on its ability to address it. China’s generally rising levels of behavioural consistency within the contemporary global order have been driven by a reasonably strong association between domestic values and global norms. Reformers in the Chinese leadership have found ways of aligning and promoting their objectives via existing global order norms, with some important exceptions such as civil and political rights, and democratic forms of domestic governance. This strategy has been extraordinarily successful, but its effects on global order are ambiguous and sometimes damaging. The multiple imbalances in China’s growth model are recognized by the Beijing leadership, but its political stability concerns hamper the promotion of effective solutions to them. Moreover, Beijing has often defined its contributions to global order in relatively parochial ways and has shown a preference for conservative incrementalism in order to test out the implications of normative creation and evolution for its own domestically rooted concerns. It has not yet readily embraced a leadership role in relation to global order problems out of fear that others would demand too much. Finally, our argument also implies that the nature of contemporary globalization is not necessarily positive for the maintenance, let alone the further deepening, of global order frameworks along the lines of Ikenberry’s (2009) ‘Liberal internationalism 3.0’. First, globalization has often increased the domestic social and political salience of global order frameworks but, contrary to the hopes of optimists, it has not ensured good fit between dominant domestic and global norms. Second, globalization has also confronted established norms, rules and institutions with demands from a variety of new actors and has sometimes sharpened their perception of pervasive procedural and distributive illegitimacy in global governance. Related to this, globalization has also gradually reshaped the global power hierarchy and has greatly raised the importance of the bilateral China–US relationship. Both countries have increasingly assessed the merits of behavioural convergence with a range of global norms in relation to the potential impact this has on their own relative standing as well as on the overall hierarchy of global power. This development, in combination with the prominent focus given in these two states to the domestic consequences of global order frameworks, foreshadows a further erosion of solidarism in favour of behavioural forms that privilege the specific and diffuse instrumental benefits of ad hoc cooperation. If so, this could impoverish and endanger global society and seriously constrain resolution of the collective challenges that confront us all.

#### Seabasing key to effective humanitarian response in littoral regions like the Persian Gulf

Tangredi, regional director of the planning consulting firm Strategic Insight, 11

(Sam J., “SEA BASING: Concepts, Issues, and Recommendations,” <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d49d4281-7790-435d-9b3f-c7df59fb1544/Sea-Basing--Concept,-Issues,-and-Recommendations>)

Because it is dependent on sea control, the U.S. Navy would naturally provide the majority of resources for sea-basing platforms, out of its existing fleet and ship-construction budget.12 <Footnote begins> This would not seem as contentious an issue under the broad definition as it does under the narrow one—in which case it seems a more obvious case of resource trade-offs between surface combatants and amphibious warships.<Footnote ends> Originally the Donald Rumsfeld–era Office of Force Transformation defined “sea-base” as “a noun; the sea and not the things on it.”13 However, the sea base can be more properly thought of as the ships and platforms on which—and by which—the forces are positioned. The ocean is the fluid medium that provides both the terrain upon which heavy objects move and the reduction in friction that allows them to do so—metaphorically, the ocean allows castles to move. These iron castles constitute the sea base. Within the castles are stored and transported the means of military power, including the expeditionary strength of the Marine Corps and resupply for Army land forces. These castles also provide the best available logistical platforms for humanitarian assistance in littoral regions. As mentioned earlier, a most attractive feature of sea basing is that it offers an overseas base of operation located close to or in a crisis area but that is itself completely under the sovereignty of the United States.14 The strike power that can be projected from the continental United States is just a small portion of that required to affect events on land in combat or crisis. Sea basing provides for a forward presence and thereby produces deterrence effects that might not be achievable through latent conventional capabilities in the continental United States. Sea basing is also a means of providing sustained security cooperation and humanitarian relief. All of this can be achieved without long-term violation of anyone else’s sovereign territory under international law. Proponents of sea basing like to quote British naval strategist Sir Julian S. Corbett’s observation (1906) that Britain—then the world’s greatest sea power—traditionally favored sovereign ports and bases that made it “independent of uncertain neutrals and doubtful allies.”15 But to justify spending resources on sea basing by the need for such independence is to oversell the concept. America’s current allies or partners are for the most part neither weak nor uncertain, and in the current political environment it is doubtful that they would place disabling restrictions on basing in the face of a mutual threat. Indeed, if anything, current trends seem to be in the direction of an increasing willingness on the part even of nontraditional allies (such as Singapore) to accommodate an American military presence on their territory. However, it is valid to argue that spending on sea basing should be increased on the grounds that antiaccess capabilities of potential opponents (primarily China and Iran) have made fixed regional land bases extremely vulnerable.

#### Inadequate disaster response causes pandemics.

Aljunid et al 2012 Syed, Professor of Health Economics and Senior Research Fellow at UNU International Institute for Global Health, "Preventing and controlling infectious diseases after natural disasters", March 13, United Nations University, unu.edu/publications/articles/preventing-and-controlling-infectious-diseases-after-natural-disasters.html#info

Beyond damaging and destroying physical infrastructure, natural disasters can lead to outbreaks of infectious disease. In this article, two UNU-IIGH researchers and colleagues review risk factors and potential infectious diseases resulting from the secondary effects of major natural disasters that occurred from 2000 to 2011, classify possible diseases, and give recommendations on prevention, control measures and primary healthcare delivery improvements.¶ Over the past few decades, the incidence and magnitude of natural disasters has grown, resulting in substantial economic damages and affecting or killing millions of people. Recent disasters have shown that even the most developed countries are vulnerable to natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005 and the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and tsunami in 2011. Global population growth, poverty, land shortages and urbanization in many countries have increased the number of people living in areas prone to natural disasters and multiplied the public health impacts.¶ Natural disasters can be split in three categories: hydro-meteorological disasters, geophysical disasters and geomorphologic disasters.¶ Hydro-meteorological disasters, like floods, are the most common (40 percent) natural disasters worldwide and are widely documented. The public health consequences of flooding are disease outbreaks mostly resulting from the displacement of people into overcrowded camps and cross-contamination of water sources with faecal material and toxic chemicals. Flooding also is usually followed by the proliferation of mosquitoes, resulting in an upsurgence of mosquito-borne diseases such as malaria. Documentation of disease outbreaks and the public health after-effects of tropical cyclones (hurricanes and typhoons) and tornadoes, however, is lacking.¶ Geophysical disasters are the second-most reported type of natural disaster, and earthquakes are the majority of disasters in this category. Outbreaks of infectious diseases may be reported when earthquake disasters result in substantial population displacement into unplanned and overcrowded shelters, with limited access to food and safe water. Disease outbreaks may also result from the destruction of water/sanitation systems and the degradation of sanitary conditions directly caused by the earthquake. Tsunamis are commonly associated with earthquakes, but can also be caused by powerful volcanic eruptions or underwater landslides. Although classified as geophysical disasters, they have a similar clinical and threat profile (water-related consequences) to that of tropical cyclones (e.g., typhoon or hurricane).¶ Geomorphologic disasters, such as avalanches and landslides, also are associated with infectious disease transmissions and outbreaks, but documentation is generally lacking.¶ After a natural disaster¶ The overwhelming majority of deaths immediately after a natural disaster are directly associated with blunt trauma, crush-related injuries and burn injuries. The risk of infectious disease outbreaks in the aftermath of natural disasters has usually been overemphasized by health officials and the media, leading to panic, confusion and sometimes to unnecessary public health activities.¶ The prolonged health impact of natural disasters on a community may be the consequence of the collapse of health facilities and healthcare systems, the disruption of surveillance and health programmes (immunization and vector control programmes), the limitation or destruction of farming activities (scarcity of food/food insecurity), or the interruption of ongoing treatments and use of unprescribed medications.¶ The risk factors for increased infectious diseases transmission and outbreaks are mainly associated with the after-effects of the disasters rather than to the primary disaster itself or to the corpses of those killed. These after-effects include displacement of populations (internally displaced persons and refugees), environmental changes and increased vector breeding sites. Unplanned and overcrowded shelters, poor water and sanitation conditions, poor nutritional status or insufficient personal hygiene are often the case. Consequently, there are low levels of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases, or insufficient vaccination coverage and limited access to health care services.¶ Phases of outbreak and classification of infectious disease¶ Infectious disease transmission or outbreaks may be seen days, weeks or even months after the onset of the disaster. Three clinical phases of natural disasters summarize the chronological public health effects on injured people and survivors:¶ Phase (1), the impact phase (lasting up to to 4 days), is usually the period when victims are extricated and initial treatment of disaster-related injuries is provided.¶ Phase (2), the post-impact phase (4 days to 4 weeks), is the period when the first waves of infectious diseases (air-borne, food-borne, and/or water-borne infections) might emerge.¶ Phase (3), the recovery phase (after 4 weeks), is the period when symptoms of victims who have contracted infections with long incubation periods or those with latent-type infections may become clinically apparent. During this period, infectious diseases that are already endemic in the area, as well as newly imported ones among the affected community, may grow into an epidemic.¶ It is common to see the international community, NGOs, volunteers, experts and the media leaving a disaster-affected zone usually within three months, when in reality basic sanitation facilities and access to basic hygiene may still be unavailable or worsen due to the economic burden of the disasters.¶ Although it is not possible to predict with accuracy which diseases will occur following certain types of disasters, diseases can be distinguished as either water-borne, air-borne/droplet or vector-borne diseases, and contamination from wounded injuries.¶ Diarrhoeal diseases¶ The most documented and commonly occurring diseases are water-borne diseases (diarrhoeal diseases and Leptospirosis). Diarrhoeal diseases cause over 40 percent of the deaths in disaster and refugee camp settings. Epidemics among victims are commonly related to polluted water sources (faecal contamination), or contamination of water during transportation and storage. Outbreaks have also been related to shared water containers and cooking pots, scarcity of soap and contaminated food, as well as pre-existing poor sanitary infrastructures, water supply and sewerage systems.

#### Disease spread causes extinction.

**Keating, Foreign Policy Web Editor, 2009**

(Joshua, “The End of the World”, 11-13, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/13/the\_end\_of\_the\_world?page=full, ldg)

How it could happen: Throughout history, plagues have brought civilizations to their knees. The Black Death killed more off more than half of Europe's population in the Middle Ages. In 1918, a flu pandemic killed an estimated 50 million people, nearly 3 percent of the world's population, a far greater impact than the just-concluded World War I. Because of globalization, diseases today spread even faster - witness the rapid worldwide spread of H1N1 currently unfolding. A global outbreak of a disease such as ebola virus -- which has had a 90 percent fatality rate during its flare-ups in rural Africa -- or a mutated drug-resistant form of the flu virus on a global scale could have a devastating, even civilization-ending impact.How likely is it? Treatment of deadly diseases has improved since 1918, but so have the diseases. Modern industrial farming techniques have been blamed for the outbreak of diseases, such as swine flu, and as the world’s population grows and humans move into previously unoccupied areas, the risk of exposure to previously unknown pathogens increases**.** More than 40 new viruses have emerged since the 1970s, including ebola and HIV. Biological weapons experimentation has added a new and just as troubling complication.

### Imperialism/Military Intervention Answers

#### US not an aggressive power

Joseph **Joffe**, 20**14**, research fellow @ the Hoover Institute, Stanford, The Myth of America’s Decline, Kindle edition

International activism, soft or hard, has waned. Preoccupied with itself, the United States has become a reticent power. In global politics, the country has narrowed its interests, no longer pursuing the sweeping designs that characterized earlier eras. In the American tradition, Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower stand for muscular containment and international institution building. Kennedy and Johnson , Democrats both, hark back to Andrew Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt, representing assertive nationalism. From Wilson via Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush, a global democratic agenda held sway, “regime change” included. **Barack Obama’s two terms do not fit smoothly into any of these traditions. It is neither isolationism nor interventionism, exceptionalism or universalism, nationalism or institutionalism. It is the politics of reticence abroad** coupled with the expansion of the “social state,” as the Europeans call it, at home. In matters military , **defense budgets are declining** in ways not seen since demobilization after V-J Day. The use of force has shifted from massive deployment to over-the-horizon balancing and to pinpoint attacks exploiting the economy and safety of high-precision standoff weapons.

#### US restrained now

Andrew **Sullivan**, May 1, 20**14**, The Dish, “Letting Go of American Hegemony,” http://dish.andrewsullivan.com/2014/05/01/a-wartime-president-of-a-peacetime-country/

The switch to disapproval happened about a year ago. Some of the subsequent shift may be due to the harsh criticism Obama received for not striking Syria after seeming to move toward it (even though the public wants to go to war in Syria like they want to abolish social security). Some of it may be due to Putin’s ugly machinations – prompting unreconstructed neocons like McCain to blame Obama for somehow encouraging it. **The open wound of the Israel-Palestine question – where Obama has been very very active but without any progress at all – may also be a factor. But I suspect the bigger picture is that we’ve seen both an acceptance of a much more restrained America after the catastrophe of neocon governance *and* subsequent lingering unease about no longer being the sole superpower whose authoritah is always respected**.

#### US committed to using military power as a last resort

John **Feffer** is the co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus, May 14, 20**14**, The Three War Doctrine, http://fpif.org/three-war-doctrine/

U.S. troops have left Iraq and are leaving Afghanistan. The “war on terrorism” now seems so last decade. U.S. military spending has leveled off, and the Pentagon is looking at some fairly serious reductions after 2015. Last month, President **Obama finally pulled the various threads of his foreign policy approach into a** **[“doctrine”](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-foreign-policy-president-defends-his-obama-doctrine-where-military-intervention-is-a-last-resort-9303424.html" \t "_blank" \o "“doctrine”)** **that emphasizes incremental diplomacy and leaves military intervention as a last resort.**

### “Intervention” Bad Answers

#### Their K of “intervention” is asinine---they collapse a core difference between neoconservative militarism and liberalism

Jim Arkedis 11, the director of the National Security Project at the Progressive Policy Institute and a principal fellow of the Truman National Security Project "Not All Interventions Are The Same" March 28 www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/28/not\_all\_interventions\_are\_the\_same?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

"Liberal interventionists are just 'kinder, gentler' neocons, and neocons are just liberal interventionists on steroids," political scientist and blogger Stephen M. Walt, commenting on calls for U.S. involvement in Libya, asserted recently on this website, echoing a false equivalence that has sadly become a common conceit among foreign-policy thinkers. It was inevitable that pundits would compare the invasion of Iraq (an idea promoted by neoconservatives) to the imposition of a no-fly zone in Libya (an idea promoted by liberal interventionists). Yet obscuring the difference between these two schools of thought threatens more than the vanity of a group of academics: It places the coherence and stability of the United States' long-term grand strategy in jeopardy.¶ While Walt, a self-identified "realist," develops a more sophisticated version of this false equivalence, there are, of course, obvious fundamental differences between neocons' triumphal nationalism and liberals' conviction that America can best advance its interests and values in cooperation with other democracies. Walt concedes the distinction, only to accuse liberals of being more cunning than neocons about concealing their will to power: "[T]he former have disdain for international institutions (which they see as constraints on U.S. power), and the latter see them as a useful way to legitimate American dominance."¶ In Walt's estimation, intervention is intervention, no matter the avowed motives behind a given mission, or the various circumstances that can justify the use of force. Because George W. Bush and Barack Obama have each initiated a military action, it follows for Walt that neocons and "liberal interventionists" see the world much the same way.¶ This is bunk. Traumatized by U.S. blunders in Iraq, realists now misapply that war's lessons to Obama's decision to join international efforts to protect Libyans from the wrath of a mad dictator. While the president is being attacked by everyone from John Boehner to Dennis Kucinich, it is critical to set the record straight.¶ Because Walt uses the terms "liberal interventionist" or "liberal hawk" pejoratively, I'll refer to "progressive internationalism" instead. Progressive internationalists aren't hard-core lefties, but rather progressives in the original sense of the word: pragmatic liberals. We are ideological moderates rooted in classically liberal understandings of individual liberty and equality of opportunity -- at home and abroad -- who believe the world's problems should be solved through tough-minded diplomacy and negotiation, whenever possible.¶ Further, the terms "hawk" or "interventionist" imply an overreliance on the military. Walt accuses both neocons and progressive internationalists of looking at every problem as a nail to be pounded by the hammer of U.S. military might. While progressive internationalists certainly support a strong military as the bedrock of America's foreign policy, they also know that international affairs in the 21st century seldom present black-and-white binary decisions of the sort that Bush mistakenly sought to resolve with a good whack.¶ This no doubt brings to mind Iraq, and I cannot go further without acknowledging the elephant in the room: Yes, many progressive internationalists did support the decision to invade Iraq. (In 2003, I was a civilian counterterrorism analyst at the Department of Defense and did not take a public position on that action.) In hindsight, I believe constructive critique of my colleagues is warranted and they have learned much in Iraq's wake. The only point I offer in their defense is this: It's just hard to imagine that an Al Gore administration -- which would have been stocked full of progressive internationalists -- would have ginned up that ideological charge to war.¶ Progressive internationalists recognize that U.S. foreign policy is now a holistic enterprise that must first summon all sources of national power to deal with what goes on within states as well as between them -- direct and multilateral diplomacy, development aid to build infrastructure and civil society, trade to promote growth, intelligence collection, and law enforcement, to name a few -- and only then turn to force as the final guarantor of peace and stability.¶ Neocons, however, disdain multilateral diplomacy and overestimate the efficacy of military force. Their lopsided preoccupation with "hard power" creates an imposing facade of strength, but in fact saps the economic, political, and moral sources of American influence. By overspending on the military and allowing the other levers of American power to atrophy, neocons misallocate precious U.S. national resources in two ways -- leaving the United States with too little of the "smart power" capacities desperately needed in war zones like Afghanistan and an overabundance of "hard power" capacities it will never use. The trick is to carefully cultivate both, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen have championed since Obama took power.¶ Walt allows some daylight between neocons and progressive internationalists in their willingness to defer to international institutions, but he again misses the true difference. He rightly characterizes neocons' disdain for multilateral talking shops (see: John Bolton) but wrongly suggests progressives are insincere in embedding U.S. power in international institutions. The fact is that we do indeed believe that international institutions make the world a safer place for the United States and other democracies by entrenching liberal norms around the globe. Can it really be an accident that America is embroiled in conflicts across the Middle East, a region whose countries are least touched by liberal democracy and adherence to internationalism?¶ Progressive internationalists believe the United States should be the unquestioned vanguard of democratic values, and that American leadership is strengthened when granted a sense of legitimacy that attracts others to our cause. Without a doubt, unilateral application of force in self-defense is a legitimate exercise of power, but legitimacy can evaporate under two circumstances: when America's actions betray its core values or when America acts offensively without an international mandate and the backing of close allies. My organization, the Progressive Policy Institute, in a 2003 manifesto on progressive internationalism, argued that "the way to keep America safe and strong is not to impose our will on others or pursue a narrow, selfish nationalism that betrays our best values, but to lead the world toward political and economic freedom."¶ Neocons, by contrast, pursue security interests at the expense of American values and damage U.S. legitimacy while doing so. That was George W. Bush: He betrayed American values and alienated core international partners by torturing prisoners, denying them any sense of due process, and falsifying a threat to justify an effectively unilateral invasion of a Muslim country. He strove for the mere appearance of legitimacy, forging ham-fisted, bribed coalitions of the somewhat willing.¶ The Obama administration's actions in Libya are surely legitimate. The president chose to intervene after securing active support from the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, not to mention the U.N. Security Council. The international community's near-unanimity is an acknowledgement of the "responsibility to protect" (or R2P), a U.N. norm that obliges the international community to defend innocents in the face of humanitarian atrocities.¶ Realists like Walt disdain R2P because shielding other human beings from mass murder does not fit within the realists' narrow band of core American interests. To them, America's blood, attention, and treasure are not worth spending unless there is an immediate quid pro quo payoff in terms of national security. Ironically for Walt, realists are closer to neoconservatives on this score: Bush and Cheney meshed realism with neoconservatism when they sold the Iraq invasion as a quick and painless exercise of overwhelming American power that would render an immediate payoff in the form of a decapitated threat and an instantaneous "beacon of democracy" in the Middle East.¶ Progressive internationalists, like neocons, would define R2P as a core national interest, and we would both advocate strongly for the protection of innocent civilians who yearn to express their individual freedoms. We believe protecting civilians from murderous dictators creates a more stable international community and a safer America while promoting universal human rights and values. But though our ends are similar, our thresholds for intervention, our military methodology, and our justifications for action could not be more different. Neoconservatives' disdain for smart power and realists' shortsighted interpretation of core U.S. interests are poor uses of national resources. In contrast, progressive internationalists seek to use all of America's might to shape an international environment more congenial to the country's true interests and democratic values.¶ These differences are hardly trivial. Conflating them, as Walt does, is a transparent attempt to reframe U.S. foreign-policy debates around a choice between intervention and nonintervention. But time and again, the American people stubbornly refuse to make those choices in a moral vacuum. This leaves the United States with a messy, imprecise, unscientific approach to international politics, just like its approach to domestic politics. Yes, this pragmatic progressive tradition has sometimes proved chaotic in practice, but Obama should be commended, not chastised, for aligning American interests and values, seeking international legitimacy, and looking to shape the world as both more democratic and ultimately safer.

### Job Reductions Answers

#### There is no impact to this. We outweigh.

#### We have a big military budget now, it’s non-unique

#### There is no evidence we need more jobs. Unemployment is just under 5%. That’s close to full employment

#### Military spending boosts the economy

National Conference on State Legislatures, September 9, 2016, Military’s Impact on State Economies, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/military-s-impact-on-state-economies.aspx>

The Department of Defense (DoD) operates more than 420 military installations in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico. These installations—which may also be referred to as bases, camps, posts, stations, yards or centers—sustain the presence of U.S. forces at home and abroad. Installations located within the United States and its territories are used to train and deploy troops, maintain weapons systems and care for the wounded. Installations also support military service members and families by providing housing, health care, childcare and on-base education. **The DoD contributes billions of dollars each year to state economies through the operation of military installations. This spending helps sustain local communities by creating employment opportunities across a wide range of sectors, both directly and indirectly. Active duty and civilian employees spend their military wages on goods and services produced locally, while pensions and other benefits provide retirees and dependents a reliable source of income. States and communities also benefit from defense contracts with private companies for equipment, supplies, construction and various services such as health care and information technology.** The economic benefits created by military installations are susceptible to change at both the federal and state levels. Recent events such as the drawdown of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, federal budget cuts, and potential future rounds of Base Realignment and Closure have left government officials uncertain of the future role and sustainability of military installations. These trends have been a driving force behind many states’ decisions to commission studies that define the military activity and infrastructure that exists in the state and measure the economic impact of military presence. Economic impact studies allow states to better advocate on behalf of their installations and plan for future growth or restructuring. At least 26 states have recently completed or are in the process of completing military economic impact studies. Impacts generally include salaries and benefits paid to military personnel and retirees, defense contracts, local business activity supported by military operations, tax revenues and other military spending. **In 2015, for example, military installations in North Carolina supported 578,000 jobs, $34 billion in personal income and $66 billion in gross state product. This amounts to roughly 10 percent of the state’s overall economy. In Kentucky the military spent about $12 billion from 2014 to 2015, which was a reduction of $3.5 billion since the last report in 2012. With around 38,700 active duty and civilian employees,** the military is the largest employer in Kentucky by more than 21,000 jobs. They also support the highest payroll with a total of $3.85 billion, $80 million higher than the second largest industry in Kentucky. Even states with relatively small military footprints have reported significant economic impacts. A study in Massachusetts, for example, found that by investing $9.1 billion in FY 2011, military installations contributed another $4.6 billion in spending and added more than 30,600 jobs to the state economy. The table below is a representation of military economic impact studies done on behalf of each of the 50 states. Most of the studies were done internally or commissioned by state organizations, while others were sourced from regional or national analyses or other publications. At least 23 states – Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington – utilize numbers that were gathered by internally commissioned studies.

#### Military spending means private sector job creation

sector-job-creation.html

President-elect [Donald Trump](http://www.cnbc.com/donald-trump/" \t "_blank) wants a U.S. military with more ships, more troops and more aircraft, but getting it won't be easy, even with a Republican Congress. Still, the ambitious plan could translate into more jobs in the private sector from coast to coast. It could include work not only in building new fighter jets and missiles, but in shipyards in Virginia and elsewhere. "The Trump plan — at least what we know of it so far — is probably so positive for defense overall that there's probably many more winners than there are individual losers," said Roman Schweizer, a defense analyst at Cowen. Still, some industry observers suggest the new administration might place more emphasis on controlling costs by stressing the need for better terms, which would save the Pentagon money but could work against the defense contractors. Analysts estimate [Trump's defense plan](http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/08/heres-the-bill-for-trumps-military-buildup-plan.html" \t "_blank), which was disclosed during a national security policy speech in Philadelphia on Sept. 7, could add upwards of $250 billion more to U.S. military spending over the next four years, with a portion coming from freeing up funds from nondefense programs. Trump said he will ask Congress to repeal sequestration, which is a relic of a debt ceiling compromise reached in 2011. "Republicans are divided on the budget caps," said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. "You have defense hawks who want to increase defense spending and then you've got fiscal hawks who want to keep spending low." Harrison said the Trump defense plan is "somewhere between 3 percent and 6 percent annual growth above inflation" and at the high end would be in line with the defense buildup we saw in the early 1980s under Ronald Reagan.

### Middle East Presence Bad Answers

#### Disengagement from the region emboldens Iran, causes wildfire proif, collapses the Saudi Eastern province, bolsters Russia influence in the Caucuses and support for Kurdish independence and shreds US credibility globally.

**Inbar, 2/24**/2016, professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, is the director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum (Efraim, “The Consequences of American Retreat from the Middle East”, http://www.meforum.org/5870/american-retreat-from-the-middle-east)

The US, under President Barack Obama, has signaled its intent to reduce its presence in the Middle East. The US fought two unsuccessful wars in the region – a frustrating lesson about the limits of its power. At the same time, US dependency upon Middle Eastern energy has been reduced thanks to domestic progress in fracking technology. Moreover, Washington has decided to "pivot" to China, an emerging global challenger, and also to cut defense expenditures, leaving fewer military assets available for projecting power in the Middle East. (For a while during President Obama's tenure, the US had no aircraft carriers in the eastern Mediterranean or in the Gulf at all, an unprecedented situation.) In addition, the American campaign against ISIS has been extremely limited, and has met with little success. Unfortunately, this disengagement signals both fatigue and weakness. Washington also has desisted from confronting Iran and has gone to great lengths to accommodate it. President Obama's contention is that by completing a nuclear deal with Iran, he resolved one of the outstanding security issues in the region before leaving office. However the deal legitimizes a large nuclear infrastructure in Iran, and ignores the cardinal national security interests of at least two US allies: Israel and Saudi Arabia. The subsequent removal of international economic sanctions – with no reciprocal requirement for any change in Iranian regional policy – positions Iran to reap great financial benefits at no cost. President Obama's Iran policy has occasioned a dramatic change in the regional balance of power, yet Washington appears largely unperturbed. Whereas US policy on Iran has been guided primarily by wishful thinking, the apprehensions of regional actors with regard to Iran's hegemonic ambitions have multiplied in response to the nuclear deal. While Washington claims to be confident that Iran will play "a responsible regional role," leaders in Ankara, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Riyadh see Iran as almost entirely unaltered from its pre-deal state in any meaningful political sense, with the potential to produce nuclear bombs in a short time. The gravest consequence of the US policy of disengagement from the region is the increased probability of nuclear proliferation. Powers contending for regional leadership, such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia will not stand idly by in the nuclear arena, particularly as the US is no longer seen as a reliable security provider. US attempts to convince regional powers to rely on an American nuclear umbrella in an attempt to prevent nuclear proliferation are likely to fail. The emergence of a multi-polar nuclear Middle East, which is a plausible consequence of the American nuclear accommodation with Iran, will be a strategic nightmare for everyone. An emboldened Iran, which traditionally acts through proxies rather than through military conquest, might intensify its campaign to subvert Saudi Arabia, possibly by playing the Shiite card in the Shiite-majority and oil-rich Eastern province. The loss of that province would considerably weaken the Saudi state and might even bring about its disintegration. Iran could use subversion, terrorist attacks, and intimidation of the Gulf states to evict the thinning American presence completely from the Gulf. In the absence of American determination and ability to project force, Iranian superior power might "Finlandize" the Gulf countries. We could also see also the Finlandization of the Caspian basin, where Iran shares the coast with important energy producers like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The Caspian basin and the Persian Gulf form an "energy ellipse" that contains a large part of the world's energy resources. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are very fearful of growing Iranian influence. Those countries, which adopted a pro-Western foreign policy orientation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, might decide to return to the Russian orbit, because Russia appears at present to be a more reliable ally than the US. Russia is fully alive to the potential for a reassertion of a Russian role in the region in the wake of American retreat. To that end, it has taken the major step of intervening militarily in Syria to assure the survival of Assad's regime. The Syrian littoral is a vital base for enhanced Russian naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and this preceded Russian air participation in the Syrian civil war. In addition, Russia wants to protect energy prospects that depend on Assad's survival. It already has signed exploration contracts with the Assad regime with regard to the recent gas discoveries in the Levant basin. Syria has been an ally of Iran since 1979 – the longest alliance in the Middle East. The preservation of the Assad regime is critical to Iranian interests because Damascus is a linchpin to its proxy, the Hezbollah in Lebanon. Russia's efforts on Assad's behalf thus directly serve the interests of the Iranian regime. If successful, those efforts will further Iranian influence in the region. Outside Syria, we may see Iran join Russia in supporting Kurdish political ambitions in order to weaken Turkey, Iran's rival for regional leadership. The Kurds are a thorn in Turkey's side. Iran and Turkey are supporting opposing sides in the civil war in Syria, where the Kurds are carving out autonomous regions. Depending on how the war transpires, Kurdish national dreams might benefit from the power vacuum created by the disruption of the Arab statist structure and the American exit from the region. As to Egypt, American reluctance to support the al-Sisi regime plays into Russian hands. The Russians are selling weapons to Egypt, negotiating port rights in Alexandria, and supplying Egypt with nuclear reactors. In Iraq too, we see the harbingers of a Russian presence in coordination with Iran, as American influence in that state continues to wane. The rise of a more aggressive Iran – a direct consequence of the US retreat – may bring about greater tacit cooperation among Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. The big question is whether Turkey will join such an anti-Iranian alignment. US weakness in the region inevitably will have ripple effects in other parts of the globe. American credibility is now subject to question, and allies elsewhere may determine that it would be wise to hedge their bets. Greater challenges await the US beyond the Middle East.

#### Proliferation causes nuclear war.

Edelman et al., distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 11

(Eric S, Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments President, Evan Braden Montgomery, Research Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, ebsco, accessed 11-14-13, CMM)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.¶ There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.¶ n-player competition¶ Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

#### Great Power War

**Mead, Yale professor, 2015**

(Walter, “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Military Balance in the Middle East”, 8-5, http://www.hudson.org/research/11493-the-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action-and-the-military-balance-in-the-middle-east)

In the Middle East, these policies have meant that since World War Two the United States has acted to prevent any power or combination of powers either inside or outside the region from gaining the ability to blackmail the world by threatening to interrupt the flow of oil to the great markets of Asia and Europe. Whether the danger came from external powers like the Soviet Union (which occupied part of Iran and threatened Turkey in the early years of the Cold War) or from ambitious leaders within the region (like Saddam Hussein when he invaded Kuwait), the United States has acted to ensure the security and political independence of the oil producing states of the region. These policies have helped create the longest era of great power peace in modern times. They have also reduced the cost of America’s military commitments. Because other countries do not feel the need to maintain large forces with an intercontinental capacity to protect their global trade, the United States has been able to maintain a global presence at a far lower cost than would be feasible if the world’s major economic powers were engaged in competitive military build ups. **A strong American presence in the Middle East** and on the high seas **has the effect of suppressing security competition worldwide,** enabling America’s most important interests to be secured with much less cost than would otherwise be possible. Should the United States withdraw from this role, the world would likely see increased competition among other powers. China, for example, would see a greater need to protect its oil security, accelerating the build up of its armed forces. Japan and India would both likely see this build up as a threat to their own energy and maritime security and would accelerate build ups of their own. **Trust among these powers, already weak, would erode, and the dynamics of a zero-sum competition** for security and access to resources would drive them towards greater hostility and more dangerous policies. Under those circumstances, American prosperity and security would be much harder to defend than they are now, and **the risks of great power conflict would intensify**. America’s Middle East policy is not just about the Middle East; it is about America’s global interest in a peaceful and prosperous world. The starting point for any American strategy in the Middle East today must be the basic approach that has served us well since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt. America’s vital interests require us to look to the safety and the security of the Middle Eastern oil producing states, ensuring that no power, either external or regional, gains the power to interfere with the smooth and stable supply of oil and gas to the great economic and industrial centers of the world. As we look at the region today, these vital American interests are not as well secured as one would wish. Today’s Middle East is threatened by conflicts that could lead to immense humanitarian disasters against which the horror of the Libyan and Syrian civil conflicts would appear small scale. Whether considered from the humanitarian standpoint or from the perspective of vital American interests, the dangers facing us in the Middle East today are immense, and it is against this background that the value of the JCPOA or indeed of any major policy step involving the region needs to be understood. One danger is presented by the rise of Iran and the consequences of its efforts to increase its power in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Iran is the one country at the moment that appears to believe that it has both the capacity and the will to establish a hegemonic position in the region. Iran could challenge vital American interests in two ways. It could come close to success in this regional strategy, presenting the United States with the choice of accepting Iranian hegemony or engaging in conflict. Alternatively, an Iranian bid for control, while ultimately falling short, could create such chaos and upheaval in the region that normal governance would break down and some oil exporting countries could be paralyzed by international or civil conflict. Another danger comes from the surge in fanaticism among some Sunni groups, in part because of the fear inspired by what many see as an Iranian-backed surge of Shi’a power across the region. Under the wrong circumstances fanatical movements like ISIS could either conquer or make ungovernable wide stretches of the Middle East, including important oil producing provinces and countries. The successful establishment of a ‘caliphate’ or some other form of radical and revolutionary governance across strategically important areas could present the United States with the choice between military intervention or accepting the establishment of a hegemonic regional power. Short of that, insurrections or guerilla conflicts involving fanatical groups could destabilize key countries. Additionally, groups based in territory controlled by these forces and accessing financial and other resources under their control could plan and carry out major attacks against western targets as Al Qaeda did from Taliban controlled territory in 2001. Beyond the danger of Sunni radicalism, there is the danger that the sectarian conflict between Sunni radicals and Shi’a radicals aligned with Iran now taking shape would so **seriously destabilize the region and important countries in it that the oil supply could not be secured.** In this scenario, even if neither side in the sectarian war achieved anything like dominance, the social upheavals, economic distress and surge in violence and hate fueled by an escalating religious conflict could lead to conditions in which **the oil industry could no longer function in a stable and orderly way**. The JCPOA and the Regional Crisis In evaluating the JCPOA, the Senate needs to apply two tests. The first, which is where most of the attention so far has been concentrated, is the question of whether the agreement offers a path to resolve the question of Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons. The second test is of equal importance when it comes to determining the prudence and desirability of Congressional support for the existing agreement. That second question is whether the JCPOA will advance or hinder America’s vital interests in the region other than our interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran. Does the JCPOA make it more or less likely that any of the three dangers referenced above – of an Iranian drive for hegemony, of a similar movement by fanatical Sunni-based groups, or of an intensifying and escalating sectarian war that destabilizes the region – will come to pass? For the JCPOA to serve the American interest in the Middle East it needs to pass both tests; the agreement must block Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, and it must help (or at the very least, not hinder) America’s broader regional agenda. My purpose in appearing before the Committee today, Mr. Chairman, is to offer some suggestions about how the Members of this Committee and their colleagues in the Senate can determine whether the JCPOA advances, hinders or leaves unchanged America’s pursuit of its vital interests in a combustible region at a critical time. This is a complex problem; the question of the effects of the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program is more technical than political, depending more on the nature of the limits and the verification protocols, though questions remain about whether the United States and the other signatories will have the political will to enforce it. The effect of the JCPOA on the regional situation depends much more on perception and policy. How will Iran, our allies and other forces in the region view the agreement? How does the agreement weaken or strengthen Iran on the ground? What policies will the United States and Iran pursue in the region and toward each other should the agreement come into full force? One thing seems clear: if the JCPOA fails to contain Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran gets a nuclear weapon, the agreement will be a disaster in regional politics as well. Iran’s drive toward regional hegemony will receive a powerful boost, the strength of fanatical movements in the Sunni world will be boosted by a sense of apocalyptic fear and rage, and the sectarian conflict will intensify in ways that are both unpredictable and, probably, very dangerous for American interests. But what if the JCPOA is successful on the nuclear front, even temporarily, and is seen to have stopped or slowed Iran’s drive for the bomb? Or, perhaps more probably, suppose there is a period of time in which the success or failure of the JCPOA on the nuclear issue is unclear? During this uncertain interval, one that could last for some time, how will the JCPOA affect the regional balance of forces? Here, the news is bad. Whatever the JCPOA does in terms of the nuclear program, when it comes to the conventional balance in the region the JCPOA appears to strengthen Iran. The end of sanctions does not just result in a “windfall” gain to Iran as frozen assets are released; it also adds substantial and growing amounts to Iran’s national income as normal trade relations resume, as Iranian oil production expands, and as access to markets for new technology and spare parts increases the productivity of Iranian society. In the short term this means that Iran will have more money with which to support regional allies like the Assad regime in Damascus; in the medium term as conventional weapons restrictions are lifted Iran will have the opportunity to strengthen both defensive and offensive arms capabilities; in the medium to long term Iran’s greater economic clout will substantially increase its political weight both in the region and in world affairs, giving it new allies and making a return to sanctions and isolation increasingly unlikely. These worries loom larger because Iran, under sanctions and suffering serious economic privation, has nevertheless been able to operate effectively in regional politics, scoring gains against Sunni adversaries that have seriously alarmed some of its neighbors. If an isolated and economically challenged Iran could achieve such results, one must ask what it can achieve under the more favorable conditions that will follow the implementation of the JCPOA. It is worth noting in this context that many of Iran’s neighbors do not share the Obama Administration’s view that the greatest danger from Iran flows from its nuclear program. Rather, the fear is that Iran’s large population, sectarian fervor and powerful security institutions make it potentially the most powerful state in the region and a threat to the security of its neighbors. For many Saudis in particular, whose close ties to Pakistan’s security establishment give them confidence that an Iranian nuclear weapon could be offset by the existence of the Pakistani arsenal, the nuclear program in Iran is much less threatening than Iran’s apparent ability and willingness to support militias, rebels and Iran-aligned governments across the region. Although Gulf governments have issued pro forma statements in support of the JCPOA, their fear and distrust of Iran, and their lack of comfort with American regional policy have led to dramatic shifts in their policy as they seek to offset the perceived negative consequences of the JCPOA on the regional balance. The most spectacular (and alarming) changes have been seen in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has departed from a long history of quiet and cautious policy and initiated a series of high risk, high profile steps that testify to a deep sense of distress and unease with American policy and its consequences for the regional balance. The inevitable increase in Iranian conventional resources and capabilities that follows the JCPOA can damage American interests in three ways. First, if Iran devotes even some of its gains from the agreements to its regional allies and hegemonic goals, it could create a major crisis in the region that would require massive American intervention to avoid the danger of having one country dominate the oil wealth of the entire Gulf. Some countries would be endangered directly by subversion or conflict; others, increasingly surrounded by Iranian clients and allies, would feel the need to align their foreign policy and their oil production and pricing strategies with Iran. The United States could be faced with a triumphalist Iranian regime that would be able to manipulate world oil prices and supplies. It would be extremely difficult for future presidents to create effective coalitions to limit or balance Iran under these circumstances. Second, **fear of Iran can drive American allies and other actors in the region to actions that destabilize the region or run counter to American interests**. Concerns about potential proliferation among other regional countries who want to balance the Iranian nuclear program are one example of the potential ‘blowback’ from the JCPOA. But there are others. Saudi Arabia and other oil producing Gulf states could for example ‘**circle the wagons’ among Sunni states, tightening their links with military and intelligence services in countries like Egypt and Pakistan** in ways that undercut important American goals. **Many Gulf countries will see the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear capacity and growth in the quality and quantity of its arsenal of delivery systems as an important deterrent and counter to Iran. This could only intensify the arms race in South Asia and increase the chances of conflict between India and Pakistan**. It will also likely lead to more resources and power going to figures in the military and nuclear establishment who share radical ideologies uncomfortably close to those of Al Qaeda and other dangerous groups. Bringing Pakistan more fully into Middle East politics would be a natural and obvious move for oil rich Sunni states alarmed by a rising Iran. More broadly, fear of a rising Iran increases the incentives for rich individuals and states to deepen their links with fanatical organizations and fighters. Fanatical anti-Shi’a fighters may, from an American standpoint, be terrorists who are as anti-western as they are anti-Iran. If Iran’s regional power is seen as rising, however, many in the Sunni world will be tempted to support these organizations as indispensible allies in the fight against Iran. Finally, the perception, plausible to some however incorrect, that Iran now has tacit American support in its quest for regional hegemony will act as a powerful recruiting incentive for radical pro-Sunni jihadi groups throughout the Sunni world. Sectarian conflicts feed on apocalyptic fears; the perception that Shi’a ‘heretics’ are threatening the Islamic heartland and holy cities in the Arabian Peninsula will make it significantly easier for radicals to recruit new fighters – and to raise the money to employ, train and arm them. Evaluating JCPOA Elected officials charged with determining whether JCPOA strengthens or weakens the American position will need to balance a number of factors in determining whether or not the agreement merits Congressional support. This must necessarily be a judgment call; officials will have to weigh probabilities and balance the strengths and weaknesses of the agreement. For example, if the agreement is found to have a very strong ability to stop the progress of Iran’s nuclear program, those gains might be worth some regional difficulties. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the regional consequences of the agreement would be so severe that even a relatively effective nuclear agreement could be a net negative for American interests in the region. Judgments about the regional impact of the JCPOA must take one other factor into account: Administration policy in the region could substantially limit or seriously exacerbate the impact of the agreement on the regional situation. To reach useful conclusions on the likely consequences of this agreement, Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues will need to consult with the Administration to determine as far as possible what the future course of American policy toward the Middle East and Iran will be. There are two possible courses the United States can take. One would be to see the JCPOA as the first step in a policy of accommodating Iran looking to détente or an even closer relationship. Alternatively, the JCPOA could be seen as an effort to facilitate a tougher policy of regional containment by taking the dangers of nuclear proliferation off the table. Much depends on which course the Administration chooses. A policy of accommodation will maximize ‘blowback’ from the JCPOA, **throwing the region and America’s key alliances into deep disarray**. The more credible the perception is that the United States is prepared to accept and perhaps facilitate a large regional role for Iran, the more the United States will be seen as having taken the anti-Sunni side in a widening sectarian war. Gulf states who have long considered the United States a reliable protector will see American policy as a threat to their security and **will explore new policy options with potentially very dangerous consequences for stability and American interests.** The gap between radical and fanatical fighting groups and militias on the one hand and governing elites in the Sunni world will compress; alignments that are unthinkable today could become quite likely if key Sunni states come to believe that the United States has chosen Iran and the Shi’a in the sectarian war. Such a course of action is also **more likely to empower hardliners in Iran**, as they will be able to make a plausible case that **Iran has a historic opportunity to vault into the ranks of leading global powers by consolidating its power in the critical Gulf area.**

#### Alternative security orders are a pipe-dream – the US has to lead in Middle East conflicts – decline in the US commitment escalates every regional tension, causes Russia-Turkey war

**Mehmetcik, 3/21**/2016, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, Işık University (Hakan, “Decline, New Middle East, New Balance of Power: Not Just Less American but also Less Liberal (I)”, http://www.iapss.org/2016/03/21/decline-new-middle-east-new-balance-of-power-not-just-less-american-but-also-less-liberal-i/)

The Middle East is in its most volatile, chaotic state in its long history. Deep forces of the old regimes, terrorists, gangs, foreign fighters pursue millenarian objectives through heinous crimes, genocidal practices in prolonged conflicts. They challenge the very order built around nation-states by disintegrating them to the ground. The competition for power and influence becomes a natural state of affairs as tensions over ethnic and sectarian lines become both prolonged and regional. The causality I dwell on is threefold. First, the decline in the United States’s “will and capacity” in influencing regional dynamics after decades long interventions has created power vacuums from which Iran and Russia have benefited significantly. Here I am bandwagoning with the popular view of Iran’s rise and its consequences, as well as Russian neo-soviet interventionism, albeit with more realpolitik pessimism. Given its conventional military capacity, nuclear advancement, economic dynamism, and cultural power, an already assertive Iran should be expected to follow even more assertive foreign policy after the deal with P5+1. Given Russian aggressive acts from Ukraine to Northern Europe against the West, and new Cold War rhetoric, the relations with Russia will not be eased in the near future, yet it may get worse before it gets better. Finally, against declining United States and rising Iran & Russian axis (put Shia Hezbollah into this basket), a new power balancing has been emerging in the region, which cats itself evidently in the Syrian civil war. It is plain naivety to wait other states in the region sitting idle to restrain the expansion of Iranian and Russian influence favoring Shia prisms at the expense of their security and interest while the United States in an absolute and deliberate retreat. That is, in the post-American Middle East, a repressed cold war between Iran and Arab States[1] as well as Turco-Russian conflict is imminent. In this sense, the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran has already worsened over the past few years due to existing political and strategic considerations, grievances, and anxieties about each other. Turkish Russian relations has back its normal conflictual phase (I call it normal since the several century old relations are nothing, but all about conflicts over and over again.) Everyone fears Iran’s growing influence through a strong and effective proxy networks and Russian open ended aims and military interventions, first in Ukraine and now in Syria, as a destabilizing factor.[2] Arabs see the deal rewards Iran for its bad behavior not just by legitimizing and opening the way for Iran to be threshold nuclear power but also by making Iran more resourceful and confident. Many countries see high diplomatic contacts rewards Russia and what they have done in Ukraine and have been doing in Middle East. The uncertainty of the United States’ role in the region stemming from the doubts about Obama’s will and commitment to provide security is exacerbating not just in Gulf capitals but also in other regional capitals such as Tel Aviv or Ankara. American way of doing things irks Turks, alienates Iraqis, frightens Syrians, discourages Arabs and most of all creates a regional security structure where neither the United States nor its allies and partners simply can trust each other. [3] Increasing mistrust increases inflammatory attempts from both sides. For the United States traditional allies, end result of the diminishing trust in America varies from waging proxy war through different auxiliaries in Syria to clashing agendas in the regional security.[4] In a similar way, for the United States traditional adversaries decreasing US will and capacity is an incentive for making their own agendas within a more vigorous form of foreign policy. [5] The most recent example of this Russian inflammatory interventions in Syria. Thus, currently, all friends are disappointed with the United States regional policy while foes cheered it with enthusiasm.[6] For the Americans, America’s position as sole superpower in the region turns to be ‘a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t situation.’ [7] Here, the argument is not that the region is free from wrong doings and problems on its own making. From economics to social justice, from human rights to good governance on many critical issues region is in a mess. Yet, when it comes to things that have capacity to change the balance of power on the ground, they are result of the current US’s interventions and subsequent unchecked retrenchment strategies. Thus, the main argument is that the way in which the security paradoxes evolve in the region is a result of the United States failing strategies. To better frame the analysis, the article aims at bridging causality between American first ambitious (from the early 1990’s till 2008) and later ambiguous (since 2009) Middle East strategy and changing balance of power in the region.

#### Material presence is key – ground troops are an important signal of commitment – otherwise Iran-backed militias fill the role

**Nader, 2015**, senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and the author of Iran After the Bomb (Alireza, “Iran's Role in Iraq”, http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE151.htmlhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE151.html)

The conquest of Mosul and much of Anbar province by ISIL and the poor performance of Iraqi armed forces have made the Iraqi Shi’a more reliant on Iran. Short of reliable conventional troops, the Iraqi government has leaned on Shi’a militias with close ties to Iran to protect Baghdad and stop ISIL’s onslaught. The IRGC has been more than happy to oblige. Iraq’s dependence on Iran can facilitate the latter’s foreign policy objectives, from decreasing Tehran’s international isolation to possibly gaining more leverage on nuclear negotiation. Therefore, it is not surprising that the IRGC’s involvement in Iraq has become more public than it was during the U.S. occupation (2003–2011). Qassem Soleimani was in the shadows during that period; the IRGC had a minimal physical presence in Iraq, and instead trained Iraqis on Iranian territory and supplied some of the most sophisticated weapons used by Shi’a militias against American forces. Iranian officials were denying Soleimani’s presence in Iraq as recently as July 2014—likely out of concern of alienating Sunni Arabs (Adelkah, 2014). Iran no longer stays away from the limelight in the fight against ISIL. By the fall of 2014, Soleimani had been transformed into a public hero. AAH openly praised his role in uniting the “resistance forces” (“Namayande-ye Gorouh-e . . . ,” 2014). Furthermore, Iranian news sites have highlighted the IRGC’s active role on the front lines. One such instance was the defense of Amerli in October, in which the IRGC sent helicopters into the besieged town to arm and train the locals (“Sepah-e Pasdaran . . . ,” 2014). Qassem Soleimani’s photos were also prominently displayed in the aftermath of the liberation of Jurf al-Sakhar, in which 15,000 fighters—mostly Iraqi Shi’a—took part (“Sepah-e Pasdaran . . . ,” 2014). The battle for Jurf al-Sakhar showcased the growing role of Iranian-backed Shi’a militias in liberating strategic Iraqi territory from ISIL. While many Shi’a militias conduct extrajudicial killing of Sunnis and other abuses, the Shi’a militia fighting in Jurf al-Sakhar cooperated with Sunni tribes in recapturing the city. Shortly after the operations, a member of the Badr Organization told reporters, “With Iran’s help, and without any involvement from the international coalition, we were able to achieve big victories against Daesh [ISIL]” (Ozv-e Sazmaan-e . . . ,” 2014). In late November, Iran made global headlines when its air force bombed ISIL targets in Diyala province, in defense of what Iranian officials describe as a 25-mile buffer zone in Iraq (Arango and Erdbrink, 2014). There are a couple possible explanations for Iran’s increasingly public role in Iraq. First, the Iranian government is keen to prove its reliability to Iraq’s Shi’a-led government. For example, while the military effectiveness of Iranian airstrikes is unclear, it is more likely that the sorties were intended to bolster the perception that Iran is doing more to protect the Iraqis than the United States is (Pollack, 2014). Washington and Tehran still compete for influence in Iraq despite the U.S. troop withdrawal; most concerning for Iran, the rise of ISIL could provide an opportunity for U.S. forces to return to Iraq and supplant Iran’s presence. Currently, there are approximately 3,000 American troops in Iraq, a number that might increase in the future. Iran may not have an advanced air force or intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities, but it does possess a distinct advantage over U.S. forces: It is more willing to commit ground troops in Iraq and work directly with Shi’a militias that are considered more effective than Iraq’s regular armed forces, but often commit human rights abuses and are therefore problematic partners for the United States. Iran was quick to respond to the fall of Mosul; it began sending advisors and weapons to its neighbor within 48 hours of ISIL taking over the city (Daragahi et al., 2014). The United States, on the other hand, did not begin airstrikes until two months later. This has not gone unnoticed by the Iraqis. In a television interview, Prime Minister Abadi said, “When Baghdad was threatened, the Iranians did not hesitate to help us, and did not hesitate to help the Kurds when Erbil was threatened . . . unlike the Americans, who hesitated to help us when Baghdad was in danger, and hesitated to help our security forces” (Arango and Erdbrink, 2014).

### Military Industrial Complex Bad Answers

#### This argument is non-unique. The US has a $615 billion defense budget now. We are going to have a military industrial complex REGARDLESS of whether or not we SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE military spending, which is the question the resolution presents. We have reasons in the Constructive as to why we have to SIGNFICANTLY INCREASE military spending. We aren’t defending the status quo.

Violence is inevitable because umans have a will to survive – they will do whatever necessary to ensure that survival

Victor Davis Hanson, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “Postmodern War,” City Journal, February 8, 2005, <http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson020805.html>, UK: Fisher

Yet lost in all this confusion is the recognition that the essence of war remains unchanged—the use of force to eliminate an adversary, coerce an opponent to alter his behavior, or prevent annihilation. Technology, modern social theory, the ease and luxury of the West—these are simply the delivery systems that change with the ages, but do not alter or affect the substance of conflict. In our present context, all our concern about American combat casualties would vanish should there be another mass murder similar to 9/11. Like ancient man, postmodern man is **hardwired to survive**, and thus really will use his **full arsenal when faced with the alternative of extinction**. Should we lose the stock exchange or the White House, there would be almost no calls for restraint against states that harbored or aided the perpetrators, on the logic that every terrorist must sleep, eat, and use an ATM card somewhere. But what about the far more likely scenario of guerrilla wars and counterinsurgency? In such lesser conflicts, the human desire for victory still trumps most other considerations. The hysteria over the Iraqi war in the 2004 election did not really result from a failure to find weapons of mass destruction or to publicize a clear link between al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. These were issues raised after the fact for political purposes during a campaign that happened to coincide with a change in American perceptions as the war’s rocky aftermath unfolded. After all, on the eve of the invasion over 65 percent of Americans supported the war, and three weeks later, when Saddam’s statue fell, support was nearing 70 percent. The current depressing debate about preemption, allies, WMD, and al-Qaida ties originated in the subsequent inability of the United States to project a sense of **absolute victory** in the postbellum occupation, as looting led to terrorist reprisals, an insurgency, and televised beheadings.

#### Hardline militarism is the best alignment – pacifism has emboldened and strengthened enemies, must shift from this dangerous trend

Alex Epstein, Graduate of Duke University, BA Philosophy, Junior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, “Peacenik Warmongers,” Ayn Rand Institute, December 9, 2002, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7458, UK: Fisher

We do not need to predict or deduce the consequences of pacifism with regard to terrorism and the nations that sponsor it, because we experienced those consequences on September 11. Pacifism practically dictated the American response to terrorism for more than 23 years, beginning with our government's response to the first major act of Islamic terrorism against this country: when Iranian mobs held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days at the American embassy in Tehran. In response to that and later terrorist atrocities, American Presidents sought to **avoid military action** at all costs--by treating terrorists as isolated criminals and thereby ignoring the role of the governments that support them, or by offering diplomatic handouts to terrorist states in hopes that they would want to be our friends. **With each pacifist response** it became clearer that the most powerful nation on Earth was a **paper tiger--and our enemies made the most of it**. After years of American politicians acting like peaceniks, Islamic terrorism had proliferated from a few gangs of thugs to a worldwide scourge--making possible the attacks of September 11. It is an obvious evasion of history and logic for the advocates of pacifism to label themselves "anti-war," since the policies they advocate necessarily invite **escalating acts of war** against anyone who practices them. Military inaction sends the message to an aggressor--and to other, potential aggressors--that it will benefit by attacking the United States. To whatever extent "anti-war" protesters influence policy, they are not helping to prevent war; they are acting to make war more frequent and deadly, by making our enemies more aggressive, more plentiful, and more powerful. The only way to deal with militant enemies is to show them **unequivocally** that aggression against the United States will lead to their destruction. The only means of imparting this lesson is overwhelming military force--enough to **defeat and incapacitate the enemy**. Had we annihilated the Iranian regime 23 years ago, we could have thwarted Islamic terrorism at the beginning, with far less cost than will be required to defeat terrorism today. And if we fail to use our military against state sponsors of terrorism today, imagine the challenge we will face five years from now when Iraq and Iran possess nuclear weapons and are ready to disseminate them to their terrorist minions. Yet such a world is the goal of the "anti-war" movement. The suicidal stance of peaceniks is no innocent error or mere overflow of youthful idealism. It is the product of a fundamentally immoral commitment: the commitment to ignore reality--from the historical evidence of the consequences of pacifism to the very existence of the violent threats that confront us today--in favor of the wish that laying down our arms will achieve peace somehow. Those of us who are committed to facing the facts should condemn these peaceniks for what they really are: **warmongers for our enemies.**

#### A foreign policy dedicated to force would have been able to prevent terrorism – past acts of appeasement have served to only embolden terrorists

Onkar Ghate, Ph.D. in philosophy, is a senior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, “Diverting the Blame for 9/11,” The Providence Journal, April 2, 2004, Originally published March 31, 2004, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8021&news\_iv\_ctrl=1509, UK: Fisher

Sept. 11 could have been prevented only by having a principled foreign policy. The squabbling and finger-pointing surrounding the 9/11 commission only serve to obscure the fundamental lesson of that horrific day. Whatever errors or incompetence on the part of a particular individual or intelligence agency, what made September 11 possible was a failure of policy. Our government, whether controlled by Democrat or Republican, had for decades conducted an accommodating, range-of-the-moment, unprincipled foreign policy. September 11 was not the first time America was attacked by Islamic fundamentalists engaged in "holy war" against us. In 1979 theocratic Iran--which has spearheaded the "Islamic Revolution"--stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held 54 Americans hostage for over a year. In 1983 the Syrian- and Iranian-backed group Hezbollah bombed a U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon, killing 241 servicemen while they slept; the explosives came from Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement. In 1998 al-Qaeda blew up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 individuals. In 2000 al-Qaeda bombed the USS Cole in Yemen, killing 17 sailors. So we already knew that al-Qaeda was actively engaged in attacking Americans. We even had evidence that agents connected to al-Qaeda had been responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. And we knew in 1996 that bin Laden had made an overt declaration of war against the "Satan" America. But how did America react? Did our government adopt a principled approach and identify the fact that we were faced with a deadly threat from an ideological foe? Did we launch systematic counterattacks to wipe out such enemy organizations as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Fatah? Did we seek to eliminate enemy states like Iran? No--our responses were shortsighted and self-contradictory. To cite only a few of depressingly many examples: we initially expelled Iranian diplomats--but later sought an appeasing rapprochement with that ayatollah-led government. We intermittently cut off trade with Iran--but secretly negotiated weapons-for-hostages deals. When Israel had the courage to enter Lebanon in 1982 to destroy the PLO, we refused to uncompromisingly support our ally and instead brokered the killers' release. And with respect to al-Qaeda, we dropped a perfunctory bomb or two on one of its suspected camps, while our compliant diplomats waited for al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks to fade from the headlines. At home we treated our attackers as if they were isolated criminals rather than soldiers engaged in battle against us. In 1941 we did not attempt to indict the Japanese pilots who bombed Pearl Harbor--we declared war on the source. Yet we spent millions trying to indict specific terrorists--while we **ignored their masters.** Despite emphatic pronouncements from Islamic leaders about a "jihad" against America, our political leaders failed to grasp the ideology that **seeks our destruction**. This left them unable to target that enemy's armed combatants--in Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia--and the governments that assist them.

Appeasement and acquiescence to world opinion sent the message to the world that the US will not fight – this triggered continue terrorist attacks

Robert Tracinski, Received his undergraduate degree in Philosophy from the University of Chicago and studied with the Objectivist Graduate Center and Editorial Director of the Ayn Rand Institute, “Acts of War,” Ayn Rand Institute, September 11, 2001, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7384&news\_iv\_ctrl=1509, UK: Fisher

Our enemies have attacked the very center of our civilization. It is worse than Pearl Harbor. Our enemies have attacked, not a military base far out in the Pacific, but the very center of our civilization: our nation's political capital in Washington and its commercial capital in New York City. The scope of these attacks is not yet clear, but it is estimated that tens of thousands of Americans--most of them civilians--have been murdered. This is not the act of a few isolated terrorists. An attack of this size and scope, an attack carefully timed and coordinated across the country, is the product of a large organization that can only operate with the support and protection of a foreign government. This is not a mere criminal act. It is an act of war. These terrorists have not awakened a sleeping giant. They have attacked a complacent giant, a giant who refused to see, until it was too late, the disastrous consequences of his policies of restraint and appeasement. Americans were seduced by those who advocated a "measured" response and pinprick strikes against terrorists and the countries that support them. We allowed our judgment to be blunted by those who tell us that it is wrong ever to pronounce moral judgment, by those who say that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. We cringed before unfavorable "world opinion" as if that were the worst thing we had to fear. When terrorists bombed the World Trade Center the first time, we rounded up a few of the conspirators and put them on trial--while we left the terrorist leaders and their sponsors untouched. When they bombed our embassies in Africa, killing hundreds, we sent off a few Tomahawk missiles, scaling back our attack to avoid any civilian casualties. When they bombed the USS Cole--less than a year ago--**we did nothing**. And for the past year, as Israel has been under relentless assault by Palestinian terrorists, we urged restraint and demanded that they negotiate with the leader who unleashed those attacks. Terrorists have been at war with the United States for years, and we have sent them a clear, consistent message: We will not fight back. Through our actions, we have assured the terrorists, and the governments that sponsor them, t

Militarism is the most moral choice – total victory allows the ending of dictatorships and build-up of peaceful societies

John Lewis is a Consulting Editor for The Objective Standard, a journal of culture and politics, “The Moral Lesson of Hiroshima,” Capitalism Magazine, April 29, 2006, http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4648, UK: Fisher

There can be no higher moral action by a nation than to destroy an aggressive dictatorship, to permanently discredit the enemy's ideology, to stand guard while a replacement is crafted, and then to greet new friends on proper terms. Let those who today march for peace in Germany and Japan admit that their grandparents once marched as passionately for war, and that **only total defeat** could force them to **re-think their place** in the world and offer their children something better. Let them thank heaven-the United States-for the bomb.

Some did just that. Hisatsune Sakomizu, chief cabinet secretary of Japan, said after the war: "The atomic bomb was a golden opportunity given by Heaven for Japan to end the war." He wanted to look like a peaceful man-which became a sensible position only after the Americans had won.

Okura Kimmochi, president of the Technological Research Mobilization Office, wrote before the surrender: "I think it is better for our country to suffer a total defeat than to win total victory . . . in the case of Japan's total defeat, the armed forces would be abolished, but the Japanese people will rise to the occasion during the next several decades to reform themselves into a truly splendid people . . . the great humiliation [the bomb] is nothing but an admonition administered by Heaven to our country." But let him thank the American people-not heaven-for it was they who made the choice between the morality of life and the morality of death inescapable.

Americans should be immensely proud of the bomb. It ended a war that had enslaved a continent to a religious-military ideology of slavery and death.

There is no room on earth for this system, its ideas and its advocates.

It took a country that values this world to bomb this system into extinction.

For the Americans to do so while refusing to sacrifice their own troops to save the lives of enemy civilians was a sublimely moral action. This destroyed the foundations of the war, and allowed the Japanese to rebuild their culture along with their cities, as prosperous inhabitants of the earth. Were it true that total victory today creates new attackers tomorrow, we would now be fighting Japanese suicide bombers, while North Korea-where the American army did not impose its will-would be peaceful and prosperous. The facts are otherwise. The need for total victory over the morality of death has never been clearer.

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Commitment to militarism is necessary to prevent war, especially in the nuclear age – pacifism has allowed for the Nazis and the Imperial Japan to prosper

Thomas Sowell, Rose and Milton Friedman Senior Fellow at The Hoover Institution, “Pacifism and War,” Jewish World Review, September 24th, 2001, http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/sowell092401.asp, UK: Fisher

Pacifists of the 20th century had a lot of blood on their hands for weakening the Western democracies in the face of rising belligerence and military might in aggressor nations like Nazi Germany and imperial Japan. In Britain during the 1930s, Labor Party members of Parliament voted repeatedly against military spending, while Hitler built up the most powerful military machine in Europe. Students at leading British universities signed pledges to refuse to fight in the event of war.

All of this encouraged the Nazis and the Japanese toward war against countries that they knew had greater military potential than their own. Military potential only counts when there is the will to develop it and use it, and the fortitude to continue with a bloody war when it comes. This is what they did not believe the West had. And **it was Western pacifists who led them to that belief.**

Then as now, pacifism was a "statement" about one's ideals that paid little attention to actual consequences. At a Labor Party rally where Britain was being urged to disarm "as an example to others," economist Roy Harrod asked one of the pacifists: "You think our example will cause Hitler and Mussolini to disarm?"

The reply was: "Oh, Roy, have you lost all your idealism?" In other words, the issue was about making a "statement" -- that is, posturing on the edge of a volcano, with World War II threatening to erupt at any time. When disarmament advocate George Bernard Shaw was asked what Britons should do if the Nazis crossed the channel into Britain, the playwright replied, "Welcome them as tourists."

What a shame our schools and college neglect history, which could save us from continuing to repeat the idiocies of the past, which are even more dangerous now in a **nuclear age**.

Their argument ignored reality and emphasizes fantasy – utilization of arms is necessary to bringing an end to fighting, ensuring peace in the long term – restraint invites violence

Victor Davis Hanson, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “Kill the Insurgents - Stop Talking,” The New Republic, June 2, 2004, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson060204.html, UK: Fisher

Most of the time in war, diplomatic machinations don't create enduring realities--**events on the battlefield do.** After World War I, the defeated, but not humiliated, German army that surrendered in France and Belgium provided the origins for the "stab in the back" mythology that fueled Hitler's rise to power. After World War II, by contrast, the **shattered and shamed** Wehrmacht in Berlin was unable to energize a Fourth Reich. George S. Patton, snarling to head for Berlin and beyond in 1945, grasped the importance of "the unforgiving minute," when military audacity can establish a fait accompli on the ground that diplomats quibble over for decades. His unfulfilled wish to take Prague meant a **blank check** for a late-arriving Red Army that would help ensure a half-century of **totalitarianism** in Eastern Europe.

The labyrinth of failed plans and bad-faith deals in the Balkans led nowhere until the U.S. Air Force secured in 79 days in 1999 the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic--the chief foreign policy achievement of the Clinton administration. Suicide bombing failed to bring Yasir Arafat what he could not obtain at Camp David only because of the skill and ingenuity of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which--through a multifaceted strategy of border fortification, proactive attacks, targeted air assassinations, and increased intelligence and vigilance--drastically curtailed the efficacy of the tactic. Arafat today is a marginalized figure not because of a belated European perception that he is corrupt and murderous, but because he was first reduced to a humiliated lord of a rubble pile--thanks to the IDF.

In our current postmodern world, we tend to **deprecate the efficacy of arms**, trusting instead that wise and reasonable people can adjudicate the situation on the ground according to Enlightenment principles of diplomacy and reason. But thugs like Moqtada Al Sadr's Mahdi Army and Saddam Hussein's remnant killers beg to differ. They may eventually submit to a fair and honest brokered peace--but only when the alternative is an Abrams tank or Cobra gunship, rather than a stern rebuke from L. Paul Bremer. More important, neutrals and well-meaning moderates in Iraq often put their ideological preferences on hold as they wait to see who will, in fact, win. The promise of consensual government, gender equality, and the rule of law may indeed save the Iraqi people and improve our own security--but **only when those who wish none of it learn that trying to stop it will get them killed.**

A year ago, we waged a brilliant three-week campaign, then mysteriously forgot the source of our success. Military audacity, lethality, unpredictability, imperviousness to cheap criticism, and iron resolve, coupled with the message of freedom, convinced neutrals to join us and enemies not yet conquered to remain in the shadows. But our failure to shoot looters, to arrest early insurrectionists like Sadr, and to subdue cities like Tikrit or Falluja only earned us contempt--and not just from those who would kill us, but from others who would have joined us as well.

The misplaced restraint of the past year is not true morality, but a sort of weird immorality that seeks to avoid ethical censure in the short term--the ever-present, 24-hour pulpit of global television that inflates a half-dozen inadvertent civilian casualties into Dresden and Hiroshima. But, in the long term, such complacency has left more moderate Iraqis to be targeted by ever more emboldened murderers. For their part, American troops have discovered that they are safer on the assault when they can fire first and kill killers, rather than simply patrol and react, hoping their newly armored Humvees and fortified flak vests will deflect projectiles.

### Military Isn’t Evil

#### Military has unique capabilities and responsibility with regard to demining

Cahill-MD-13

To Bear Witness: A Journey of Healing and Solidarity, Updated, Revised, and Expanded Edition Google Books

In the fertile grazing grounds of Somaliland, mothers now tie toddlers to trees so that the young children cannot crawl, innocently but dangerously, out among the more than one million mines that have been haphazardly laid there over the last decade. Camels, and the youngsters and adolescents who tend them, are less fortunate, since, to survive in the Somali savannah, animals must endlessly search for water and nourishment. The fields are littered with animal carcasses, and stone mounds mark the graves of herders. The towns are crowded with amputees. Mine injuries have become one of the major health hazards in that sad country, reaching epidemic proportions in the north. Numerous international conferences, Congressional and United Nations hearings, and extensive media coverage have heightened our awareness of the growing problems posed by landmines. These efforts have documented the horror of mine injuries and the vast-indeed global-scope of the crisis. The educational process, however, has almost become an end in itself, with articles repeating articles, using the same data in an orgy of condemnations. But the emphasis has rarely, if ever, been on possible solutions. One has been expected to find solace merely in continuing to express outrage. However, the growing number of mine victims demands, if nothing else, that we move beyond rhetoric, beyond merely reconstructing limbs, to stop the spread of a devastating epidemic and devise a permanent cure. Physicians know, perhaps better than most, that no words can mask the human suffering that war inevitably brings. I have seen the landmine crisis firsthand as a physician. In directing medical and public health programs in Nicaragua and Somalia, I have had to deal with the mutilated bodies; the crippled and blinded; the psychologically traumatized; and the devastating effects on families, communities, regions, and countries. But a physician's view is not merely medical; he does not cease to be an involved citizen merely because he wears a stethoscope or uses a scalpel. In fact, those experienced and skilled in international health can offer unique insights, and even solutions, not usually found in foreign policy debates, legal formulations, or military lore. The special evil of antipersonnel landmines is that they do not discriminate between the civilian and the soldier, and they continue to maim and kill innocent victims long after the conflict in which they were deployed is over. But that is neither the beginning nor the end of the problem. Landmines are considered by military establishments to be indispensable defensive weapons in interstate warfare; they have also become offensive weapons of choice in internal conflicts, as can be seen in many Third World countries. Additionally, they are easy to make, profitable to sell, and relatively inexpensive to acquire. Mines no longer have to be laid individually but can be scattered over vast areas, dropped from airplanes or delivered by rockets. It is virtually impossible to map the location of mines delivered by such "sophisticated" systems. Both sides employ mines in war, but media interpretation and official condemnation are the prerogatives only of the victor. In the Persian Gulf War, for example, much attention was devoted to the minefields Iraq laid inside Kuwait. However, little notice was given to the millions of mines rocketed by the allied forces deep into Iraq, far from the battlefields-one mine for every Iraqi man, woman, and child. The constant development and refinement of the instruments of war has been the most malignant result of the technological revolution of our times. Public protest has rightly been aroused, and international action taken, against the threat of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Landmines do not just pose a threat; they blow up innocent people every hour of everyday. It is time to consider whether they, too, should be deemed a particularly inhumane weapon that should be circumscribed by international law. Landmines are one of the great scourges of history. They are turning vast areas of the earth into wastelands of death, economic ruin, and social disintegration. More than 100 million landmines are now scattered wantonly across the fields, roads, and other strategic areas of some 60 countries. Up to 30 million mines have been laid in Africa. In the Middle East, mines used during the Iran-Iraq and Persian Gulf wars have been added to those still lying in wait from World War II. Since 1990, an estimated 3 million mines have been sown, without markers or maps, among embattled civilians in the former Yugoslavia, and the total there is growing by some 50,000 per week. Part of the problem is the sheer number of mines, and of the manufacturers and exporters of them. More than 250 million landmines, including approximately 200 million antipersonnel landmines, have been produced over the past twenty- five years. Antipersonnel landmines continue to be made at an average rate of 5- 10 million per year. Approximately fifty nations produce these weapons, and about thirty export them. With such widespread distribution, no one escapes; in the recent Somali conflict, 26 percent of U.S. casualties were due to inexpensive, low technology, easy-to-use, conventional landmines-the same mines that are currently contaminating so much of the developing world. Landmines are now used to terrorize and disrupt whole populations, not simply to block or control battlefield movements, as during World War II. The very concept of a "battlefield" that can be demarcated in space and time is, in fact, no longer valid. The entire countryside is now fair game in most conflicts, and the hapless inhabitants become part of every conflict. In World War I, only 5 percent of those killed or wounded were noncombatants; by World War II, the level was 50 percent, and the hgure has approached 90 percent in recent conflicts. Defending the use of landmines by invoking obsolete battlefield definitions and military logic offers a seriously flawed argument in which unchallenged language distorts reality. Long after armies leave, long after cease fires and even peace treaties have been signed, still hidden mines continue to do their terrible work on a devastating scale, especially in the twenty most ravaged countries, from Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Vietnam to Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia; from El Salvador and Nicaragua to Iraq and Kuwait. Because of the presence or fear of landmines, almost half the land area of Cambodia is unsafe for farming or any other human use. After eighteen years of civil war and 2 million landmines, no major road in Mozambique is usable. In Angola, the loss of arable land is so massive that the World Food Programme had to earmark $32 million of its 1994 food aid budget merely to offset nutritional deficiencies. Refugees are afraid to return to their homes, creating a growing financial burden on international relief agencies. Landmines have cut the expected rate of repatriation in Cambodia from 10,000 to 1,000 per week. In Afghanistan the situation is even worse. Some 3.5 million refugees will not return because mountain roads and fields are infested with mines. The bill for refugees refusing to leave the camps in Pakistan was $50 million in 1993. In southern Sudan, mines have paralyzed agricultural production, leaving thousands trapped in a drought-stricken region. Everywhere, power plants, transportation centers, water supplies, and other essential services are primary mining targets so that the basic infrastructure of society collapses, and economic independence becomes a painful mirage. In landmine infested areas, medical and public health teams are overwhelmed; the problems of evacuation, triage, and surgical treatment are daunting, but the challenges of rehabilitation are staggering. While over 1,000 people are killed by mines every month, many more are injured and permanently disabled. In Cambodia, one in every 236 people is a landmine amputee; the rate is one in 470 in Angola, and one in 1,000 in northern Somalia. One of the most significant, and most neglected, features of landmines is that the cost of clearing a minefield is at least 100 times that of laying it; in addition, clearance is a highly dangerous and painfully slow process. The number of deminers killed in Kuwait since the Persian Gulf War exceeds that of U.S. combatants killed during the conflict. The enormity of the global landmine crisis and the increasing rage against the special crimes that mines commit against the innocent, in times of peace as well as conflict, are finally and belatedly generating public demands for action. But what action? What can be done? One might view the landmine crisis in the same way as the ruler in The King and I saw the confusing challenges of change-as a "puzzlement" that no single approach and no single actor can solve. Certainly, no amount of ranting will help any longer, and a piecemeal approach is obviously inadequate for the growing disaster. Yet, the problem was created by man's ingenuity-perverse, to be sure-and ultimately will have to be solved by the combined, cooperative, and coordinated efforts of many people. The solutions will depend on technical and military experts with creative technological ideas. They will depend on lawyers who are willing to grapple with the elusive and frustrating verbal nuances that must be overcome if new, enforceable conventions, regimes, and agreements are to be fashioned. They will depend on doctors and humanitarian workers who can create models that may solve some of the most pressing problems posed by landmine injuries. And they will depend on diplomats and politicians who are willing to move beyond the boundaries of Cold War power politics to forge new treaties and provide innovative leadership, rather than merely repeat the slogans of the past. Solutions are possible. Civilian and military approaches to the landmine crisis need not be mutually exclusive; in fact, the primary function of the United States military is to protect the safety of our citizens and to do so, ultimately, under civilian command. For philosophical as well as practical reasons, the military must play an essential role in solving the landmine crisis. Responsible military leaders share the ethical concerns about landmines and must balance the transient benefits these weapons offer against their overwhelming impact on noncombatants and the social and economic price they impose on fragile nations. Only the military currently possesses the information, expertise, and organization that could reverse the landmine crisis. If the military were directed to share their knowledge and skills with civilian forces in a global demining program, immediate progress could be anticipated. Much of the technology needed to mount an effective demining operation already exists, but the necessary political will and financial commitment have been wanting. International humanitarian law and conventions could easily be strengthened, but, once again, such change demands a political determination that has been sadly lacking. Surgical and public health programs for landmine victims could be standardized, thereby making them more economical and accessible in poorer countries where the burden is greatest. If we are not to perpetuate the present haphazard response system, in which flawed programs are repeatedly launched in different parts of the world, international coordination and cooperation are required. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs should be designated and funded to undertake this task. Clearing the Fields is the effort of men and women, in and out of government, representing different disciplines and ideologies, all searching for solutions to a universally recognized disaster. Rooted firmly in the hard reality of their experiences, the contributors to this volume document the crisis and then explore possible avenues of escape. There is an almost palpable feeling that solutions to the landmine crisis can be realized, even if political leaders must be forced to follow the will of an aroused populace. Hope rests on a worldwide movement, a slow, stumbling coalescence of determined private groups influencing governments and international organizations, even if each is motivated by different reasons. There is growing revulsion at the waste of innocent life, at the fear and despair that permeate mine infested lands, and at the skyrocketing costs to donor and recipient nations alike. There is a reluctant acceptance that current military methods can be changed, if necessary, and that the required technological and legal tools for resolving the crisis are already available or could be developed. Finally, the bright light of public scrutiny has exposed the lack of political thought and leadership on this topic. The hour has come at last; solutions to the landmine crisis are at hand.

### Military Intervention Worsens Conflicts Answers

#### This is non-unique – We have a massive military budget now and are engaging in military intervention. We are just defending a SIGNIFICANT INCREASE in military spending for a particular purpose. All of their impacts will occur regardless of whether or not military spending is significantly increased

#### We have on-point evidence that military power projection is needed in the area that we identify

#### They haven’t identified an alternative – if the US military completely collapsed there would be huge wars

**Thayer 2006** [Bradley A., Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, The National Interest, November -December, “In Defense of Primacy”, lexis]

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.

The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations.

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted.

Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.

Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

#### We can always have a large military and reduce intervention

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

The best way to get at the question of American grand strategy is to take stock of the character of the international security environment today. **The United States is interested**, in the first instance, **in protecting its own people and territory from acts of aggression. But it also has sought to foster a global order** **in which key overseas allies and interests are protected, in the interest of broader American security and prosperity, and in awareness of the fact that ignoring problems abroad has generally hurt U.S. security**. (**The United States tried a policy of non-interference, related to today’s academically popular paradigm of offshore balancing, before both world wars and to some extent the Korean war**.) There are problems with this overall narrative, to be sure, as the Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump campaigns in the United States have helped reveal in 2015 and 2016. For one thing, the United States spends a higher share of its gross domestic product on its military than almost all of its allies and security partners, raising valid questions about burdensharing. Yet these issues are no more acute than during the Cold War and indeed, on balance they are probably less concerning now, given that American military spending has dropped to a modest share of the nation’s economic output. A larger problem is that, even though America as a nation has never been richer, members of its middle economic classes often feel disempowered and disenfranchised by the forces of globalization. They also feel poorer and less secure than before, and less hopeful about the future. Sustaining support for American internationalism therefore undoubtedly requires significant steps to make the middle classes more supportive of such a goal— which in turn has repercussions for tax policy (and the progressivity of the tax code), for education policy, and for the labor provisions of trade agreements among other matters in public policy. All that said, **the internationalist role of the United States has been on balance very beneficial, and it is important to recognize as much. Indeed, despite the recent bedlam affecting the Middle East in particular, overall trends in human history have been clearly favorable in recent decades**. 1 **The overall frequency of interstate violence has declined greatly. Casualties from all types of war, particularly when adjusted for the size of the human population, are down substantially. Prosperity has extended to many corners of the world that were previously extremely poor**. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (pp. 3-4). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

#### We’ve succeeded in decimating ISIS

**CNN, 12-14**-16, http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/14/politics/white-house-isis-numbers/

**At least 75% of ISIS fighters have been killed during the campaign of US-led airstrike**s, according to US officials. **he US anti-ISIS envoy said the campaign has winnowed ISIS' ranks to between 12,000 and 15,000** "battle ready" fighters, a top US official said on Tuesday. The figures mean the US and its coalition partners have taken out vastly more ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria than currently remain on the battlefield, two years since the bombing campaign began. Last week a US official said **the coalition had killed 50,000 militants since 2014.** CONTINUES Speaking at the White House Tuesday, Brett McGurk, the US special envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition, said **the terror group is no longer able to replenish its ranks**, predicting the number of fighters would continue to dwindle. "**The number of battle-ready fighters inside Iraq and Syria is now at its lowest point that it's ever been,"** McGurk said, describing the update he gave the President to reporters after the meeting. He noted that the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS had been stemmed by tighter surveillance and border controls.

#### US still needs a sizable army due to maintain strength in Korea

Michael **O’Hanlon, 2014**, March 1, Washington Quarterly, “Sizing US Ground Forces: From “2 wars” to “1 war + 2 missions”, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sizing-us-ground-forces-%E2%80%98%E2%80%982-wars%E2%80%99%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98%E2%80%981-war-2-missions%E2%80%99%E2%80%99> (Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow with the [Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=16ab9835fd1545dfad62a538b86ec653&_lang=en&_z=z) and director of research for the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=7e60367e9ea646cd97bdf148dc5e2451&_lang=en&_z=z) program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His most recent book is [*Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence while Cutting the Defense Budget*](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=9ce348403f3e462d84dc3a4bda3edbd5&_lang=en&_z=z) (Brookings Institution Press 2013).

Building on this backdrop, **this paper recommends that the U.S. ground forces** discard the two-war requirement altogether, and **instead organize themselves around a “1+2” paradigm**—**with the capacity for one prompt, large-scale combat operation (probably in Korea)** along with two mid-sized and longer-term multilateral stabilization missions of one type or another. Yet **this construct,** even if it seems less demanding than existing policy requirements, **does not allow cuts to the Army below the range of roughly 425,000 to 450,000 active-duty soldiers**, by my math. If and when the North Korea challenge is resolved or defused, there may be a basis for a much smaller active-duty Army. But that day is not yet here. So while the proposal may seem to the “left” of official force planning requirements, it is actually an effort to place a floor under which Army force structure, and specifically the active-duty Army, should not descend.

#### Most plausible scenario for war is in Korea

Michael **O’Hanlon, 2014**, March 1, Washington Quarterly, “Sizing US Ground Forces: From “2 wars” to “1 war + 2 missions”, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sizing-us-ground-forces-%E2%80%98%E2%80%982-wars%E2%80%99%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98%E2%80%981-war-2-missions%E2%80%99%E2%80%99> (Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow with the [Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=16ab9835fd1545dfad62a538b86ec653&_lang=en&_z=z) and director of research for the [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=7e60367e9ea646cd97bdf148dc5e2451&_lang=en&_z=z) program at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American foreign policy. He is a visiting lecturer at Princeton University, an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. His most recent book is [*Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence while Cutting the Defense Budget*](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/~/link.aspx?_id=9ce348403f3e462d84dc3a4bda3edbd5&_lang=en&_z=z) (Brookings Institution Press 2013).

As noted, **the most plausible place for another major ground combat operation for U.S. forces is on the Korean peninsula**. This would not necessarily result from the traditional scenario of an invasion of South Korea by the North. **It could be sparked, rather, by an internal coup or schism within North Korea that destabilized the country and put the security of its nuclear weapons at risk. It also could result somewhat inadvertently from an exchange of gunfire on land or sea that escalated into North Korean long-range artillery and missile attacks on South Korea’s nearby capital of Seoul**. The North Korean aggressions of 2010, including the brazen sinking of the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan and subsequent attacks on a remote South Korean island that together killed about 50 South Koreans, are instructive here.6 Alternatively, if North Korea greatly accelerated its production of nuclear bombs—it is now believed to have about ten or more, according to U.S. intelligence—or seemed on the verge of selling nuclear materials to a terrorist group, the United States and South Korea might decide to preempt with a limited strike against its nuclear facilities. North Korea might then respond in dramatic fashion.

#### Every credible measure of study shows violence is down because of everything consistent with the aff---heg, democracy, liberal trade---it’s only a question of sustaining current dynamics and preventing shocks to the system

Pinker 11 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

On the day this article appears, you will read about a shocking act of violence. Somewhere in the world there will be a terrorist bombing, a senseless murder, a bloody insurrection. It's impossible to learn about these catastrophes without thinking, "What is the world coming to?"

But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?"

Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species.

The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children.

This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood.

Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals.

Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence.

The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago.

For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control.

These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history.

It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves.

The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide.

The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back.

Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors.

The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery.

The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace.

Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population).

Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars.

The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers.

The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously.

The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%.

The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end.

Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends.

In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people.

Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature?

This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment.

It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels.

The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels.

We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice.

Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism.

For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money.

A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them.

These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

#### US hegemonic norms necessary to prevent terrorism, prevent bioweapons use, and solve climate change

Michael **Mazaar**, 20**14**, A Strategy of Discriminate Power: A Global Posture for Sustained Leadership, Washington Quarterly, March 1, <http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/strategy-discriminate-power-global-posture-sustained-leadership> (MICHAEL J. MAZARR is Legislative Assistant and Chief Writer in the office of Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-OK). Dr. Mazarr holds A.B. and M.A. degrees from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. He is an Adjunct Professor in the Georgetown University National Security Studies Program, and he served in the U.S. Naval Reserve for seven years as an intelligence officer. Before coming into the House, Dr. Mazarr was a Senior Fellow in International Studies, where he directed a number of major projects. He has authored five books, edited five anthologies, and published a number of scholarly articles.)

Fourth and finally, **the U**nited **St**ates **will have a rising role in nontraditional security threats. These range from intentional techniques and tools—such as cyber attacks, economic harassment, terrorism, and biological weapons**—to fragilities and instabilities residing in a complex, networked system, such as capital market volatility and the results of climate change; to resentments, grievances, and prideful assertions stemming from identity politics. As a result, **forestalling strategically significant threats to the homeland will require more than balancing power. It will demand preserving the system’s stability and developing** norms **to bring pressure against would-be destabilizing agents**.

### Military Prostitution Answers

#### This is non-unique and no link – we have military power now --$600 billion worth. Their evidence is descriptive of the status quo we are arguing for more navy boats and more high tech weapons to counter China. These don’t promote any avenues for people in the military to rape native populations

#### The Pro just replaces military bases with tourism, which displaces local businesses without helping women.

Angst, Assistant Prof of Anthropology @ Lewis and Clark College, 8

(Linda, “Local Violence, Global Media: Feminist Analyses of Gendered Representations,” pp. 152-154)

It seems incongruous that feminists should espouse this patriarchal model, yet perhaps Okinawan feminists feel that toeing the nationalist line is simply a practical strategy for criticizing the structure from Within. In Other words, it may be that they hope that by adopting this language, Okinawan feminists are, in effect, standing the State on its head, criticizing it by using the very language (Of patriarchal nationalism) by which it is legitimized. Feminism as subversion is the most positive reading possible of what seems, on balance, a problematic adoption of nationalist, patriarchal tropes. Women working in Okinawa's base related and (now) resort tourism. related sex and entertainment industry have long borne the brunt Of their so cially stigmatizing and physically debilitating, dangerous work, including abuse by their patrons. Protest leaders, who define an idea of collective cultural self through reference to a pristine, precolonial past, draw upon images of purity and chastity, such as the Himeyuri and the raped schoolgirl; yet the real prosti- tuted daughters of Okinawa are excluded. Indeed, in many ways, bar and brothel women are lingering and unwanted images of pre-war era Okinawa as the IOW ethnic Despite their many and long-standing sacrifices, these women are coded as less deserving of public concern by many groups because they are not "pure." The lack of sensitivity to the fact that there is little work available to unedu- cared women other than bar and sex work melds with the focus on the 12.year. Old raped girl as the primary symbol of sacrifice and victimhood (just as the Himeyuri served in this capacity for wartime and postwar Okinawa until 1995). Yet the raped girl differs fundamentally from Other Women in Okinawa: precisely because she is a girl, her chastity places her within the protection of the patriarchal family. Women working in the sex trade have always been rele gated to the lowest rungs of the social order, although in the first decades after the war, the survival of many Okinawan families relied on the incomes of these same Women—sisters, mothers, and other female relatives. NOW that most Okinawans have managed to put behind them the hardscrabble years, the women who still bear the burden of sacrifices—now older Okinawan women or Filipinas working in Okinawa—have been forgotten, stigma- tized by, and therefore relegated to, work in bar and brothel districts. Ironically, the very women who have experienced the life of the prosti- tuted daughter are excluded from public recognition as that particular symbol of Okinawan victimhood. That is, Okinawan women working in the sex trade, around bases and in the tourist industry, are ineligible for inclusion within the protective embrace of the collective family, despite having sacrificed their own reputations as "decent women" in the service of families. Feminists have often been guilty of misrepresenting these women and claiming to speak for them. Still, whatever criticisms we may have of feminist appropriations of other women’s voices, in Okinawa they are at least willing to take seriously the situa- tion of these forgotten women and include them in their agendas. Conclusion Okinawans generally agree that the 1995 rape shows the need to re-examine policies allowing U.S. Okinawa. It has justifiably been used as leverage against Tokyo for the removal of U.S. bases and the return of Okinawan lands. Feminist groups object to the focus on an agenda of devel- opment of Okinawan lands (most probably by corporate capital, as has been the case with the resort development in Okinawa since the late 1960s. which they believe leads to the marginalization and perhaps eventual exclusion of what they consider to be the heart of the matter; protecting and improving women's lives. For example, to what degree would small businesses owned and run by women be protected' Much of the development that has already occurred in Okinawa is large, well-known Japanese corporations that may not be interested in the needs of small owners, women such as Keiko and Kaa-chan who run a snack shop and bar in Kin, or the women who operates the Churasa Soap Factory in Onna. Indeed the issue of how women will figure in the service economy of tourism is not addressed. While women have been expected to support men in their political protests for Okinawan rights, the result has not necessarily been the fulfillment of women’s agendas. Rather, women are expected to defer their goals to the aims of Okinawan identity politics (read “economic development” in this case). From the perspective of a government attempting to improve economic conditions, there is a practical logic to moving from servicing the military to Japanese and Asian tourists. The infrastructure is in place: shops catering to outsiders, recreational/entertainment outlets, and a history of leasing land foreigners. Because women in these industries will simply cater to a different clientele, the problem of women seems to disappear. Okinawan feminists and other women with whom I have spoken fear that, in this way, women will continue to be the base of a tourist economy pyramid, mostly earning minimum and enjoying few if any employee benefits. As Enloe suggests, an economically and socially marginalized exis- tence will continue for these women within the sexual economy of tourism. The problem will remain invisible as long as officials insist on deferring issues of women's human rights to the cause of Okinawan nationalism. Many local businesses have been transformed by tourism, but the lot of most unskilled female laborers, especially those in the sex trade, has not changed. Assembly. woman Takazato is concerned that women's lives may not improve in the de- velopment scenario painted prefectural authorities; this plan simply replicates a service economy that is patriarchal in its ideological origins, particularly in the ways that work roles have been designated as either male or female.

#### US marine presence in Okinawa is key to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions

Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage Foundation, 11 (Bruce, 6-24-11, “Top 10 Reasons Why the U.S. Marines on Okinawa Are Essential to Peace and Security in the Pacific,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-marines-on-okinawa-are-essential-to-peace-and-security-in-the-pacific>, accessed 9-7-15, CMM)

Reason #8: The U.S. Marine presence helps the U.S. to conduct humanitarian operations.

The Okinawa Marines have routinely been the primary responders to major natural disasters in Asia, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, mudslides in the Philippines, and the typhoon in Taiwan. The Marines have led or participated in 12 significant humanitarian assistance–disaster relief (HADR) missions during the past five years alone, helping to save hundreds of thousands of lives in the region.[26] For example, in response to the March 2011 natural disasters in Japan, U.S. military forces in Asia responded quickly and worked seamlessly with the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Operation Tomodachi (“friendship”) highlighted the versatility of U.S. forces deployed on Okinawa. During Operation Tomodachi, the proximity of Futenma MCAS to Marine ground and logistics units was critical to the rapid deployment of supplies and personnel. Marine assets on Okinawa began flying to Japan within four hours of being tasked. Helicopter and fixed-wing C-130 aircraft from Futenma were involved in humanitarian operations, as were members of the 31st MEU, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, and 1st Marine Air Wing, all based in Okinawa. U.S. disaster relief operations generated considerable goodwill in Japan, including on Okinawa. Okinawans now realize what the Marines were training for when conducting HADR operations elsewhere in Asia. Yet Okinawan media refused to publish articles or photos of U.S. Marines from Okinawa conducting humanitarian assistance operations in Japan.

#### Effective HADR is key to prevent disease spread and environmental collapse

Brattberg, fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, 13 (Erik, 11-21-13, “The case for US military response during international disasters,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/190954-the-case-for-us-military-response-during-international>, accessed 9-7-15, CMM)

The scale of the U.S. military’s response to the disastrous Haiyan Typhoon in the Philippines has been impressive. The deployment of USS George Washington along with other smaller vessels has allowed for the delivery of over 600 tons of relief supplies. Moreover, U.S. military transport has already moved thousands of humanitarian workers into the disaster-stricken Tacloban and airlifted almost 5,000 survivors into safety. As natural disasters and complex humanitarian emergencies are becoming more common worldwide, the U.S. will increasingly be called in to assist during other disasters. What’s more, weak and fragile states with inadequate emergency response capacities, infrastructure and public health services are particularly vulnerable to severe natural disasters. Here, military response is crucial to getting relief efforts up and running during the immediate post-disaster phase. But military-led disaster relief is not only a humanitarian imperative – it can also serve a larger strategic imperative as a part of U.S. foreign policy. Compounding the strategic importance of the US military’s role in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are four key reasons. First, and most obviously, providing disaster relief helps boost U.S. soft power in the world. By assisting in humanitarian emergencies, the U.S. military sends a message that it’s a global force for good. The importance of this kind of ‘soft-power diplomacy’ cannot be underestimated, especially in times when the US is perceived as losing influence in the Asia-Pacific region to China. Responding to disasters can also lead to a more positive attitude towards the U.S. – as was the case following U.S. assistance during the flood in Pakistan in 2010. Second, disaster relief can help contain some of the negative consequences of major disasters from spreading elsewhere in the world. This is particularly the case in weak states where crises can easily spill over national boundaries in the forms of massive refugee flows, the spread of infectious diseases, or environmental collapse. Case in point: the robust U.S. intervention in Haiti after the earthquake in January 2010 prevented what could otherwise have been huge refugee flows to the U.S. Third, disaster relief is also an opportunity for the U.S. military to forge stronger multilateral security relationships with other countries’ militaries. In the Philippines, U.S. troops have worked alongside troops from several other countries. As the U.S. looks to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific in the future, these kinds of activities can serve a clear purpose of building trust and developing military-to-military ties. As the Pentagon currently winds down its military presence in Afghanistan, relief efforts can also provide essential real-life training opportunities for American troops. Moreover, they can serve to legitimize US military presence in certain parts of the world where it is currently disputed. Finally, military-led disaster relief reinforces the view of America as an indispensible nation. Clearly the only international actor capable of carrying out such large-scale complex operations as the one currently seen in the Philippines is the US military. Few countries are complaining when the US acts as the world’s police in times of real crisis. In contrast, China sent no troops to the Philippines and has so far contributed little in financial aid. The forceful U.S. response also serves to affirm American commitment to allies and partners that the U.S. is there and is willing to assist in times of crisis. Of course, the military is not the only important actor in international disaster response. Relief efforts must be a whole-of-government enterprise with solid civil-military links. Other international humanitarian actors are also equally important. But, as the Philippines illustrates, in some situations the military is the only institution with the capacity to respond. Without it, nothing else can get done. Given the growing importance of disaster relief, the U.S. military should prioritize these issues even more in coming years. This is not only the right thing to do; it is also increasingly in our interest to do so.

### Military Sexual Assault Answers

#### This is non-unique and no link – we have military power now --$600 billion worth. Their evidence is descriptive of the status quo we are arguing for more navy boats and more high tech weapons to counter China. These don’t promote any avenues for people in the military to rape native populations

#### Rapists rape out of uniform. If the rapists were not in the military, they would be in other professions and they would still be rapists. There are horrible people everywhere.

#### Their evidence is terrible. ‘Just because some people in the military have committed rape on or off bases does not mean that military bases promote rape.

#### Reduced effectiveness of U.S. presence in East Asia triggers global nuclear war

Andrew T.H. Tan 15, Associate Professor in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, 2015, “Preventing the next war in East Asia,” in Security and Conflict in East Asia, ed. Tan, p. 228-230

The absence of effective regional institutions, regimes, norms and laws that could regulate tensions and conflicts between states has meant that the geostrategic environment in East Asia is reminiscent of that in Europe before the world wars, characterized by changing power balances and the outbreak of serious inter-state crises. A regional war in East Asia would have devastating global consequences. Three of the key players, namely the USA, China and Japan, are, in that order, the three largest economies in the world. More seriously, any conflict could escalate rapidly into nuclear war, as the conventional war capabilities of the USA could compel North Korea and China to resort to weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear missiles and biological and chemical weapons. By 2013 the possibility of open warfare in East Asia had been taken seriously, with widespread warnings that tensions between China and Japan, for instance, had reached the highest levels since the end of the Second World War. Due to the possibility of misperception and miscalculation, accidental war could break out - however implausible from a rational perspective that might sound.

What can be done to prevent possible conflict in East Asia? One of the key lessons of the previous two world wars is the need for strong international institutions, regimes, norms and laws which could better manage the inevitable conflicts of interests between states. Another important lesson, taken from the Cold War in Europe, has been the need for a long process of confidence and security building measures - such as the Conventional Forces in Europe process - which would improve transparency and build trust, to accompany the parallel processes of deep dialogue, engagement and cooperation. This could eventually lead to more intrusive forms of regionalism which could reduce tensions, resolve or manage disputes without resort to violence, and more generally keep the peace among the main regional powers.

While the imperative to take regionalism seriously is there, it remains to be seen whether there is tar-sighted leadership among the key state actors in East Asia to do so, even when the terrible consequences of a regional conflict are obvious and no one actually wants such a conflict to occur. Much depends on the two key players in East Asia, namely the USA and China. While the USA faces serious economic and financial difficulties, and its long-term decline is evident, it remains a key player in the region. China must thus realize that unless it arrives at an accommodation with the USA as well as its allies in managing regional security, it cannot hope to maintain regional stability in the long term, which it needs for its economic modernization and development. While it believes that the balance of power is shifting in its favour, it has to understand that effective regional influence ultimately has to be earned, not imposed. Similarly, the reality of China's rise means that Washington must learn to accommodate it - the alternative being a dangerous and destabilizing amis race that would bankrupt the USA and lead to unpalatable outcomes, such as a general conflict. Learning to live with a peer competitor requires leadership, engagement and dialogue, rather than instinctively reaching out for a Cold War containment strategy.

The two countries must therefore begin a broad-ranging dialogue to manage not just their relations but also regional security, as they are key players in ensuring stability in the region. In this respect, a glimmer of hope can be discerned from China's unusual silence and lack of open support for its traditional ally. North Korea, even as it carried out its unprecedented brinkmanship since the young Kim took power. China has also openly criticized North Korea for its nuclear tests and has supported United Nations sanctions, and there are clear signs of disarray in China's traditional policy of uncritical support for North Korea, as its behaviour could lead to unpalatable outcomes for China, such as an unwanted war on the Korean peninsula, or the acquisition of nuclear arms by Japan and South Korea. In April 2013, for instance, President Xi Jinping obliquely criticized North Korea, stating that 'no one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains ... while pursuing its own interests, a country should accommodate the legitimate interests of others' (Washington Post 2013). Media reports also indicate a flurry of visits by US officials to Beijing in early 2013 to discuss the situation in North Korea (New York Times 2013a). The surprise purge and execution in late 2013 of Kim Jong-un's powerful uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who had been the key interlocutor in China's relations with North Korea, has also demonstrated that China is not in control of events in North Korea (New York Times 2013b). Thus, there is the possibility that China and the USA could in fact cooperate in managing regional security, such as over the Korean peninsula.

The high tensions and historical animosities between China and Japan are more difficult to resolve, but these require strong and capable foreign policy leadership on the part of both countries, which appear to be lacking at this time. China, in particular, needs to understand that the long-term consequences of its promotion of nationalism by arousing anti-Japanese sentiments domestically would lead to an unstable regional neighbourhood and ultimately conflict with Japan, surely an undesirable outcome given that the two countries are each other's major trading partners with much to gain from joint cooperation. On Japan's part, the failure by its leaders, particularly conservative right-wing politicians, to come to terms with its role in the Second World War has led to various controversial statements which have only played to anti-Japanese nationalism in China and South Korea. As CNN noted in an opinion piece in May 2013, 'nearly 68 years after surrender, some Japanese conservatives are engaged in counterproductive battles over history- that make Japan appear weak and undignified, unable to take the measure of its history\* (CNN 2013a). As an analyst noted regarding Shinzo Abe's performance as Prime Minister, Abe has in fact undermined Japan's interest by 'preserving redundant renderings of Japan in the 21st century, negating the positive and responsible record of Japan as a post-war nation-state' (Kersten 2013: 50). The high tensions in 2013-14 between the two countries, which are both now on a quasi-war footing, points to the urgent need for conflict and crisis management mechanisms to be immediately implemented to hold tensions in check. Ultimately, both governments would need to stop fuelling nationalist sentiments, and instead focus on maintaining stability as well as preserving the benefits arising from the deep economic interdependence between the two countries.

The long-term decline of the USA's influence in the region, despite the fact that it has pledged to maintain or even increase its military presence in East Asia, is probably unavoidable. However, an effective US presence and role in the region remains essential. Through deterrence as well as engagement as an equal power, China could be persuaded to take part in dialogue about the management of regional security instead of making unilateral military moves which raise tensions and might spark conflict. This requires other states in the region to help to shore up regional stability by becoming more effective security partners, first by investing in their own military capabilities, and second by providing more effective regional security cooperation. The reason for this is not, however, to contain China, given that much greater efforts will have to be made to engage it, but to ensure the maintenance of a regional balance of power that would channel foreign policy choices towards more peaceful means of resolving disputes. Ultimately, however, China and the USA will have to find the strategic wisdom and political will to work out some form of entente cord idle in East Asia if conflict in the region is to be avoided.

#### Turn – WAR generates rape. As long as we win that voting Pro is the best way to reduce war, rape will go down, This is exactly why we need to deter conflict

BBC News, no date, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4078677.stm

Rape and sexual abuse are not just a by-product of war but are used as a deliberate military strategy, it says. The opportunistic rape and pillage of previous centuries has been replaced in modern conflict by rape used as an orchestrated combat tool. And while Amnesty cites ongoing conflicts in Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, Chechnya, Nepal and Afghanistan, the use of rape as a weapon of war goes back much further. **Spoils of war?** From the systematic rape of women in Bosnia, to an estimated 200,000 women raped during the battle for Bangladeshi independence in 1971, to Japanese rapes during the 1937 occupation of Nanking - the past century offers too many examples

#### War turns structural violence but not the other way around

Joshua Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

### Missile Defense Bad Answers

#### Missile defense is the bedrock of allied coop

**Frühling, 16**—Associate Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Stephan, “Managing escalation: missile defence, strategy and US alliances”, International Affairs Volume 92, Issue 1, pages 81–95, January 2016, dml)

In recent years, the effect of this dynamic on allies’ perception of extended deterrence has played out most strongly in East Asia. Japan saw a **direct threat** to Japanese population centres from North Korean missiles from the time of the 1998 Taepodong I test, which led it to seek its own national missile defence programme—a decision that still has no equivalent among European allies. US investment in its own national missile defence effort thus **reinforced**, rather than undermined, perception of **a shared threat** between the two allies, and hence also strengthened the **political credibility** of US guarantees. This was **particularly important** for Japan because of China's economic and military rise, which raises questions about the **ability** and **willingness** of the United States to **underwrite Japan's security** in the long term. Japan thus tends to be **far more concerned** than Europe about the possibility of **further reductions** in the US nuclear arsenal, especially any reduction below 1,000 warheads, and the effect this might have on US escalation dominance over China.13 In this context, even **a limited US national missile defence system** (of a size that can completely deny a North Korean threat, but could still be overcome by the much larger number of Chinese ICBMs) is **useful** for the **management of escalation**, because it reduces Chinese options to use its nuclear forces for demonstration or signalling purposes.14 Essentially, it forces China into the binary choice inherent in its official ‘no first use’ posture—at a time when its commitment to that posture may be subject to debate.15

In contrast, US national missile defence could be seen as undermining the ‘indivisibility of security’ if it were perceived as **an attempt at decoupling**, insulating the United States from regional dangers while **leaving US allies** to bear the consequences of any resulting deterioration of relations with the adversary. The Reagan administration's SDI programme was perceived this way in western Europe, where opposition resulted from fears of both abandonment (by a United States that might feel safe from the Soviet threat behind its missile defence shield) and entrapment (in a Soviet reaction to US policy). Similarly, European opposition to the Bush administration's proposal for a ‘third base’ of ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Poland in the early 2000s, which was intended to help defend the United States and countries in north-western Europe against missiles from the Middle East, arose from concerns about American unilateralism and aggressive policies towards so-called ‘rogue states’, as well as the consequences of US policies for Europe's relations with Russia.

Rightly or wrongly, there was little perception of a missile threat from Iran in Europe. Many west European countries saw the maintenance of a good relationship with Russia as a political priority, and professed Russian objections to US missile defence plans, however spurious, as a hindrance to improved cooperation. Russia's large tactical nuclear arsenal gives it far more options for gradual escalation than are available to, for example, China—a consideration which further reduces the value of a limited US national missile defence system for managing escalation of conflicts with Russia. That said, support for US policy was strong among east European countries, especially Poland. This, however, had less to do with the defence of the US homeland than with the fact that the proposed installations would have been the first forward-based US military assets on the territory of the new NATO allies.16

Enmeshing regional and US homeland defence

Throughout the Cold War, the forward-basing of US forces on allies’ territory was an important element of US alliances, and regionally bolstered the balance of forces in favour of US allies. At times the presence of US forces also raised the confidence of allies in US guarantees by merely functioning as trip-wires, ensuring that American blood would flow in any major attack. Such was the strategic logic of western garrisons in West Berlin during the Cold War, for example. The political relevance of creating the prospect of US casualties in an attack on an ally also remains relevant today, as can be seen in the deployment of ‘reassurance’ forces to east European NATO members, which deliberately enmeshes US interests with those of the allies.

Some US facilities, however, are **forward-based on allied territory** primarily for geographic reasons and serve the defence of the United States itself, rather than primarily the defence of its allies. Australia continues to host so-called ‘joint facilities’, including early warning and intelligence satellite ground stations and a submarine communications station, that were integral to the US global command and control system during the Cold War, and remain of central importance to the United States today. Denmark (in Greenland) and the United Kingdom also continue to host early warning radars that can detect attacks against the continental United States. Any attack on these facilities would equate to an attack on the United States that happened to take place on an ally's soil.17 Even if few or no US military personnel might be affected by an attack on these facilities, a robust US reaction would thus be a virtual certainty, given the potential consequences for (and demonstrated adversary intent towards) the US homeland.

The need for a **globally distributed architecture** of sensors for the interception of ICBMs now provides **far greater scope** than in the past for US allies to similarly **enmesh** their own countries and facilities with the direct defence of the North American continent. Successful defence depends on early cueing of sensors, and rapid establishment of a reliable post-burnout track, for which sensors are best placed as close as possible to the early part of a missile's trajectory. In some cases, this requirement will lead the United States to **forward deploy its own systems** on its allies’ territory—as is the case with radars in Japan, Israel and Turkey, for example. In other cases, however, allies’ national systems can also become part of US defences. **Japan**, for example, began to reverse a decades-old policy in 2006, when it began to share data from its large air defence radar network with the United States for missile defence purposes.18 As a result, any attack on the Japanese network would now also materially affect the US ability to defend its own territory and population. Exploiting similar opportunities in the case of other allies would both **strengthen the credibility** of US security guarantees and **reduce the asymmetry** inherent in US alliances.

This does not, of course, mean that traditional reasons for forward basing in alliances are not relevant for missile defence as well. For example, US plans for missile defence installations in Poland were welcomed by Warsaw for their **trip-wire character**, rather than for the associated missile defence capability itself.19 As defensive systems, missile defence capabilities are **particularly useful** to **demonstrate alliance commitment** in a generally non-threatening manner. US Aegis ships now provide missile defence patrols in Japan and the Mediterranean. The United States is also emplacing an Aegis Ashore system in Romania, with construction of a second one in Poland beginning soon. In the longer term, this raises questions of burden-sharing in the alliance. However, it is clear from the deployment of German and Dutch Patriot batteries to Turkey since 2012, and France's procurement of Surface-to-Air Missile Platform / Terrain (SAMP/T) systems, that European allies are already able to make contributions for defence against shorter-range threats.

Defending the territory and population of US allies

European NATO member states and Japan are thus both developing and fielding missile defence systems that involve complementary US and allied elements for defence against regional threats. However, developing technology and fielding force structure do not themselves address questions about the strategic effect that the United States and its allies seek to achieve through these programmes, and how regional missile defence relates to deterrence and decisions to intervene on other allies’ behalf. In the end, the effect of both US national and regional missile defence on extended deterrence has to be seen in the context of the adversary's options for escalation, of **perceptions by allies** of the regional threats they face, and of their **expectations** and **concerns about alliance guarantees**.

#### Asian faith in the nuclear umbrella holds but is on the brink—squo BMD coop is key to assurance—snowball prolif is likely and fast

Manning, 16—senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council and its Strategic Foresight Initiative (Robert, “North Korea and the Logic of a Nuclear Asia”, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korea-the-logic-nuclear-asia-15399>, dml)

Reverberations of North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile tests are still rattling nerves in an uneasy northeast Asia, one filled with new threats of nuclear annihilation from Pyongyang. This week, North Korean media reported that the country’s leader, Kim Jong-un, has instructed for nuclear weapons to be ready for use at any time. This comes as the specter of a North Korea with an operational nuclear-tipped ICBM raises anew questions about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over East Asia. Pyongyang’s provocations have also torpedoed South Korea’s hopes of building a strategic partnership with China, shifting geopolitical dynamics in the region.

Look no further than the overheated debate in South Korea over whether Seoul needs its own nuclear weapons to understand the precarious state of geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. North Korea’s recent tests have put South Koreans on edge, abruptly ended President Park Guen-hye’s “Trustpolitik” efforts to reach out to Pyongyang.

After each of Pyongyang’s previous nuclear tests there has been an outpouring of emotional sentiment calling for South Korea to acquire its own nuclear deterrent. Before, such talk has quickly dissipated. This time, however, it is growing louder. Many prominent members of the South Korean elite—including leading ruling party legislators—are raising the issue. A recent ASAN Institute poll suggests that nearly 54 percent of South Koreans favor Seoul going nuclear. This trend is but one sign of unease in East Asia, one that goes well beyond concerns over Pyongyang.

China’s growing assertiveness in the East and South China seas, its growing military capabilities and its rhetoric pointedly questioning the U.S. military presence and alliances in the region has fueled new anxiety about the durability of the U.S. “rebalance” and America’s extended deterrence. With each newly created island and radar deployment inside its “9-dash line,” doubts grow about U.S. effectiveness.

Why Nukes Matter

So far, the spread of nuclear weapons has been a classic tale of a global chain of nuclear proliferation, reflecting a perceived security dilemma since the Soviet Union broke the U.S. monopoly after the second world war. For North Korea, with an ill-equipped conventional military force with 1970s-era equipment, nuclear weapons may be viewed as a cheaper deterrent. For Pyongyang, the lesson of U.S. intervention in Iraq and Libya (after Muammar el-Qaddafi gave up his nuclear program) is that nuclear weapons are its insurance policy against U.S. attack and/or regime change efforts.

But even before North Korea attained its nuclear prowess, South Korea considered going nuclear. After the bitter U.S. defeat in Vietnam in 1975, many in Asia feared an American retreat from its predominant role in Asia. The South Korean president at the time, Gen. Park Chung Hee (Ms. Park’s father), began a secret effort to build nuclear capabilities in the late 1970s. Washington, however, discovered the fledgling nuclear program and persuaded Gen. Park that nuclear weapons would not enhance ROK security and that maintaining the U.S.-ROK alliance was a better choice.

The U.S. nuclear umbrella, extended through its longstanding alliances in the region, has underpinned stability. But in recent years, North Korea has moved toward attaining the capability of a nuclear-tipped ICBM. The result—at the same time as China’s rapid military modernization has posed new challenges to U.S. force projection capabilities—has been fresh doubts about America’s extended deterrence. Would the United States really trade Los Angeles for Shanghai or Pyongyang?

America’s Response

Washington has responded by enhancing and upgrading its military presence in East Asia and working with allies to fashion a multilayered missile defense system. Thus Japan has made large investments in ballistic missile defenses—including co-developing the SM-3 2A, a mobile system for Aegis cruisers, with the United States. Now Seoul is also in talks with Washington about acquiring THAAD missile defense system which would integrate it into the U.S.-Japan defense network. Like Japan, Seoul has several Aegis cruisers, and could also deploy the SM-32a when it becomes operational.

Beijing argues that citing North Korea is just an excuse for the United States to put in place a missile defense system aimed just as much at containing Beijing as defending against Pyongyang. But the physics of U.S. missile defense systems clearly show that they would not threaten China’s nuclear second strike capability. In truth, Beijing is far more concerned about the upgrade in U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral defense cooperation and trilateral integration of missile defense systems

China has damaged its credibility with Seoul by downplaying the North Korean threat and publicly displaying heavy-handed pressure to warn Seoul against acquiring THAAD. The recent comment by China’s ambassador to the ROK, Qiu Guohong that THAAD Sino-ROK relations “could be destroyed in an instant,” if the ROK deployed THAAD was an unusually blunt statement that drew an indignant response from Seoul.

The irony of telling South Koreans alarmed at Pyongyang’s belligerence that a North Korea armed with WMDs is not a legitimate threat, all while Beijing continues to enable North Korea, seems lost on China.

President Park has made building a strategic partnership with China (its largest trading partner) a priority, knowing that China’s cooperation will be critical to the ultimate reunification of Korea. But the disappointment of many South Koreans at Beijing’s pressure on Seoul not to pursue missile defenses is palpable: to South Koreans China appears more angry at Seoul’s interest in THAAD than at the bellicose behavior of its defiant ally, North Korea.

China’s innovative diplomacy as host of the Six-Party talks on denuclearization lays in ruins. The just approved UN Security Council sanctions will be a true test of China's intentions. As 90 percent of North Korean trade is with China, the effectiveness of sanctions will depend on Beijing's willingness to enforce them.

If ways and means of containing and rolling back Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions are not found, it would not be surprising if momentum in Seoul to acquire nuclear weapons built. And if that occurred, how would Japan and Taiwan who also entertain doubts about the U.S. nuclear umbrella respond? Clearly, the stakes are high if we are to avoid further nuclearized Northeast Asia.

#### Allied cooperation is strong due to missile defense integration

**Frühling, 16**—Associate Professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University (Stephan, “Managing escalation: missile defence, strategy and US alliances”, International Affairs Volume 92, Issue 1, pages 81–95, January 2016, dml)

In East Asia, missile defence cooperation between Japan and the United States is in many ways **more advanced**, and **deeper** (because also extending to the co-development and co-production of interceptors), than it is in NATO. None of the US alliances in Asia, however, have much experience of negotiating the **strategic aspects of escalation** in the way that NATO developed during the Cold War. Instead, planning for joint operations for the common defence tended to be **dominated by the U**nited **S**tates (in the case of South Korea), consciously parallel and separate rather than integrated (in the case of Japan) or simply non-existent (in the case of Australia). Both Japan and South Korea have, however, sought **more formal dialogue** with the United States on nuclear and deterrence policies in recent years. **Detailed examination of missile defence** by senior officials, reporting back to political leaders, would be a useful way to **address the implications of emerging capabilities**, and at the same time to **develop mechanisms** for **closer alliance cooperation**. Indeed, the announcement of a new ‘Alliance Coordination Mechanism’ in the April 2015 US–Japan defence guidelines takes the US–Japan relationship one step further in this direction.37

#### BMD sends a strong signal of resolve which prevents successful North Korean blackmail—the plan is perceptual appeasement—impacts are cascade prolif and nuclear escalation

Roberts, 14—consulting professor at Stanford University and William Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (Brad, “On the Strategic Value of Ballistic Missile Defense”, Proliferation Papers, No. 50, June 2014, dml)

The foundation would be a strategy of nuclear brinksmanship, not nuclear war-fighting. Nuclear war-fighting would likely be seen as quickly legitimizing a U.S. decision to employ its full strengths at the conventional and nuclear levels to achieve the most decisive possible outcomes as quickly as possible. This is not in North Korea’s interest. But blackmail might seem plausible. To be successful, nuclear blackmail requires both the credible demonstration of resolve and the credible demonstration of restraint. The resolve relates to the willingness to make good on an escalatory threat and the restraint relates to the willingness not to inflict punishment if terms are met. North Korea’s strategy would require that its leaders believe that they can escalate an unfolding conflict in various ways but without crossing the nuclear response threshold of the United States. They may believe that there are vulnerabilities in U.S. power projection that can be exploited and illuminated, both of an operational kind (the dependence on a few key ports and bases in the region) and of a political kind (the willingness of U.S. allies to stand with it in an escalating crisis). And if they see the threat of nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland as credible, they may also believe that they can employ nuclear weapons in the theater in support of these operational and political objectives and restrain U.S. retaliation by threatening the U.S. homeland. In the language of escalation control, North Korean leaders may come to believe that their new tools of coercion enable them to manage escalation if it becomes necessary, both horizontally (by attacking more targets in the region and/or beyond) and vertically (by increasing the lethality of those attacks).9

Further, North Korea’s leaders seem to believe with Sun Tzu that it is preferable to subdue an enemy than to defeat it. More precisely, they may believe that the United States, RoK, and Japan can all assess the impact of a nuclear-armed North Korea on the calculus of regional deterrence and decide accordingly to alter their strategic calculus in various ways. U.S. allies may come to believe that the United States has become de-coupled from their defense (to invoke a cold war term) by virtue of the new vulnerability of the American homeland to North Korean attack. The United States itself may conclude that the likely costs and risks of seeking regime removal in war outweigh the potential benefits. Thus, North Korean leaders might hope that the United States will abandon its hostile policies and agree to a political settlement on the peninsula consistent with Pyongyang’s preferences.

The conditional verb tense highlights the speculative nature of this line of reasoning. Little is known about how North Korea thinks about or plans for armed confrontation with the United States under the nuclear shadow. The typical American instinct is to believe that North Korea’s leaders too will believe that nuclear war cannot be fought because it cannot be won. There is no evidence one way or the other with regard to North Korea’s instincts. But the capabilities they have deployed and are developing and deploying enable a bold but risky strategy of nuclear blackmail.

From a U.S. perspective, these developments are highly consequential. Successful North Korean blackmail in peacetime or war would set precedents of a far-reaching kind, calling into question the credibility of U.S. security guarantees more generally while also validating the implicit Sundarji premise that nuclear weapons are useful for coercing the United States into accepting an outcome to a regional conflict that it would not accept in the absence of adversary nuclear threats. The wrong choices by the United States and its allies in a military crisis with North Korea under the nuclear shadow could tip the security environment in a dangerous new direction. To be coerced into appeasing a nuclear-backed challenger or to accept defeat in a regional war with some nuclear aspect could have wide-ranging repercussions for the international situation after such a war. The wrong choices could also lead to the “nuclear cascade” long feared by policymakers.10 For instance, a failure of U.S. deterrence could embolden others to seek capabilities of their own with which to challenge the United States and U.S.-guaranteed regional orders. A failure of assurance of key allies could similarly lead them to conclude that they can no longer count on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to protect them.

As a model of the new strategic problem, North Korea helps to illuminate a broad spectrum of deterrence challenges in regional conflict under the nuclear shadow. Those challenges come in three distinct sets.

1. At the low end of the conflict spectrum are provocations and confrontations just below the level of armed conflict. These encompass for example North Korea sinking of the Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island or China’s confrontational posturing in support of its claims in the maritime environment. These are what the latest Japanese defense white paper defines as “gray zone” conflicts.11

2. At the opposite, high end of the spectrum are nuclear attacks on the homeland of the United States. Think of this as the “black-and-white zone,” where any attack by nuclear means on the homeland of the United States or an ally should be understood as generating a U.S. nuclear response.

3. In the middle are what might be termed “red zone” threats – conflicts involving actual combat operations and efforts by newly capable regional actors to try to exploit new nuclear and missile capabilities to their advantage with actions that they calculate or hope to be beneath the U.S. nuclear response threshold.

Each of these areas poses new deterrence challenges in the 21st century. Assertiveness in the “gray zone” by North Korea has markedly increased, perhaps as a result of North Korea’s success in developing strategic forces that it believes can negate the risks of escalatory responses by the United States and RoK.12 Deterrence in the “black and white zone” is not a new challenge but it is new in form, as a dangerous and unpredictable North Korea acquires the means to conduct such strikes. The “red zone” is an area that heretofore has attracted little analytic attention.13 But there are new challenges that seem to be little understood. Among those is the significant potential for miscalculation by the aggressor.

In this red zone, it is possible to identify some of the key decisions by the adversary related to these new nuclear and missile capabilities for which U.S. deterrence strategies and capabilities must be credible and effective. Again, it is useful to use North Korea as a model. In a war on the peninsula, the leadership in Pyongyang would likely face a number of specific decisions about how to utilize nuclear-tipped missiles and other means to try to persuade Seoul and Washington to accept a political settlement on terms favorable to its interests but without generating a response by the allies involving the employment of the overwhelming nuclear forces available to them.

These are decisions:

1. To move from a strategy of military provocations into military action aimed at accomplishing a fait accompli on the ground quickly, and reversible at high cost to the United States and its allies (and perhaps involving the use of chemical and/or biological weapons against key allied bases on the peninsula to slow U.S. intervention and local operations and also to signal escalation risks for the RoK and explicit threats to employ nuclear weapons if the allies do not accept the fait accompli).

2. If this strategy fails to produce the desired political results, to escalate by conducting missile attacks with non-nuclear weapons on U.S. bases and other targets in Japan.

3. If this fails, to conduct a limited nuclear attack. North Korea might believe that such an attack could break the alliance (by inducing the RoK to sue for peace before the United States is prepared to do so) without running a significant risk of U.S. retaliation. It might believe that an off-shore demonstration shot or a high-altitude burst for its electro-magnetic pulse effects would not be seen by Washington as warranting a retaliatory strike that would potentially kill many. Presumably this type of action would also be accompanied by a threat of more North Korean nuclear attacks if the allies do not sue for peace on the North’s terms.

4. If this fails, to threaten or conduct limited nuclear attacks on Japan or U.S. bases there, with the threat of more to come.

5. If this fails, to threaten or conduct limited nuclear attacks on U.S. military facilities in the American homeland engaged in military operations against North Korea (for example, Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu or the missile defense facilities in Alaska).

6. And if the United States employs nuclear weapons in retaliation, to respond or not with additional nuclear attacks of its own, whether on U.S. bases and forces in the region or on the American homeland more generally.

The regional deterrence architectures of the United States and its allies in East Asia must be effective in shaping each of these six choices.

Each decision in this hierarchy would involve assessments of the resolve of the United States and its allies to continue in an escalating conflict, as well perhaps as assessments of Pyongyang’s own resolve. Each new action by Pyongyang can be understood as a test of the separate or collective resolve of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. In the scenario above, Kim Jong Un would be making choices to signal his resolve to safeguard his interests even in an escalating conflict, while testing the resolve of the alliance arrayed against him to remain intact. The United States would seek to signal its resolve to safeguard its ally and forces and the American homeland, while testing the resolve of the aggressor regime to remain committed to aggression and escalation.

This is a competitive and inherently risky strategy.15 Any such competitive testing of resolve would bring to the fore in the decision-making process the stake each “side” perceives in the conflict – and the perceived stake of the adversary. Presumably each side begins with the premise that its stake is more substantial. For North Korea, a vital interest would seem to be at stake – regime survival. For the United States, the vital interest of an ally or allies would be at stake – their long-term viability under a political outcome dictated by the North if the United States were to concede. North Korean leaders may believe that their vital interest is the more compelling, thus lending credibility to their escalatory threats in their eyes.

Accordingly, a key danger is the potential for miscalculation of resolve. 16 To escalate by any means seems to require a conviction that the other side lacks the resolve to retaliate or to counter-escalate. Leaders in North Korea may calculate that the resolve of the United States and its allies is weak, perhaps because of a belief that democracies are paper tigers or so casualty averse as to avoid escalation at all costs. The United States and its allies may calculate that the resolve in Pyongyang is weak, perhaps because of a belief that nuclear war is unwinnable and thus will not actually be fought. In tests of resolve, bluffs are often employed. This creates the additional risk of miscalculation derived from a decision to dismiss as a bluff a statement of resolve that is no bluff at all. It is possible also that a regional aggressor might choose to conduct nuclear attacks even in a lost war for the sole purpose of exacting vengeance on the victorious side (a purpose for which Saddam Hussein’s biological weapons may have been intended).

This analytical model derives from the situation on the Korean peninsula but has broader applicability. In today’s security environment, the deterrence challenge facing the United States and its allies is not associated with a global conflict; rather, it arises from the potential for regional conflicts under the nuclear shadow (that is, the presence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the combatants and the potential for their use in extreme circumstances). North Korea is the latest and most vivid example of this emerging problem. Iraq and Libya came as models of this problem soon after the Cold War, though neither ended up posing this particular deterrence problem. Iran may yet fit this model, if it chooses not to freeze its nuclear program. The continued prevalence of nuclear and missile proliferation in the international system implies that there could well be other such challenges in the future.

Responding to an Adversary’s Theory of Victory

This new strategic problem has been taking shape ever since the wakeup call provided by the Persian Gulf War. With an eye on this emerging problem, the United States has made some clear and decisive strategic choices. To a significant extent, these are common across administrations since the end of the Cold War and enjoy a significant degree of bipartisan support. In its national strategy, the United States has chosen to remain engaged, not retreat into isolationism, and to modernize its alliances for 21st century purposes. In its military strategy, it has chosen to project power in support of its international commitments and to maintain strong capabilities for deterring and defeating potential regional aggressors.

The United States has also rejected mutual vulnerability as the basis of the strategic relationships with states like North Korea. It has done so in part because of an abiding concern that a multipolar world based on the principle of mutual assured destruction would be deeply unstable. In a world of multiple nuclear powers large and small with nuclear arsenals of intercontinental reach, the vision of world order set out in the United Nations system – of cooperative and collective security – might be seen as finally failed, as a handful of major powers are no longer able to exercise power to secure international peace. But there are other reasons as well. U.S. nuclear threats may not be credible, especially for gray zone conflicts and for red zone conflicts if the adversary believes there are significant military actions he can take that fall beneath the U.S. nuclear response threshold. U.S. nuclear threats may also not be effective, especially for reducing the coercive value of aggressor nuclear threats and against leaders who calculate that an asymmetry of stake lends credibility to their threats that the U.S. lacks because its interests at risk are not vital. Heavy reliance on nuclear threats is also not reassuring to allies, who seek protection and assurance in addition to deterrence. Heavy reliance on nuclear threats would also be unhelpful to the effort to strengthen international cooperation for nonproliferation and disarmament.

The Comprehensive Approach to Strengthening Regional Deterrence Architectures

This new deterrence challenge cannot be met by missile defense alone. The Obama administration has set out a comprehensive strategy for strengthening regional deterrence architectures, building on solid bipartisan foundations from the two decades since the end of the Cold War. 18 Key elements of that approach are the following:

• Strong political partnerships between the United States and its allies and partners that focus cooperative action on new (as opposed to past) problems of international security;

• Preservation of a balance of conventional forces that is favorable to the interests of the United States and its allies/partners;

• Conventional strike capabilities, including a long-range prompt component;

• Ballistic missile defense in two dimensions: (1) protection against regional threats to U.S. forces and U.S. allies/partners and (2) protection of the American homeland against limited strikes from countries like North Korea and Iran;

• Resilience in the cyber and space domains;

• A nuclear component tailored to the unique historical, geographical, and other features of each region where the nuclear “umbrella” is extended.19

These various elements contribute in different but complementary ways to the deterrence of regional aggression under the nuclear shadow. This comprehensive approach is the game changer, not any single element. It provides a strong and diverse tool kit for addressing the particular challenges of deterrence in a regional conflict against a state like North Korea. Missile defense is an essential part of the solution, but not the solution in and of itself.

The Strategic Values of BMD

As argued above, for deterrence in a regional context to be effective, it must be effective in decisively influencing the adversary’s assessments of resolve and restraint at each of the decision points in the transition from “gray zone” to “red zone” to “black-and-white zone”. Missile defense operates differently but constructively on each of those main decision points.

Before illustrating this assessment, it is important to understand the current state of U.S. missile defense capability. With the systems in hand and in current development, it is possible for the United States and its allies to have a defense in depth from attacks by states like North Korea. Defenses against regional ballistic missiles have been developed, successfully tested, and deployed.20 Defenses against intercontinental-range missiles were deployed during the George W. Bush administration before developing and testing were complete and have a number of reliability and other performance problems.21 But as a general proposition, the existing homeland defense posture is effective against small numbers of early generation intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Early generation missiles are relatively unsophisticated technically, meaning that they take longer to ready to launch, are slower in flight, lack missile defense countermeasures and, if not the result of a rigorous development and testing program, may lack reliability. An early generation force, as opposed to an early generation missile, is also likely to be relatively small in number. Later generation missiles fly sooner, faster, further, and more reliably, may have missile defense countermeasures along with multiple warheads, and are likely to exist in numbers sufficient to enable the kind of salvo launches that can overwhelm either sensors or interceptors or both. The shortcomings of available BMD systems in dealing with countermeasures and large raid sizes are well known.22

Accordingly, the Obama administration set out as national policy commitment to (1) maintain an advantageous defensive posture of the homeland against limited strikes by countries like North Korea and Iran and (2) field phased, adaptive regional defenses in partnership with U.S. allies in each region where it offers security guarantees.23 In follow up to the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, the administration and its regional partners have made substantial progress toward the latter objective.24 The administration has also taken subsequent decisions to adjust the homeland posture in the light of new information about the threat, by implementing certain hedge capabilities identified in the 2010 BMDR (and emplacing additional Ground-based Interceptors in available silos once technical fixes are confirmed).25

With this defense-in-depth portfolio of improving missile defenses, what then are the particular strategic values of BMD in this comprehensive approach to strengthening regional deterrence? And what other values should be accounted for in a comprehensive stock-take of BMD strategic values?

In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitioning from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It:

1. Creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of the attacker.

2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage.

3. Provides some assurance to allies and third party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor.

4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy.

5. Reduces the political pressure for preemptive strikes.

In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping to free the United States and its allies from escalation decisions that might seem premature.

When a crisis has become a hot war and where testing is underway in the red zone, missile defense again has various strategic values. It:

1. Helps to preserve freedom of action for the United States and its partners by selectively safeguarding key military and political assets.

2. Increases time and opportunity to attack adversary’s missile force with kinetic and non-kinetic means, potentially eliminating his capacity for follow-on attacks or decisive political or military effects.

3. Reduces or eliminates the vulnerability of allies, thus reinforcing their intent to remain in the fight.

If and as a regional adversary begins to contemplate possible nuclear attacks on the American homeland, perhaps only in revenge, missile defense:

1. Significantly reduces if not eliminates the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to one or a few shots, thus taking the adversary’s “cheap shot” off the table and driving him [them] to larger salvos that will seem less like blackmail than all-out nuclear war and thus should be deterrable by other means.

2. Reduces the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to repeat attacks, thus reinforcing its intention to remain in the fight.

A catalogue of the strategic values of BMD must also include an assessment of its contributions in peacetime to the foundations of effective deterrence in crisis and war. In this context, it:

1. Provides opportunities for close defense cooperation among the United States and its allies and security partners.

2. Signals the resolve of the United States and its allies/partners to stand up to coercion and aggression (regional missile defense can be demonstrated in live testing with our partners to demonstrate that resolve).26

3. Erodes the perceived potential effectiveness for both military and political purposes of nascent ballistic missile capabilities.

4. Imposes additional costs and uncertainty on those considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons to challenge U.S. regional guarantees.

5. Encourages engagement with Russia and China to slow or halt missile proliferation in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects.

6. Provides non-nuclear allies a means to contribute to the strengthening of extended deterrence, thereby reducing incentives to acquire nuclear deterrents of their own.

This catalogue identifies 16 specific strategic values of missile defense. Some of them are direct to the deterrence challenge, some indirect, and some are relevant only to related challenges. Of note, U.S. allies participating in the BMD project have identified and elaborated many of these strategic values.27 In the language of strategy, BMD reinforces the comprehensive approach by lowering the cost and risk of our continued resolve and by raising the cost and risk for the challenger, essentially taking his “cheap shots” off the table and requiring him to resort to larger salvo shots that undermine a blackmail strategy of doing a little damage while threatening to do more. Missile defense also has important assurance values, especially for those allies who might be targeted by an adversary’s efforts to split the United States from its allies.

#### Missile defenses de-escalate conflicts and strengthen allied relationships

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card

In an emerging political-military crisis, one potentially transitioning from the gray zone to the red zone, missile defense has various strategic values. It:

1. Creates uncertainty about the outcome of an attack in the mind of the attacker. 2. Increases the raid size required for an attack to penetrate, thereby undermining a strategy of firing one or two and threatening more, thus reducing coercive leverage (while increasing the likelihood of retaliation). 3. Provides some assurance to allies and third-party nations of some protection against some risks of precipitate action by the aggressor. 4. Buys leadership time for choosing and implementing courses of action, including time for diplomacy. 5. Reduces the political pressure for preemptive strikes. In short, BMD helps to put the burden of escalation in an emerging crisis onto the adversary, thus helping to free the United States and its allies from escalation decisions that might seem premature. When a crisis has become a hot war and where testing of adversary intent and resolve is underway in the red zone, missile defense again has various strategic values. It: 6. Helps to preserve freedom of action for the United States and its partners by selectively safeguarding key military and political assets. 7. Reinforces the enemy’s incentive to keep some missiles in reserve for later use, thereby increasing the time and opportunity to attack the adversary’s missile force with kinetic and nonkinetic means, potentially eliminating its capacity for follow-on attacks or for achieving decisive political or military effects. 8. Reduces or eliminates the vulnerability of allies, thus reinforcing their intent to remain in the fight. If and as a regional adversary begins to contemplate possible nuclear attacks on the American homeland, perhaps only in revenge, missile defense: 9. Significantly reduces if not eliminates the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to one or a few shots, thus taking the adversary’s “cheap shot” off the table (that is, that adversary will not be able to shoot very few weapons while threatening to shoot many more but will have to contemplate a much larger initial salvo that will seem to the attacked state less like blackmail than all-out nuclear war— something that should be deterrable by other means). 10. Reduces the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to repeat attacks, thus reinforcing its intention to remain in the fight. A catalogue of the strategic values of BMD must also include an assessment of its contributions in peacetime to the foundations of effective deterrence in crisis and war. In this context, it: 11. Provides opportunities for close defense cooperation among the United States and its allies and security partners. 12. Signals the resolve of the United States and its allies/ partners to stand up to coercion and aggression (regional missile defense can be demonstrated in live testing with our partners to demonstrate that resolve). 17 13. Erodes the perceived potential effectiveness for both military and political purposes of nascent ballistic missile capabilities. 14. Imposes additional costs and uncertainty on those considering the acquisition of nuclear weapons to challenge U.S. regional guarantees. 15. Encourages engagement with Russia and China to slow or halt missile proliferation in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects (as the alternative is a steady increase in the quality and quantity of U.S. defensive capabilities, an outcome they wish to avoid). 16. Provides nonnuclear allies a means to contribute to the strengthening of extended deterrence, thereby reducing incentives to acquire nuclear deterrence of their own.

This catalogue identifies sixteen specific strategic values of missile defense. Some of them are direct to the deterrence challenge, some indirect, and some are relevant only to related challenges. Of note, U.S. allies participating in the BMD project have identified and elaborated many of these strategic values. 18 In the language of strategy, BMD reinforces the comprehensive approach by lowering the cost and risk of our continued resolve and by raising the cost and risk for the challenger, essentially by taking his “cheap shots” off the table and requiring him to resort to larger salvo shots that undermine a blackmail strategy of doing a little damage while threatening to do more. Missile defense also has important assurance values, especially for those allies who might be targeted by an adversary’s efforts to split them from the United States. Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (pp. 89-90). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition.

#### Homeland missile defense strengthens deterrence against North Korea and Iran

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card

#### In a missile defense strategy that clearly distinguishes between capabilities for homeland defense and for regional defense with allies, it is important to be clear about the value for regional deterrence of missile defense of the American homeland. As a general matter, protection of the U.S. homeland from long-range missile strikes by countries like North Korea and Iran reinforces the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. If the United States is not vulnerable, regional adversaries will not be credible in threatening to put the American homeland at risk in an effort to “decouple” the United States from the defense of its allies by deterring U.S. military action with threats to the homeland. Thus, homeland protection strengthens regional deterrence by helping to ensure that the United States has the freedom to employ whatever means it chooses to respond to aggression by regional challengers without risk of escalation to strikes against its homeland. It also provides a measure of assurance to the United States sufficient to enable sustained political and military engagement in East Asia and elsewhere at a time of rising threat from missile attack— engagement that has significant deterrence benefits. As discussed in further detail in Chapters 6 and 7, it also strengthens the assurance of allies; especially in East Asia but also in Central and Southern Europe, allies are worried about the decoupling effect of long-range ballistic missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (pp. 90-91). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition.

#### Missile defense cooperation sends a signal of commitment to the US-Japan alliance

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card

The argument that missile defenses can substitute for nuclear deterrence in the regional equation hinges largely on their value in demonstrating tangibly a link between the United States and its allies. For example, in Europe U.S. nuclear weapons are maintained in part on the argument that they provide clear evidence of a transatlantic link and thus of direct American military engagement if ever a European ally’s security is jeopardized. Missile defense cooperation among the United States, Poland, and Bulgaria (among others) is also an affirmation of this transatlantic link. In East Asia, where U.S. nuclear weapons are not maintained, missile defense cooperation plays a positive role in signaling the linkage between the United States and its allies. Indeed, the very close missile defense cooperation between the United State and Japan sends a clear message of peacetime and wartime linkage. Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (p. 95). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition.

#### Missile defense compliments deterrence, cannot substitute for it

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card

But, as argued earlier in the review of the deterrence contributions of individual elements of the comprehensive approach, nuclear weapons contribute some unique values to the regional deterrence equation that cannot be replaced by missile defense. Such defense can take off the table “cheap shots” against the United States and its allies and partners but cannot effectively deter larger-scale nuclear attacks— a problem for which U.S. nuclear forces are uniquely relevant. Nuclear weapons also “cast a shadow” over decisions in the red zone because they invoke for the adversary questions about what price it might yet pay for an act of aggression in a way that defensive measures of the attacked party do not. Thus the Obama administration, like its predecessors, has argued that missile defense is a complement to nuclear deterrence and not a substitute. Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (p. 95). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition.

### Nuclear Modernization/Expansion Bad Answers

#### Nuclear modernization needed to deter Russia, China, North Korea

**Kroening, December 23**, Matthew Kroenig is associate professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is a former strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is currently writing a book on U.S. nuclear strategy, Politico, December 23, 2016, Politico. Trump said US should expand nuclear weapons, he’s right, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/trump-said-the-us-should-expand-nuclear-weapons-hes-right-214546>

On Thursday, Donald Trump created controversy when he tweeted, “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.” In case anyone was confused, he followed up Friday morning with an off-air remark to MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” that clarified his intentions: “Let it be an arms race,” he said. “We will outmatch them at every pass and outlast them all.” The backlash was swift and unanimous. Critics charged that there is no plausible reason to expand U.S. nuclear weapons, that Trump’s comments contradicted a decades-old bipartisan consensus on the need to reduce nuclear stockpiles, and that such reckless statements risk provoking a new nuclear arms race with Russia and China. On this matter, however, Trump is right. **U.S. nuclear strategy cannot be static, but must take into account the nuclear strategy and capabilities of its adversaries.** For decades, the United States was able to reduce its nuclear arsenal from Cold War highs because it did not face any plausible nuclear challengers. But **great power political competition has returned and it has brought nuclear weapons, the ultimate instrument of military force, along for the ride. In recent years, North Korea has continued to grow its nuclear arsenal and means of delivery and has issued chilling nuclear threats against the United States and its Asian allies**. As recently as Thursday -- before Trump’s offending tweet -- Rodong Sinmum, the Pyongyang regime’s official newspaper, published an [opinion article](http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2016-12-22-0005" \t "_blank) calling for bolstering North Korea’s “nuclear deterrence.” The potential threats are everywhere. **Washington faces an increasing risk of conflict with a newly assertive, nuclear-armed China in the South China Sea. Beijing is expanding its nuclear forces and [it is estimated](http://thebulletin.org/2016/july/chinese-nuclear-forces-20169627" \t "_blank) that the number of Chinese warheads capable of reaching the U.S. homeland has more than trebled in the past decade and continues to grow. And Russia has become more aggressive in Europe and the Middle East and has engaged in explicit nuclear saber rattling the likes of which we have not seen since the 1980s.** At the height of the crisis over Crimea in 2014, for example, Russian President Vladimir Putin ominously [declared](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11064209/Vladimir-Putin-Dont-mess-with-nuclear-armed-Russia.html" \t "_blank), “It's best not to mess with us … I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers.” And on Tuesday, he vowed to “enhance the combat capability of strategic nuclear forces, primarily by strengthening missile complexes that will be guaranteed to penetrate existing and future missile defense systems.” As former Defense Secretary William Perry correctly notes, “Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War.” **The United States needs a robust nuclear force**, therefore, not because anyone wants to fight a nuclear war, but rather, the opposite: **to deter potential adversaries from attacking or coercing the United States and its allies with nuclear weapons of their own. Under President Barack Obama, the United States mindlessly reduced its nuclear arsenal even as other nuclear powers went in the opposite direction**, expanding and modernizing their nuclear forces. Such a path was unsustainable and Trump is correct to recognize that America’s aging nuclear arsenal is in need of some long overdue upgrades. So, what would expanding and strengthening the nuclear arsenal look like? **First**, **the United States must modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad** (submarines; long-range bombers, including a new cruise missile; and intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs). The Obama administration announced plans to modernize the triad under Republican pressure, but critics are already trying to kill off the ICBM and the cruise missile, and production timelines for these weapon systems keep slipping into the future. The Trump administration must make the timely modernization of all three legs of the triad a top priority. **Second, the United States should increase its deployment of nuclear warheads**, consistent with its international obligations. According to New START, the treaty signed with Russia in 2011, each state will deploy no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads, but those restrictions don’t kick in until February 2018. At present, according to the [State Department](http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2016/262624.htm" \t "_blank), the United States is roughly 200 warheads below the limit while Russia is almost 250 warheads above it. Accordingly, Russia currently possesses a nuclear superiority of more than 400 warheads, which is [worrisome](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/nuclear-superiority-and-the-balance-of-resolve-explaining-nuclear-crisis-outcomes/40D3E730559CB33860C11A9C288DEEEF" \t "_blank) in and of itself and also raises serious [questions](http://www.nipp.org/2016/06/21/schneider-mark-russias-growing-strategic-nuclear-forces-and-new-start-treaty-compliance/" \t "_blank) about whether Moscow intends to comply with this treaty at all. The United States, therefore, should expand its deployed arsenal up to the treaty limits and be fully prepared for further expansion should Russia break out — as Moscow has done with several other legacy arms control agreements. Third, and finally, the United States and NATO need more flexible nuclear options in Europe. In the event of a losing war with NATO, [Russian strategy](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2015.1008295" \t "_blank) calls for limited nuclear “de-escalation” strikes against European civilian and military targets. At present, NATO lacks an adequate response to this threat. As I explain in a [new report](http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/toward-a-more-flexible-nato-nuclear-posture" \t "_blank), **the United States must develop enhanced nuclear capabilities, including a tactical, air-to-surface cruise missile, in order to disabuse Putin of the notion that he can use nuclear weapons in Europe and get away with** it. These stubborn facts lay bare the ignorance or naivety of those fretting that Trump’s tweets risk starting a new nuclear arms race. It is U.S. adversaries, not Trump, who are moving first. It is a failure to respond that would be most reckless, signaling continued American weakness and only incentivizing further nuclear aggression. The past eight years have been demoralizing for many in the defense policy community as Obama has consistently placed ideology over reality in the setting of U.S. nuclear policy. The results, an increasingly disordered world filled with intensifying nuclear dangers, speak for themselves. Rather than express outrage over Trump’s tweet, therefore, we should take heart that we once again have a president who may be willing to do what it takes to defend the country against real, growing and truly existential threats.

#### Need nuclear modernization to deter Russian aggression and US Russia nuclear war

**Kroening, November 15**, Matthew Kroenig is associate professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is a former strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is currently writing a book on U.S. nuclear strategy, November 15, 2016, Toward a More Flexible NATO nuclear posture, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Toward\_a\_More\_Flexible\_NATO\_Nuclear\_Posture\_web\_1115.pdf

**The risk of nuclear war between NATO and Russia may be higher now than at any time since 1989**.1 Indeed, at the 2016 NATO Summit, NATO’s leaders expressed concern about Russia’s destabilizing behavior in Europe, including Moscow’s “irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military concept and underlying posture.”2 To deter Russian nuclear aggression, NATO leaders reaffirmed that “[a]s long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance,” and vowed to “retain an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities.”3 US Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, speaking in September at Minot Air Force base, went further to declare that **nuclear weapons are “the bedrock of our security.”4 Unfortunately, after a quarter century of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, Western strategists are increasingly recognizing that NATO may lack a credible nuclear deterrent for Russia’s assertive nuclear strategy, especially Moscow’s concept of nuclear “de-escalation” strikes.5 Some analysts have concluded that an effective deterrent for Russian strategy must include a NATO ability to respond with limited nuclear strikes of its own**.6 With a legacy nuclear posture developed for larger-scale Cold War contingencies, however, NATO arguably does not possess the capability necessary to follow through on such a strategy. **If NATO hopes to reliably deter Russian nuclear strikes and broader nuclear coercion, therefore, the Alliance must consider the development of new, more flexible nuclear capabilities.7**

#### No major nuclear arms race because other countries can’t sustain an arms race

Lowther & Bonavita, December 8, 2016

Dr. Adam B. Lowther is the Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies (SANDS) at Kirtland, AFB. His latest book is[**Defending the Arsenal: Why America’s Nuclear Modernization Still Matters**](https://www.amazon.com/Defending-Arsenal-Americas-Nuclear-Modernization/dp/1138204544). Maj. Angelo Bonavita is the Deputy Director of SANDS and hold a PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology, December 8, 2016, The nuclear threat environment facing the Trump administration, http://warontherocks.com/2016/12/the-nuclear-threat-environment-facing-the-trump-administration/

Third, **counter to arguments made by nuclear critics, the United States will not set-off a nuclear arms race by modernizing its nuclear arsenal. With the American economy five times larger than the ailing**[**Russian economy**](http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/putins-economic-weakness-10084)**, sustaining an arms race with the United States is not a viable option for Russia. China is limited in its production of nuclear weapons by its relatively small stockpile of**[**fissile material**](http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Chinas_Nuclear_Weapons_and_Fissile_Materials_Holdings-Uncertainties_and_Concerns_(TESTIMONY).pdf)**. Thus, such arguments are hyperbolic rather than demonstrative of how our adversaries are likely to respond to American modernization**.

Russia already developing new nuclear weapons

**Kroening, November 15**, Matthew Kroenig is associate professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and senior fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. He is a former strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is currently writing a book on U.S. nuclear strategy, November 15, 2016, Toward a More Flexible NATO nuclear posture, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Toward\_a\_More\_Flexible\_NATO\_Nuclear\_Posture\_web\_1115.pdf

Others will certainly argue that developing new nuclear capabilities would provoke Russia and instigate a new nuclear arms race.40 There was a time when such arguments had an air of plausibility, but, in the face of Russia’s nuclear modernization and saber rattling, they look increasingly untenable.

#### The North Korean nuclear threat is growing – Kim has consolidated his rule, its military power is increasing, diplomacy fails, and China cannot reign in the threat

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is the author of Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World *and co-author of*The Korean Conundrum: America’s Troubled Relations with North and South Korea*,* December 28, 2016, The Ugly North Korean Reality Facing Trump, http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/the-ugly-north-korea-reality-facing-trump-18880

In North Korea, **Kim Jong-un appears to rule supreme**. There is no talk of collective leadership, competing coalitions or personal limitations. **Most of those at the political summit five years ago when his father died are gone—dead, purged or missing**. Kim has done what many of us thought impossible: take *and keep* control in one of the world’s most dangerous political snake pits. His father spent far less time preparing the way for Kim than his grandfather had for his father. And Pyongyang was filled with party apparatchiks, military officers and skilled technocrats who had waited more than six decades to supersede the Kim dynasty. To many, uncle Jang Song-thaek looked like a more plausible figure to end up on top, having married into the Kim family, served both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and acquired substantial influence after the latter’s stroke. But the young Kim, about to turn only 33 in January, skillfully and sometimes brutally purged the various mentors and minders chosen by his father. **Scores of top officials,** most dramatically Jang, **have been executed**. And while elite dissatisfaction is evident from occasional high level defections, nothing suggests sufficient opposition to oust Kim or overthrow the system. In fact, he has shifted power back from the military to the Korean Workers’ Party, highlighted by a party conference earlier this year which cemented his control. His dress, hair style and girth mimic his grandfather more than his father. That’s almost certainly conscious, since Kim Il-sung retains popular respect as the nation’s founder, while Kim Jong-il is remembered for the North’s worst crisis, the famine of the late 1990s that killed a half million or more people. Kim Jong-un lacks a title similar to “Great Leader” for Il-sung and “Dear Leader” for Jong-il, both of which were spoken reverently by even high-ranking officials. I proposed “Cute Leader” for Jong-un, but it never caught on. However, he obviously is as serious about governing as were his dynastic predecessors. Indeed, he may prove to be more successful than either of them. Kim Il-sung founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but only after being selected by the Soviet occupation forces. The elder Kim started the Korean War, during which his armed forces almost overran the Republic of Korea, but after Washington’s entry in the war only massive Chinese military intervention saved his regime. He effectively consolidated power and embarked upon a nuclear program, but when he died his country was otherwise backward and headed toward crisis. Kim Jong-il implemented a military first policy and shifted power from the KWP to the autonomous Defense Commission. However, state authority withered as the regime proved unable to feed its people. People looked to personal effort and private markets for survival. Many North Koreans fled to China and ultimately South Korea. Kim took his country further along the nuclear path, but offered little beyond. **Kim Jong-un is pushing his “Byungjin” strategy, both economic development and nuclear weapons. Despite international opprobrium and sanctions, even by the DPRK’s onetime allies Beijing and Moscow, he appears to be succeed**ing. Missile and nuclear tests continue, suggesting that Pyongyang has made greater progress than foreign experts had expected. ***By some estimates he could have fifty to one hundred nuclear weapons by 2020.* The economy also is growing**, perhaps by two or three percent a year. The base remains very low, almost nonexistent in many rural areas. Nevertheless, the turnaround is dramatic from the famine of only a couple decades ago. In Pyongyang, the “donjo” or “masters of money” have made their appearance. Members of this relatively prosperous class, many involved in private market activities, are unafraid to flaunt their wealth. And this has occurred **despite steadily tougher economic sanctions** imposed by the United Nations, United States and South Korea. Which suggests that the Trump administration will find itself facing an ugly reality. First, a relatively secure Kim Jong-un in control of a reasonably stable North Korean state. Second, a slightly more prosperous North Korea able to give the nomenklatura enough material goods to maintain elite commitment to the regime and loyalty to the Kim dynasty. Third, a military capable of striking U.S. bases and eventually the American homeland, creating a genuine nuclear deterrent to Washington. What to do? More of the same is likely to deliver more of the same results. Not negotiating has not slowed DPRK military activities. But **negotiations appeared to have little** more **effect.** And today **virtually no one believes that Pyongyang is inclined to voluntarily yield up its nuclear program, irrespective of the incentives offered.** While sanctions could be further stiffened, without Chinese enforcement they will not cripple the regime or force it to change course. Moreover, in the unlikely event that Beijing agreed to something akin to “bone-crunching” penalties, Kim & Co. still might resist, with extraordinary hardship for average North Koreans and the potential of a catastrophic collapse with equally catastrophic consequences (loose nukes, factional fighting, mass refugee flows, Chinese military intervention). **The president-elect** said he wants Beijing to solve the North Korea “problem.” Unfortunately, he **assumes the People’s Republic of China has more influence than it does in Pyongyang: North Korea and the PRC might rightly be called frenemies. The DPRK long has resisted the “fraternal” advice coming from its big brother.** In any case, **China has no incentive to promote regime change for America’s benefit**, **which would risk a North Korean implosion and ultimately a reunited Korea allied with America hosting U.S. troops on the Chinese border**. A deal would have to be struck, and that would require American and South Korean concessions. Even then the North might resist Chinese economic pressure, with the potential for a messy collapse. **Military strikes,** once planned by Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter for President Bill Clinton, remain an option, but **would be a wild gamble, especially with the Seoul-Inchon region—South Korea’s commercial, political and population heart—so close to the border. Although the DPRK would lose any war, it could cause horrendous casualties before succumbing**.

#### US nuclear weakness could tempt North Korea to miscalculate

Brad Roberts, professor, Georgetown, and former nuclear policy advisor to Obama, 2016, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Kindle edition, page number at end of card.

The New Spectrum of Deterrence Challenges With the advent of North Korean nuclear weapons and long-range strike capabilities, **we are entering a new, more dangerous phase with North Korea**. **New nuclear crises seem likely, each intended by North Korea to convey a risk of nuclear war. Whether through calculation or miscalculation, such crises might result in actual armed confrontation, combat operations, and escalation of various kinds**. These risks cannot be fully calibrated but cannot be ignored. North Korean leaders appear to have thought about how to manage the risks of escalation in a conflict with the United States through nuclear and other threats, though whether they actually have one or more theory of victory vis-à-vis the United States cannot be known definitively. On the central question of whether North Korean leaders might actually conduct nuclear attacks, the U.S. policy maker is presented with an uncertainty: North Korean nuclear attack cannot be ruled out. But neither should it be ruled in. Although we cannot say definitely whether North Korea would employ nuclear weapons, we can understand something of when, why, and how, based on the pathway analysis given in the preceding pages. As a practical matter, **the United States must take steps to reduce the risks of North Korean nuclear use**, whatever they may be, while also preparing for the possibility of use and the need to restore deterrence if North Korea proceeds to limited nuclear strikes (while holding something in reserve) aimed at demonstrating the credibility of its nuclear threats. Toward this end, the United States needs an analytical model to fully map out the problem space and to identify where and how U.S. deterrence practices might be relevant and effective in eliciting restraint by North Korean leaders. Drawing on the pathway analysis in the preceding discussion, it is possible to catalogue and organize the particular decisions North Korean leaders might make that the United States must be effective in influencing to induce North Korean restraint. It is useful to think of a broad spectrum of deterrence challenges in regional conflict under the nuclear shadow defined by different phases of conflict and degrees of escalation. 83 Those challenges come in three distinct sets along this spectrum: 1. Gray zone: At the low end of the conflict spectrum are provocations and confrontations just below the level of armed conflict. These encompass, for example, North Korea sinking the Cheonan or the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.84 War is not underway, but conflict is present, and military-backed coercion is being attempted, whether explicit or implied. 2. Red zone: In the middle of the spectrum are what might be termed “red zone” threats— conflicts involving actual combat operations and efforts by regional actors to try to exploit nuclear and missile capabilities to their advantage with actions that they calculate or hope to be beneath the U.S. nuclear response threshold (U.S. declaratory policy notwithstanding). Along the spectrum, this zone appears to be growing in size and relevance as these new capabilities are developed and fielded. 3. Black-and-white zone: At the opposite, high end of the spectrum are nuclear attacks on the homeland of the United States. Think of this as the “black-and-white zone,” where any attack by nuclear means on the homeland of the United States or an ally should be understood as resulting in a devastating U.S. response, likely nuclear. In the gray zone, the key points are decisions by North Korean leaders whether or not: 1. To conduct conventional provocations. 2. To conduct cyber attacks on civilian and military targets as a form of coercion. 3. To test and otherwise display new capabilities as a way to send messages of resolve and vulnerability. 4. To initiate military operations for a fait accompli. This fourth decision (to cross from the gray zone into the red zone) might be taken if Pyongyang were to assess that it would be possible to take its “hostage” quickly and to impose high costs on the United States and its allies if they were to seek to reverse it. In the red zone, Pyongyang’s key decision points are as follows: 5. If the fait accompli is not quickly achieved by military means, to employ chemical and/ or biological weapons for operational benefits (to degrade U.S. projection of U.S. and allied conventional forces through contaminated bases) and for strategic purposes (to signal a willingness to escalate to more lethal means against additional targets). 6. If this strategy fails to produce the desired political results, to pressure the hostage with additional punishment. On the Korean peninsula, this could involve some rocket and artillery fire into Seoul. 7. If this strategy fails, to retaliate by conventional means for attacks conducted by the United States and its allies. In a Korean conflict, this could involve attacks on or off the peninsula, including on bases and other targets in Japan (Japan hosts eight bases under UN Command in support of the defense of Korea). 8. If the political and military strategy is failing, to conduct a limited nuclear attack with an eye to demonstrating its resolve but in a manner calculated to make U.S. nuclear retaliation unlikely (in Pyongyang’s assessment). North Korea might believe that such an attack could break the alliance (by inducing the RoK to sue for peace before the United States is prepared to do so). **It might believe that it can greatly reduce if not eliminate the risk of U.S. retaliation with the very limited employment of a nuclear weapon as a way to signal resolve** but without killing any or many (such as an offshore demonstration shot or a high-altitude burst for its electromagnetic pulse effects). Presumably this type of action would also be accompanied by a threat of more North Korean nuclear attacks if the allies do not sue for peace on the North’s terms. In the black-and-white zone, North Korea would face the following decisions: 9. To threaten or conduct limited nuclear attacks on military and/ or civilian targets in South Korea or Japan, with the threat of more to come. 10. If this fails to induce the desired restraint of the United States and its allies, to threaten or conduct limited nuclear attacks on U.S. military facilities in the American homeland engaged in military operations against North Korea (for example, Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu or missile defense facilities in Alaska). 11. And if the United States employs nuclear weapons in retaliation, to respond or not with additional nuclear attacks of its own, whether on U.S. bases and forces in the region or on the American homeland. The purpose here might be to persuade the United States that the costs of continuing the war outweigh the potential benefits. Alternatively, the purpose might simply be to exact revenge on a hated enemy as the regime’s final act in a war it is poised to lose in any case. This sequence of decisions implies that the employment of nuclear weapons by North Korea for lethal effect on enemy military and political targets would come only late in a failed conventional conflict. But, as noted earlier, North Korean leaders may calculate that regime survival would automatically be at risk in any renewed war on the Korean peninsula and thus may contemplate employment of nuclear weapons early in a conflict to shock Washington and Seoul into suing for peace. This perception of a need for and value in employing nuclear weapons early in a conflict may be reinforced by fears that the United States would be successful in preemptively eliminating those capabilities. Each decision in this hierarchy would involve assessments of the resolve of the United States and its allies to continue in an escalating conflict, as well perhaps as assessments of Pyongyang’s own resolve. Each new action by Pyongyang can be understood as a test of the separate or collective resolve of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. In the preceding scenario, Kim Jong Un would be making choices to signal his resolve to safeguard his interests even in an escalating conflict, while testing the resolve of the alliance arrayed against him to remain intact. The United States would act to signal its resolve to safeguard its allies and forces and the American homeland, while testing the resolve of Kim Jong Un to remain committed to aggression and escalation. These are inherently competitive and risky strategies. 85 Any such competitive testing of resolve would bring to the fore in the decision-making process the stake each side perceives in the conflict— and the perceived stake of the adversary. Presumably each side begins with the premise that its stake is more substantial. For North Korea, a vital interest would seem to be at stake— regime survival. For the United States, the vital interest of an ally or allies would be at stake— their long-term viability under a political outcome dictated by the North if the United States were to concede. As argued in the preceding pages, **North Korean leaders may believe that their vital interest is the more compelling, thus lending credibility to their escalatory threats in their eyes. Accordingly, a key danger is the *potential for miscalculation of resolve***. 86 To escalate by any means seems to require a conviction that the other side lacks the resolve to retaliate or to counter-escalate. As argued in the preceding paragraphs, leaders in North Korea may calculate that their resolve is superior to that of the United States and its allies. **They may see resolve of the United States and its allies as relatively weak or absolutely weak**— perhaps because of a belief that democracies are paper tigers or so casualty averse as to avoid escalation at all costs. **They may calculate that America is in decline and no longer ready to pay a significant price to defend the interests at stake on the Korean peninsula. They may calculate further that as the supposed true heirs to Korean history, their victory against the United States is inevitable.** Conversely, the United States and its allies may calculate that the resolve in Pyongyang is weak, perhaps because of a belief that nuclear war is unwinnable and thus will not actually be fought. Moreover, in tests of resolve, bluffs are often employed. This creates the additional risk of miscalculation derived from a decision to dismiss as a bluff a statement of resolve that is no bluff at all. This suggests that the challenges of managing escalation in a regional conflict with a nuclear-armed aggressor are numerous. Such adversaries may engage in deliberate acts of escalation, as argued earlier. But escalation may be inadvertent, if it results from an action that was not intended to be escalatory but is perceived as such by the other side. And escalation may be accidental, if it results from actions that were not deliberate (but often occur in the fog of war). Deliberate escalation may be “manageable” if the adversary decision maker conducts a deliberate assessment of benefit, cost, and risk, whereas inadvertent and accidental escalation are inherently less “manageable.” 87 The decisions catalogued here are illustrative of the actual decisions that North Korean leaders would face in trying to secure their interests in a political-military confrontation Rwith the United States. There is little evidence to confirm that leaders or planners in Pyongyang have thought systematically about such decisions. But this analytic framework is needed to inform the development of U.S. deterrence strategies vis-à-vis North Korea and any other potential nuclear adversary that might attempt to bring “nuclear queens” into play in an effort to “mess with the United States.” Without such a framework, the United States cannot adequately understand how potential enemy leaders calculate the benefits, costs, and risks of various courses of action— a calculus that our deterrence strategies seek to influence. Conclusions A new strategic problem for the United States has taken shape since the end of the Cold War. The problem has taken various forms in the Middle East over the last two decade but has taken its clearest and most compelling form in Northeast Asia, where **the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea with the means to deliver nuclear weapons at long range is rewriting the strategic landscape. Political agreements** with proliferators **may yet alleviate this new problem** by eliminating the North Korean nuclear threat and preventing the emergence of new regional threats. After all, the United States, along with many other nations working within the nonproliferation regime and outside it, seeks a political settlement with Pyongyang that would roll back its capabilities and bring it back into the NPT. A different regime in Pyongyang might finally abandon its nuclear arsenal to join the community of nations. Korean reunification may yet occur in a way that enables a reunified Korea to join the international consensus against nuclear weapons. The United States also leads a strong international coalition to promote the full and effective implementation of the NPT***. But efforts to eliminate this new problem entirely seem unpromising at this time***. **Prolonged stalemate with North Korea** and long-term uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear future **seem more likely to amplify than attenuate proliferation pressures**. Moreover, other leaders of regional powers may yet find their own reasons to seek “nuclear queens” of their own to “mess with the United States”— or some other country— and pursue their own visions of regional order**. The evidence strongly suggests that North Korea has thought about how to use its new “nuclear queens” to secure its control, to advance its interests in its long-running confrontation with the United States and South Korea, and perhaps even to achieve a settlement on its terms of the long-running conflict on the peninsula**. This thinking encompasses ideas about how to persuade the United States to come to the negotiating table willing to cut a deal. It also encompasses ideas about how to manage the risks in war of escalation by the United States. There is no clear evidence that North Korea has a theory of victory in a war with the United States involving extended nuclear war fighting. But **there is evidence**, albeit incomplete, **that North Korea has various theories of victory**. Of these, the most plausible in U.S. eyes must by the theory built on nuclear blackmail and brinksmanship, rather than nuclear war fighting. There is some reason to think, however, that North Korean leaders may believe that they can employ nuclear weapons on a limited basis to demonstrate their resolve and thus to prevail in a limited war with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. To prevail means, in this context, to survive a conflict with their political aims achieved and other interests intact. North Korean capabilities and concepts can be used to map out a spectrum of deterrence challenges for the United States and its allies. Especially troubling are those new deterrence challenges associated with what I have called the red zone— a category of decisions by leaders in Pyongyang to escalate conflicts in ways that they may believe fall beneath the likely U.S. response threshold. Although this spectrum of deterrence challenges has analogues in the Cold War, it is not merely a Cold War vestige. It requires meaningful solutions suited to the current context. It requires also adapting the old logic of limited nuclear war to this new problem. Roberts, Brad. The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (p. 80). Stanford University Press. Kindle Edition.

#### We need to fund nuclear modernization to boost deterrence

***Michaela Dodge****is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and Strategic Policy in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation, November 2016, The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Policy: First Steps, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/11/the-trump-administrations-nuclear-weapons-policy-first-steps*

Nuclear weapons continue to be essential for U.S. national security and will continue to play an irreplaceable role in deterring a large-scale attack against the U.S. homeland. Nuclear weapons in the hands of U.S. adversaries and potential adversaries are the only weapons that pose an existential threat to the nation. The Trump Administration will have a unique opportunity to reverse President Barack Obama’s ill-founded nuclear weapons policies, strengthen deterrence, assure allies, and ensure that U.S. nuclear modernization programs continue, including maintaining a triad of U.S. delivery systems: bombers, intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, and submarines.

**Wishful Thinking and Nuclear Security**

The Trump Administration will have the opportunity—and responsibility—to honestly assess the state of U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure and the state of the international environment that guides U.S. nuclear weapons planning. **The Obama Administration aspired to work toward conditions that would allow the United States to eliminate its nuclear weapons by reducing their role in U.S. national security strategy**. **But its assessments were guided** more **by wishful thinking** than realities of the international security environment.

In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the White House assessed that Russia is no longer an adversary and that the potential for conflict is low—a fallacy demonstrated by Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and other steps hostile to U.S. interests. **Sinc**e President **Obama took office, Russia has not only launched the most expensive nuclear weapons modernization program since the end of the Cold War, it is also in violation of a whole host of bilateral and international arms control treaties**, some of which, like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty or the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, have profound implications for U.S. allies in Europe. Moscow repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons “pre-emptively” against U.S. allies in Europe. But the Kremlin is not the only adversary the United States has to worry about, particularly since U.S. nuclear weapons provide the ultimate guarantee of many U.S. allies’ security, including Japan and South Korea.

**North Korea has conducted four nuclear weapons tests since 2009, two this year. Iran, flush with cash and emboldened due to the relaxation of nuclear restrictions under the Administration’s flawed Iran deal, has not only been violating the deal but also continues to fund terrorist activities in the Middle East**.[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/11/the-trump-administrations-nuclear-weapons-policy-first-steps" \l "_ftn1) The nuclear deal puts Iran in a better position to develop nuclear weapons than otherwise would have been the case. Other nations now place an increased value on nuclear weapons as guarantors of their security.

**Next Steps**

To strengthen deterrence, assure allies, and ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, the Trump Administration should:

* **Re-examine assumptions that guide U.S. nuclear weapons policy on both unclassified and classified levels.**The Trump Administration should conduct a classified and unclassified review of U.S. nuclear weapon policies, particularly focusing on the threat level, allied assurances, and nuclear weapons modernization.
* **Request funding for U.S. nuclear warheads, delivery platforms including the triad, and the supporting nuclear infrastructure.**U.S. nuclear weapon systems are aged, and a majority of them are serving well past their intended service lives.[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/11/the-trump-administrations-nuclear-weapons-policy-first-steps" \l "_ftn2) The United States has neglected nuclear weapons modernization programs since the end of the Cold War and as components are expiring, the country must get ahead of the curve and modernize its nuclear systems. A flexible and agile nuclear weapons complex is a key to this step. The Obama Administration laudably increased funding for the nuclear enterprise after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) ratification. The funding levels must be sustained now, and increased in the future, in order to meet the needs of a credible survivable deterrent vis-à-vis a growing threat.
* **Stop unilateral nuclear weapons reductions.**The New START data declarations show that the United States disproportionately reduced the number of its nuclear warheads since the treaty was signed. The latest State Department data exchange, from September 1, 2016, shows that Russia currently deploys 400 more nuclear warheads than the U.S.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/11/the-trump-administrations-nuclear-weapons-policy-first-steps" \l "_ftn3) The trend must be reversed, as a perception of nuclear superiority emboldens Russia’s aggressive foreign policies that are detrimental to U.S. interests in Europe and in the Middle East.
* **Withdraw from New START.**Moscow has demonstrated that it is not interested in a benign relationship with the United States. Its massive nuclear weapons modernization investments and deployments defeat the purpose of New START, which has outlived its utility under current conditions.
* **Withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.**Russia is currently in a material breach of the INF Treaty, developing capabilities that directly threaten North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies and the U.S. ability to defend them.[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/11/the-trump-administrations-nuclear-weapons-policy-first-steps" \l "_ftn4) At this point in time, the United States is the only party restricted by the treaty.
* **Maintain nuclear ambiguity.**Nuclear ambiguity—lack of specificity with regard to the scenarios under which the United States would use a nuclear weapon—has served as reliable deterrence over the past several decades. The policy should be continued and re-affirmed.
* **Move away from the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).**In today’s world with multiple nuclear powers, relying on a deterrence that leaves something to chance is not a viable nuclear strategy. For one, unlike the United States that values its way of life and its people, some U.S. adversaries are not concerned with saving the lives of the people they rule. They care about their own survival and about the survival of tools that help them in power. This means that the United States needs an individualized and potentially different set of nuclear and conventional capabilities and strategies in order to threaten the things that its adversaries value. A uniform Cold War approach is not a fitting or prudent strategy for today’s rapidly changing environment.
* **Reverse the Obama Administration policy of “three nos.”**In an effort to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, the Obama Administration instituted a policy of (1) no new nuclear warheads, (2) no new military missions, and (3) no new military capabilities for the existing weapons. This policy assumes that U.S. adversaries are and will be deterred the same way that U.S. adversaries were deterred during the Cold War, when nuclear weapons in the current inventory were designed and deployed. The United States must be able to explore options for deterrence without artificial and obsolete policy restrictions.
* **Respect the Senate regarding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).**Since the Senate rejected the CTBT in 1999, future President Trump should ask the Senate to return the CTBT to the executive branch. This step would effectively terminate any further consideration of the treaty ratification. Additionally, consistent with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Trump Administration should announce that it has no intention of ratifying the CTBT.

While the executive plays a pivotal role in guiding U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Congress plays an important role as well. To ensure that U.S. nuclear weapons policy is on a sound footing in the future, Congress should:

* **Fund the U.S. nuclear weapons modernization program. Congress must work with the Administration to modernize aging nuclear platforms, maintain and extend the life of nuclear warheads, and revitalize the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.**
* **The Senate should return the CTBT to the executive branch.**Since the Senate voted to reject ratification of the CTBT, a termination of any further consideration of the treaty’s ratification is a prudent step the Senate should take.

These steps will ensure that the United States continues to maintain safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons that credibly deter a whole range of potential adversaries in the decades ahead.

### Public Infrastructure Trade-Off Answers

#### There is no evidence that the Republicans would agree to spend more money on public infrastructure if it wasn’t for an increase in military spending

#### Non-unique – we spend money on the military now, we just increased the defense budget

#### There is no internal link evidence that says $100 billion/year, assuming it all even went to infrastructure, would be critical to infrastructure

### Pan Kritik Answers

Jones 14

David Martin Jones, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). This is a large claim.

Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship also embraced Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18).

Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property.

It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, Pan asserts, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian realists like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, have made consistently since the late 1990s. In other words, not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations.

Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China’s thought managers (Brady: 6).

#### No Impact --- Predictions about China are self-correcting and essential for good policymaking.

Gilley 2005

Bruce, Ph.D. candidate in politics at Princeton University, March, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/shjdir/v6n1/shjdir\_v6n1e.pdf

Prediction of regime changes, then, has been accurate in some cases and inaccurate in others. Like all inferences made in the social sciences, some have been right and some have been wrong. But in all cases, scholars who choose to predict have been forced to line up what they believe are the factors relevant to regime change and then inferred a prediction. Many have been wrong. But in doing so, they have concentrated minds, allowing policy-makers to be open to the potential sources and direction of change. What sets such efforts apart is not that they predicted correctly, but that they predicted at all. Those who have “eschewed prognostication” have implicitly endorsed some form of continuation of business as usual, or else have been so overwhelmed by a sea of data to have been hamstrung in making any inferences at all, descriptive, causal, or predictive. The costs of inaccurate prediction are to be ready for the wrong changes. The costs of a failure to predict are to be not ready for change at all. At least in the former case, there is a possibility of accurate prediction and preparedness for the right changes. Even where one is prepared for the wrong outcome—a liberal democracy rather than a form of electoral authoritarianism as in Putin’s Russia, for example—many of the same policies will be applicable, support for the rule of law and media, for example. In the latter case, policymakers are doomed from the start.

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### Social Spending Trade-Off Answers

#### Non-unique – We have a $19 trillion deficit and it increases ever year. The Republicans are going to pass massive tax cuts and Trump wants a massive infrastructure plan. Those will increase the deficit. If the Republicans are going to cut social spending if they deficit increases, they are going to do that now.

Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/12/05/trump-deficit-spending-may-not-impress-the-market/

Mr. **Trump has said that he will seek to boost economic growth through a series of tax cuts and fiscal spending**. Already, analysts are forecasting a broad rise in corporate earnings due to tax cuts, which could have especially large impacts on sectors like [banks](http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/11/23/how-a-trump-tax-cut-could-boost-banks/?mod=ST1)and [retailers](http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/11/29/investors-in-retail-stocks-bet-on-lower-corporate-taxes/?mod=ST1). That could support the next leg higher in many stocks, the thinking goes. But **the tax plan Mr. Trump has proposed would cause the budget deficit to expand to nearly $1 trillion in 2017 from about $590 billion this year**, the bank’s researchers believe.

#### There is no evidence that the Republicans will increase social spending now or that they won’t cut it. There is no social spending uniqueness in a Republican world for defense spending to trade off with. Republicans already want to wipe out Obamacare, reduce Medicaid spending, and privatize Medicare. They aren’t doing this because of military spending – they just hate these programs

#### Their impact is ludicrous --- It assumes the programs are eliminated and it assumes that people have no other source of food or health care. The terminal impact is absurd even if there are *some* reductions as a result of increased military spending.

#### Turn – military spending massively increases economic growth .These jobs would generate tax revenue through economic activity, reducing the need for social welfare

National Conference on State Legislatures, September 9, 2016, Military’s Impact on State Economies, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/military-and-veterans-affairs/military-s-impact-on-state-economies.aspx>

The Department of Defense (DoD) operates more than 420 military installations in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico. These installations—which may also be referred to as bases, camps, posts, stations, yards or centers—sustain the presence of U.S. forces at home and abroad. Installations located within the United States and its territories are used to train and deploy troops, maintain weapons systems and care for the wounded. Installations also support military service members and families by providing housing, health care, childcare and on-base education. **The DoD contributes billions of dollars each year to state economies through the operation of military installations. This spending helps sustain local communities by creating employment opportunities across a wide range of sectors, both directly and indirectly. Active duty and civilian employees spend their military wages on goods and services produced locally, while pensions and other benefits provide retirees and dependents a reliable source of income. States and communities also benefit from defense contracts with private companies for equipment, supplies, construction and various services such as health care and information technology.** The economic benefits created by military installations are susceptible to change at both the federal and state levels. Recent events such as the drawdown of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, federal budget cuts, and potential future rounds of Base Realignment and Closure have left government officials uncertain of the future role and sustainability of military installations. These trends have been a driving force behind many states’ decisions to commission studies that define the military activity and infrastructure that exists in the state and measure the economic impact of military presence. Economic impact studies allow states to better advocate on behalf of their installations and plan for future growth or restructuring. At least 26 states have recently completed or are in the process of completing military economic impact studies. Impacts generally include salaries and benefits paid to military personnel and retirees, defense contracts, local business activity supported by military operations, tax revenues and other military spending. **In 2015, for example, military installations in North Carolina supported 578,000 jobs, $34 billion in personal income and $66 billion in gross state product. This amounts to roughly 10 percent of the state’s overall economy. In Kentucky the military spent about $12 billion from 2014 to 2015, which was a reduction of $3.5 billion since the last report in 2012. With around 38,700 active duty and civilian employees,** the military is the largest employer in Kentucky by more than 21,000 jobs. They also support the highest payroll with a total of $3.85 billion, $80 million higher than the second largest industry in Kentucky. Even states with relatively small military footprints have reported significant economic impacts. A study in Massachusetts, for example, found that by investing $9.1 billion in FY 2011, military installations contributed another $4.6 billion in spending and added more than 30,600 jobs to the state economy. The table below is a representation of military economic impact studies done on behalf of each of the 50 states. Most of the studies were done internally or commissioned by state organizations, while others were sourced from regional or national analyses or other publications. At least 23 states – Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and Washington – utilize numbers that were gathered by internally commissioned studies.

#### Turn -- Undermining the global economy undermines the US economy. Extend our constructive argument that China aggression undermines international norms and the global economy.

Ian Bremmer, September 2016, Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World, Kindle edition, page number at end off card. Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk.. He’s also the President of the Eurasia Group

Still others warn that in today’s interconnected world, it’s dangerously naïve to believe that America can ever really be safe in an unsafe world. **We can’t create jobs and grow our economy without a stable global economy. No nation can do more than the United States to promote and protect this better world**, and it is America’s values, not its economic weight or military might, that we leave behind when the troops head home. Values that help others stand on their own. Washington, they argue, must get its financial house in order, invest in a stronger America, and pursue U.S. interests around the world. **But it is shortsighted to believe that we can only build lasting strength at home by retreating from the world** or by renouncing our faith in the power of democracy, freedom of speech, rule of law, and freedom from poverty and fear to create broadly shared peace and prosperity. This argument has merits too. Bremmer, Ian. Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World (Kindle Locations 475-481). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

#### Social welfare programs don’t solve poverty

Michael Spalding, September 21, 2012, CNN, Why the US has a culture of dependency, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/21/opinion/spalding-welfare-state-dependency/

For most of American history, the average farmer, shop owner or entrepreneur could live an entire life without getting anything from the federal government except mail service. But those days have gone the way of the Pony Express. Last year, the Wall Street Journal reported that [49% of the population](http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/05/26/number-of-the-week-half-of-u-s-lives-in-household-getting-benefits/?KEYWORDS=number+of+the+week" \t "_blank) lives in a household where at least one person gets some type of government benefit. The Heritage Foundation's annual Index of Dependence on Government tracks government spending and creates a weighted score adjusted for inflation of federal programs that contribute to dependency. It reports that in 2010, [67.3 million Americans](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/2012-index-of-dependence-on-government" \t "_blank) received either [Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,](http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/tanf/about.html" \t "_blank) Social Security, support for higher education or other assistance once considered to be the responsibility of individuals, families, neighborhoods, churches, and other civil society institutions -- an [8% increase](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/~/media/Images/Reports/2012/02/cda1202/CDA2012indexdependencegovttable1750px.ashx" \t "_blank) from the year before. These people aren't necessarily dependent on government; many could live (even live well) without their Social Security check, Pell grant or crop subsidy. That's not the point. The problem is that **Washington is building a culture of dependency, with ever-more people relying on an ever-growing federal government to give them cash or benefits. This is a growing and dangerous trend**. **The United States thrives because of a culture of opportunity that encourages work** and disdains relying on handouts. **The growth of the welfare state, a confusing alphabet soup of programs that are supposed to help low-income Americans make ends meet and do not include entitlements such as Social Security or Medicare, is turning us into a land where many expect, and see no stigma attached t**o, drawing regular financial support from the federal government. [Opinion: Americans are not moochers](http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/20/opinion/ghilarducci-mcgahey-romney/index.html?hpt=op_t1) **Consider means-tested social welfare programs. The federal government** [**operates at least 69 programs**](http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/news/economy/welfare-reform/index.htm) **that provide assistance deliberately and exclusively to poor and lower-income people.** The benefits include cash, food, housing, medical care and social services. et when poverty expert Robert Rector, senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, [examined these anti-poverty programs,](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/obama-administration-ends-welfare-reform-as-we-know-it" \t "_blank) he found that only **two,** the earned income tax credit and the additional child refundable credit, **require recipients to actually work for their benefits**. It had been three, but earlier this year, the [Obama administration effectively set aside](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/us/politics/welfare-to-work-shift-angers-republicans.html" \t "_blank) the most well-known welfare work requirements, those specifically written into the 1996 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families law. The Department of Health and Human Services announced that states could apply for a waiver of the law's clearly stated work requirements. Meanwhile, although spending on welfare has [been cut in half since it was reformed in 1996,](http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/09/news/economy/welfare-reform/index.htm) other federal spending on programs, such as food stamps, has soared year after year and decade after decade. Simply put, [spending on social welfare programs](http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/07/news/economy/government_assistance/index.htm) has exploded. [CNNMoney: The poor do have jobs](http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/21/news/economy/poor-jobs/index.html?hpt=hp_t2) **Under a culture of dependency, poverty becomes a trap, and recipients get stuck. Long-term welfare recipients lose work habits and job skills and miss out on the marketplace contacts that lead to job opportunities.** That's a key reason the government should require welfare recipients to work as much as they can. What could be called "workfare" thus tends to increase long-term earnings among potential recipients.

#### Turn – Social spending creates intergenerational poverty

Family Facts, no date, Breaking the Cycle of Welfare Dependence, http://www.familyfacts.org/briefs/46/breaking-the-cycle-of-welfare-dependence

**Research on Negative Effects of Welfare Dependence**: **Social science research published in peer-reviewed academic journals suggests that welfare participation is associated with negative effects for children and adults and with an intergenerational cycle of dependence**.

* Welfare participation and early childhood cognitive development. **A 2011 study published in Children and Youth Services Review analyzed the effect of welfare participation in the TANF program on young children’s cognitive development**.4 It found that, compared to children in non-welfare families, those whose families received welfare when they were between three and five years old had, on average, lower cognitive development (about 11 percent of a standard deviation difference on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). The study considered a host of factors, including child and maternal background characteristics as well as family dynamics and the home environment, but the negative effect of participation in TANF persisted. Further analysis suggested that increased maternal stress and lower household income among TANF families explained about 7 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of the cognitive deficiency between five-year-olds whose families received welfare and those whose families did not.
* Welfare receipt and children’s educational attainment**. Welfare receipt, particularly during adolescence, also appeared to have a negative effect on children’s educational attainment**. Using nationally representative data that tracked individuals born between 1967 and 1978 throughout their childhood, a 2003 Demography study found that one year of welfare receipt during ages 11 to 15 was associated with a reduction of more than a quarter of a year in total schooling.5 Moreover, the likelihood of high school completion diminished by 14 percent for each year of welfare receipt between age 11 and age 15 and by 6 percent for each year of welfare receipt between age 6 and age 10.
* Intergenerational welfare receipt. Research suggests that welfare participation may adversely affect the next generation’s economic well-being. A 2003 study in the Journal of Marriage and Family found that, compared to women whose families, when they were between age 8 and age 13, did not receive welfare, those whose families participated in welfare were more likely to receive welfare themselves.6 The effect of intergenerational welfare receipt may be partially explained by the adult children recipients’ employment, education, and marital characteristics. That is, parental welfare receipt was linked to children’s employment, education, and marital status in adulthood. For example, compared to mothers who gave birth out of wedlock, married mothers who remained married averaged three fewer years of welfare participation.
* Intergenerational welfare dependence. Using a nationally representative survey that followed the same group of respondents from childhood through adulthood, a 2004 study on the intergenerational transmission of welfare dependence also examined the likelihood of receiving welfare in adulthood if one’s parents ever received welfare.7 Welfare receipt included participation in AFDC (the pre–1996 reform cash assistance program); food stamps; or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The study found that the average probability of welfare participation for the entire study sample was over a quarter (0.275); **if their parents had ever received welfare while the respondents were growing up, their probability of welfare receipt as adults increased to nearly one-half (0.468)—nearly three times the probability (0.166) for respondents whose parents did not receive welfare**.

#### Turn—verification. Political and economic pressures have given states the incentive to provide welfare to as few as possible—they use intrusive, harsh verification procedures

Amy **Mulzer**, JD Columbia University School of Law, **2005**, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Summer, 36 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 663, “The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs,” p. 674-7

Improvements in the Medicaid and food stamp programs have been far overshadowed by negative developments in cash assistance programs. The legal-bureaucratic era ended with the passage of PRWORA in 1996, which eliminated the federal legal entitlement to cash assistance and devolved control over cash assistance (TANF) programs to the states. n52 While PRWORA requires states to "set forth objective criteria for the delivery of benefits and the determination of eligibility," it gives them extraordinary discretion in the establishment of those criteria. n53 And while the force of tradition has led states to retain many of the procedures previously used in AFDC, various political and economic pressures have led to an increased use of these procedures as a method of "informally rationing" benefits. n54 Unable to alter eligibility levels without jeopardizing their caseload reduction credit n55 - and eager to reduce their caseloads - states are employing a different brand of verification extremism, aimed not at rooting out fraud but at discouraging claimants from applying in the first place. n56 This practice has been fueled by a new method of welfare administration, which relies less on formal policymaking and more on signaling and intimation among policymakers, administrators, and front-line workers. n57 It has also been fueled by public ambivalence towards cash  [675]  assistance programs; suspicious of these programs and their claimants, the public wants the rolls reduced, but does indeed wish to aid the poor. n58 Informal rationing allows states to reduce welfare rolls without cutting eligibility or benefit levels, leading the public to believe that the drop was caused by a genuine reduction in need. n59

In addition, with a degree of discretion and localization unknown since the pre-AFDC era has come an increase in the amount of outright hostility agencies display towards claimants. Some state and local agencies are using verification procedures to stigmatize and embarrass claimants, not merely to reduce the number of completed applications, but seemingly for the sake of stigma itself. n60 This approach, though not officially sanctioned by PRWORA, may be seen as following logically from signals the Act gave concerning the moral status of claimants. n61 A prime example of this approach may be found in New York City's Human Resources Administration (HRA), as run by former mayor Rudolph Giuliani. Under Giuliani's guidance, the agency took a highly intrusive investigative approach to verification, n62 applied documentation requirements strictly, n63 and encouraged suspicion of claimants. n64 Bucking the trend towards reliance on computer-matching in the program, HRA even mandated home visits for Medicaid applicants. In 1998, the New York Times reported the story of a woman whose application on behalf of her son was rejected after HRA investigators looked into her bedroom closet and spotted a pair of men's blue jeans; the agency claimed that the jeans proved that the woman was still living with her spouse. n65 As journalist Nina Bernstein observes, home visits such as this one may be seen less as an attempt to weed out fraud and more as an attempt to bring back the age of man in the house rules and "midnight raids." n66

#### Independently this informal rationing subverts democratic accountability by allowing politicians to roll back welfare without public knowledge.

David A. **Super**, Law Professor Washington & Lee University, **2004**,Yale Law Journal, January, 113 Yale. L.U. 815, “Offering an Invisible Hand: the rise of the personal choice model for rationing public benefits,” p. 840-1

The relative invisibility of informal rationing devices has several consequences. Policymakers wishing to articulate one agenda and pursue another can adjust the stringency of informal rationing devices with little danger of being called on the inconsistency. At the same time it was publicly espousing fiscal discipline, the Clinton Administration made numerous changes in Medicaid and food stamp procedures to reduce claimants' costs of participation and the risk of procedural denials. Its Office of Management and Budget (OMB) adopted the convenient position that changes allowing more already-eligible people to participate should not be regarded as increasing the programs' costs because they were only bringing in participants whom Congress already had decided to serve when it enacted the programs' substantive eligibility rules. [n75](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.938334.9651797186&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246040153675&returnToKey=20_T6854971115&parent=docview#n75) Conversely, as the recent economic downturn has squeezed states' budgets, many have dropped policies adopted a few years earlier to ease procedural burdens on claimants for Medicaid. State policymakers apparently have reasoned that these changes will go largely unnoticed, or can be explained away in technical terms, while changing formal eligibility rules would be understood as a retreat from efforts to reduce the ranks of the uninsured. Yet the source of savings under both sets of policies is essentially the same: fewer people receiving Medicaid coverage.

The relative invisibility of indirect methods can also allow policymakers to ration benefits for a broader array of purposes than they could readily hope to justify publicly. The upheavals of the mid-1990s did stretch the range of politically acceptable objectives for eligibility rules, at least for a while. Traditionally, however, policymakers have had to justify most eligibility rules under one of only a small handful of rubrics. Most substantive eligibility rules are explained either as measuring need for a benefit or worthiness to receive it. Once a basic need-or worthiness-based rationing system is established, arguments about equity, reliability, simplicity, or cost may lead to some fine-tuning. At some point, however, restrictions on substantive eligibility without substantive justification can expose policymakers' failure to fulfill their own stated programmatic objectives. Discouraging participation may be a safer way to achieve the same savings.

#### The failure to submit to democratic accountability threatens global survival.

Carl **Boggs,** National University, **1997,** Theory and Society, December, Volume 26, Number 6, p. 773-4

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here -- localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post-modernism, Deep Ecology -- intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation.

The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved -- perhaps even unrecognized -- only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side-step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions. In the meantime, **the fate of the world hangs in the balance**. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies.

This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites -- an already familiar dynamic in many lesser developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise -- or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.

### Russia Encirclement Bad/Arms Race with Russia Bad Answers

#### We won’t USE new military capabilities to deter the Russians, he’ll cede to them

*Dr. Evelyn Farkas, December 12, 2016, Farkas served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia from 2012 to 2015, is former Executive Director, Graham-Talent WMD Commission and has served almost twenty years in the executive and legislative branches of government,* Politico, Here’s What America needs to know about Trump and Russia, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/trump-russia-intelligence-need-to-know-214520

This weekend, we finally learned the CIA’s professional conclusion about Russia’s involvement in our presidential elections: **Russia hacked both the Democratic Party and the Clinton campaign,** and **the goal was to help Trump win**. And the CIA isn’t out on a limb here: both the director of National Intelligence, who represents all 16 intelligence agencies, and the head of Homeland Security, have said Russia was behind the hacking. The FBI also holds Russia responsible for hacking, but hasn’t reached a conclusion about its motives.We are only beginning to process the fact that a foreign country interfered with American democratic elections. But when it comes to Russia and its relationship with Donald Trump, the election hacking may be only the tip of the iceberg. The American public doesn't have access to the data the intelligence community—all 16 agencies combined—have on the Russian government, its banks and oligarchs, and their relationships with Trump's campaign, his business ventures, and the president-elect himself. That must change before January 20. The information needs to be made public. **I've worked in the defense community for the past 20 years, the past three as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia. Over that time**, my colleagues and **I have watched Russian cyber-operations become far more ambitious and insidious.** They've moved from technical denial-of-service attacks—targeting Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008 and against Ukraine’s internet and cellular phone networks in 2014 and electrical grid a year later—to the use of cyber spying and release of captured information to influence publics, including their own. In 2014, during U.S. and European Union negotiations to build a transitional government in Ukraine, Russia made public a wiretapped conversation between my colleagues Assistant Secretary Toria Nuland and the U.S. ambassador in Ukraine, Geoff Pyatt, during which Nuland is heard saying “Fuck the E.U.” The objective was to embarrass U.S. officials and increase tension between them and their EU counterparts. I watched as Russia funded far-right and far-left political parties in Western and Eastern Europe (most notably in France and Hungary), as well as NGOs and used its economic influence (especially in oil and gas) to pressure European politicians to support Kremlin objectives. **This fall, we saw Moscow continue to intervene in other nations' politics, funding pro-Russian political parties in Moldov**a, and sponsoring demonstrations against that country's pro-Western government. This week, the head of the German domestic intelligence agency warned: "We see aggressive and increased cyber spying and cyber operations that could potentially endanger German government officials, members of parliament and employees of democratic parties." **We know from the most senior intelligence officials that the Russian government hacks and transfer of information to WikiLeaks were conducted at a minimum to cause Americans to lose faith in their political process, and at a maximum to increase the odds that Trump could win the election**. And we should heed their words: As a close consumer of intelligence on Russia for three critical years, I know our intelligence on Russia, unlike that on North Korea, for example, is excellent. Given Russia's capabilities and its recent patterns, it is not at all far-fetched to ask whether Trump is indeed the “puppet” Secretary Clinton mockingly named him in the second presidential debate. Is he financially and politically beholden to Russians close to the government and to the Kremlin itself? If so, is he prepared to accommodate Putin’s interests? Should we expect a robust "reset," in the tense relationship between the two countries, perhaps one that even compromises U.S. interests, like the stability of its allies in Europe, and American values, like democracy and human rights? If the Trump administration attempts one, it is worth noting that whatever the U.S. gives up would likely be very temporary: For domestic political reasons, Putin needs the United States as its public enemy, given Russia’s current and foreseeable economic situation, and Russian presidential elections are coming up in 2018. Today, we already have enough clues and too much undisclosed information to warrant worry about the puppet scenario**. There are signs the Trump campaign was involved in coordinating this release of hacked information**—then-adviser Carter Page’s trips and meetings in Moscow, and Russian statements that they were in touch with the campaign. And of course**, Trump publicly called on the Russian government to continue hacking Hillary Clinton’s computers during a televised campaign appearance.** His campaign dismissed it as a joke; it's not clear everyone did. It may be too much to say that the Kremlin and Russian secret services put Trump on the path to seeking the presidency, but they certainly contributed to getting him there—even perhaps, to their surprise. Since the election, various senior Russian officials, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, have asserted that they’ve had ongoing conversations with the Trump camp. Trump spokesperson Hope Hicks has denied this. If the Russian officials in this "he said-she said" game aren't lying, it raises the question about what they are discussing or planning. **We know,** per Donald Trump Jr., that **Russia makes up a significant amount of the family business**. What we don’t know is how much Russian money is involved, and what Russian money. How did Trump get out of debt? To whom does he owe money? Who provides the collateral for his loans? Is he beholden to Russian oligarchs and banks who are under the thumb of the Kremlin and Russian security services? If these relationships do exist, **the basic foreign policy implication is that a President Trump will seek to accommodate** Vladimir **Putin's objectives**: equal status between the United States and Russia; **a 19th century sphere of influence for Russia in Europe/Eurasia/Central Asia; and acceptance of brutal nondemocratic dictators even in the face of their people's nonviolent attempts to force them from power.** **And the United States** is unlikely to retaliate against Russian cyberattacks, and ***may not maintain strong deterrence against Russian violations of air, sea and space protocols for military behavior.*** In Europe, **this would mean no further NATO enlargement and no military or other assistance to non-NATO states like Ukraine and Georgia that are occupied in part by Russian forces and trying to maintain their political and economic sovereignty**. It would likely arrest the movement toward democracy and free-market capitalism. In the Middle East, it would mean letting the brutal dictator Bashar Assad try to rule Syria by force, with Russia and Iran helping. The result would be more insecurity—Eastern and Western European states would start looking out for their own interests, arming unilaterally and weakening NATO and further dividing the EU. With collective security diminished, and the chance of American resistance significantly reduced, **Russia may be tempted to test NATO countries by sending security forces into the Baltics to protect ethnic Russians or by conducting risky military maneuver in NATO air or maritime space**. If a conflict were to break out among major European powers—collectively our top trading partner, and individually our closest allies—U.S. basic interests would be affected. If America chose to side with Russia over our European allies, that would be a repudiation of U.S. interests and values. In Syria, the final crushing of the conventional opposition forces would spell the dawn of a bitter and destabilizing insurgency against Assad, Iran and Russia. For the homeland, the failure to respond to Russian cyber-interference and to establish and maintain military deterrence against attacks on U.S. military and civilian infrastructure will make us less safe. There will be a greater temptation for the Russian government to use cyber and other means to disrupt normal life in America for smaller stakes, like getting sanctions lifted or retaliating against the Magnitsky human rights law. Being cooperative in this area will only make America weak, coupled as it will be by mutual distrust between our militaries and the conventional and nuclear balances between us. For a lot of Americans, this whole Russian-intervention scenario may seem far-fetched. And political scientists and former policymakers like myself know not to jump to conclusions based on a few data points, and on the significant questions Trump has refused to answer. It is also possible that the somber professional Cabinet members like Jim Mattis and John Kelly will successfully advocate for U.S. interests, and the Trump circle's evident impulses to accommodate Putin will be effectively countered or moderated. Nonetheless, **there's already plenty to worry about. Nothing like this level of foreign interference in American democracy has even been imagined in modern political history**. So before we even get to interagency debates on Russia, before the president-elect takes the oath, the American people deserve to know what the intelligence community knows about his business history and entanglements with Russians and Russia. The intelligence community, especially the CIA, will be loath to reveal too much lest their sources and methods are compromised. But if our worst fears are realized, Trump has knowingly benefited from Kremlin help, but those means may be jeopardized by the next administration, anyway. His team would be motivated to eliminate means of collection and analysis and of informing others in the executive branch or Congress. As the public and legislators press for more clarity, there are a handful of specific questions they need to focus on: 1) What did Russia do to interfere in U.S. elections? 2) Did any American citizens collude with Russia to assist in the Kremlin’s efforts to interfere in elections? If so how, and were Trump associates, or Trump himself, aware? 3) Have Russians given or loaned Trump and/or his businesses money, or provided collateral or other financial assistance to him? If the answers yield further evidence that the president-elect is indebted to the Russian government or individuals with Kremlin ties, the intelligence community and policy officials should also begin disclosing what they know about whether Trump's associates have been in contact with Russian officials, and what they've been discussing. There are U.S. government officials who know the answers to these questions; the most powerful among them, with the ability to declassify intelligence, will leave when power is transferred to Trump. It is bad enough that Trump has been labeled the biggest "Pinocchio" of all the presidential candidates by the fact-checkers at *The Washington Post*. But it would be far worse if his Geppetto, the man holding his strings, was Vladimir Putin—and if the people who were in a position to warn Americans did not do so.

#### Non-unique – Russia is aggressive now. That’s our Pro scenario and they have no answers

#### Non-unique –w e have lots of military spending now, including nuclear modernization and we pulled out of the AMB treaty and expanded NATO. This is going to happen regardless of an increase in military spending and will freak out the Russians

#### Russia perceives encirclement now

Fyodor Lukyanov is Editor in Chief of Russia in Global Affairs, Chair of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and a Research Professor at the National Research, April 21, 2016, Foreign Affairs, Putin’s Foreign Policy, The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Putins-Foreign-Policy-18133

In the immediate post-9/11 era, the United States was riding high. But in more recent years, the order designed by Washington and its allies in the 1990s has come under severe **strain. The many U.S. failures in the Middle East, the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent recession, mounting economic and political crises in the EU, and the growing power of China made Russia even more reluctant to fit itself into the Western-led international system**. What is more, although the West was experiencing growing difficulties steering its own course, it never lost its desire to expand-pressuring Ukraine, for example, to align itself more closely with the EU even as the union appeared to be on the brink of profound decay. **The Russian leadership came to the conclusion that Western expansionism could be reversed only with an "iron fist," as the Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov put it in 2011.** The February 2014 ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych by pro-Western forces was, in a sense, the final straw for Russia. Moscow's operation in Crimea was a response to the EU's and NATO's persistent eastward expansion during the post-Cold War period. Moscow rejected the further extension of Western influence into the former Soviet space in the most decisive way possible-with the use of military force. Russians had always viewed Crimea as the most humiliating loss of all the territories left outside of Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. **Crimea** has long been a symbol of a post-Soviet unwillingness to fight for Russia's proper status. **The return of the peninsula righted that perceived historical wrong, and Moscow's ongoing involvement in the crisis in Ukraine has made the already remote prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO even more unlikely and has made it impossible to imagine Ukraine joining the EU anytime soon. The Kremlin has clearly concluded that in order to defend its interests close to Russia's borders, it must play globally.** So having drawn a line in Ukraine, Russia decided that the next place to put down the iron fist would be Syria. The Syrian intervention was aimed not only at strengthening Assad's position but also at forcing the United States to deal with Moscow on a more equal footing. Putin's decision to begin pulling Russian forces out of Syria in March did not represent a reversal; rather, it was a sign of the strategy's success. Moscow had demonstrated its military prowess and changed the dynamics of the conflict but had avoided being tied down in a Syrian quagmire. IDENTITY CRISIS There is no doubt that during the past few years, Moscow has achieved some successes in its quest to regain international stature. But it's difficult to say whether these gains will prove lasting. The Kremlin may have outmaneuvered its Western rivals in some ways during the crises in Ukraine and Syria, but it still faces the more difficult long-term challenge of finding a credible role in the new, multipolar environment. In recent years, Russia has shown considerable skill in exploiting the West's missteps, but Moscow's failure to develop a coherent economic strategy threatens the long-term sustainability of its newly restored status. As Moscow has struggled to remedy what it considers to be the unfair outcome of the Cold War, the world has changed dramatically. Relations between Russia and the United States no longer top the international agenda, as they did 30 years ago. Russia's attitude toward the European project is not as important as it was in the past. The EU will likely go through painful transformations in the years to come, but mostly not on account of any actions Moscow does or does not take. Russia has also seen its influence wane on its southern frontier. Historically, Moscow has viewed Central Asia as a chessboard and has seen itself as one of the players in the Great Game for influence. But in recent years, the game has changed. **China** has poured massive amounts of money into its Silk Road Economic Belt infrastructure project and is emerging as the biggest player in the region. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Moscow, but more than anything, it serves as a reminder that Russia has yet to find its place in what the Kremlin refers to as "wider Eurasia." Simply put, **when it comes to its role in the world, Russia is in the throes of an identity crisis. It has neither fully integrated into the liberal order nor built its own viable alternative.** That explains why the Kremlin has in some ways adopted the Soviet model-eschewing the communist ideology, of course, but embracing a direct challenge to the West, not only in Russia's core security areas but far afield, as well. To accompany this shift, the Russian leadership has encouraged the idea that the Soviet disintegration was merely the first step in a long Western campaign to achieve total dominance, which went on to encompass the military interventions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya and the color revolutions in post-Soviet countries-and which will perhaps culminate in a future attempt to pursue regime change in Russia itself. **This deep-rooted view *is based on the conviction that the West not only seeks to continue geo­political expansion* in its classical form but also wants to make everyone do things its way, by persuasion and example when possible, but by force when necessary.**

#### Credible US forward military presence reduces the risk of regional arms races

National Defense Panel, 2014, National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future, William Perry, John Abizaid, Co-Chairs, http://www.usip.org/publications/national-defense-panel-releases-assessment-of-2014-quadrennial-defense-review

*Preservation of reasonable stability in key regions of the world. World War II demonstrated that America cannot isolate itself from con ict overseas that threatens our vital interests and allies. Both our security and pros- perity are enhanced by peace and stability in key regions. This is a fun- damental reason why America has remained actively engaged abroad since World War II. And since America is a military power without peer that has no interest in taking or subjugating other lands, its forward military presence and commitments to allies have greatly lessened the likelihood of arms races and damaging military competitions among* regional rivals. Absent America’s leadership, large parts of the world would likely evolve to dangerous imbalances, particularly in Eurasia, threatening American trade and investment and potentially leading to con icts greatly damaging to the United States.2

#### Russian cooperation needs to be backed by military power

*Barry R. Posen is the Director of the Security Studies Program at MIT,* November 29, 2016, How to think about Russia, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-think-about-russia-18546

Finally, it is of great concern that **Russian elites seem to fetishize the only card they have to play—military power**. **To ensure that they don’t catch the victory disease from their heretofore minor military successes, or misinterpret our cooperative efforts as evidence of weakness, the United States and its friends should always have some military power in reserve even where and when they  are trying to cooperate with Russia**. **Given Russia’s renewed military strength, however, we must understand that our military power can deter**, but probably not compel.

#### Military strength critical to cooperative, respectful relations

[Stephen Sestanovich](https://sipa.columbia.edu/faculty/stephen-sestanovich) is a Columbia University professor who was the State Department’s ambassador at large for the former Soviet Union during the Bill Clinton administration, November 25, 2016, New York Times, The Two Putin Problem, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/opinion/sunday/the-two-putin-problem.html?mtrref=www.cfr.org&assetType=opinion

Both Putins aim to restore respect for Russia as a great power. Yet neither has been able to do so. With other leaders, Russia’s president suffers from a reputation for dishonesty and double-dealing. And all over the world, polls show greater popular confidence in [President Obama](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?inline=nyt-per) than in Mr. Putin. In Europe, the margin is a staggering five to one. Mr. **Trump will need to slow the aggressive momentum of the first Puti**n and play on the anxiety of the second. **There may be room in such a relationship for strongman-to-strongman shows of “respect,” but Mr. Trump must not kid himself. The key to winning Mr. Putin’s respect — and to assuring his restraint — is to leave no doubt about America’s military**, economic and diplomatic **power.** It will surely surprise Mr. Trump to hear it, but the policies he inherits from the Obama administration provide the essential ingredients for such a relationship. **Europe is the critical case.** Russian aggression and confrontation there have not cracked trans-Atlantic unity. Western support has held [Ukraine](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ukraine/index.html?inline=nyt-geo) together and confined separatists to two small enclaves. Sanctions have deepened Russia’s economic downturn. **All NATO members have pledged to increase military spending. And the alliance plans to deploy small military units to new members, creating a needed tripwire against Russian pressure. Only by understanding this** record, rather than disparaging it, **can Mr. Trump achiev**e — and profit from — **chummy personal relations with his Russian counterpart.** Let’s imagine, for example, that the second, anxious Putin decided to accept an outstretched hand from Washington as cover for extricating himself from the stalemate he has created in eastern Ukraine. If so, President Trump would have a shot at reviving the long-blocked “Minsk 2” agreement, which obliges Russia to withdraw while Ukraine allows some form of autonomy for the eastern separatists. Mr. Trump should know the risks of this respect-for-retreat strategy. Once Mr. Putin decides he wants out of eastern Ukraine, he’ll find a way to go ahead with the Minsk 2 deal. But he won’t even consider backtracking if he thinks he can get what he wants for nothing. That’s why the new president must insist on a real solution in Ukraine, not a cosmetic one. Giving Russia relief from sanctions without a complete withdrawal would only make Mr. Trump look like a chump. He would have failed to check the first Putin, and let the second one off the hook. Russian-American relations would face new challenges. They would become less stable, not more. If Mr. Trump plays the two Putins right, he has a chance to move forward on other issues. Russian officials have expressed little interest in new arms control talks. But that was before Russian military spending came under pressure. **Having promised his own buildup, Mr. Trump is in a position to re-engage Mr. Putin on the broad issue of strategic nuclear stability**. (Doing so will have will have the further benefit of making it easier for European governments to maintain Ukraine-related sanctions.)

#### Poor relations are not due to US policy but due to Russian economic decline

Kathryn **Stoner, 11-22**-16, The Atlantic, Cooperation With Russia is Possible, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/trump-putin-russia-election-nato/508496/

But **the relationship clearly broke down upon Putin’s return to the Russian presidency in 2012. What changed was not U.S. policy** (NATO expansion had [ended](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm) in 2009; how could it justify the invasion of Crimea in Ukraine in 2014?), **as much as it was Russian economic and political conditions. With the decline in global energy prices, Russia was no longer prosperous nor politically stable.** It may be that Putin saw the risk to his own legacy, as Russia struggled through the aftermath of the global economic crisis. And so in the fall of 2011, he announced his return to the presidency. **As Russia’s economic crisis deepened, Putin fused his own desire to retain the presidency with his country’s very survival as a nation-state. An internal legitimating narrative—that Russia was under siege from a hedonistic, overly militarized West—took hold. As a result, Russia under Putin is increasingly authoritarian at home and aggressive abroad. But past cooperation between Russia and the United States demonstrates that this is not structural as much as it is a result of the personalization of politics under Putin**. He has eviscerated the political opposition, and hollowed out institutions like the Russian parliament and the courts that might check his grip on the system he has built. The recent arrest of Alexei Ulyukaev**,** Russia’s minister of economic development, on what appear to be politically motivated corruption charges, could signal a further purging of a more liberal wing within Putin’s administration, and a further [consolidation](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/europe/russia-alexei-ulyukayev-detained.html?_r=0) of his personal power.

### Sanctions Good Answers

#### Sanctions didn’t change Russian behavior

Emma Ashford, **Emma Ashford** is a research fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, July 2016, Our Foreign Policy Choices: Rethinking America’s Role, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833971>

. On European issues, in con- trast, the administration made heavy use of sanctions. The targeted sanctions made it difficult for various companies linked to the Russian government or to Kremlin cronies to raise money in international cap- ital markets, to conduct joint ventures with U.S. energy and finance companies, and to access technology used for unconventional drill- ing projects. Yet the sanctions-even in conjunction with the crippling drop in global oil prices-have been largely ineffectual in altering the Kremlin's calculus on Ukraine. Worse, though they were designed to specifically target elites close to Russia's decisionmakers, the burden of sanctions has fallen most heavily on the Russian population. The past two years have in many ways simply confirmed long-standing research on sanctions: they are rarely successful on issues important to the target nation.

#### Sanctions fail

Ian Bremmer, September 2016, Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World, Kindle edition, page number at end off card. Ian Bremmer is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk.. He’s also the President of the Eurasia Group

Unfortunately, as Fidel Castro would be happy to remind us, sanctions sometimes accomplish nothing of value. The United States should have enough experience with sanctions to know where they will never work. Restrictions that spread the pain across an entire population can never undermine North Korea, because North Korea’s leaders don’t care if their people starve, and they need international isolation to keep their grip on power. Even those penalties intended to target the elite, by freezing foreign bank accounts and denying them imported luxury goods, will probably never produce positive results. Efforts to sanction North Korean banks, for example, simply make Unfortunately, as Fidel Castro would be happy to remind us, sanctions sometimes accomplish nothing of value. The United States should have enough experience with sanctions to know where they will never work. Restrictions that spread the pain across an entire population can never undermine North Korea, because North Korea’s leaders don’t care if their people starve, and they need international isolation to keep their grip on power. Even those penalties intended to target the elite, by freezing foreign bank accounts and denying them imported luxury goods, will probably never produce positive results. Efforts to sanction North Korean banks, for example, simply make Bremmer, Ian. Superpower: Three Choices for America's Role in the World (Kindle Locations 1577-1582). Penguin Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

#### Sanctions fail with countries that are threats because the US doesn’t have ties to them

Stephen Walt, Harvard, 2005, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Priimacy, Kindlg edition

Economic sanctions work best against countries where there is a close and potentially long-term economic relationship— because each side has a lot to lose— but these states tend to be close U.S. allies and thus are the states that U.S. leaders are least disposed to punish. Sanctions are more likely to be used against hostile regimes, but such regimes are unlikely to be close economic partners and thus will have less at stake. In other words, economic weapons work best where they are least likely to be employed, and they work least well in the cases where they are most frequently applied. 4 U.S. leaders will also be reluctant to employ sanctions when doing so will hurt U.S. firms, and especially if it will give foreign competitors new market opportunities. Walt, Stephen M.. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U. S. Primacy (Kindle Locations 1689-1694). W. W. Norton & Company. Kindle Edition.

### South China Sea Build-up/Arms Race Bad Answers

#### This is non-unique – it’s happening now. That’s our advantage

#### We need to increase deterrence to prevent it. Extend our scenario

#### Turn – perceptions of declining commitments cause an arms race. That’s our Aff

#### Credible US forward military presence reduces the risk of regional arms races

National Defense Panel, 2014, National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Ensuring a Strong US Defense for the Future, William Perry, John Abizaid, Co-Chairs, http://www.usip.org/publications/national-defense-panel-releases-assessment-of-2014-quadrennial-defense-review

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#### Coercion necessary to challenge China’s threat to the international order

SENATORS McCAIN, REED, CORKER, AND MENENDEZ SEND LETTER ON CHINESE MARITIME STRATEGY, March 19, 2015, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/letter-to-secretary-carter-and-secretary-kerry-on-chinese-maritime-strategy>. DOA: 2-1-16

Like President Obama, we believe China can and should play a constructive role in the region. We also acknowledge that the costs of seeking to shape China's behavior in the maritime commons may affect other elements of our bilateral relationship. But **if China continues to pursue a coercive and escalatory approach to the resolution of maritime disputes, the cost to regional security and prosperity, as well as to American interests, will only grow. For the international community to continue benefiting from the rules-based international order that has brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific region for the last seven decades, the U**nited **S**tates **must work together with like-minded partners and allies to develop and employ a strategy that aims to shape China's coercive peacetime behavior.** There is no doubt that the United States must continue to sustain a military balance in the region that secures our long-standing political and economic interests, upholds our treaty commitments, and safeguards freedom of navigation and commerce. At the same time, **China's deliberate effort to employ non-military methods of coercion to alter the status quo**, both in the South China Sea and East China Sea, **demands a comprehensive response from the United States and our partners**. While administration officials have highlighted various speeches and initiatives as evidence of a broader strategy, **we believe that a formal policy and clearly articulated strategy to address these forms of Chinese coercion are essential**. That is why the National Defense Authorization Act of 2015 includes a requirement for a report on maritime security strategy with an emphasis on the South China Sea and East China Sea. **Specifically, we believe such a strategy should address or consider a number of key items: specific actions the United States can take to slow down or stop China's reclamation activities in the South China Sea; the possible benefits of releasing intelligence more regularly about China's destabilizing behavior**; what forms of security cooperation with China would be inappropriate to continue if land reclamation activities proceed and what forms of engagement might provide incentives for China to alter its behavior; the region's Maritime Domain Awareness needs; how to help regional partners enhance their own capacity; and additional diplomatic engagement with ASEAN countries or others in the international community to support unimpeded access to the Indo-Pacific maritime commons. The United States faces a myriad of international challenges that inevitably compete for our attention and resources. The slow, calculated competition for sovereignty and influence in the Indo-Pacific region is not currently a crisis that garners international headlines. Yet the impact of this competition will likely reverberate for years to come. The Congress stands ready to support a renewed effort to address this challenge. More specifically, we look forward to working with you on the development and implementation of a comprehensive strategy for the maritime commons of the Indo-Pacific region, and to your thoughts on how the Administration and Congress can best work together on these issues.

#### We must protect freedom of navigation under international law in the South China Sea

Daniel Russel, Assistant Secretary Of State For East Asian And Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, May 13, 2015, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/051315_russel_testimonyanddownload=1> DOA: 2-27-16

**For nearly 70 years, the U**nited **S**tates, along with our allies and partners, **has helped to sustain in Asia a maritime regime, based on international law, which has underpinned the region's stability and remarkable economic growth. International law makes clear the legal basis on which states can legitimately assert their rights in the maritime domain or exploit marine re**sources. By promoting order in the seas, **international law has been instrumental in safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all countries regardless of size or military strength**. We have an abiding interest in freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms in the East and South China Seas and around the world.

#### The US needs to strengthen its military presence in the South China Sea in order to deter Chinese aggression, protect its credibility with allies in Asia, and maintain its global leadership

Arthur Herman, National Review, December 21, 2015 , The Spratly Showdown - A plan to keep Beijing from ruling the South China Sea, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/429281/chinas-agression-south-china-seas-spratly-islands> DOA: 2-27-16

Obama-administration officials have been busy patting themselves on the back for what happened on October 27 in the South China Sea. There, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen passed within twelve nautical miles of Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, without incident. China, which claims sovereignty over the reef and is building military facilities on it, claims that crossing that supposed twelve-mile limit violates its territorial waters. The destroyer, accompanied by Navy surveillance aircraft (and shadowed by People's Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, destroyers), was asserting the principle of freedom of navigation through international waters, proving that the U.S. will not be intimidated by China's sovereignty claims. The voyage of the USS Lassen is part of an intensifying war of nerves for control of the Spratly Islands, a collection of reefs, rocks, and islets that have no fewer than six governments (those of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and the Sultanate of Brunei) claiming sovereignty over part or (in China's case) all of them. Recent incidents that have arisen out of these tensions include Chinese ships' water-cannoning and even ramming Vietnamese and Philippine maritime-police and fishing vessels, as well as issuing a warning to a U.S. surveillance plane in May to "go away" after the plane flew too close to the alleged twelve-mile limit. The Navy's recent Lassen mission may be too little too late. Many wonder whether China has not only won the race for sovereignty over key parts of the Spratlys but also secured a base from which to dominate shipping through this vital part of the South China Sea -- through which $5 trillion of commerce passes every year. The Obama administration, as usual, has been playing catch-up. China's increasingly aggressive moves in the South China Sea date back at least to 2010. But it was only this past spring, after news leaked to the New York Times and other media outlets that China was reclaiming land for airstrips on the Spratly atolls under its control -- including Subi Reef, which reporters and others dubbed "China's Great Wall of Sand" -- that the administration finally decided it needed to take action to halt further moves aimed at turning the South China Sea into a Chinese bay. We know the White House came under increasing pressure from both the Navy and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter to do something about the Spratlys, not only to restrain China but also to reassure other countries in the region that Obama's vaunted "pivot to the Pacific" was not just rhetoric. The administration's claim that "the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation . . . and respect for international law in the South China Sea," as then-secretary of state Hillary Clinton told the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 2010, couldn't be taken as just another "red line" non-commitment ‡ la Syria. **Beijing immediately expressed "its strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition" to the USS Lassen's mission, and its response was swift. Its South Sea Fleet ran a naval exercise in the South China Sea the next day.** **It also leaked reports that a PLAN vessel might ram the next U.S. warship to try the same thing**. This is no idle threat; in December 2013, a Chinese patrol craft turned across the bow of the USS Cowpens in waters not far from Subi Reef, nearly causing a collision. It would be easy for Beijing to make a deliberate collision look like an accident, especially if it became a matter of our word against theirs. In short, **China and America are now locked in an international game of chicken in the South China Sea,** with the stakes being who will be the dominant superpower in the Pacific. **The U.S. won't just look weak and ineffective if it doesn't deal forthrightly with China's South China Sea challenge,** and soon. **Such a failure could also presage a major shift in alliances in the region, with repercussions as far away as India and the Horn of Africa**. The existence of competing territorial claims for the Spratlys should come as no surprise. Off their shores are large, deep-water natural-gas and oil reserves. For China, securing control of these islands has become a basic part of its "first island chain" strategy to protect its vulnerable southern coast by sealing off other powers' access to the area, particularly that of the United States. Sovereignty over the Spratlys has been a major source of tension between China and its neighbors since at least 1988, when Beijing and Vietnam fought a sea battle in which 70 Vietnamese sailors died. In 1992, China signed an ASEAN declaration binding signatories to preserving the Spratly status quo, in effect agreeing to disagree over the conflicting claims, but in 1995 it seized a reef from the Philippines on which it set up a military outpost. China has since placed the Spratlys and the nearby Reed Bank under nominal control of a newly created prefecture-level "city," Sansha, off China's coast. No city of Sansha actually exists. But it boasts a mayor, 45 elected deputies in the local legislative congress, and a standing 15-member committee to represent all present and future Chinese residents of not only the Spratly Islands but of all the islands in the South China Sea. China's claim of the Spratlys alone is already hard for its neighbors to swallow, especially when considering that the islands are more than 680 miles from China itself. So to make its point clearer, Beijing began "reclaiming" land on islands and reefs where there had been no land at all before. In all, Chinese engineers have added approximately four square kilometers to the Spratlys, using dredging equipment that scrapes up sand from reefs and shoals and dumps it out as foundations for buildings and particularly for airstrips. Admiral Harry Harris, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, has said publicly that he believes the "great wall of sand" project is aimed at building a series of permanent military bases for the Chinese air force and navy. Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, for example, is now more than eleven times its natural size, and China is completing a 10,000-foot-long runway -- big enough for any military aircraft. It is building a similar runway on Subi Reef. The Chinese have also installed artillery pieces on Fiery Cross (which were either removed or hidden after they were spotted by a U.S. satellite). In short, China isn't just remaking the Spratlys. It's preparing to defend its claims by force. Outraged, other claimants, including the Philippines and Vietnam, have urged the United States to counter China's de facto annexation. But **what stake does the United States have in the Spratlys,** which are nearly 6,000 miles from Hawaii? **The first stake is defending international law and preserving freedom of navigation in the maritime commons, on which America's own livelihood depends. The United States also has a binding defense agreement with Taiwan and formal defense treaties with the Philippines and non-claimant Japan, which worries that what China is getting away with in the Spratlys will be repeated in the East China Sea, where Japan's dispute with Beijing over another scattering of rocks and atolls, the Senkaku Islands, is ongoing.** China's goal is clear: to drive the United States out of Southeast Asia and intimidate other claimants to the Spratlys into obedience. The United States' goal should be just as clear: to keep the islands free for navigation for all nations, including China, and to force Beijing to accept international arbitration on claims to natural resources, including oil and gas. The recent U.S. naval action will look weak if there's no follow-up. It might have looked stronger to begin with: A carrier group led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt would have sent a more forceful signal than a single warship. And the Defense Department's promise that it will also conduct cruises within twelve miles of islands claimed by other states, including the Philippines and Vietnam, borders on the ridiculous, since China is the only claimant disturbing the peace in the South China Sea. Indeed, the Obama Pentagon may have already blown the message. By failing to turn on fire-control sensors during its cruise, for example, the Lassen failed to follow the proper procedures for a genuine "freedom of navigation" operation. Instead, to Chinese observers the voyage looked more like an "innocent passage," which the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea allows, even for military vessels within the sovereign twelve-nautical-mile limit. Far from denying China's claims to sovereignty over the Spratlys, the October 27 trip could be seen as conceding those claims. **This is why regular freedom-of-navigation cruises by Navy warships, and overflights by U.S. fighter jets are now more necessary than ever** -- but they are still only a first step. The next should be a joint flotilla of U.S., Philippine, Vietnamese, Japanese, and Australian vessels sailing inside the supposed twelve-mile limit, in order to make the point that these are international waters. It would also reduce the impression of a specifically U.S.-China showdown. But these responses still will not address the real danger. **If China succeeds in establishing a military presence in this corner of the South China Sea, it will pose a direct strategic threat to U.S. interests**. Even the Obama administration has belatedly acknowledged this. China's South Sea Fleet, headquartered in Zhanjiang; its two new nuclear submarines; its first aircraft carrier, based in Hainan (a large island and China's southernmost province), which could provide air cover for any extended operations around the Spratlys -- all of these developments have added to the danger. Therefore, the United States also should convene an international conference to "demilitarize" the Spratlys. It would argue that demilitarization is necessary to secure free passage for all vessels, including military ones. **If China gets its way in the Spratlys, this will (to paraphrase Winston Churchill) be only the first sip of a bitter cup. China will eventually make similar moves in the East China Sea and step up its efforts to construct a ring of naval bases around the Indian Ocean. (Most recently it announced plans for a new naval base in Djibouti.) Access to some of the most vital sea lanes in the world -- not to mention America's relationships with its allies in the Pacific and beyond -- is at stake.**

#### Delgitimizing the President collapses US global leadership

Gary Hart, December 23, 2016, a former U.S. senator from Colorado, is the U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, National Interest, The National Security Threats You’re Underestimating, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-national-security-threats-youre-underestimating-18834

The most perplexing security challenge for the Trump administration, strangely enough, will be American politics. American leadership in international-security matters rests solely on the credibility of its political leaders. Even before the recent election outcome, some of Hillary Clinton’s opponents made it clear that they intended to deny the legitimacy of her election and leadership. Following Mr. Trump’s unexpected victory, protests [erupted](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/10/not-my-president-thousand-protest-trump-in-rallies-across-the-u-s/?utm_term=.8137ba5e07cb" \t "_blank) throughout the country, many under the banner “Not My President.” This may play well in certain extreme right- and left-wing political circles. But such unrest exacts a huge price on U.S. credibility abroad in all the challenging arenas summarized here, and in others yet to emerge. Political cannibalism at home will severely undercut the authority and credibility of America’s role in the world. It will exacerbate U.S. efforts to manage a range of existing security issues and new ones yet unimagined. This nation cannot descend into ideological self-destruction without seriously undermining its security. It is now time for the dwindling band of statesmen and women to preach this truth across the land.

### “Wait and See” Better

#### LOL. What? The Chinese are salami slicing the South China Sea and engaging in access denial. If we don’t respond they’ll cut off the sea lanes and attack Taiwan, risking nuclear escalation. The Russians are aggressive in Europe and invaded the Ukreine. See?

### Waste/Military Waste/Inefficiency Answers

#### So what? If we spend the money inefficiently, this just means we have to spend more money

#### This is Public Forum – They can’t run a counterplan to cut waste or use it to fund what we support, which means the waste will exist whether or not you vote Pro or Con

#### We have a specific scenario and they don’t have any evidence that spending on a bigger navy or A2/AD denial is a waste of money

#### We can’t solve our readiness problems through waste reductions and reforms

Benjamin Friedman, December 12, 2016, The Intelligencer, Cutting Waste in Defense Spending, http://www.theintelligencer.net/opinion/editorials/2016/12/cutting-waste-in-defense-spending/

A report, authored by McKinsey consultants for the Defense Business Board, a Department of Defense advisory body consisting mostly of corporate executives, estimated that **the Pentagon could save $75-150 billion over five years by becoming more efficient and using the savings to pay for combat forces.** According to the Washington Post, Pentagon officials feared that the report, ambitiously titled *“Transforming DoD’s Business Processes for Revolutionary Change,”* would offer ammunition to those demanding military budget cuts, so they prevented its publication. Of course, it leaked. The report estimates the whopping number of contractors — over a million — that the Pentagon pays, which is news in itself. But it’s not news that there’s excess overhead in the Pentagon. It employs too many generals with too much staff. The civilian-to-military personnel ratio is historically high, and no one is sure what all the contractors are doing. The portion of the budget going to operational and maintenance costs has risen, even as force structure has shrunk, partly *due to increased administrative and managerial support for combat units.* **But the Defense Business Board Report isn’t much help. It says the Pentagon could save $46-$89 billion by** ***“optimizing”*** **contracts, without explaining why they are suboptimal now. It sees another $5-$9 billion in savings from information-technology efficiencies**, though IT efforts at big agencies have a poor track record. Another $23-$53 billion in savings comes from business-process reforms, like *“hybrid business process innovation and agility centers,”* as if the problem was a deficiency in trendy adjectives. **The most concrete recommendation is** ***“labor force optimization”*–reducing civilian and contractor personnel. That’s not a bad idea, but the report doesn’t tell us who the wasteful personnel are**. It settles for banalities, like *“review organizational structure to identify and reduce areas of complexity and redundancy.”* **Budget cutters like to target waste because it means savings without sacrifice. Waste has no lobby or constituency**, so you lose nothing and offend no one in hunting it. But true savings, even the efficiency sort where you do the same missions for less cost, don’t come for nothing. Efficiency savings include closing bases, combining or shuttering combatant commands, cutting a nuclear-weapons delivery system, lowering personnel costs and the like. **Bigger savings require going after the Pentagon’s efficient pursuit of foolish goals — by reducing military missions. With fewer wars to plan and fight, we could have less force structure, build fewer weapons and pay fewer people. That means fighting more than waste.**

**Politics means no defense spending cuts**

Patrick Watson, Maudin Economics, Business Insider, December 29, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-cant-cut-military-spending-2016-12

**The Trump administration will have a hard time changing everything That F-35 program, for instance, is directly responsible for thousands of jobs in virtually every congressional district**. The contractors arranged it that way on purpose. **Canceling the F-35s might be the right move, budget-wise, but it would have serious political side effects.** President Eisenhower was way ahead of his time when he warned about the “military-industrial complex.” He knew from experience how political forces could make defense spending spin out of control. It is truly insane and no one has been able to change it. [Will Trump have better luck?](http://www.mauldineconomics.com/outsidethebox/dalio-on-trump) Maybe, though choosing retired USMC General James Mattis as secretary of defense doesn’t give me confidence. Mattis barely had his uniform off when he took a high-paying board seat with leading defense contractor **General Dynamics (GD)** in 2013. But I could be wrong; some people say Mattis was a good general. Maybe he learned something from that private-sector experience that will help him rein in the contracting beast. I hope so—but I’m not going to bet on it. No, the far better bet is that **defense spending will remain strong and probably growafter** Mattis and Trump take command. They may change priorities, but I can’t see them spending any less. That being the case, I think it is a mistake to interpret those Trump tweets as a sign that defense spending is on a downhill slide. In fact, the opposite is much more likely. **The all-weather sector** It’s true that the US has the world’s largest defense budget, but other countries spend a lot too… and they will have to spend even more if Trump gets the US’s NATO allies to shoulder more of the financial burden. I also bet **Trump will not-so-subtly suggest they buy American products, which will offset any revenue loss from lower Pentagon spending**

### Withdrawal Doesn’t Produce Peace/Reduces Conflict

#### Withdrawal won’t produce peace – withdrawal emboldens aggression

Bradley A. **Thayer**, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, **2006** [“In Defense of Primacy,” *National Interest*, Issue 86, November/December, Available Online via Academic Search Premier]

A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor.

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased. This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly.

# Answers to Common Defensive Arguments

### Answers to: Defense Spending Doesn’t Need to Be Higher than the Cold War

#### Defense is more expensive now, weapons are more expensive

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

Some may understandably ask why U.S. military spending needs to be substantially larger than the Cold-War inflation-adjusted average. Part of the reason is the increased cost of doing business, given trends in the expense of weaponry and in compensation and in operating costs for the Department of Defense. The rest of the reason, in short, is the world today, with its multiple threats, crises, and conflicts. These circumstances require an engaged and strong United States. American military superiority is a good thing for global stability in general, as well as U.S. and allied interests in particular. While not in jeopardy per se, that superiority is under strain and stress. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (pp. 19-20). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

### Answers to: Democratic Peace

#### Democracy not enough to secure peace

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

In regard to the so-called democratic peace, it is true that established, functioning constitutional democracies fight each other much less often, statistically speaking. 12 It is also true that such countries are becoming more common, with about 120 countries, or nearly two-thirds of the nations of the planet, electoral democracies by the turn of the twenty-first century. However, even such countries are not impervious to the possibility of civil war (as the American Civil War showed), or to a possible coup or hijacking by a strongman, who then misrules the state (as Hitler’s hijacking of the Weimar Republic demonstrates), or to other aberrations. The extraordinary popularity of Vladimir Putin in Russia since 2014, even if partly fabricated and engineered by the Kremlin, should alone throw some cold water on any excessive optimism about the hypothesis that the trappings of democracy will automatically produce naturally peaceful nations. Egypt’s extremely turbulent recent history provides another timely reminder. Democratic peace theory may work well for established, inclusive, constitutional democracies based on the liberal principle of the rights and worth of the individual. However, such states are rarer than are electoral democracies in general, and not yet sufficiently widespread for the planet to depend on any particular system of governance to ensure the peace. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (pp. 5-6). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

### Answers to: Peacekeeping Solves

#### UN peacekeeping fails 40% of the time

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

UN peacekeeping operations are prevalent in today’s world, as noted, and are worthy enterprises in most cases. But they still fail perhaps 40 percent of the time; some conflicts are just too deeply rooted, or the world’s collective peacekeeping and conflict resolution capacities are too lacking, to do better than that. This is not an argument against such missions— which do in fact succeed in whole or part some 60 percent of the time. 14 But it should remind us that, as in most things, change is often slow and uneven. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (p. 6). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

### Answers to: Nuclear Deterrence Means No War

#### Nuclear weapons can’t be relied on to deter

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

The notion that nuclear deterrence has created a world in which major powers are less likely to engage in all-out war against each other is probably true. However, nuclear deterrence would seem less dependable in cases where states consider or engage in limited war (which may or may not remain limited once they start) or in situations in which one of them has a disproportionately greater interest than the other in regard to the issue that precipitated the crisis at hand and is therefore willing to risk brinkmanship, in the belief the other side will blink first. Conflicts can also erupt in which renegade local commanders may have their own agendas, or in which command and control systems for nuclear weapons are less than fully dependable. 15 Moreover, the history of nuclear deterrence has not been as easy or as happy as some nostalgically remember it being. There were near misses during the Cold War, with the Berlin and Cuban missile crises. The spread of nuclear capabilities in places such as South Asia and the Middle East increases the odds that the tradition of nuclear nonuse may not survive indefinitely. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (pp. 6-7). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

### Answers to: Globalization Stops War

#### Globalization not enough to stop war

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

Then there is the hope that economic interdependence and globalization will make the idea of warfare so irrational and unappealing as to ensure no major conflict among the great economies of the world. There is indeed some basis for this observation. Alas, **nations historically have proven able to convince themselves that future wars will be short (and victorious), allowing for the creation of narratives about how conflict would not preclude prosperity. Also, joint economic interests among nations have existed for centuries, even as war has continued; international trade and investment were strong just before the outbreak of World War I**, for example. 17 On balance, **it is probably true that major war in today’s world has become less likely as a result of the sum total of nuclear deterrence, the spread of democracies, globalization, and other factors,** including awareness of the destructiveness of modern conventional weaponry as well. 18 **But that provides no grounds for complacency. The overall chances of war could be lower than before and the duration of time between catastrophic wars longer, yet the potential damage from conflict could be so great that war might remain just as much a threat to humankind in the future** as it has been in the past. For example, **even a small-scale nuclear war in a heavily populated part of the planet could wreak untold havoc, and decimate infrastructure that might take years to repair, with huge second-order effects on human well-being for tens of millions of individuals. Biological pathogens far more destructive** than the generally noncontagious varieties that have been known to date could be invented (also superbugs could develop naturally, for example through mutations). And the effects of climate change on a very densely populated globe could have enormous implications for the physical safety and security of tens of millions as well, causing new conflicts or intensifying existing ones. The case for hope about the future course of the world is fairly strong— but it is a case for hope, not a guarantee. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (pp. 7-8). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

#### US military leadership critical to reduce global violence, economic interdependence not enough

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

Then there is the hope that economic interdependence and globalization will make the idea of warfare so irrational and unappealing as to ensure no major conflict among the great economies of the world. There is indeed some basis for this observation. Alas, **nations historically have proven able to convince themselves that future wars will be short (and victorious), allowing for the creation of narratives about how conflict would not preclude prosperity. Also, joint economic interests among nations have existed for centuries, even as war has continued; international trade and investment were strong just before the outbreak of World War I**, for example. 17 On balance, **it is probably true that major war in today’s world has become less likely as a result of the sum total of nuclear deterrence, the spread of democracies, globalization, and other factors,** including awareness of the destructiveness of modern conventional weaponry as well. 18 **But that provides no grounds for complacency. The overall chances of war could be lower than before and the duration of time between catastrophic wars longer, yet the potential damage from conflict could be so great that war might remain just as much a threat to humankind in the future** as it has been in the past. For example, **even a small-scale nuclear war in a heavily populated part of the planet could wreak untold havoc, and decimate infrastructure that might take years to repair, with huge second-order effects on human well-being for tens of millions of individuals. Biological pathogens far more destructive** than the generally noncontagious varieties that have been known to date could be invented (also superbugs could develop naturally, for example through mutations). And the effects of climate change on a very densely populated globe could have enormous implications for the physical safety and security of tens of millions as well, causing new conflicts or intensifying existing ones. The case for hope about the future course of the world is fairly strong— but it is a case for hope, not a guarantee.

And that **hope for a better future is almost surely more credible with a strong U**nited **S**tates. To be sure, there are differences of opinion over how U.S. strategic leadership should be exercised. Some do express concern that specific mistakes in U.S. foreign policy could lead to war. 20 There is also disagreement over whether the concepts of American primacy and exceptionalism are good guides to future U.S. foreign policy. 21 But **there is little reason to believe that a truly multipolar world would be safer than**, or inherently preferable to, **today’s system**, or that a different leader besides the United States would do a better job organizing international cooperative behavior among nations. Today, **the U**nited **S**tates **leads a coalition or loose alliance system of some sixty states that together account for some 70 percent of world military spending** (and a similar fraction of total world GDP). **This is extraordinary in the history of nations**, especially by comparison with most of European history of the last several centuries, when variable power balances and shifting alliances were the norm. Even in the absence of a single, clear threat, the NATO alliance, major bilateral East Asian alliances, major Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf security partnerships, and the Rio Pact have endured. To be sure, **this Western-led system is under stress and challenge. Yet it remains strong—** and at least as appealing to most rising powers as does any alternative political or economic model. **What this long discussion is meant to achieve is an analytical rationale for a U.S. military that remains engaged globally in protecting the so-called commons (international air and sea zones, that is), partnering with allies to enhance their security, deterring great-power conflict, and constraining proliferation** where possible. Ideally**, it would also contribute to urgent humanitarian needs when others cannot provide them alone, such as prevention of genocide** or provision of humanitarian relief. In other words, **it should continue to uphold the international order**, working with allies and employing other elements of national power in the process. Coupled with an economic strategy that has fostered international trade and investment, and a diplomatic strategy that has favored inclusiveness for all nations, such an American foreign policy has since World War II helped facilitate the greatest progress in the well-being of humans in the history of the planet. Correctly applied, **it is** also **the best strategy to prevent the rise of a hostile power and the prospect of a *World War III,* and to minimize the dangers of nuclear proliferation** as well. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (p. 9). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

### Answers to: We Already Spend a Lot

#### Total spending doesn’t matter –we need the key weapons

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

American national defense resources are no longer nearly as great by proportion with the budgets of China and Russia as a decade or two ago. U.S. military spending may well be, as President Obama noted in his 2016 State of the Union address, equal to the next eight highest-spending countries combined. 3 But defense budgets do not always dictate combat outcomes, or ensure effective deterrence. Chinese precision missiles, Russian advanced air defenses, and other such assets— whether operated by Beijing and Moscow or sold to other parties— can cause asymmetric, disproportionate effects. 4 New technologies offer promise for America’s armed forces, but also new ways for adversaries to challenge or hurt the United States— as such, it is important for the Department of Defense to have enough resources to pursue modernization itself, and respond to real or anticipated innovations by others. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (p. 20). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

### Answers to: We Spend 10X What China Does

#### We need military technology to deter, not defeat, China

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

U.S. military spending is indeed large. But it is now only about three to four times that of China, after having been nearly ten times as great at the turn of the century. That may sound like a comfortable advantage. It is not, especially when the correct strategic goal for the United States is not primarily to defeat China in combat but rather to deter combat in the first place, while also operating in many other parts of the world. China, by contrast, has the luxury of being able to concentrate its strategic energies on the western Pacific region alone. And while America’s allies are wealthy and numerous in many cases, they have not kept their military spending levels as high as most had promised, and they have not always spent their resources well.

#### Need to boost defense spending to deter China and stabilize East Asia

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

One principle that should continue to guide the next American president is an innovation that occurred in the first term of the Obama administration, and that received widespread bipartisan support— the notion of a rebalancing of not only American military power, but economic and diplomatic emphasis as well, toward the broader Asia-Pacific region. The case for emphasizing the Asia-Pacific region is powerful. North Korea remains a serious threat, with erratic and bellicose behavior continuing under its new leader, Kim Jong-Un. The country has, as of May 2016, detonated four nuclear weapons and apparently continues to expand its arsenal. China has established itself as a peer to the United States by many economic and manufacturing measures, if not in all areas of high technology (and certainly not in per capita income or international influence broadly defined). It now has the second largest military budget in the world bar none, and by early in the 2020s could be spending half as much on its armed forces as does America— with far fewer geographic zones of responsibility on which to focus its military. Its capital stocks of advanced combat aircraft, advanced submarines, other naval vessels, and ballistic and cruise missiles have grown enormously; the majority of its main platforms in these categories can probably now be defined as relatively modern, and gradually approaching parity with the United States. 1 Moreover, it is again reducing the overall size of its military, and especially its army, to facilitate such improvements in quality. 2 Factoring in everything from aircraft carriers to fifth-generation fighters like the F-22 to its newest attack submarines, the United States still has a major lead over the PLA. Its overall capital stock of modern military equipment is worth nearly ten times that of China. 3 But the overwhelming superiority once enjoyed by the United States is largely gone, and it will be difficult if not impossible to recreate, even with catchy slogans like Air-Sea Battle (until recently) and the “third offset” currently guiding its efforts. It is this context, together with other dynamism in the broader area, that gave rise to the Obama administration’s emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. The military changes associated with the rebalance are not revolutionary, but they are significant— that is, if they are sustained, and if budgetary pressures do not prevent them from being achieved. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s June 2012 speech at the Shangri-La Security Dialogue in Singapore suggested that in coming years, the Pacific would receive the focus of 60 percent of American maritime assets and the broader Atlantic region only 40 percent. As he put it, “And by 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50/ 50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/ 40 split between those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers in this region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.” 4 Four Littoral Combat Ships will be based in Singapore, in fact. The Marine Corps will rotate up to 2,500 Marines at a time in Darwin, Australia. More modest but notable shifts are also occurring in Air Force assets in the region. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated at the 2013 Shangri-La conference that 60 percent of many Air Force assets will also focus on the Asia-Pacific region, though given the nature of Air Force basing, that may be a less consequential change. 5 Missile defenses are being buttressed somewhat, too, with North Korea’s threat providing the main impetus. 6 One needs to be careful in interpreting these changes. In fact, the Pacific Fleet can provide assets to the Persian Gulf, so the 60-40 split does not necessarily mean that 60 percent of U.S. naval assets will deploy exclusively to the Pacific in the years ahead. Air Force assets are even more easily and quickly redeployed than are ships. And in fact, some aspects of the 60-40 Navy apportionment preceded Panetta’s speech by several years, dating back to the George W. Bush administration. 7 But this set of announcements does nonetheless reflect a significant shift. Of course, it is not just how many ships are in the Pacific, but how they are used. The Department of Defense’s freedom of navigation activities in the South China Sea, and the earlier public commitment to treat the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands as being covered by Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, are wise moves (Washington takes no position on the rightful owner of those islands, but since they are currently administered by Tokyo, it has agreed that the islands are covered by the treaty). Were China to continue reclaiming and militarizing islands in the South China Sea, the most logical next response by Washington could be exploration of closer security ties with various states in the region (someday perhaps including new bases). In short, the general policy of patient, quiet firmness is sound. It also requires resources.

#### Army needs to be expanded for potential stabilization missions

Michael O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, 2016, Kindle edition, full cite at end of card

Another broad principle for American defense planning is this: after a number of years of cutbacks, and of falling somewhat out of strategic vogue, the Army should no longer be reduced in size or in the scope and range of its possible missions. And that second point is true for the military as a whole, despite the Obama administration’s hopes that stabilization missions and related operations could be relegated to a much less central role in American defense policy.

After the Army’s long, difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, some critics have argued that the entire notion of attempting to prepare America’s ground forces for such complex missions is a fruitless or even counterproductive exercise. Harking back in some ways to the Army’s attitude of the late 1970s and 1980s, when in the aftermath of the Vietnam War the Army eschewed preparation for counterinsurgency and focused instead on high-end maneuver warfare operations of the type eventually employed in Iraq in both 1991 and 2003, they favor a force with a more limited orientation. 8 Indeed, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance relegated large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns or other stability operations to a far less central place in U.S. force planning (somewhat ironically, after Secretary Rumsfeld had done just the opposite and elevated their importance in 2005, despite much of the GOP’s traditional aversion to what it called nation building). That 2012 Guidance stated, “U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” 9 As the Defense Strategic Guidance makes clear, while this may be an issue first and foremost for the U.S. Army, it actually involves all the services (and indeed, all of government, with especially important roles for the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and the Justice Department— though other agencies such as the Department of Agriculture have a role to play as well). There are problems with this logic, which was repeated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. However adamantly leaders in Washington declare their lack of interest in large-scale land operations, and most specifically in stabilization missions, the enemy gets a vote as well. Put differently, to paraphrase the Bolshevik adage, the United States may not have an interest in stabilization missions, but they may have an interest in us. To depict high-end, decisive-maneuver warfare as the “traditional” U.S. Army or Marine Corps mission, as many do, is to forget the history of American ground forces, which began with an irregular conflict against the British in the Revolutionary War, spent much of the nineteenth century in battles against Native Americans that were far from classic high-end combat, conducted major operations from the Philippines to Cuba and Central America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and engaged in complex missions in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. More generally, the notion that ground combat between or within states ever was typified by gentlemanly or otherwise highly regularized standards and protocols is inconsistent with much if not most of human history, as Max Boot and others have cogently argued. Guerrilla and irregular warfare are the norm more than the exception. It is true that, especially in World War II, and to a degree World War I and after Vietnam, an ethos of decisive battlefield triumph in “traditional” combat missions permeated much American military thinking. 10 But it was not even a continuous reality from the 1910s through the 1990s, as noted. And when oversimplified thinking about future war did carry the day, the nation often went astray into costly and sometimes bloody blunders. 11 The comments of General David Petraeus in a speech at his August 2011 retirement ceremony are worth recalling here: It will be imperative to maintain a force that not only capitalizes on the extraordinary experience and expertise in our ranks today, but also maintains the versatility and flexibility that have been developed over the past decade in particular. Now, please rest assured that I’m not out to give one last boost to the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, or to try to recruit all of you for COINdinista nation. I do believe, however, that we have relearned since 9/ 11 the timeless lesson that we don’t always get to fight the wars for which we are most prepared or most inclined.… Given that reality, we will need to maintain the full-spectrum capability that we have developed over this last decade of conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. 12 The Army’s 2014 Operating Concept, “Win in a Complex World,” reflects a similar perspective, namely, that the current and future Army must be ready to handle a wide range of possible challenges. 13 It accords with Petraeus’s view that the modern soldier must in effect be a “pentathlete,” with skills across a wide range of domains that apply to many possible types of operations. 14 General Raymond Odierno, Army Chief of Staff from 2011 through 2015, also frequently underscored his view that the “velocity of instability” in the world has increased— even as major land wars in the broader Central Command region have declined in scale. In late 2014, for example, the Army participated in named contingency operations on five continents, all at once. It had seven of its ten division headquarters deployed in support of these operations. 15 Beyond their sheer number, what was also striking was the varied character of these missions. As noted, the Bush administration, though initially averse to missions that smacked of nation building, came to understand these realities. Its thinking was reflected, among other places, in the DOD’s Directive 3000.05, issued in 2005, which stated that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission .… They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” 16 It was largely in the aftermath of this change in official doctrine that U.S. forces dramatically improved their battlefield performance in the counterinsurgencies of the 2000s, most notably with the Iraq surge of 2007– 08. Even though there were many frustrations with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military achieved one of the great operational comebacks in its history in Iraq in particular, once it truly took counterinsurgency seriously. Moreover, the difficulties encountered in these wars were largely due to strategic mistakes, including poor civilian guidance on how to stabilize Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s overthrow; wholesale disbanding of the Iraqi army and an overly sweeping purge of Baathists from future Iraqi political life, which gave many Sunnis incentive to rebel; and inattention to the development of viable state institutions in Afghanistan during the period of relative calm there from 2002 through 2006, which might have left Kabul better positioned to fend off the Taliban itself. It is important not to conflate the setbacks in these conflicts with some presumed American incapacity to handle insurgencies effectively. As John Nagl has argued persuasively, counterinsurgency has always been akin to “eating soup with a knife,” and not just for the U.S. military. 17 Counterinsurgency operations are very difficult, slow, costly, and undesirable when a viable alternative approach is available. But they are not a type of mission beyond the reach of U.S. military competence— and they are sometimes not a type of mission that is easily avoidable on strategic grounds. In any event, it is important that future administrations retain the counterinsurgency and stabilization skill sets— not only to conduct such missions with U.S. troops, but to be able to advise others on such operations as well. 18 Indeed, as the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations have realized, these challenges go well beyond DOD to involve much of government and other actors as well. Many of these other capacities are far from adequate. 19 Thus, it is not enough for DOD to retain, and indeed improve further, its capacities for such operations. As the government agency with by far the most resources, it must remain sufficiently focused on these kinds of missions to play a successful prodding role in ensuring that the entirety of the U.S. government— as well as America’s alliances, the UN system, and other actors— improve their capabilities for such operations. We are probably not done with them yet. All that said, there is no denying that there is some inherent tension between broadening the skill set of the future U.S. trooper and preparing him or her for excellence in core skills. If the peacetime Army becomes fixated on a laundry list of superficial preparations for a range of hypothetical missions, the excellence that has characterized the American army at war could be jeopardized. 20 The U.S. Marine Corps creed of “every Marine a rifleman” constitutes a useful reminder of how to prioritize and sequence the education and training of any trooper. 21 So while preparing for a broad set of tasks, the Army and Marine Corps, in particular, need to retain focus and simplicity— they must not become slaves to regulation or to long checklists of preparation for myriad secondary tasks. A modest number of demanding exercises mimicking stability or counterinsurgency or other complex missions is better than a slew of “certifications” for many minor and secondary tasks. O'Hanlon, Michael E.. The $650 Billion Bargain: The Case for Modest Growth in America's Defense Budget (The Marshall Papers) (pp. 30-31). Brookings Institution Press. Kindle Edition.

# Extensions

### Russia Threat

#### A determined Russian assault will wipe out NATO

Lawrence **Kapp, September 2,** Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf

As Obama’s presidency ended, however, there remained two strategic questions the administration had yet to answer. First, were the actions taken actually sufficient to deter an increasingly risk-acceptant Putin and mitigate NATO’s significant local inferiority in the east? As RAND Corporation analysts noted in 2016, NATO was still far from being able to mount a credible defense of the Baltic states, and its forces there would be quickly destroyed by a determined Russian assault.45 M

### General Deterrence/Hegemony

#### Military revitalization is critical to ensure deterrence needed to prevent great power conflict. Diplomacy fails

**Zalmay Khalilzad, a former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense, was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 2017,** National Interest, January-February, America Needs a Bipartisan Foreign Policy. Donald Trump Can Make it Happen. http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/america-needs-bipartisan-foreign-policy-donald-trump-can-18820

DONALD TRUMP won the election after a tough and divisive campaign. While running for president, he did not shy away from questioning some accepted precepts of recent U.S. foreign policy or from making a number of flamboyant policy pronouncements. Consequently, the “morning after” was replete with speculation—and not inconsiderable trepidation in some quarters—about the sort of leadership the world could expect from the forty-fifth American commander in chief. Predictions have covered the gamut. Friends and foes alike are anxiously waiting to see what the new president will do in office, studying what he has said, and preparing their own options and possible responses. **Trump has the opportunity to “think big,”** as he [writes](http://amzn.to/2hFWagL" \t "_blank) in his book The Art of the Dealand elsewhere, and recast American and Republican foreign policy for decades to come. As he does that, he will be constrained by the world as he finds it and by America’s domestic circumstances. Given these limitations, and the core beliefs he explicated during the campaign, **a prudent foreign policy is possible and can find bipartisan support. The opportunity is there.** I hope he seizes it. **THERE’S NO sugarcoating it: the world is in the most dangerous period since the end of the Cold War**. What’s more, **the very structures of the post–World War II international order are in question. There is growing global chaos**, **across multiple regions**. Crises and threats from even remote places today can have international impact. **Major powers, first and foremost Russia and China, are challenging the current rules of the game to advance their agendas and visions**. As a result, for the **first time in decades, there is a real risk of war among the major powers. Russia is taking advantage of power vacuums** created by U.S. retrenchment and using modernized elements of its military power to hammer home the message that the United States and the West cannot solve world problems without Moscow’s assistance. That posture reflects Russia’s deep-seated resentment against the West based on the belief that since the end of the Cold War it has been slighted, its interests ignored, and that it has not been given the international stature and respect it covets. **China**, meanwhile, **is a power clearly on the rise**, self-confident and convinced that time is on its side**. The country’s dramatically increased economic and military power is permitting leaders in Beijing to pursue an ambitious vision,** which they believe they are entitled to because of China’s size, huge population and five-thousand-year history, including long periods of preeminence. Against a backdrop of cultural and historic differences in which China classically did not regard other nations as equal, **Beijing seems intent on working toward a Chinese-led international order,** a vision that is quite different from the liberal international order created by the West after World War II. **These are the motivations behind the maritime territorial grabs in the South China Sea and the efforts for increased influence in Central Asia, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. U.S.-China relations are a key factor** in shaping the future of the international order. **This relationship has the potential for conflict,** because as history indicates, rising powers and status-quo powers often come into military conflict. **Significant changes are underway in several regions**. Asia is becoming a rising center in the global economy, due not just to major economic powers such as China, Japan South Korea, India and Indonesia. The future of Europe, America’s most important partner for so many decades, has become uncertain as it grapples with a trifold crisis: the threat from Russia; the pressure of massive population movements from Africa and the Middle East, with all the ensuing domestic political stressors strengthening support for nationalism and opposition to multiculturalism and globalism; and the widely perceived internal flaws of the European Union that led to Brexit. **Across a significant part of the broader Middle East, state structures have been weakening and even collapsing.** There are several contributing factors, including the failure of governments and the current state system to meet the needs of their peoples, and because of Iran’s disruptive policies to strengthen its influence by supporting substate actors**. A visible consequence is retribalization, the resurgence of alternative identities—sects, ethnicities and tribes.** The national borders devised by Western powers for Iraq and Syria, in particular, are not standing up well to the test of time. These factors, and the absence of national compacts among the major communities of key states, have led to internal instability and civil wars and have fostered conditions for the rise of extremist parties and terrorist groups. **Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan are experiencing various mixtures of civil wars, terrorism and extremism, further fueled by regional-power interference.** Among these, the threat of terrorism is the most important. Iran is supporting extremist political groups and fielding militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond in order to pursue regional hegemony—to which it believes itself entitled because of its size, population, culture and history. Iran’s policies are undermining the state system in the region. As it did after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Tehran is now also using the rollback of ISIS to expand its influence in Iraq and Syria. Rival powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which see Iranian actions as the principal threat to the region, are supporting groups opposed to Tehran. Their relations with the United States suffered during the Obama administration because Washington downplayed the Iranian threat. Pakistan’s support for insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan is an enduring problem. The effort to use assistance as leverage to encourage Islamabad to abandon support for terrorists and Taliban insurgents has not been successful, and Pakistan’s policies have contributed to Afghanistan’s precarious condition and increased Taliban attacks. The consequent disorder has also enabled an increase in ISIS and Al Qaeda’s presence there. **Technological diffusion compounds these threats. Nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile technologies are proliferating**. Hostile powers have developed cyber capabilities that can threaten the critical infrastructure of the United States and other developed countries. States, groups and individuals have used cyber attacks and hacking to meddle in the domestic affairs of states, including the United States. Communication technologies and social media enable political groups to mobilize in real time and allow transnational terrorist networks to operate at little cost, to recruit adherents worldwide and to do so in secrecy. Some retrenchment was to be expected after the George W. Bush era, which had seen almost eight years of war, two regime-change operations and two large simultaneous nation-building projects. Arguably, though, some of President **Obama’s policies overcompensated, creating power vacuums** that were soon filled by hostile powers and negative forces. Obama believed that in the twenty-first century, unlike earlier times, it was less than optimal to use military power to achieve geopolitical goals. He therefore sought to disengage from key regions. He made a great effort to engage adversaries, such as Russia, China and Iran, hoping that reasonable compromises could be found and that diplomacy alone could be a sufficient tool. The results have been mixed. In Syria, for example, his decision to draw, but ultimately not enforce, a “[red line](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2013/09/06/president-obama-and-the-red-line-on-syrias-chemical-weapons/?utm_term=.5f2ce6281e16" \t "_blank)” reverberated around the world and undermined U.S. credibility. Too often, **his emphasis on diplomacy alone was read as a weakness by revisionist powers, and they felt encouraged to press forward with aggressive agendas.** MEANWHILE, INTERNAL discord within the country over foreign policy has clearly increased. The record of the very expensive and protracted conflicts undermined the confidence of the public. Growing economic problems and demographic changes have encouraged a focus on domestic issues. The end of the bipolar world and the complexity of current global challenges have made agreement on priorities and strategies more difficult. Though bitter partisan fights also marked the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, the divisions deepened further over the course of the presidential campaign. The differences between the major candidates were stark. While Donald Trump [called](http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/27/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-speech/" \t "_blank) for “America First” policies, Hillary Clinton supported a globalist agenda involving costly policies that, at times, seemed only loosely linked to American interests. Clinton supported traditional U.S. alliances without question, but Trump felt they should be subjected to rigorous tests of relevance to the current challenges and burden sharing. Clinton denounced Vladimir Putin as an aggressive authoritarian leader, while Trump appeared sympathetic to the notion of seeking areas of cooperation and sensitivity to legitimate Russian interests. Trump advocated more military spending to bolster deterrence, but Clinton was silent on whether her ambitions required larger defense budgets. Clinton sought to downplay the ideological component of the terrorist threat, refusing to relate it to radical Islamism, while Trump highlighted the ideology of terrorists and advocated strict vetting systems for visas and for immigration from countries where terrorists operated. Clinton, historically a supporter of NAFTA and the TPP, hedged on those positions in the campaign, but Trump saw those trade deals as undermining U.S. prosperity. Of course, these differences between the candidates reflected divisions inside the country over issues of foreign policy. One side argues for retrenchment. It contends that countries need to solve their own problems and that Americans gain little and risk much from entanglement abroad. This group includes many supporters of President Obama as well as Republican budget hawks and isolationists. Another school of thought calls for a restoration of American primacy. It argues that Americans, as well as others, depend on the stability and prosperity made possible by U.S. global power and activism. These advocates include the so-called neoconservatives in the Republican Party and many globalists among the Democrats. A discussion of a new foreign policy must take into account the relative U.S. power position. **While the United States remains the world’s strongest power, with unmatched capabilities in the military, economic, technological and intellectual domains, *its advantage over others has eroded****.* The U.S. share of global GDP declined to 20 percent, as fast-growing economies claimed greater shares and U.S. growth lagged. U.S. national debt reached levels, as a percentage of GDP, not seen since immediately after World War II, when debt had funded the war effort. Annual deficits continued to run at $600 billion, and the growth of spending on entitlement programs is escalating. Meanwhile, **budget deals had gutted military spending: force-structure cuts were scheduled to reduce the army to its smallest size since the interwar years. Currently, readiness is at its lowest in decades, and modernization programs are constrained, even as the threat from abroad increases.** The new president won’t have the luxury of easing into these challenges. First of all, it is likely that other powers—both friends and adversaries—will try to test him, to try and take his measure. It will not just be state actors but also terrorists and extremists who will do so. Then too, some of the crises he inherits are urgent and immediate, and must be addressed right away. These include Syria and the war against the Islamic State. To navigate these challenges and crises, President Trump must embrace a strategic perspective­—to determine what his objectives are and how he will pursue them. He must also determine what outcomes are unacceptable to the United States. Such a perspective can help in prioritizing issues and enable him to shape the future. Trump will need domestic support from both the public and Congress. One way for him to restore bipartisanship and unity, goals he clearly stated in his early-morning acceptance speech, is to identify a few issues, based on his commitments in the campaign, where agreement can come more easily. To win broad and lasting support for his foreign policy, **Trump**’s choices must relate to domestic circumstances and include not just elites’ perceptions and preferences but also those of the public. Besides demonstrating from the beginning both the understanding and the readiness to deal with immediate issues, **he will have to focus on the longer term in the following ways.** First, **strengthening the underpinnings of American power** is clearly necessary and has broad support. As other powers have risen economically, the relative standing of the United States has declined. Urgent actions are required to restore the health of the U.S. economy and the strength of the military. The new administration needs to bolster U.S. innovation and technological leadership. Second, **ensuring peace among the great powers**. Among its landmark achievements, U.S. statecraft ended the Cold War without open conflict and maintained peace among the great powers for an impressive seventy years. That took both political skill and military deterrence, as well as soft and hard power to secure national interests and values, while appreciating the legitimate concerns of others and keeping tensions at a level below great-power war. Cooperation among the major powers is important not only to diminish the potential conflict with each other but to containing and decreasing instability around the world. Third, **prevent the domination of key regions by hostile powers**. In the post–Cold War period, American presidents have consistently stated that certain regions—particularly Europe, East Asia and the Greater Middle East—were critically important because of their wealth or resources. Although the balance of U.S. activities among the regions varied over time, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama all recognized the geostrategic importance of these regions. Fourth, the need to **counter extremism and terrorism threatening the United States** is an obvious and shared goal, underscored by the ability of the Islamic State to launch multiple attacks and to inspire homegrown terrorists. This threat has deep roots and is ultimately the product of an internal crisis of Islamic civilization. It will be around for a long time. While Americans may disagree on the means required to counter this threat, the goal of protecting the country from terrorism garners bipartisan support. Fifth, standing up for our values and promoting democracy and good governance selectively where we have confidence we can be effective is an enduring U.S. foreign-policy tradition. This means taking local conditions and America’s ability to shape events into account in order to avoid a situation in which the aftermath of regime change is hijacked by extremists or groups tied to hostile powers. Washington must strike a balance—a middle way between the expensive, risky zeal of universal evangelism resulting from American exceptionalism and multiple, large-scale nation-building exercises, on the one hand, and the passive posture of serving as an example for others to follow or not, on the other. Sometimes small state-building efforts can be a prudent option to address a strategic problem. America should engage with like-minded movements and groups abroad so long as they are truly indigenous and have genuine traction, but understand that it is for them to win their struggles for freedom. While crafting American foreign policy always has involved a tension and balance between U.S. interests and values, a bipartisan path forward needs to prioritize interests and promote values in a realistic and prudent way.

### Answers to: Our Military is Big Enough

#### Calculations that our military is sufficient assume that Russia is no longer a threat to Europe. This is false

Lawrence **Kapp, September 2,** Coordinator Specialist in Military Manpower Policy, et al, September 2, 2016, Congressional Research Services, How Big Should an Army Be? Considerations for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44612.pdf

Second, and more broadly, how would the renewed Russian threat complicate the United States’ global defense calculus? From the start, a key premise of the Asia pivot—and of Obama’s overall defense strategy—was that Europe would remain quiescent, and that Washington could thus continue its post-Cold War drawdown on the continent.47 Yet with that premise now invalidated, it remained unclear how Washington would reconcile the rising demands of European deterrence with the requirements of the Asia pivot and renewed military operations in the Middle East. The Obama administration had wagered that the demands on U.S. military power would become fewer in the post-Iraq context. With that gamble having failed, the country’s military posture was being stressed anew

### Maintenance Costs Pro

*Dr. Dan Goure is a Vice President of the Lexington Institute. He is involved in a wide range of issues as part of the institute’s national security program, “Accepting Risk” in USl national defense is no longer acceptable, http://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/the-buzz/%E2%80%98accepting-risk%E2%80%99-national-defense-no-longer-acceptable-18204*

[Dan Goure](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/dan-goure) [2]

Washington is a city that loves euphemisms. All difficult issues and troublesome subjects are couched in simple, banal terms that decision makers hope the American people will think they understand but that actually mean something different. So “revenue enhancement” is what one says when they really mean increased taxes and fees. “Undocumented immigrants,” a term which sounds as if someone just left their wallet in another pair of pants, is employed to avoid using the word illegal.  How about “violent extremists” to refer to ideologically-driven, organized and armed terrorists?  Then there is the term “misspeaking,” popular among politicians of all stripes wishing to avoid having to admit they out-and-out lied.

The Department of Defense is the master of speaking in code words. In about a minute I came up with the following examples: kinetic operations, collateral damage, enhanced interrogation techniques, overseas contingency operations, effects based operations and green on blue incidents. The worst of the lot is the term “accepting risk.” Accepting risk is a legitimate term taken from the field of risk management to describe a strategy of not spending money to mitigate the effects of low probability events. Since there is always an element of uncertainty with respect to the identity of future adversaries or their propensity to initiate hostilities against the United States, some degree of risk is inevitable in defense planning.

However, the phrase accepting risk has been utilized in recent years to mean something far different. It is increasingly employed by civilian defense officials and uniformed military leaders to characterize their response to the widening gap between what the U.S. military is being asked to do and the capabilities and forces that can be sustained given current defense budgets. Decisions to cut force structure, reduce training activities, defer maintenance on aging platforms and systems, delay or stretch out acquisition programs and shrink R&D activities have real consequences. Logically, it is not possible to do more with less, as the current Defense Secretary once asked of his department. One can really only do less with less. But this is justified by employing that decidedly neutral phrase that we are accepting risk.

With each round of reductions in uniformed personnel, program cancellations or delays and reduced budgets for operations and sustainment, the U.S. military has accepted more risk with respect both to meeting the array of current missions as well as being able to prevail in future war scenarios.  The impact of declining defense budgets, driven since 2013 by the Budget Control Act and the threat of sequestration, is to create a cascading series of negative effects on the military. For example, according to testimony to Congress by the Secretary of the Air Force, [less than half](http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2015/02/25/fewer-than-half-of-combat-squadrons-fully-ready-for-combat/23997409/" \t "_blank) [3] of all Air Force squadrons are combat ready. In addition, the Air Force faces serious shortages of both [pilots and mechanics](http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article94922927.html" \t "_blank) [4]. At the same time, pilot flying hours have fallen dramatically. Finally, the age of the Air Force’s fleets of fighters, bombers and aerial refueling tankers has increased dramatically which results in increased maintenance costs and declining capability overall. Each of the other services can tell similar horror stories.

But the current situation did not come about all at once, as the result of a single decision. Rather, it is the product of a series of relatively small actions taken by the services and the Department of Defense (DoD), designed to address the inadequacy of defense budgets by cutting capabilities and capacity while simultaneously accepting small increases in risk.  Cumulatively, years of accepting risk has resulted in a Joint Force that cannot execute the national military strategy. This is a big risk. Accepting risk became the “death of a thousand cuts” for DoD.

Even when they try to explain what they mean by accepting risk, Pentagon officials and military leaders tend to use language that does not plainly and fully explain the kind of risk. They like to talk about conflicts taking longer to win and costing more.  One military leader who has decided to avoid euphemisms and tell truth to power is Army Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) in September he explained what was truly meant by accepting the risk of asking an Army burdened by aging equipment, inadequate force structure, inferior technology and limited training to fight a war against a peer competitor: “The butcher’s bill is paid in blood, of American soldiers, for unready forces and we have a long history of that.”

Accepting risk allows the White House and DoD to avoid having to make truly painful choices, such as giving up our military presence in a major region of the world and abandoning long standing allies, and the Congress to pretend that we do not have to spend more to maintain an adequate military. In the same hearing at which General Milley and the other service chiefs testified, the SASC chairman, Senator John McCain, [observed](http://www.stripes.com/news/service-chiefs-paint-bleak-picture-ahead-of-defense-budget-1.429196) [5] that “We are lying to ourselves and the American people about the true cost of defending the nation.”

Ironically, the most serious risk the Pentagon has to accept is Congress’s inability to provide normal, stable and adequate funding. The impact of Congressional budget shenanigans, from continuing resolutions to sequestration, is in many ways more dangerous to the well-being of our military than what our foreign adversaries are doing.

The decision to no longer blindly accept risk means, among other things, the reversal of the force structure cuts of the past several years, increased funding for modernization, particularly in the Army and more resources for maintenance, repair and overhaul. It also requires not just the repeal of the Budget Control Act, but a forthright decision by the next Congress and President to spend what is necessary to adequately defend the nation and its global interests. When it comes to accepting risk, it is time for everyone to just say no.

# Offshore Balancing Answers

**Offshore balancing leads to Middle East instability and Chinese counter-balancing that collapses US heg**

**Donnelly – 2005** (Thomas Donnelly, resident fellow in defense and security policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine,” p. 16-17)

No Real Alternative. American strategists, even as they try to preserve the Pax Americana, would do well to contemplate alternative systems of international security; maintaining the U.S. position as global hegemon, however benignly, could ultimately prove beyond our capacity or our will. If that proves the case, then American policy must be trimmed either by limiting our strategic ends, hoping that means other than military power can achieve the same strategic ends, or by crafting alternative strategies. For instance, it is possible the United States will face increasing pressure to choose between addressing the problems of the Islamic world and the military containment of China. It may be that multiple, open-ended, and expansive missions in the greater Middle East gradually diffuse U.S. military power, unbalancing the mix of forces to the point where a response to Chinese provocations would be increasingly difficult. Just as Vietnam diverted and warped American military power in the 1960s and 1970s, so might long-term commitments to Afghanistan, Iraq, or other trouble spots distort the global posture of U.S. forces in the future. Conversely, concentrating too much on China or other firepower-intensive scenarios—the preferred choice of many military and civilian leaders in the Defense Department, who still resist the sort of constabulary missions that have become the steady diet of U.S. forces over the past decade—has already left today’s force structure unbalanced. In either case, sharing power with China or adopting a more realist approach to the greater Middle East would place the liberal and democratic political foundations of the Pax Americana at risk. More illusory is the idea that we can have the international system we prefer, but on the cheap. These are the hopes of the soft power advocates who have dominated the strategic thinking of the Democratic Party since the end of the Cold War and indeed during the late Cold War. A thoroughgoing analysis of soft power is beyond the scope of this paper, but its ability to influence America’s enemies is limited, at best, and is more likely to be read as plain weakness in Beijing or in Osama bin Laden’s inner councils. Any alternative strategies would still have to deal with the fact that the collapse of the traditional order in the Middle East is a pressing problem. U.S. strategists have flirted with a form of limited strategic partnership with China; in theory, Beijing has as much interest as the rest of the industrialized world in defeating al Qaeda and keeping the oil flowing. But in practice, China’s alleged contributions to the global war on terrorism have consisted mostly of a repressive approach to its own Muslim population, a tactic that is more likely to fuel Islamist radicalism than quell it. Furthermore, as discussed above, China’s pursuit of its geostrategic interests in the Islamic world has thus far proved to be more competitive than complementary to American objectives there.

**Offshore balancing fails and results in economic collapse and nuclear wars**

Zalmay **Khalilzad**, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 19**95**

It is possible that in a balance of power system the United States would be in a relatively privileged position as compared to the other great powers. Given the relative distance of the United States from other power centers, it might be able to mimic the former British role of an offshore balancer. As in the nineteenth century, the United States and other great powers would compete and cooperate to avoid hegemony and global wars. Each great power would protect its own specific interests and protect common interests cooperatively. If necessary, the United States would intervene militarily to prevent the emergence of a preponderant power. But there are also several serious problems with this approach. First, there is a real question whether the major powers will behave as they should under the logic of a balance of power framework. For example, would the West European powers respond appropriately to a resurgent Russian threat, or would they behave as the European democracies did in the 1930s? The logic of a balance of power system might well require the United States to support a non-democratic state against a democratic one, or to work with one undesirable state against another. For example, to contain the power of an increasingly powerful Iran, the United States would have to strengthen Iraq. The United States may, however, be politically unable to behave in this fashion. For example, after the Iraqi victory against Iran in 1988, balance of power logic indicated that the United States should strengthen Iran. However, because of ongoing animosity in U.S.Iranian relations, the nature of Iran's regime, and moral concerns, the United States could not implement such a strategy. There are many other examples. To expect such action is therefore probably unrealistic. Second, this system implies that the major industrial democracies will no longer see themselves as allies. Instead, political, and possibly even military, struggle among them will become not only thinkable but legitimate. n5 Each will pursue its own economic interest much more vigorously, thereby weakening such multilateral economic institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the liberal world trading order in general. This would increase the likelihood of **major economic depressions** and dislocations. Third, the United States is likely to face more competition from other major powers in areas of interest to it. For example, other powers might not be willing to grant the United States a sphere of influence in the Americas, but might seek, as Germany did in World War I, to reach anti-U.S. alliances with Latin American nations. Similarly, as noted above, another great power might decide to support a potential hegemon in the Persian Gulf. Finally, and most important, there is no guarantee that the system will succeed in its own terms. Its operation requires subtle calculations and indications of intentions in order to maintain the balance while avoiding war; nations must know how to signal their depth of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible even for the culturally similar and aristocratically governed states of the nineteenth-century European balance of power systems. It will be **infinitely more difficult** when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments of many of the states, influenced by public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the system require. Thus, miscalculations might be made about the state of the balance that could lead to wars that the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance of power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future -- and war among major powers in the nuclear age is likely to be more devastating.

**Offshore balancing causes allied proliferation**

Joseph **Nye**, Former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Foreign Affairs, July 19**95**

A second option would be for the United States to withdraw from its alliances in the region on the grounds that the Cold War is over. This strategy would let normal balance-of-power politics take the place of American leadership. The United States could try to play one state off against others. Some believe that this would be the lowest-cost option for the United States. In practice, however, such an approach would be both costly and destabilizing. The structure of power in East Asia is not a stable balance where the United States could or would want to mechanically adjust its relations between countries. East Asian reactions to the balance-of-power approach would likely lead to a **regional arms race**. Ironically, this would make U.S. participation in the region more costly and more dangerous as the United States had to balance the new and enhanced forces that would be created. And the United States would absorb these costs without the benefit of burden-sharing from Asian allies, which now reduces our costs by over $ 5 billion per year. Moreover, such a strategy would ignore and indeed waste the valuable investments we have made in existing relationships in the region.

#### Offshore balancing in the Middle East created a power vacuum that caused war

Paul Salem, Fall, 2016, The Middle East Journal, Navigating a Turbulent Middle East: Priorities for Our Next President, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634694> Paul Salem is vice president for policy and research at The Middle East Institute, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634694

The Obama Administration rushed to reverse the Bush Administration's overreach, bring troops home, and reprise the offshore balancer role of yore. However, that role presumes a tentative regional balance that can be managed and preserved from offshore; and it also presumes a state-based regional order in which power balancing, deterrence, and cost-benefit calculations are effective. By the time the wave of popular uprisings swept the Middle East in 2011, any tentative regional balance had been shattered by the dramatic de-containment and empowering of Iran after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. There was no regional stability or balance to maintain, and the US attempt to move offshore created a real and perceived regional power vacuum that made the destabilizing regional imbalance worse.

By 2013, the events of the so-called Arab Spring had brought down several states and created conditions for the rise or resurgence of major armed non-state actors from ISIS to Hizbullah, While **offshore** **balancing** presumes a balancing of states, groups like ISIS or alQa'ida, or even Hizbullah for that matter, do not play by the same rules.

#### Offshore balancing fails, means reintervention

Thomas **Fingar,** 20**14**, Finger is an academic at Stanford University, an Asia expert, and a former high-ranking official in the U.S. State Department and intelligence community, similarly believes that China has neither the incentive nor the intention of disrupting the current global system from which it has benefited so greatly. Instead, Fingar asserts that China will seek marginal adjustments to the existing rules and institutions to accommodate its growing stature and interests. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 28). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

Offshore balancing seeks to reduce America’s risks by forswearing security commitments and thus creating freedom of action for U.S. policymakers. However, offshore balancing would require U.S. policymakers to take on a different set of risks and to accept some questionable assumptions. For example, in The Peace of Illusions, Layne is little concerned with the prospect of multisided and destabilizing nuclear and missile races that would surely occur in the wake of a U.S. withdrawal from the region. He asserts, “Great power wars in Eurasia don’t happen often,” a view that dismisses the stabilizing role the United States has played over the past seven decades and that ignores the much greater destructive potential that would reside in the region under the regime he prefers, should another war occur. 29 Layne similarly downplays the consequences to the U.S. economy from a catastrophic war in Asia, setting aside the more than 8 percent of U.S. output that is sold to the region, not to mention the second- and third-order effects to the global economy from a great power conflict in the region. 30 As mentioned earlier, offshore balancing is premised on the possibility that the United States might need to intervene in Eurasia in order to prevent a hegemon from establishing a position that would threaten U.S. interests. Offshore balancing would not only increase the likelihood that the United States would have to return during a conflict to restore stability (because without a U.S. forward presence, the likelihood of major power conflict rises), the strategy ensures that the U.S. would have to do so under very unfavorable circumstances. Offshore balancing is premised on the United States intervening on the losing side during a conflict, if it appears that an undesirable hegemon might triumph. The three times the United States performed this task during the twentieth century (World War I and the European and Pacific sides of Eurasia in World War II), the costs of doing so were very high. In all three cases, U.S. intervention occurred after the potential hegemons had weakened the Allies the U.S. intervened to support and after the potential hegemons had built up their military power and captured forward positions. In these cases, an offshore balancing policy sacrificed an opportunity to prevent conflict in the first place and ensured that subsequent U.S. military campaigns to restore balance from offshore were costly in treasure and blood for U.S. soldiers. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (pp. 45-46). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

#### Empirically, offshore balancing means world war

Thomas **Fingar,** 20**14**, Finger is an academic at Stanford University, an Asia expert, and a former high-ranking official in the U.S. State Department and intelligence community, similarly believes that China has neither the incentive nor the intention of disrupting the current global system from which it has benefited so greatly. Instead, Fingar asserts that China will seek marginal adjustments to the existing rules and institutions to accommodate its growing stature and interests. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 28). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

There are alternatives to this approach, as examined above. Proponents of these alternatives are seeking other strategies that will reduce America’s exposure to risk, cut its security costs, or fashion a diplomatic solution that will avert a clash of interests among the region’s great powers. However, these alternatives to forward presence will not achieve these aims. Offshore balancing aims to reduce America’s exposure to risky entanglements and to reduce the costly burden of forward presence. Proponents claim that this approach will give U.S. policymakers more freedom of action, including the option to reassert U.S. power in Eurasia to prevent the arrival of a hegemon that could threaten U.S. interests. However, this strategy only assures dangerous great-power instability in Eurasia that will very likely result in a costly U.S. return under highly unfavorable circumstances. The U.S. experience with offshore balancing during the first half of the twentieth century was very expensive, with two world wars and the three costly U.S. military campaigns required to restore stability. It is little wonder that no U.S. president since World War II has returned to offshore balancing. Haddick, Robert (2014-09-15). Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific (p. 49). Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.

#### Four reasons offshore balancing fails

Frank G. Hoffman, a member of the FPRI Board of Advisors and a longstanding contributor to Orbis. He currently works at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, Washington DC. This entry reflects Dr. Hoffman's personal views and are not those of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government, July 14, 2016, Eurasia Review, Retreating Ashore: The Flaws of Offshore Balancing -- Analysis

(FPRI) - The current issue of Foreign Affairs contains an article promoting a distinctive U.S. grand strategy, penned by two established scholars, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Harvard's Steve Walt. These academics combine their intellects and advocate a clear alternative to today's strategy of deep engagement and the prevailing, but weakening, consensus on the role of the United States in the world. Their proposal has profound implications for U.S. diplomacy, global influence, and military spending. This is a strategy that directly contradicts the policy inclinations of the presumptive Democratic nominee running in the upcoming U.S. Presidential campaign. But it does reflect elements that have been heard from several other contenders including Mr. Trump.

Their article reminds me of the quip about the Holy Roman Empire: the empire was not very holy and was certainly not Roman in character. Likewise, Mearsheimer and Walt's strategy of **Offshore** **Balancing** (OSB) really does not have anything to do with being "offshore" and it does not balance either. A more accurate appellation would be "Retreat Ashore" or "Come Home and Hope."

**Offshore** **balancing** is a well-recognized strategy advocated by a wide range of academics as an alternative U.S. grand strategy for the United States. However, different advocates use the same term to cover a range of possible strategies for the United States that include outright retrenchment to a detached form of presumed strategic primacy. Mearsheimer and Walt are among the alchemists in the former category. What is common amongst these advocates is a desire to pull back, take less risks, seek far less engagement with the world, and step back from today's allies, partners, and forward bases and a make a sharp shift to the Continental United States.

To its advocates, **Offshore** **Balancing** has three particular virtues that are appealing. First, it would significantly reduce (though not eliminate) the chances that the United States would get involved in another conflict like Iraq. Since America need not control the Middle East on a day-to-day basis with its own forces; it can focus on other priorities while also making sure that no other foreign power establishes hegemonic status in the region. Collecting intelligence and maintaining pre-positioned equipment, however, are okay.

Next, **Offshore** **Balancing** rejects the use of military force to reshape the politics of the region or conduct engagement projects. It avoids what the authors call "social engineering" and avoid meddling in local politics by promoting democracy. Like many libertarians and advocates of retrenchment or Strategic Restraint, this strategy seeks to avoid intensive or frequent entanglements or any international role or effort not directly tied to core U.S. interests.

Third, as the offshore balancer, the United States would be in the position to husband its own resources, and keep its powder dry until absolutely necessary. "By husbanding U.S. strength," Professors Mearsheimer and Walt note, "**offshore** **balancing** would preserve U.S. primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home."

By not seeking hegemony or primacy in global affairs, OSB precludes any extensive forward presence or global police duty. Instead of protecting our own interests in key regions, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that "...the United States should turn to regional forces as the first line of defense, letting them uphold the balance of power in their own neighborhood." This allows the United States to carefully preserve its limited power, attention and resources for critical tasks. Some argue that it shifts burdens from our treasury to that of others--presuming that others are willing and able to step up to that role and do so in a positive way. Both are big assumptions that are worth examining critically. Rather than balancing, their argument is more about avoiding imperial pretensions and encourage more burden sharing. Instead of balancing, it is about shifting risks, costs, and burdens:

Washington would forgo ambitious efforts to remake other societies and concentrate on what really matters: pre­serving U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary.

Another alleged benefit is this strategy is that it sheds burdens on us and forces our allies to take up their own defense investments. The chief benefit of this concept is the presumption that it costs less compared to the current strategy and its large defense expenditures. As one advocate, Texas A&M's Christopher Layne, maintains, "A strategy of preponderance is burdensome, Sisyphean, and profoundly risky." Mearsheimer and Walt agree, "in general, Washington should pass the buck to regional powers."

While **Offshore** **Balancing** claims some historical evidence and some relevant geostrategic advantages as the basis for an American strategy, there are a few distinct disadvantages from a pragmatic perspective. By passing the buck, Mearsheimer and Walt want to have their cake (America's core interests preserved) and eat it too (a smaller and less costly defense establishment).

The authors note that the U.S. represents only 46% of the NATO Alliance's aggregate GDP but that our defense spending "contributes" 75% of NATO's military spending. This is a canard however, as it compares the total US defense establishment as if all these resources were devoted to the defense of NATO countries. Obviously, U.S. defense spending far exceeds the regional-oriented European states. Just as obviously the $535B U.S. defense budget includes resources for homeland defense, military health care, a large American R&D establishment, numerous domestic military bases, and a sizable strategic deterrent. Some of our budget directly supports either our own homeland security or our interests in Asia. But these resources are not directly related to NATO defense and thus the comparison is meaningless. Untested by the pair is the presumption that by withdrawing our forces from Europe and Korea, there will be substantial savings.

Some advocates of this approach would abandon many, if not all, of America's treaties and security obligations. Walt and Mearsheimer are vague on this in their Foreign Affairs article but many advocates explicitly reject NATO or our bilateral Pacific partners as obligations. Dr. Mearsheimer has called for U.S. withdrawal from NATO in the past. No mention is made about other allies or partners, and presumably Israel is also left adrift to care for itself, until it is nearly overrun.

The biggest flaw in their argument involves allied state behavior if this strategy became operative. This approach argues that it exploits the capabilities of regional players in their own neighborhood where they have vital interests in order to preserve stability. Instead of risking resource overstretch by the extensive investment in building up and posturing U.S. military forces around the globe, Japan, South Korea and our NATO allies would be expected to provide more for their own national and regional security commensurate with their interests. These major regional powers would police themselves in their interaction with other powers.

But this assumes that regional powers share our interests and have the will and capacity to stabilize the region. China's actions (and Russia's in the Black Sea or Iran's in the Persian Gulf) suggest that these assumptions are frail. Mearsheimer and Walt fail to consider the possibility that such countries will not take advantage or operate against U.S. allies negatively. Their hope is an illusion belied by the rising level of geopolitical competition of the last several years. Withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific or Europe is not likely to have a stabilizing effect on these region. This produces a very reactive strategy that arguably increases the chances of a war breaking out, for example in Korea or in the South China Sea.

The fourth problem relates to the law of unintended consequences. As Dr. Hal Brands has noted, this version of OSB appears to offer numerous benefits at little risk, but in fact, the risks and liabilities including greater nuclear proliferation, are indeed quite significant.

Critical allies like Japan would face a stark choice having to hedge against a lack of commitment from the United States and would need to appease or negotiate a subservient position to Chinese hegemony. Other scholars have noted this particular fatal flaw in OSB:

In East Asia today, U.S. allies rely on U.S. reassurance to navigate increasingly fraught relationships with a more assertive China precisely because they understand that they will have great trouble balancing Beijing on their own. A significant U.S. retrenchment might therefore tempt these countries to acquiesce to, or bandwagon with, a rising China if they felt that prospects for successful resistance were diminishing as the United States retreated.

A related strategic and operational disadvantage that Mearsheimer and Walt fail to recognize is the presumption that U.S. forces will have the capability to regain access to key regions during crises. **Offshore** **balancing** places our forces back at home, far from future flashpoints. The further one distances U.S. capabilities from its interests in critical regions of the world, the slower and harder it is to make an effective response.

Having abandoned Asia or the Middle East, returning after being absent for some time is not a matter of simply sailing back. Having unburdened ourselves of forward stationed forces and basing, port and airfield infrastructure will be needed to deploy forces at great distances, we should be more realistic about the time and cost involved in generating combat power overseas in the absence of access. Regaining access and bringing forces to bear will be harder and take longer for future U.S. Presidents under such a strategy. Embedded in OSB is the notion that American credibility, commitment and capabilities can be "surged" at will. That's not how the world works. More likely, our perceived detachment would undercut U.S. crisis management actions and our diplomacy. Certainly, it would make U.S. policy actions reactive and belated.

#### We can’t wait for Russia to burn out – it will conquer Europe in the mean time

Daniel Drezner, Pakistan Columnists, June 17, 2016 The curious case of offshore balancing

The overlap is not perfect, however, which leads to the second puzzle: How is **offshore** **balancing** supposed to deal with Russia? That is clearly the country where **offshore** **balancing** deviates the most from the status quo. And although I share Mearsheimer and Walt's scepticism about Russia augmenting its great power status any further, I'm far less sanguine about choosing this particular moment to signal US disengagement from Europe. Russia might not actually be a potential hegemon for all of Europe, but Moscow is sure acting like it thinks it could be.

Offshore balancers tend to think that states that exaggerate their own great power capabilities eventually burn out. That is true in the long run. In the short run, however, matters tend to be far messier, as residents in Ukraine and the Baltics would note. I'm way more comfortable with the role that US deterrence plays in Europe right now than Mearsheimer and Walt. Ideas such as "turning NATO over to Europe" are the kind of moves that lead to severe critiques of academic realism:

#### Offshore balancing won’t solve Russian aggression, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, Middle East instability, or the collapse of democreatization

Daniel Drezner, Pakistan Columnists, June 17, 2016 The curious case of offshore balancing

The last thing that puzzles me is exactly how **offshore** **balancing** would fix the list of ills that Mearsheimer and Walt use to set up their argument for a new grand strategy in the first place. How, exactly, would **offshore** **balancing** stop Russia's annexation of Crimea, nuclear proliferation, turmoil in the Arab world, terrorism or the democratisation recession? I'm pretty sure the answer is that **offshore** **balancing** would fix none of these problems.

### soft power – wrong

**States don’t have feelings – soft power doesn’t work**

**Fan 7** (Ying, Senior Lecturer in Marketing at Brunel Business School, Brunel University in London, “Soft power: Power of attraction or confusion?”, November 14)

The whole concept of soft power — power of attraction — is based on the assumption that there is a link between attractiveness and the ability to influence others in international relations, that is, such a power of attraction does have the ability to shape the preferences of others. This may be the case at the personal or individual level. It is questionable whether attraction power works at the nation level. Wang (2006) identifies two problems. First, a country has many different actors. Some of them like the attraction and others do not. Whether the attraction will lead to the ability to influence the policy of the target country depends on which groups in that country find it attractive (eg the political elite, the general public or a marginal group), and how much control they have on policymaking. For example, soft power by Country A may have positive influence on the political elite but negative influence on the general public in Country B, or vice versa.

Secondly, policy making at the state level is far more complicated than at the personal level; and has different dynamics that emphasise the rational considerations. This leaves little room for emotional elements, thus significantly reducing the effect of soft power. Even Nye (2004a) has to admit, what soft power can influence is not the policy making itself but only the ‘environment for policy’. Soft power may be counterproductive because societies react differently to American culture, the working of which is extremely complex, not least because of the diversity, as Fehrenbach and Poiger point out, in the ‘ processes by which societies adopt, adapt, and reject American culture’ ( Opelz, 2004 ).

### xt wrong

**Soft power doesn’t influence decisionmaking**

**Ogoura 6** (Kazuo, President of the Japan Foundation, “The Limits of Soft Power,” http://www.cgp.org/index.php?option=article&task=default&articleid=341)

One blind spot in the soft power concept is the confusion over the source of this power. For Nye and many others, the power of soft power lies in “attraction.” The problem with this idea, however, is that it views things from the perspective of the party exercising power. Seen from the viewpoint of the party being influenced by the power, the question of whether accepting the power accords with this party’s own interests is likely to be a far more important consideration than the attraction of the power. Here we must keep in mind that sovereign nations in the international community act not on the basis of likes and dislikes but in accordance with their own interests. No matter how attractive a given country may be, other countries will not accept its attractive power if it obstructs their freedom of action or adversely affects their economic interests. Hollywood movies, for instance, are often cited as a source of American soft power, but in France they have been subject to partial restriction precisely because of their attractiveness. The justness and legitimacy of the exercise of power is often an issue in relation to the source of soft power. However, legitimacy is bound to be an issue regardless of whether the power is hard or soft. The fact that hard power is sometimes exercised without legitimacy stems from a peculiar way of thinking about the use of hard power, and this is a great problem. It is important to note that within the international community the exercise of military and nonmilitary power is basically the same—or, rather, it is when the power is military in nature that there is a need for strict legitimacy in its use. (But whereas military power can exert a coercive influence however vague its legitimacy, when the justification for the use of soft power is tenuous this can prompt the party on the receiving end to resist or refuse the power, preventing the party exercising the power from achieving its aims.) The other side of this problem is the need to consider just what the international justification for military action might be. Leaving this issue to one side, though, it is certainly problematic to regard the legitimacy of soft power as the source of its clout.

**Best studies prove no theoretical justification for soft power**

**Brooks and Wohlforth 8** (Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth 8, IR @ Dartmouth, World Out of Balance, p. 158-170)

According to the logic of institutionalist theory, the United States thus now faces very significant constraints on its security policy due to the institutional order: the United States must be strongly cooperative across the board to maintain cooperation in those aspects of the order that it favors. As it turns out, the institutionalist argument for why the United States needs to pursue a highly cooperative approach regarding all parts of the institutional order is premised on a particular view of how reputations work. Institutionalist theory rests on the notion that "states carry a general reputation for cooperativeness that determines their attractiveness as a treaty partner both now and in the future. A defection in connection with any agreement will impose reputation costs that affect all current and future agreements."36 Despite the fact that this conception of a general reputation does a huge amount of work within institutionalist theory, the theory's proponents have so far not provided a theoretical justification for this perspective .17 Rather, they have simply assumed this is how reputation works. In the most detailed theoretical analysis of the role that reputation plays within international institutions to date, Downs and Jones argue that there is no theoretical basis for viewing states as having a "a single reputation for cooperation that characterizes its expected reliability in connection with every agreement to which it is a party."" Downs and Jones maintain that it is more compelling to view states as having multiple, or segmented, reputations: "states develop a number of reputations, often quite different, in connection with different regimes and even with different treaties within the same regime."" In other words, there is reason to think that a state's reputation within the security realm cannot be different from the reputation that it has within the economic realm, or, indeed, that a state cannot have varying reputations within different parts of the security realm. As an illustrative example, Downs and Jones note: The United States has one simple reputation for making good on its financial commitments with workers in the UN Office of the Secretary General and another quite different simple reputation with officials of European states in connection with its financial commitments to NATO. Neither group is much concerned with characterizing the reliability of the United Stales in meeting its financial commitments in general. Those inside the Office of the Secretary General are aware of the fact that the United States has paid its NATO bills, and NATO workers know that the United States is behind on its UN dues. However, they design their policies in response to the behavior of the United States in the subset of contexts that is relevant to them.43

**Soft power is ineffective and depends entirely on hard power**

**Liaropoulos 10** (Andrew, Senior Analyst in the Research Institute for European and American Studies; lecturer in University of Piraeus, Department of International and European studies; also teaches in the Joint Staff War College, the National Security College, the Air War College and the Naval Staff Command College; Masters in Intelligence & Strategic Studies and PhD, “Being Hard on Soft Power,” no date given but must be written in 2010 or 2011 because he cites references published in 2010, http://www.rieas.gr/research-areas/global-issues/transatlantic-studies/1519-being-hard-on-soft-power-.html)

Soft power has been highly criticized as being a rather ineffective and vague concept. Neorealist scholars place emphasis on hard power, meaning economic and military power and downgrade the role of culture and values in shaping events. Critics argue that soft power is just a reflection of hard power. States are able to exercise soft power, only through their hard power. Only states with a capable military, economic power and industrial strength can claim to exercise soft power effectively. Another point of criticism is that it is difficult to measure power in general and soft power in particular. By its very nature, soft power is a relative and intangible concept, that is inherently difficult to quantify. Quantitative metrics can be used to measure elements of hard power like population, defence expenditure, military assets, gross domestic products and the effects of economic sanctions, but it is tricky to meaure influence, reputation and cultural power. The lack of a clear conceptual framework on soft power is evident when the latter is translated into public diplomacy and strategic communication. The way soft power campaigns are conducted depends on the nature of the state that exercises soft power, the type of message that is transmitted and the nature of the target. Recent cases of soft power operations highlight the fact that successful application of soft power is rather limited. In Iraq, the United States were unable to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. The vast majority of the polulation was against the U.S military occupation and this had a profound effect in the duration and intensity of the counterinsurgency campaign. The Coalition Forces failed to communicate their message successfully. The reasons for this failure lay in the nature of both the messenger (U.S / Coalition Forces) and the target (Iraqis). The U.S in general lacked credibility in the Arab World and the Iraqis were very skeptical of Washington’s intention. The U.S lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi populace and in certain cases even lost the trust of some of their allies. After years of totalitarianism Iraqis were ill-equipped to value the credibility of information and it was difficult for the Coalition Forces to counter misinformation in a society that is not culturally receptive to such messages. In addition, the U.S information campaign had to compete with a rather sophisticated information campaign that took place both inside and outside Iraq. The insurgents were able to mobilize part of the population and provide a credible anti-American rhetoric. Furthermore, the Iraqi populace was for the first time exposed to alternative sources of information. In the post-invasion era, the Iraqis had access to satellite television and foreign news services and as a result, part of the population was alienated and hostile to U.S forces. The occupation clashed the interest of the Iraqi population that wanted to regain control of their country and viewed the U.S forces as an imperial power that invaded in order to exploit their natural resources. The case of Iraq, vividly demonstrates the limitations of soft power. A serious constraint is that no state, no matter how powerful, can control the information sphere. The U.S did not have the monopoly on communication and therefore was unable to shape the battlefield of perception in a close society like Iraq. Responding to misinformation, refuting conspiracy theories, filling information vacuums and building credibility is not an easy task, even for a hegemon.